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This thesis is a case study in the political economy of urbaniz- 
ation and urban life in the Sudan. It is both a historical study and 
"community study" of the town of Hassaheisa in the Gezira Province. The 
central themes derive from a concern with the nature and determinants 
of the 'underdevelopment' rather than the 'development' of urbanizat- 
ion. The study focuses on the process of commercial capital accumulat- 
ion as a major and central aspect of the history of the town's growth 
and existence. Commercial capital accumulation is identified as a spec 
ific process which is dependent upon, and subordinate to, the wider 
processes of colonial and neo-colonial capitalist accumulation. 
The study dwells on the major features of trade in Hassaheisa a: 
it has developed since the establi.. hment of the town by the British col 
onial administration. Among the most prominent and fundamental feature 
of trade and commerce are the fact that the rate of commercial capital 
accumulation has always been low; the main reason for this is that ac( 
umulation has taken place under conditions constrained and restricted 
by government's policies formulated to allow 'development' to fit in 
with the demands and needs of the world market. 
The social, economic, and political behaviours of the town's 
merchants (who constitute the dominant and central group in the comm- 
unity) are analysed primarily as "responses" to the above constraints 
and restrictions. The nature of various aspects of the town, and the 
ideological framework of daily life within it, are explained as funct 
ions of the need of merchants to maximize their commercial opportunit 
ies. The antagonistic contradictions between the interests of the mer 
chants and those of the "ordinary residents" are thus central topics 
2 
of investigation and analysis in the study. It dwells in particular 
on: 
(a) The way in which 'tribalism' is created and manipulated by 
the dominant groups to blur and distort contradictions and 
differences of interests and, 
(b) on various aspects of local life that bear upon opportunities 
for maintaining control over the institutions of political 
dominance as vehicles for capital accumulation and instru- 
ments for the control and management of the resultant contra- 
dictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 
INTRODUCTION: 
This thesis is in one sense a general historical and "com- 
munity" study of the town of Hassaheisa in the Gezira Province 
of the Sudan; but, a little more specifically, iL is a case study 
in the poZiticaZ economy of urbanization and urban life in the 
Sudan. 
The particular conceptual and theoretical themes and prob- 
lems tackled are first indicated in Section III of this chapter, 
and are then developed throughout the thesis. Before even beginn- 
ing to elaborate on the theoretical thrust of the work, however, 
I devote sections I and II of this introduction to a brief acco- 
unt of the "natural history" of the study and my reasons, both 
practical and conceptual, for selecting Hassaheisa as the site 
for my investigations. Considerations of feasibility, accessib- 
ility, personal interest, and the like, can become crucial der- 
erminanzs of the form a study ultimately takes. The reader is 
not only entitled to know how a study developed; he or she must 
know if the analysis is to be properly assessed. 
By the same token- and this rarely needs to be laboured- 
the reader needs to know the methods and procedures actually used 
in collecting and analysing the data. In sections IV and V, foll- 
owing my initial statement of the conceptual and theoretical pro- 
blems of the thesis, I therefore give brief accounts of the 
choice and application of the methods used in the field and in 
the subsequent analysis and organization of the data. 
I. THE "NATURAL HISTORY" OF THE STUDY: 
After graduating from the Department of Sociology and Soc- 
ial Anthropology at Khartoum University in 1977,1 was appointed 
to a teaching assistantship there. In keeping with the general 
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practice in Khartoum University I at once began to turn my mind 
to the choice of an appropriate field of research. Throughout 
my undergraduate course, I had been particularly interested, Lnten 
aLLa, in "urban studies". From the start I was thus inclined to 
consider taking. some urban research. But 1 had reservations owing 
to two sets of difficulties which had hitherto inhibited the dev- 
elopment of graduate research in this field. These difficulties 
were: 
(1) Inadequate academic resources at two levels: the scarcity 
and the generally poor quality of basic urban data in the 
Sudan, and uncertain availability of adequate academic sup- 
ervision in this field. 
(2) The -general inadequacy of financial resources for urban res- 
earch in the Sudan, combined with the fact that the Univer- 
sity's funds for graduate research in general are scarce. 
Urban research can be expensive, especially if it is thought 
necessary to conduct large-scale surveys in the field. More- 
over, daily life in Sudanese towns is often difficult: apart 
from the expenses involved, which are far higher than in 
rural areas, one commonly has to risk the waste of "prec- 
ioug'time waiting in endless queues for basic necessities. 
This combination of difficulties caused me to hesitate in 
choosing urban sociology and/or anthropology as my field. 
' Yet 
I was loath to launch into research in another academic field in 
which I did not have the same interest and which might therefore 
have involved some loss of motivation and inner intellectual re- 
source. But at the very period I was _ý-o-n"dering this dilemma, I 
received the following note from the Head of the Department. of 
Sociology and Social Anthropology at Khartoum University: 
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Subsequent to a request from the Director of the 
Economic and Social Research Council, (Sudan), 
Professor Valdo Pons of Hull University, who was 
in March and April 1977 Visiting Professor to the 
Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, 
Khartoum University, has prepared long-term prop- 
osals for sociological research into urbanization 
and social change in the Sudan. In these proposals, 
Professor Pons has stressed the need for uban rese- 
arch in the country, outlined specific recommendat- 
ions for immediate research plans, and suggested 
timetable of work. (... ) The first phase of the pro- 
posals is to carry out census-type surveys in selected 
towns and urban areas in the Sudan in order to gather 
basic information on their socio-economic and demogra- 
phio composition. Such basic data should allow for 
comprehensive analysis not only between different urb- 
an areas in the Sudan, but also between Sudanese and 
non-Sudanese towns. Finally these surveys should be 
seen as preparatory for a second phase of studies-i. e. 
intensive "community studies" of the selected towns. 
Four towns for the proposed census-type surveys will 
be selected from among the following: Greater Khartoum, 
Nayala, Gadarif, Dilling, Malakal, Port Sudan, Hassah- 
eisa, Kosti, Sennar, and Atbara. 2 
To this "note" was attached a memorandum from the Director 
of the Economic and Social Research Council in Khartoum to all 
post-graduates who might be interested in participating in the 
proposed studies, stating that the Council would offer material 
facilities including field work expenses for the programme. 
These were fortunate and timely developments for me, and 
they were further enhanced by a firm undertaking from the Faculty 
of Economic and Social Studies to release me, if successful in 
my application, from all teaching duties in order to allow me 
to undertake my graduate training in the Department of Sociology 
and Social Anthropology at the University of Hull. My application 
was successful and I was consequently involved in the overall 
project with three colleagues. Each of us chose to study one of 
the ten towns identified above, those selected being Nayala, 
Hassaheisa, Kosti, and Sennar. 
In the Summer of 1978, the Economic and Social Research 
Council financed a brief initial tour of several towns for three 
4 
of the research workers who were accompanied by Professor Pons. 
We visited Hassaheisa (3 days), Wad-Medani (2 days), Sennar 
(3 days), and Kosti (3 days). We set out to establish contacts 
in each town, to exchange views and opinions on a number of 
obvious or "surface" problems, and we discussed, as we observed, 
what we thought the practical problems of both survey and more 
intensive field work might be. This tour was useful in a number 
of ways. In addition to simply stimulating general discussion 
on various issues of the sociology of urbanization and urban 
life in towns of this type, it gave each of us a chance- to some 
extent the first ever- to see and set out to "know" a few Sudan- 
ese towns. In my own case, I had up till then only been to three 
of the ten towns selected as "targets" in the proposals: Khartoum 
(where I went to University), Hassaheisa (the town to my own 
home village), and Kosti (which I visited on a school trip in 
1970). I deliberately include a few personal points of this kind 
in my account of the "natural history" of this thesis because 
they are, I believe, directly relevant to an appreciation of 
how research is conducted and the nature of questions asked in 
field studies. 
Following on our return to Khartoum from the mini-tour, 
the participants in the proposed studies held a series of furth- 
er discussions. Some of these meetings were attended by the Head 
of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology who ass- 
umed the directorship of the project. Drawing on our first-hand 
impressions of the towns to be studied, and also on available 
questionnaires from past "model" studies, we drew up a general 
census-type socio-demographic questionnaire intended for use in 
all the separate studies. 
5 
In May 1978 I departed for Hassaheisa where I spent a 
month making accommodation arrangements, enquiring into the 
official facilities available for study, and evaluating the 
problems involved in planning the census-type survey, including 
the selection of an appropriate sample. I then returned to Khar- 
toum for further consultations about the work, and Ibrought back 
the questionnaire forms for the survey in June 1978. 
The following month was spent in recruiting and training 
a team of eight secondary school and university students as 
field assisstants. After two weeks, we began to apply the quest- 
ionnaire to a pilot sample for a week. The fourth week was spent 
evaluating the returns from the pilot sample and discussing pro- 
blems arising from it with the Head Department of Sociology and 
Social Anthropology who visited me at that time in his capacity 
of director of the "project". The main survey was then conducted 
as decribed in Section IV over a period of seven weeks, and two 
additional weeks were spent in conducting another survey on a 
sample of Suk3 merchants. The scope and design of this second 
survey were developed and formulated on the basis of my exper- 
ience in the field and for particular research interests expl- 
ained in Section IV. During these periods of survey I also began 
to keep notes on my general observations and on written materials 
I encountered on various aspects of the community of Hassaheisa. 
At the end of September 1978 1 left the Sudan to spend a 
period of nine months at Hull University. During this time I 
concentrated on the following: 
1. Reading in the field of urban studies, especially studies 
that were not available in Khartoum. 
2. Participating in the Department's weekly post-graduate 
6 
workshop from which I received general stimulation as 
well as clarification on research issues closely related 
to my own work; and attending selected formal courses, 
and primarily a course on methodoZogy in social res- 
earch. 
3. Using the Computer to process some of my survey data, esp- 
ecially those on the SuJ. 
4. Discussing plans for work with my supervisor and other 
members of the staff at regular meetings. 
5. Writing a preliminary analysis of the data then at my dis- 
posal, which I first used simply to "define" aspects of 
the Hassaheisa situation. Some of these data were later 
published4, but the greater parts are used in this thesis. 
6. Discussing the main issues and problems (including research 
methods) which I progressively defined as central for my 
second and main period of field work. 
I returned to Hassaheisa in July 1979 and stayed there up 
to November 1980. During this period I also made several trips 
to Khartoum University to use the Library's Sudan Collection, 
and to Wad Medani to work on the Gezira Archives at Barakat. In 
Hassaheisa itself I conducted intensive field work- through int- 
erviews with informants and "subjects" and through participant 
and non-participant-observation on various aspects of life in 
the town. In particular, as will be seen from the materials used, 
I tried to identify and to follow through in detail exzmpZes of 
certain aspects of political and economic processes in the town. 
I attempted, and I believe that I succeeded to some extent, to 
observe and capture selected features of what Pons calls the 
"texture of urban life"5 in Hassaheisa, both past and present. 
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11, WHY HASSAHEISA? 
As is commonly the case in choosing a particular town or 
community for studies of this kind, my choice of Hassaheisa was 
made with a number of reasons in. mind and these are in different 
ways all relevant to full understanding of the study and the 
way in which I conducted it. The inclusion of Hassaheisa in the 
list of towns suggested for study in the original proposals sub- 
mitred to the Economic and Social Research Council played some 
part. But there were further more important reasons: 
(1) Firstly, there are reasons and justifications related to the 
need to establish a sound and adequate conceptual framework and 
appropriate theoretical perspective for research into the pro- 
cess of urbanization in "modern" Sudan. These justifications 
can be summarized in the following: 
(a) Having been much influenced as an undergraduate by polem- 
ical discussions- deriving from the classical texts on 
'urban sociology' and 'urban anthropology'- on the nature 
of urbanization, I was most concerned with the problematic 
of urbanization as both a cause and a consequence of 
wider socio-economic and political structural develop- 
ments. And being particularly 'familiar' with studies 
of African urbanization under colonial conditions, I was 
deeply interested in investigating a case which might 
shed light on the relationship between urbanization and col- 
onisation in a situation Zeast affected or distorted 
by 
conditions of earlier and different historical periods. 
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Hassaheisa is an urban area established and developed 
entirely during-and since the British colonial period and 
thus provides a "pure" and ideal case for approaching 
8 
a central question about the nature of contemporary urb- 
anization in the Sudan. 
(b) Closely related to the above, I was most interested in 
establishing a proper theoretical perception of a town 
which exercises dominant social, economic and political 
power over its surrounding countryside. I grew up in 
this area8, and ever since becoming aware of social life 
around me, I knew that "the people" of Hassaheisa were 
"different"; they are urbanized and/or civilized 
'0, better 
housed, and better served than the people of my village 
in the countryside. They have electricity'0, a cinema, 
secondary schools and, above all, they have the SuI where 
"there is everything" and "everything is there". When my 
father (a tenant in the Gezira Scheme) sold his crops (in 
the production of which I used to contribute manuaZZy since 
the age of seven years), he used to bring back from Hass- 
aheisa the goods we always admired: clothes, shoes, and- 
to my delight as a boy- various fresh fruits. It was from 
such immediate experiences of childhood and youth, that 
my image of Hassaheisa was formulated, and particularly 
that I came to regard its people as "special" and diff- 
erent. 
11 All this was reinforced when I paid occasional 
visits to the Suh.; "the people" sitting behind the ben- 
ches inside their shops were apparently contented with 
life about them. Also, in contrast to "my people" in the 
village, they spoke about different things such as At- 
baUUad ( home), At-baUUah (dazes), and so on12, and, 
significantly, in a different accent. Yet they, or some 
of them, were the "ruling" Council which governed the 
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whole district, and they included the local government 
Officer whom we used to see in our village, surrounded 
by policemen, collecting Gutta'an (animal tax) and A'. tab 
(house tax). This officer was "one of them", living in 
Hassaheisa with "them" and he behaved quite "cordially" 
with them in contrast to his "tough" behaviour in the 
village when collecting taxes. With this image in my 
mind, any study of Hassaheisa thus seemed to me to call 
for theoretical clarification of the nature of this town 
and of how it came to be superior to, and to dominate my 
"village", 
(2) Secondly, there were reasons of a different practical order 
for my choice of Hassaheisa. In various ways, it seemed more 
feasible for me to study this rather than any other town in the 
Sudan: 
(a) Given the increasing difficulties of daily life in the 
urban areas of the Sudan, the location of Hassaheisa only 
20 kilometres from my home village clearly held our the 
attraction that I could 'escape' home to take refuge from 
difficulties in the town. For example, as I explain in 
Chapter 4, it is often the case that some of the basic 
consumer goods are found in nearby villages, albeit at 
a higher price, while there is an acute shortage of them 
in the town. Also, I was attracted by the possibility of 
not having to face problems of accommodation and the 
soaring rents in the town. As it subsequently turned our, 
my limited funds virtually compelled me not to live reg- 
ularly in the town and to commute daily from my village 
home where I had "free" accommodation with my parents. 
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(b) Over time, and especially in recent years, I had come 
to know, and had cultivated cordial relations with, a 
relatively large number of different people at various 
levels in the town: in the Suk as a customer, in the Coun- 
cil as a subject citizen , in the Ginneries as a workmate 
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and in the residential neighbourhoods as a friend a coZZ- 
eague, and even as a relative. I thus envisaged being 
able to use these established relations in the pursuit 
of my research. A "net-work" of aids is virtually indis- 
pensable for adequate fieldwork, especially in a country 
like the Sudan where a researcher's daily problems are 
not only to penetrate the complex and formidable barriers 
created through rigid official adherence to bureaucratic 
procedures (particularly when it comes to "research"), but 
also with "the people" themselves. Ordinary people usually 
tend to suspect the motives of research workers, to query 
their identities 
14, 
and either not to see or to pretend 
not to see, the relevance of the research to their "act- 
ual problems". 
(c) As an ordinary resident of the district, and of the town 
at different times and under different circumstances, I 
had previously acquired a good deal of knowledge about 
the area. 
15 It therefore seemed sensible and useful for 
me to exploit the information I already had. I hoped 
that this would sometimes enable me- as in fact it often 
did- to see , understand, and explain various 
immediate 
events and occurrences with reference to dimensions (his- 
torical or situational) not immediately apparent in the 
situation, yet without recourse to time-consuming special 
investigations. 
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(d) Finally, with a population estimated at the time of study 
at 30,000, Hassaheisa was conveniently small and "Manage- 
abZeýý for a detailed study. I thought that intensive obs- 
ervations of the kind I wished to undertake would be eas- 
ier to plan and carry out in a town of this size than in 
a larger one. 
III, THE FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH "PROBLEM": 
More than ten years ago, Sondra and Gerry Hale complained 
about the state of urban studies in the Sudan in the following 
terms: 
one of the primary problems in a country ... where so little research has been undertaken in urban areas, is 
that scholars do not resist the temptation to 'pick a 
town' and then proceed to handle as many of the above 
categories (demographic, economic, ecological, normative, 
interactional, historical, and political.. -the author) 
as possible. The field is so pristine that 'mere des- 
cription' and the history of towns are considered val- 
uable contributions. Urban studies of the Sudan are, 
for the most part, just beginning to be problem-oriented, 
but there are not yet enough published data to contrib- 
ute to the formation of important new paradigms, hypoth- 
eses, concepts, or t. heories". 16 
More recently, Pons has expressed the view that consider- 
able progress has been made since the time of the Hale's comp- 
laint about the absence of "problem-oriented" studies and that 
we are now in a position to enter a new phase. And he clearly 
implies that in this phase, research could profitably be motiv- 
aced from the "inside", rather than stimulated from "the out- 
side": 
Urban research will no doubt develop its own course 
as students select particular problems for study acc- 
ording to their own ideas of economic, cultural, pol- 
itical, and social relevance... (thus) I do not argue 
for formal programmes of research dictated by any one 
major consideration, and would not recommend research 
on one specific subject or topic rather than another. 17 
`ý 
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The two opinions cited clearly carry rather divergent 
signals for a research worker setting out to formulate a ''pro- 
blem" for fresh work. While agreeing with the Hales that much 
early Sudanese urban research was "mere description" which yiel- 
ded little to urban theory, I share the optimistic and positive 
appreciation which Pons makes about the present and possible 
future course in this field. While the Hales in effect attempt 
to direct the attention of students to particular problem areas 
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Pons argues for the full freedom of the research worker in the 
Sudan to select and develop problem areas in accordance with 
their own ideas of relevance. I may state openly that I prefer 
the latter approach, partly because it offers the kind of freedom 
I personally like, but also because it places the responsibility 
of problem selection, and by extension of the ultimate evaluat- 
ion of the data gathered, squarely on the shoulders of the res- 
earch worker himself or herself rather than on the "institutions" 
which plan and finance any research programme. The position adv- 
ocated by Pons encourages the exc7knge of ideas and perspectives 
and thus gives legitimacy to different approaches and independ- 
ent analyses; in effect, it invites research workers to bring 
differing sets of assumptions to the study of problems which are 
clearly academic, but also, inevitably, poZiticaZ as all socio- 
logy is. This is particularly important in a situation such as 
that of the present Sudan where traditions, the colonial herit- 
age, and political considerations all combine to impose and leg- 
itimise a prevailing state of singleness in all social spheres. 
Exercising my natural 'right' to select my own problem 
for research, I first considered questions such as: What kind 
of "urban problem"? Is it to be a problem situated in the urban 
area, or a general sociological problem studied in 
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the urban area? If the former, then another question follows: 
Whose problem? if we accept space as determining the problem, how 
do we approach the study from a relative perspective? -i. e. the 
relation of the problem to different groups in that space. On 
the other hand, if we wish to study a sociological problem in 
the urban area, what is the peculiar characteristic of the area 
which renders the theoretical problem more illuminating than else- 
where? Bearing in mind such broad general questions, I planned 
my research Eo respond to, or to satisfy, the following: 
(a) A concern to contribute to a clarification as to why the 
conceptual and theoretical bases of the dominant convent- 
ional literature on urban sociology and anthropology, par- 
ticularly structuralist and functionalist versions, have 
led to so much disillusionment and frustration. 
(b) A concern to do more than to produce a study likely to 
become, at best, an adjunct to social engineering. 
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In 
my view, many urban research workers run the risk of be- 
ing transformed into tools in the hands of the dominant 
ruling groups in the society, and in this way may lose 
their independence and credibility and fail to introd- 
uce any new perspectives to the debate on the so-called 
"urban problem". 
(c) As a member or 'citizen' of an underdeveloped society, 
"underdevelopment" is for me not only an observation but 
also personaZ experience which often proves bitter and 
frustrating. As a student in a country like the Sudan, 
it would be strange indeed if "underdevelopment" did not 
figure prominently in my preoccupations. Thus the gearing 
of research towards the study of some of the determinants 
and forms of underdevelopment helps me as a person to 
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formulate a proper image of the conditions of my own 
existence which I naturally aim to change. 
I therefore formulated my research as dealing with a pro- 
bl. em of "underdevelopment"; and approached urbanization as one 
process- among others- which must be perceived as playing a role 
in, and expressing, the underdevelopment of the Sudan. And since 
I do not only seek to understand, explain, but also, more cruc- 
ially to change and improve my existential conditions, as normal 
human beings do, I discarded from the outset of the present work 
the way in which the question of underdevelopment is posed by 
the theorists of "modernity": What forces, present in an under- 
developed society, were absent in Europe, or vice versa, and 
hence prevented the former's rapid advance towards deveZopment? 
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Instead, I looked for a framework which would allow me to quest- 
ion the constituent components of the situation and their resp- 
ective "roles" in the production and reproduction of underdeve- 
lopment. I thus attempted to see a way that would afford the max- 
imum opportunity to "capture" the mechanisms of underdevelopment 
and their complex dynamics. This, of course, demands that under- 
development be conceived as a dynamic process rather than a static 
condition, and this in turn calls for a careful and systematic 
delineation of the widest aspects of the socio-economic and 
political interests which have shaped and maintained the general 
situation underlying the process of underdevelopment in the 
Sudan. So the identification of colonialism and neo-coZoniaZism 
as "instrumental" in capitalist expansion and penetration must 
be reviewed and assessed. That is to say-that we must bear in 
mind, and constantly refer to, historical developments such as 
the imposition of the commodity-form of production, the creat- 
ion of surpluses, the appropriation of such surpluses, the pol- 
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itico-ideological framework indispensable for the imposition and 
maintenance of these processes and, ultimately, the emergence 
and development of different socio-economic groups defined prim- 
arily in terms of their respective pZaces in the structure of 
antagonistically conflicting sets of interests. 
This overall approach means that I have to use a concept 
of urbanization that is totally free from the theoretical rest- 
rictions inherent in the use of notions such as disorganization, 
adaptation, integration, and marginalization. 
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This means that 
we have to reconsider urbanization and urbanism as processes 
developing in close association with interrelated aspects of 
colonial and neo-colonial capitalism as these interact in the 
urban situation. We have in particular to draw an analytical dis- 
tinction between external or "alien" capitalism (i. e. that imp- 
osed from "outside"), and internal or "indigenous" sets of soc- 
ial, economic, and political relations. I stress that this is 
only an analytical distinction, because the two aspects are ess- 
entially integrated through the latter being subjugated in var- 
ious forms to the former. I attempt in this thesis to bring these 
two aspects together into one conceptual framework and to examine 
their specific "interaction" in producing and reproducing '{ur'ban 
underdevelopment". I thus also attempt to explore and explain how 
different aspects of the urban situation are articuZated in 
specific manner- not simply juxtaposed or co-existent- which 
give the urban situation its characteristic features. Stated in 
yet another way, I set out to identify and specify the way and 
manner of the creation and maintenance of the above articulation 
rather than devoting myself to what I see an absurd effort 
in 
measuring and depicting illusive indicators of 
integration and/ 
16 
or adaptation to "modernism'' . 
22 
To pursue the aims I have thus 
set myself, it is necessary to emphasise the following: 
(a) The need to redefine the particular urban situation under 
consideration in terms of a social formation 
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which is 
cemented and being reproduced through the prevalence and 
dominance of a certain mode of production24in the Marxian 
sense. 
(b) The need to recognize that this social formation express- 
es the specific articulation of aspects of different modes 
of production especially the imposed capitalist mode of 
extraction and appropriation of surpluses introduced under 
and through colonialism, and the indigenous pre-colonial 
and pre-capitalist modes of production. In this way the 
process of urbanization will not figure simply as an exp- 
ression of what Little refers to as a "great movement of 
people , stimulated by Western contact with Africa". 
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(c) The need to see various patterns of socio-economic and 
political relations in the urban area as aspects of such 
modes brought together (articulated) in ways which perpet- 
uate and reproduce the whole "underdeveloped" social form- 
ation, and thus not to regard these relations as simple 
responses- structural, categorical, or personal- to the 
"disintegrative impact" of the urban situation. 
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As maintained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, both the colon- 
ial administration and the subsequent neo-colonial state found it 
difficult and unrewarding to maintain capitalist relations of 
production and exploitation based on the separation of the Zabour 
from the means of production as it was the case in Western Eur- 
ope. 
27 Instead, the process of exploitation was initiated, and 
now continues, mainly by coercing the indigenous population 
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(through taxation, land expropriation, trade, and unequal exch- 
ange) to sell their labour power in the form of commodity (crops) 
which is being produced within indigenous systems of economic 
and social relations. Thus the extension of the new and 'modern' 
relations of surplus appropriation into previously non-capitalist 
Sudanese societies actually intensified, and still continues to 
intensify, the presence and reproduction of "backward" and 
traditional modes and forms of socio-economic and political rel- 
ations within which the production of surpluses being achieved, 
and effectively prevents them from disappearing. We thus have a 
"paradoxical" situation in which the 'modern' capitalist proc- 
esses of accumulation are maintained by the exploitation of lab- 
our organized entirely in archaic pre-capitalist modes. Each -it 
is assumed- necessitates and fosters radically different sets of 
values and attitudes, and different patterns of social and polit- 
ical organization, and the like. Yet, each is becoming progress- 
ively more dependent for survival on the other. 
The urban situation, then, represents an arena where such 
an "articulation" takes. place in its most intensified form and 
in the most visible and recognizable way. The study of this art- 
iculation and of interactions of its aspects in the urban area 
which result in the reproduction and perpetuation of what is in 
effect an "underdeveloped" urban situation, is. clearly a legit- 
imate and necessary empirical and theoretical undertaking. And 
it is an undertaking which by implication rejects the whole range 
of conceptualizations of towns and cities as a dualistic or plur- 
alistic structures composed of different conflicting "systems" 
which coexist but do not interpenetrate. 
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Following on the above statement of position, I now rest- 
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are that the central problem of this thesis concerns urbanizat- 
ion as a socio-economic process which effectively expresses the, 
and contributes to the production and reproduction of, "backward- 
ness" or "underdevelopment" in the country as a whole, and in 
urban areas in particular. Arising out of this problem, I attempt 
a comprehensive interpretation of the specific mechanisms by 
which certain "traditional", "archaic" and "backward" institut- 
ions, values, norms, and patterns of behaviour continue to have 
effective meaning in the new, structurally different, "modern" 
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situation. And, in particular, I identify two readily recogn- 
izable processes in urban life in the Sudan: (a) tribaZization 
and the continuous reproduction of the institutions of tribal- 
ism; and (b) capital accumulation, its forms and specific mech- 
anisms. And, on the whole, I am trying to show the patterns and 
mechanisms by which these two processes are articulated in one 
locality and also to show the ways through which accumulation 
operates to reproduce tribalism and how the latter gives accum- 
ulation most of its features, i. e. how they reproduce the basic 
contradiction of persiszant 'tribalism' in conjunction with 
capitalistic "development". 
IV, METHODS OF INVESTIGATION AND DATA COLLECTION: 
The following is a brief account of the methods used to 
gather empirical data for the study: 
1. Surveys: 
Quantitative data on Hassaheisa were gathered mainly thr- 
ough formaZ surveys. Questionnaires were first completed for a 
sample of the town's population (See Appendices 2 and 4). Draw- 
ing a sample posed difficult methodological problems. Using the 
1978 estimate of the town's population (See Chapter 3), 1 atte- 
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mpted to complete the questionnaire on a 10% sample. In order 
to make this sample as representative as possible, and bearing 
in mind the kind of residential patterns which I knew were char- 
acrerized by a general socio-economic homogeneity within each 
neighbourhood, I set out to work on a random basis within 
each area. For example, in the Omda neighbourhood I bagen by tak- 
ing the first house in the first street; when there was no res- 
ponse or if the occupants were unwilling to cooperate, I Look 
the next house, and so on. I then moved to the 10th house in 
the same street and proceeded in the same manner, later moving 
to the 20th, 30th, and 40th house and so on until I reached the 
last house in the last street of the neighbourhood. There are, 
of course, some shortcomings to this method of sampling: 
(a) The houses approached do not necessarily correspond to the 
number of households in the neighbourhood. 
30 A house, or 
the buildings on one plot or at the "same address", may well 
contain more than one household, or they may be unoccupied. 
As I took, however, only one household from each address 
(where there was a response) the households eventually mak- 
ing up the sample might be fewer (or larger) than 10 percent. 
But as there was no adequate household sampling 
frame, I had 
to content myself with this method. 
(b) It is a matter of general knowledge that many single men- 
bachelors or married men without their families- in Sudanese 
towns and in Hassaheisa- live in Azaba colonies 
(male res- 
idences) composed of a number of houses close to each other 
in certain areas of the town. My method of sampling clearly 
did not allow for the fully proportional representation of 
this important segment of the population. 
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Despite these shortcomings, the main survey clearly did 
yield basic information of value on a series of the population's 
characteristics as may be seen in Chapter 7. The ultimate value 
of survey, data of this kind also, of course, depends greatly on 
the quality of the information recorded. In this connection, I 
tried to guard against misinformation by the use of two techniq- 
ues. First, the questionnaire was applied twice on the same in- 
formants: in 1978 (June-September) and a year later in 1979 
(September-October). 31 Second, during the actual interviewing 
information given by the head of the household was, whenever 
pos$ible, checked and supplemented through the responses of other 
members of the household who were always encouraged to particip- 
ate in the interviews. 
As I mention in Chapter 4, a separate survey was also 
conducted on the Suk merchants in 1978.220 out of 1037 owners 
of commercial firms were involved in this survey, i. e. 20%. Each 
type of trade available in the Sua I tried to represent by the 
same percentage according to the estimates of its respective 
total number. But in the actual conduct of the survey, I tried 
to achieve this percentage randomly. 
2. Planned Observations: 
Following on my definition of the areas and processes of 
social life most crucial to the working of the "urban system" 
(i. e. capital accumulation and tribalization), I planned a whole 
programme of further participant and non-participant observations 
on events, incidents, and occurrences in the day-to-day 
life of 
the town. The scope of my observations was wide covering social, 
economic, political, and religious life in general. My 
initial 
aim was simply to immerse myself in daily life and record obser- 
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vations which did not necessarily "make sense" at the time. Quite 
commonly, these were simply fragments of information which could 
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only be put together meaningfully over time as the study develop- 
ed. The planning and the use of these observations was controlled 
and supplemented at different stages by the continuous recalling 
of fragments of information accumulated in my earlier "particip- 
ation" in the life of the town. 
3. Interviews: 
Apart from direct observations and surveys, I interviewed 
a wide range of personaZitieswho play, or have in the past pla- 
yed, active roles in the history or present-day life of the Hass- 
aheisa community. The accounts, and the perceptions and inter- 
' pretations, of these personalities constitute much of the most 
important material in this study. In some cases, these accounts 
and interpretations illustrate, delineate, and explain aspects 
of developments in the community of which I was not previously 
aware, and at other times they dwell on topics of which I had 
abandant information but was simply interested in gathering fur- 
ther interpretation. I conducted lengthy interviews (and tape- 
recorded them) with the following: 
(a) The administrative Officer of the Town Council on various 
aspects of the functioning of the Council. 
(b) The Chairman of the Town Council (1977-81) Mr Al-Fatih 
Hamad Annil, on the history and present composition of the 
council and particularly on factionaZ poZitics of the Coun- 
cil. 
(c) Mr. Ali Eisa Bishara, a leading merchant and a former chair- 
man of the Town Council, on the development of the political 
and social alliance of the ShammaiiJn (Northerners) in Hass- 
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aheisa, in addition to other local political issues; 
(d) Mr. Yousif, Iheimir, a son of the former Omda of the town, 
on the history, composition, and contemporary situation of 
the Vubao4n in Hassaheisa, and the Iheimir family in parr-i- 
cular; 
(e) Mr. Yousif Hassan, a prominent merchant and politician in the 
town and a former Chairman of the Council, on developments 
in trade and commerce in the town's Suk; 
(f) Mr. Mohamed Eisa, a retired bureaucrat and presently a mer- 
chant, on the early general history of the town; 
(g) Mr. Abdel-Karim Ali Musa, a leading merchant, on the early 
development of trade and on the history of involement of the 
Turco-Egyptian immigrant group in the town's life; 
(h) Mr. Mohamed Al-Jack Abu-Shama, the General Secretary of the 
Retail Traders' Union in Hassaheisa, on different issues 
concerning trading activities in the town. 
(i) Mr Ismail Mohamed Fur, a prominent political leader and 
deputy Chairman of the Council (1977-81), on a number of iss- 
ues concerning the history and participation in local life 
of the Dan6unian. 6 in Hassaheisa; and, 
(j) The late Mr. Al-Amin Mohamed Al-Amin, a prominent politician 
in the Gezira and a former President of the Gezira Scheme 
Tenants' Union, on various issues on the development of the 
town in relation to the HaUUaw. n group and tenants in partic- 
ul ar . 
The above is not an exhaustive list, for I also interviewed 
a number of others such as managers of 
industrial firms (large 
and small-scale), leaders of social clubs, trade unionists, etc. 
The nature of the information gathered through such interviews 
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with people in leadership positions is, of course, usually part- 
isan so that it calls for interpretation and discussion. I have 
attempted to make this clear whenever using such interviews. 
4. Documentation: 
To develop my perception of the processes of urbanization 
and of daily urban life in Hassaheisa, I naturally drew on all 
available documentary evidence. 
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Documents are, of course, imp- 
ortant in so far as they provide accounts about events or occas- 
ions pre-dating the field study (history) or about different but 
possibly similar situations (other localities). The main documen- 
Lary sources used for this thesis were the following: 
(a) Public and Official Archives: 
These generally hold documents collected and presented by 
public and offficial institutions. In the British Library, I had 
access to the complete series of the Sudan Gazette from which I 
gathered information on the whole range of colonial legislation 
affecting urban areas and accounts of numerous important events. 
In the Sudan Archives at Durham University (School of Oriental 
Studies), I had an access to an invaluable set of official govern- 
ment Reports and correspondence. At Barakat (Wad Madani) I had 
access to the Gezira Archives which contain vast files on the 
Gezira Scheme. In Hassaheisa itself, I had access to many docu- 
ments in the Offices of different governmental departments (e. g. 
the local government Council, the Police Headquarters, the Local 
Rates, the Taxes Offices, etc. ). These sources included the for- 
mal minutes of meetings, and a wide variety of reports, corres- 
pondence, etc. I 
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(b) Business and Merchant Sources: 
Although I found few systematic business records in Hassa- 
heisa, those that I did locate were helpful in various ways. For 
example, the private Journal of an ordinary merchant yielded val- 
uable insights into the scale of his trading activities, and 
otherwise insignificant invoices gave me occasionally meaninful 
insights into the way in which the prices were registered, etc. 
On the whole, despite the secretive nature of many of the merch- 
ants (owing to the fact that they are constantly in commercial 
competition), some did make available to me many of their comm- 
ercial records which enhanced my understanding of the way in 
which trade operates in the Sui. 
(c) Statistics: 
Despite the poor quality of census and other official 
statistics in the Sudan33, we have no option but to use them. 
Thus it will be seen that I have drawn heavily on data from the 
First National Census of 1955/56, The Household Survey of 1964/ 
66, The Second National Census of 1973, and the Hassaheisa Town 
Census of 1980. One simply has to be cautious in using such data. 
They may not be of the quality one would wish, but the trends and 
overall profiles they reveal are so striking that they clearly 
do have considerable value as historical records for comparative 
purposes. 
(d) Literature: 
Other descriptive accounts, mainly by academics, on the 
Hassaheisa region, on the Gezira Scheme, and on the Sudan as a 
whole were extensively used, as may be seen from references 
given throughout this study. The accuracy and validity of these 
works probably varies a good deal; from highly sophisticated 
25 
academic works to very general impressionistic accounts. What- 
ever their limitations, a work such as mine would not be poss- 
ible at all without reference to them. 
Through the above methods and techniques of data collection, 
I have brought together the first comprehensive collection of 
information on the town of Hassaheisa. Only a part of all the 
materials gathered are presented in this thesis, other parts 
either not being of particular relevance to the issues under 
discussion (e. g. data on women and conjugal relations), or hav- 
ing been previously used by me and published. (Reference to 
pxevious publications are given whenever they are relevant). In 
the case of relevant data used in the thesis, I have attempted, 
to follow the advice given by Pons, to present them "in such a 
way that explanations alternative to those made by (me) can rea- 
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sonably be attempted by the reader". 
V. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
I have attempted to arrange the Chapters in this thesis 
so as to allow various central issues to develop serially. Foll- 
owing this introductory chapter in which I give an indication of 
a number of important points relating to the history, setting, 
sociological problems and methods of the study, I attempt in 
Chapter Two to place the study of urbanization in the Sudan in 
general in a more elaborate poZiticaZ-economy perspective . The 
Chapter deals with broad issues about the development of the 
colonial and neo-colonial socio-economic formation in the Sudan, 
and I argue that the identification and specification of this 
socio-economic formation as a distinct historical condition, 
gives the process of urbanization its essential characteristic 
h 
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In Chapter Three I give a general descriptive analysis of 
various aspects of the town of Hassaheisa. I dwell on events 
and processes in the specific history of the production, deveZ- 
opment, and reproduction of the town. Chapter Three is thus int- 
ended to characterize the main features of the town's historical 
and contemporary urban structure. 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six deal in some considerable der- 
ail with capital accumuZation in Hassaheisa. The central theme 
in these three chapters is the commercial nature of the process 
of accumulation as an empirical manifestation of the "underdevel- 
opment" of capitalist development in this particular situation. 
I pursue this theme by illustrating the relationship between 
commerce and the needs and crises of the world colonial capital- 
ist economy. Thus in Chapter Four, trade is investigated as the 
main pattern through which the surpluses of the country were and 
are expatriated, while the remaining surpluses are accumulated by 
local merchants. The rate and magnitude of this local accumulat- 
ion is presented as the main dynamic characteristic of urban life 
as far as it affects and is affected by other social, political, 
and economic processes in the community. Chapters Five and Six 
deal with related processes in land and manufacturing respectiv- 
ely. The two chapters are designed to illustrate, first, the lim- 
its of the process of accumulation which is essentially mercant- 
ilist despite the 'diversification' of its forms; and, secondly, 
to show and explain the social content and consequences of the 
intrusion of capital to the property and manufacturing spheres of 
accumulation. 
In Chapter Seven, I trace the specific historical condit- 
ions under which the populations of Hassaheisa began to tribaZ- 
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rise themselves. The development of 'modern tribalism' is seen 
as an ideology arising out of an 'old' or 'traditional' tribal- 
ism which is constantly being recreated and transformed into 
'new' forms compatible with the new realities of accumulation 
in the town. I argue that both processes (tribalization and 
accumulation) are continually distorted and refashioned to match 
and serve the specific 'underdeveloped' character of each other. 
Capital accumulation is arrested in its commercial mercantilist 
stage and bound by its dependent position, while tribalization 
is used and manifested not as a source for cultural and social 
diversification, but as a base for faZse consciousness. In Chap- 
ter Eight I analyse the way in which a certain kind of articul- 
ated development of these two processes of urban life takes 
place with the effect of perpetuating the 'backward' character 
of both (and, by extension, of the whole situation), while they 
themselves 'advance' and flourish. In particular, I try to show 
how the local Town CounciZ is an arena for the politics and the 
performances which reflect, and simuZtaneousZy contribute to, 
the intensification of the processes of accumulation and trib- 
alization. But since the process of accumulation intrinsically 
polarises the population into two antagonistic camps (i. e. those 
who accumulate, and those who not only fail to do so, but also 
'suffer' as a result), the 'conflict' between the interests of 
the two camps cannot be ignored or overlooked. Because of the 
centrality of 'polarization' and the 'struggle', the develop- 
ment of 'tribal ideology' is in fact "necessary" in the sense 
that if 'tribalism' does not relegate and ultimately replace 
this 'struggle', it is 'needed' to obscure and distrot the 
'struggle'. 
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I 
1. I know of two colleagues who began research in different Sudanese towns in 1978, but who subsequently abandoned 
their investigations to seek employment in Saudi Arabia. 
2. See also the Preface to Pons, V. (ed. ), -1980. 
3. Sui is a local word of Arabic origin used by Sudanese for for trading area or a marker place. 
4. E1-Mustafa, M. Y. A., 1981. 
5. Pons uses the term 'texture of urban life' to refer to "interpersonal relations in the family and other 
small groups; the norms, prescriptions, and codes 
of conduct which govern such relations; and the 
values and aspirations commonly articulated and 
expressed within relatively homogeneous and close- knit networks". Op. cit., 1980, Perface, pp. 
xxxvi-xxxvii. 
6. Is it the case, as Reissman argues, that "Urbanization is 
social change on a vast scale" ? According to him urbaniz- 
ation: 
"means deep and irrevocable changes that alter all 
sectors of society... Apparently the process is ir- 
reversible once begun. The impetus of urbanization 
upon society is such that society gives way to urban 
institutions, urban values, and urban demands". See 
Reissman, 1964, p. 15. Somewhat similarly, Hoselitz argues 
that: 
"Students of urbanization are agreed that, to the 
extent to which the process of urbanization is med- 
iated through urban centres... in general, the lar- 
ger the city, the more important is its general med- 
iating function in the process of social change and 
acculturation. To some extent, therefore, the rapid- 
ity with which a country modernizes, or at least with 
which psychological attitudes favourable to moderniz- 
ation are created, is dependent upon the growth of its 
cities especially large cities". See Hoselitz, B. E., 
1974, p. 174. 
Or is the opposite opinion more valid that which sees the 
growth of urbanization in the 'developing' countries as 
more an expression of "lack of national development than 
the result of it" ? See Dwyer, 1974, p. 12. Even more force- 
ful and challenging is Castells' view that urbanization in 
the Third World is 
"an obstacle to development, in so far as it immobil- 
izes resources in the form of non-productive invest- 
ments, necessary to the creation and organization of 
services indispensable to great concentrations of pop- 
ulation, whereas these concentrations do not justify 
themselves as centres of production". Castells, 1977, 
p. 41. 
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7. I have perceived Hassaheisa as a colonial town par excell- 
ence, as opposed to some other towns in the Sudan which 
were established in pre-colonial times. About half of all Sudanese towns to-day are of the same 'type' as Hassaheisa. 
See Born, M., 1980, pp. 147-83. 
8. My home village is Sarasir, about twenty kilometres west of Hassaheisa, and my parents' family still lives there. 
9. In Arabic the words Muuamad. Ln (urbanized) and MutahadhA, 
(civilized) carry the same meaning and often used synony- 
mously. 
10. 'Electricity has only recently been extended to some of the 
villages around Hassaheisa- in 1979 in the case of my own 
family's village. 
11. Ir is quite usual for the people in my village to "explain" 
various types of behaviour, and even some physical features, 
of the town's population simply by stating that they are 
"town people". 
12. Such terms occur frequently in the oral traditions of people 
in Hassaheisa from the Northern Provinces. 
13. Secondary school students in the Gezira work in any available 
job commonly during the 'Summer' vacation, mainly to earn 
money for school clothes. The lucky ones find temporary 
employment in the public sector. In the 'summer' of 1968 
I had worked in the Ginneries as a Balance-Clerk. 
14. Ibrahim explains how his 
ulation he studied in the 
more difficut by the fact 
eher', bahith, can easily 
Service? )", See, Ibrahim, 
position vis-a-vis the local pop- 
Ingessana Hills District was made 
that "The Arabic term for 'resear- 
be mistaken for Mabah-. -th. (Secret 
S. S., 1980, p. 2. 
15. In addition to this, I had in 1978, just prior to planning 
the present work, conducted some research in Sarasir, See, 
El-Mustafa, M. Y. A., 1979 (In Arabic). 
16. Sondra Hale and Gerry Hale, 1971, p. 4. 
17. Pons, V., 1980, pp. xxix-xL. 
18. Sondra Hale designed her own research, reported in the 
volume of 1971, as "an attempt to suggest and to stimulate 
a type of urban study conspicuously lacking in Sudan". See 
Hale, 1971, p. 54. 
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19. Mariotti and Magubane, commenting on the nature of urban 
anthropology in Africa, argue that: 
"The tie between urban anthropology and social engin- 
eering is not in doubt. When practical problems are 
encountered, urban anthropologists and sociologists 
often act as experts supplying elements of a decision. 
Anthropology, then, can function practically at two levels, either through the 'rationalization' of human 
behaviour or by supplying tactics for the 'manipulat- 
ion' of behaviour. This can be achieved by identifying 
the myths or irrational convictions closely related to 
the practical experience of the masses". See Mariotti, 
A., and Magubane, B., 1978, p. 65. 
20. Being concerned with such questions, many authors of stud- 
ies of urbanization in Africa, for example, centred their 
problematic on the "persistence" and/or "continuity" of 
certain social institutions, values, traditions, etc., which 
they saw as empeding change to fuller "urban way of life". 
The whole matter was viewed first in an "evolutionary", 
then in a "functionalist", and later in a "functionalist- 
structuralist" perspective of which culminated in a range 
of "dualist" and "pluralist" approaches. 
21. It is now well accepted that Wirth's propositions in his 
Urbanism as a Way of Life, and numerous elaborations and 
modifications of it in the Western literature, played a 
prominent role in providing theoretical concepts upon which 
this kind of perspective is based. See Wirth, L., 1969. 
What we may refer to as the Wirthian legacy has been infl- 
uential in urban studies in Africa and elsewhere in the 
so-called Third World, and has often merged or partially 
coincided with other largely ahistorical and apolitical 
traditions. The task of "freeing" ourselves from its impact 
and implications is therefore very important. 
22. For a systematic critique of the approach I reject, See, 
Magubane, B., 1971. 
23. I use the concept of "social formation" to designate a 
determined historical situation specified by a particular 
articulation of its different economic, political, ideol- 
ogical, and theoretical levels of instances at a given 
moment in its historical existence. Cf. Paulantzas, N., 
1982, p. 15. 
24. Reference is to the dominance of the capitalist mode of 
production imposed through colonialism. 
25. Little, K., 1971, pp. 85-102. 
26. Mitchell, J. C., 1969, pp. 9-10. 
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27. The development of capitalism in Western Europe necessit- 
ated the creation of a situation where: 
"the overwhelming majority of the people are put 
in a situation where they are forced to work to 
avoid starvation. The capitalist class creates and 
maintains this situation by compulsion by achieving 
total control over all the means of producing social 
wealth... It means the creation of a working class- 
a class of people who can survive only by selling 
their capacity to work to the class that controls 
the means of production". See, Cleaver, H.. 1979, p. 75. 
28. A dualistic perception was first developed by Boeke, J. H., 
1953, 'in relation to Indonesia where he "saw" the co-exist- 
ence of capitalist and pre-capitalist societies with con- 
flicting needs and characteristics, and which led him to 
conclude that this threatened the disintegration of both 
societies. In Africa, however, there was a strong tendency 
to account for the coexistence of the "advanced" and "back- 
ward" cultures in terms of a supposed harmony of interests. 
The benefits of modernization were assumed to flow outwards 
from the "advanced" culture to revitalize the stagnating 
"traditional" and "backward" culture. This was perceived 
as a situation of harmony without contradictions, and of 
cooperation for the promotion of development of both. See, 
for example, Mitchell, J. C., 1969, Watson, W., 1959, and 
Kuper, H. (ed. ), 1965. 
29. Here I must stress the contradictory nature of this cont- 
inuity in contrast to the "complementary" harmoneous co- 
existence implied in works such as that of Watson, W., 1958, 
in the case of Mambwe, and that of Barclay, H. B., 1964, in 
the case of Mahas. 
30. The working definition of a household which I employed was 
that; a household is the unit of people living at an add- 
ress and sharing "one cooking pot" (one domestic budget). 
31. It is for this reason some of the tables giving survey data 
carry the date 1978/1979. 
32.1 was guided to a large extent by Pitt, D. C., 1972, p. 14. 
33. Reservations about government statistics in the Sudan have 
been expressed by, for example, E1-Arifi, 1971, pp. 115-40, 
and myself, E1-Mustafa, M. Y. A., 1981, pp. 4-5. 
34. Pons, V., 1980, p. xxxix. 
CHAPTER TWO 
ISSUES IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANIZATION IN THE SUDAN 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of urban settlements in the course of human his`- 
ory has been described as "pre-eminently a social process, an ex- 
pression more of changes in man's interaction with his fellows 
than in his interaction with his environment". 
l 
This perspective 
adds considerable theoretical and analytical possibilities to de- 
finitions of urban settlements as geographical areas or places 
where the inhabitants engage primarily in non-agricultural econ- 
omic activities2, for any definition of "urban" needs to be placed 
and explained in the context of specific historical developments. 
If we ignore the different specific historical conditions under 
which different urban settlements have arisen and existed we run 
the risk of trying to understand them as static and suprahistor- 
ical entities. 
3 
Any attempt to analyse urban settlements ahist- 
orically leads by implication to conceptualizations derived on 
the basis of particular sets of concrete and specific urban feat- 
ures and thus to the unjustified use of universal "urban" abst- 
racts. In addition, such approaches preclude any understanding 
of the specific processes which have led to the rise and develop- 
ment of different towns and cities-i. e. the particular processes 
of urbanization. 
The present Chapter attempts to place the process of urban- 
ization in the Sudan in an appropriate historical context, and 
it does this by pointing to the specific historical conditions 
under which this process developed in the past and operates to- 
day. The Chapter thus sets out to ensure that we avoid the damag- 
ing theoretical consequences of accepting any superficial simil- 
arities that may exist between urbanization processes 
in differ- 
ent situations at different historical epochs. 
4 Thus, for example, 
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the fact that urbanization always involves the movement of people 
from agricultural to non-agricultural activities should not be all- 
owed to lead us to ignore or to minimize the vastly different cha- 
nges in social relations that may be involved in such movements in 
overall historical contexts that may otherwise bear little simil- 
arity to each other. Very specifically, we need to bear in mind 
that the processes of "urbanization" in the Sudan have a long his- 
tory stretching from the period of the pre-historic Nubian king- 
doms through those of the Christian States, the Funj Sultanate, 
The Turkish regime, the brief years of Mahdist State, and the 
period of Condominum colonial rule to the present neo-colonial 
eras, but that the specific nature of urban growth at various 
times during these periods has been quite essentially different. 
It is thus necessary to approach the whole question of Sudanese 
urbanization historicaZZy. Unless we do so, it is extremely diff- 
icult to realize what specific problems relating to the underly- 
ing dynamics of the social change involved that merit close att- 
ention. It is this view which has led me to embrace the method of 
political economy in the present study. 
THE METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Political economy deals primarily with the social sphere 
that includes the production, exchange and distribution of comm- 
odities. According to Marx's Preface to his Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy6, the social sphere of political 
economy is identified with the "economic base" on which the legal 
and political superstructure of society arise. Within this econ- 
omic base the mode of production is seen as the determining inst- 
ance which is in turn determined by dialectical interaction bet- 
ween the material productive forces and the social relations of 
production. And the social relations into which people enter in 
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order to produce their material lives are simultaneously economic 
and political. In a capitalist society, for example, any move to 
impose laws and ordinances governing the length of a working day 
or the codes of industrial conduct is essentially a political as 
well as an economic movement; that is to say, it is a "movement of 
the class, with the object of achieving its interests in a general 
form, in a form possessing a general social force of compulsion. 
7 
In other words, this political framework of laws, ordinances, and 
of the coercive apparatus of dominance in general is always necess- 
ary and indispensable for- it is not merely a reflection of- the 
more basic social action of imposing and maintaining corresponding 
economic relations of production, exchange, and circulation of 
social wealth. 
8 
As explained in the previous chapter, the present study is 
limited in historical scope to Sudanese urbanization from the 
turn of the century, which marked the imposition of British col- 
onial rule, onwards. 
9 
During this period capital accumulation in 
its various forms figures, according to the perspective and method 
I am using, as the most fundamental process underlying the struc- 
tural development of Sudanese society. Thus a close examination 
of the nature of this process and the identification of its char- 
acteristic features is an essential prelude to the proper under- 
standing and ultimate critique of urbanization and to any attempt 
to understand the so-called 'urban problem'. 
10 
in the Sudan. This 
is because capital accumulation rests primarily on the extraction 
of surpluses which were in turn created in a definite mode of product- 
ion based on certain social relations. And as urbanization is 
taken as a process of change in these social relations, the focus 
on the study of accumulation provides a proper instance to see 
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and criticize the whole production process and the social relat- 
ions involved in their full complexity. 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN SUDAN 
The "colonial character" of the process of capital accumul- 
ation in the Sudan since the beginnings of British rule must be 
stressed at the outset. I do this by first discussing the basic 
historical "causes" of the development of colonialism, the ways 
and methods through which colonialism sought to achieve its major 
purposes, and, second, by showing the main consequences of the proc- 
ess in the Sudan. 
" 
The incorporation of the Sudan into the British Empire was 
in essence the penetration and expansion of British monopoly cap- 
ital into the country. British capital was suffering in the wake 
of its expansion from the following series of needs and constr- 
aints: 
(1) As a consequence of the long-term decline in the labour res- 
erve (due to the, then rapid migration of labour power out of West- 
ern Europe to overseas territories), there was a slow but contin- 
uous increase in real wages in Britain and Western Europe, and 
this led to the growth of an active interest in the exploitation 
of cheap labour-power outside Western Europe. 
(2) There was at the same time a growing need for various raw mat- 
erials. This was caused by appreciable differences in the 
levels 
of productivity in manufacturing industries (e. g. in the British 
textile industry) and agricultural production (e. g. cotton which 
had also been severely affected by the American Civil War). 
(3) The concentration of capital in the "Jest", where investment- 
costs in spheres that had already been extensively industrialized 
were rising rapidly, led to considerable pressure 
for capital to 
be transferred into new areas or regions for investment. 
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(4) The reduction and near exhaustion of spheres of investment 
in the "West" had added to the problem posed there by the contin- 
uing tendency of the average rate of profit 
12 
to fall due to the 
significant increase in the organic composition of capital. This 
was because earlier capital used to be transferred from spheres 
of production with declining rates of profits to new and fresh 
ones. But, owing to "full" capitalist expansion in the West and 
the virtual exhaustion of economic spheres for investment there, 
the possibility of capital transferrence was eventually eliminated 
and the natural consequence was that expansion was now only poss- 
ible, in significant measures, beyond the boundaries of Western 
Europe. 
All these factors led, in Mandel's analysis, to the struct- 
ural crisis of capitalism for which colonialism was in effect the 
only possible "solution". Colonization, the annexation of many 
non-Western territories by force and the subjugation of the people 
of these territories, opened the way for the transferrence of cap- 
ital from the West to the newly controlled areas on a large scale 
and at a rapid rate. It is easy to appreciate that the logic under- 
lying the process was the-search for "surplus profits" leading to 
further capital accumulation and growth. Prominent among the means 
through which surpluses were achieved, were the following: 
Firstly, much higher rates of profit were achieved by inve. s- 
ting capital in areas where the average organic composition of 
capital13 was significantly lower than in the West. 
Secondly, the prices of the commodity of labour power (wages) 
in these areas were far below its historical value due to low stan- 
dards of living-Both a limited range of necessities and the presence 
of surplus populations led labour to accept the lowest possible 
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"wages" and thus allowed the realization of higher than average 
surplus values. 
Thirdly, since the capital transferred was, by and large, 
excess capital in the West (where it could not achieve the aver- 
age profit), its investment in the annexed regions allowed a gen- 
eral increase in the average rate of profit to be realized. 
A major consequence for the annexed regions to which this 
capital was sent was that any chances of indigenous replication 
of Western capitalist development were severely reduced, if not 
eliminated, as the resources that would have been necessary for 
internal accumulation were being systematically transferred back 
to the West in the form of surpluses. 
14 
And such portions of the 
surplus as remained locally were concentrated in the non-product- 
ive economic sectors of foreign trade, services, and commerce. 
15 
These processes were then perpetuated through the systematic in- 
corporation of the economies of the annexed territories into the 
world market where a relation of "unequal exchange" has continued=. -- 
to operate and has thus ensured the continuing flow of surplus to 
the original centres of capital. 
The entire Sudanese colonial experience developed along these 
lines. The specific conditions of the country made investments in 
agricultural production most profitable, and the general strategy 
followed by the. colonial state was therefore to develop a peasant 
economy 
16 bound to Western centres of capital through world trade. 
Peasants were retained as simple commodity producers and "encour- 
aged" to remain on their own lands as cash croppers. The colonial 
state had little difficulty in establishing and imposing policies 
which led to a monopoly over the crop market and imperial capital- 
ism was thus. able to control the manner of the labour process in 
I 
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crop production and to dictate the nature and magnitude of the 
crop produced. 
Although the peasants continued to own the means of produc- 
tion (i. e. agricultural land and implements), they rapidly lost 
control over the organization of. the production process through 
being forced to sell their crops to capital; a situation summar- 
ized by O'Brien in the following quotation: 
... what originally appears as a relation of exchange bind- 
ing the simple commodity producer to the 'market' tends to 
assume the character of a relation of production binding 
the producer to capital. The 'price' which the producer 
receives becomes a concealed wage. 
17 
URBANIZATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF ACCUMULATION 
Up to World War II the pattern of accumulation outlined 
above obviously depended upon the stability of the Sudanese peas- 
ant communities engaged in the production process as cash cropp- 
ers. Various policies were developed to achieve this requirement. 
Thus legislation was introduced to ensure (a) that peasants did 
not leave their communities (e. g. legislation to stem landless- 
ness) and (b) that there were adequate inducements to production 
for the market (e. g. legislation imposing taxes ). 
18 
Owing to particular reasons and circumstances, the colonial 
administration sought to concentrate and intensify crop product- 
ion in certain region. 
19 
Thus the decision to promote cotton pro- 
duction in the Gezira had its own specific history. According to 
Frankel, cotton 
was wanted at almost any price, and it is significant that 
the scheme was only seriously developed long after it had 
been planned and at a time when it was thought that Empire 
cotton supplies had to be safeguarded. 
20 
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Whatever the specific reasons and timing, the concentration 
of colonial economic activities and investment in this particular 
region of the Sudan created a vast demand for cheap labour indis- 
pensable for both construction works and crop production, 
21 
The attraction of sufficient labour from peasant communities- 
whether from the Gezira itself or from other regions- proved to 
be very difficult as peasants in those early years were reluctant 
to sell their labour power. 
22 
One Governor-General's perception 
of the reasons for the problem of labour shortages, which were not 
confined to the Gezira, but which were first experienced in Khart- 
oum itself and continued for many years, is interesting and worth 
quoting. After noting the failure of increased wages to attract 
the Sudanese for work, he gave his reasons for the failure of the 
laws of supply and demand to operate as follows: 
The reason why the laws of supply and demand as regulating 
the wages of labour do not apply in the Sudan may be noted. 
In the first place the Sudani is as a rule naturally lazy 
and disinclined to manual labour or hard work of any sort; 
secondly, owing to the cheapness of durra- their staple 
food- a man can live on next to nothing. It is often not 
sufficiently realized that Sudanese, even in Khartoum, the 
most expensive town in the Sudan, can live on nine or ten 
piastres a month or even less when durra is cheap. The res- 
ult is that a man needs only work for three or four days in 
a month to make his living. (... ), it seems evident that the 
present purely artificial conditions can only be rectified by 
the application of some form of pressure, with a view to break- 
ing up these rapidly increasing idle communities. 
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The extent of these "idle communities'" reluctance to be 
involved in waged labour may be furthermore illustrated by the 
recourse of the colonial administration to policies of recruiting 
labour from beyond the borders of the Sudan. In a certain case 
the administration formally applied to the gaols in Egypt for 
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workers. Thus "in December 1913,1080 convicts from Tura and Abu 
Zibil penitentiaries (in Egypt) were brought to the Sudan for emp- 
loyment upon the Gezira irrigation works at Sennar". 
24 
But, how- 
ever, this policy of labour importation, whether for work in the 
Gezira, or on the railways or in Port Sudan docks, soon proved too 
expensive, and the administration had to launch a new policy with 
the sole aim of breaking up the Sudanese peasants' resistance and/ 
or "idleness". This policy of "application of some form of press- 
ure" was based on the following: 
(1) The selective imposition of taxes in certain regions; e. g. 
capitation or poll-tax was levied mainly in the Western Sudan, 
while date and sagia taxes were levied in Northern Sudan. Both 
were designed to generate greater cash needs over and above the 
need already created by other universal taxes levied in the Sudan 
as a whole (e. g. animal, land, and house taxes). 
(2) To minimize the opportunities of people meeting these new 
taxes from surplus cash from within their respective peasant eco- 
nomies, the colonial administration commonly adopted and imposed 
measures to disrupt, distort and partially destroy peasant activ- 
ities. 25 In addition to the high agricultural taxes and other 
charges it imposed, and to the elaborate legislation aimed at 
ultimately decreasing agricultural productivity, the administrat- 
ion applied a policy of "slave"-emancipation, especially in North- 
ern Sudan. Though this policy was masked by humanitarian and eth- 
ical veils, its essence was to undermine the partial reliance of 
Northern peasant communities on "slaves" as an important labour 
force. Emancipated "slaves" were thus superficially regarded as 
a "surplus" over and above other members of the community who even- 
tually disengaged from agricultural pursuits when they ceased to 
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be viable after the departure of the "slaves''. 26 As such this 
"surplus" labour force was expected by the colonial administrat- 
ion to move towards the regions of labour shortage, i. e. the Gez- 
ira. 
Obviously, the overall policy of the administration towards 
the then existing peasant economies had serious contradictory ele- 
ments in its underlying assumptions and practical consequences. 
Whereas the assumption was that a measured "application of some 
form of pressure" would result in "breaking up these rapidly in- 
creasing idle communities", the disruptions caused had a number 
of unintended consequences: 
(1) Though the policies were "successful" in bringing substantial 
numbers of "peasants" to areas of new agricultural investment (e. g. 
the Gezira)- to the point that rural-rural migration was the sal- 
ient feature of population movement in pre-World War II period-27 
this "success" undermined the very basis of the administration's 
economic strategy of stabilizing peasant communities. Moreover, 
in some regions it led to a considerable drop in agricultural 
prloduction and this was a factor in the administration later 
reversing its earlier policy on slavery. 
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(2) At the same time, however, increasing numbers of rural people, 
who had been induced to disengage, in one way or another, from 
peasant pursuits, found their way to the then limited number of 
urban settlements, notably to the capital of Khartoum. 
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Though 
the towns then held little promise of employment, and the urban 
wages were considerably lower than in rural areas of investment 
(e. g. the Gezira and Tokar) 
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many of these "surplus" people, 
mainly ex- and runaway "slaves", stayed in the towns, and it 
became necessary for the government to try to induce them to ret- 
i 
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urn to their original homes (or to their "masters" in the case 
of "slaves"). The alternative for those who did not respond pos- 
ively was facing punishment under the Vagabonds Ordinance of 1905 
designed to deal with "idle" persons and vagabonds. "Idle" in the 
Ordinance referred to: 
Any person who has no settled home and has 
no ostensible means of subsistence and can- 
not give a satisfactory account of himself. 
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Here one may note that the above case is yet another "evid- 
ence" against the simplistic. arguement which accounts for urban- 
ization in terms of the more simplistic postulate of "labour mob- 
ility". 
Contradictory as it was, the colonial policy led, over time, 
first, to the far-reaching decomposition of rural peasant commun- 
ities with marked variations in different regions of the Sudan, 
and, secondly, following on this decomposition, an extensive inter--- 
regional movements of the populations began. Both these consequen- 
ces were closely related- in spite of the contradictory nature of 
this relationship- to the specific dynamics of the colonial cap- 
italist economy and its growing patterns of accumulation. Some of 
those who moved came to settle in newly established (or converted 
into) commercial and administrative centres all over the country. 
In these centres they entered into "new" social relations with 
each other, and engaged in "new" economic pursuits corresponding 
and compatible with dominant mode of colonial capitalistic accum- 
ulation. This was the essential beginning of the process of urb- 
v 
anization which has since continued in the Sudan throughout the 
colonial and neo-colonial periods, and its study is the main task 
in this thesis. 
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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBANIZATION AND A CRITIQUE OF URBAN 
STUDIES IN THE SUDAN32 
(1) The social character of urbanization as defined above 
exactly stems from the particular historical conditions under 
which it develops and to which I have referred. The decomposit- 
ion of the peasant economy meant- and means- the effective dis- 
possession of the "surplus population" from their means of prod- 
uction, i. e. land. 
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As such, this population was left with only 
one asset at its disposal, namely, the labour power which could 
be exchanged for the necessary cash needed for both taxes and 
subsistence. Thus the movement of this "surplus" section of the 
population between different regions (whether rural or urban) was, 
and is, by no means a simple Zabour mobiZity34; it was, and is, 
rather a process of proZetarianization. 
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The process of 'modern' 
urbanization in the Sudan thus assumed its most fundamental and 
essential feature from being a historical process of the trans- 
formation of the social relations of the people, and of the diff- 
erentiation of population into distinct social "classes" or cat- 
egories. Empirically there has been an intimate relationship bet- 
ween the two aspects of the major process of socio-economic change 
based on the logic and dynamics of colonial capitalistic accumul- 
ation: proletarianization and urbanization. 
The rate of urban growth and urbanization in the country 
was relativey low during the colonial period; after more than 50 
years the level of urbanization was only 8.3% in 1955/56.36 This 
is partially attributable to the policy of stabilization of the 
peasant communities attempted by the colonial government, and par- 
tially to the relatively low rate of capitalistic intensification 
of the country's economy. But the level has accelerated during the 
past 25 years, and is now 25.0%. 
37 This level is contrary to the 
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expectations of an earlier generation of students who had based 
their projections on the pre-independence rate of urbanization. 
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The recent acceleration is an indicator of, and corresponding to, 
the growing intensity of the processes of rural decomposition and 
proletarianization since independence, themselves being intrinsic- 
ally related to the recent capitalistic intensification under the 
neo-colonial situation. 
It is clearly impossible to attribute this rapid recent in- 
crease in the rate of urbanization soley to the uneven spatial 
distribution of services and economic investments in the country-39 
To do so would be to assume that the would-be rural-urban migrant 
can "rationally" make an accurate cost-benefit analysis or learn- 
ing of the degree of concentration of services in a certain loc- 
ality, and that he then decides his future movements on the basis 
of these calculations. 
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Such an assumption would impute a deg- 
ree of sophistication to the migrant which needs verification at 
the very least on two levels; the channels of communications he 
used to receive the information on the urban situation, and the 
way he comprehended the fact of uneveness. Moreover, we would also 
first need to establish every individual's fundamental identific- 
ation of his existential situation and whether he is a free agent 
or not. 
(2) At this juncture it is necessary to emphasize another 
important feature of the urbanization process in the Sudan; namely, 
that the process involves people who originate from widely separ- 
ated and remote areas of the country (this is particularly true 
of the inhabitants of towns in the central regions of the country). 
This fact adds the following dimensions to any comprehensive urban 
do 
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profile of the country: 
(a) The towns are not only centres of administration (political 
domination) and trade (economic exploitation) where many services 
are concentrated: they are also heterogenous settlements which 
commonly stand as alien enclaves for the local people of their 
immediate hinterlands. This impeds and largely negates these 
centres' alleged potential role as bases for the diffusion of 
change and "modernity"41, while simultaneously accentuating anta- 
gonisms between the town and country. 
(b) The diverse origins, and the often conflicting urban groups, 
do not necessarily result- as sometimes assumed- in a situation 
of diversified "cultural" alternatives for the individual urban- 
ite. On the contrary, such evidence as we so far have, suggests 
an increasing adherence of members of various groups to their res- 
pective "cultural" systems. At best, members of one group ignore 
others; at worst, they show considerable hatred of, and prejudice 
towards, others. 
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To explain this, we need to refer to the con- 
crete processes attendant on daily life in the urban context; pro- 
cesses that can be identified in the real lives of the urbanite 
peoples; economic, political and social processes and how they are 
being carried out in relation to the situation of inter-group "hos- 
tilities", rather than the confused and confusing use of mysteri- 
ous notions about these groups' histories, natural ways of life, 
cultural heritage, and values. 
(3) In this way we can approach the study of a further imp- 
ortant feature of urban life in the Sudan: the persistence and 
continuous reproduction of so-called "rural" and "traditional" 
sets of values, attitudes, and institutions. The emergence and 
maintenance, and even often the further development of phenomena 
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such as "tribal" loyalties and ethnic identifications, close- 
knit social and kinship networks, and exclusive voluntary assoc- 
iations have commonly captured the attention of scholars as sal- 
ient characteristics of urban society in the Sudan43, and, in fact, 
in other towns and cities in the Third World. This apparent "co- 
existence" of a "modern" capitalist social and economic formation 
in the urban milieu with "traditional" pre-capitalist systems of 
values and socio-political institutions has generally been per- 
ceived in one or the other of two divergent ways: 
(a) The first offers an abstracted frame of analysis which assumes 
that immigrants in the urban areas are principally "free agents" 
in their choice of patterns of life that best suit their interests. 
Being faced with the disorganizing and disruptive impact of urban 
life, their "natural" response is to reconstruct and rebuilt sub- 
stitutive social systems, largely borrowed from their rural trad- 
itional inventory, in order to achieve a degree of "adaptation" 
to the urban context as a first step towards ultimate "integrat- 
ion", "involvement", and "incorporation" into this newly found 
heaven of progress and advancement. 
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There is in this type of 
analysis a basic abstract assumption of "contrast" and "conflict" 
between rural and urban ways of life. The natural "evolution" of 
human life necessitates the elimination or transformation of the 
less 'advanced' and less equipped system to cope with needs and 
requirements of urban life which is developing according to the 
dynamics of "modern" and non-rural processes-i. e. the total "re- 
jection" of the 'backward' rural way of life. When these rural 
ways of life persist or recur, they are usually conceived as being 
transient in time and local in space (situational)45. Thus this 
approach resulted in attention being focused on the study of var- 
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ious indicators of "acculturation" and "assimilation" where the 
process of adjustment and adaptation of immigrants was seen as 
the central problematic. 
When the empirical data show a regressive- rather than pro- 
gressive- pattern in the development of this evolutionary schema, 
which is often the case, the focus of the studies is simply swit- 
ched to the investigation of immanent aspects of the culture, the 
system of values or social organization, and, at times, to "the 
nature" of the immigrants who are often seen as holding "unexpect- 
edly" refractory and intransigent attitudes and values least cond- 
ucive to change and modernization. 
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By "ignoring" the historical 
processes underlying the empirical data gathered at the small-scale 
level of investigation, such studies reveal their "irreducible 
ideological components". And since they can only function as ideo- 
logical implements in the "rationalization" of human behaviour 
and/or supply bases for the development of manipulative tactics, 
these studies lend their conclusions to systematic use by adminis- 
trators and other dominant groups for the domination and exploit- 
ation of ordinary urban populations and for legitimation of exist- 
ing socio-economic and political orders in the urban world. 
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(b) The second, and very different, way in which many forms of 
immigrant behaviour have been viewed as a "mechanical" consequence 
of the process of "structuring" and "constraining" of that behav- 
four by the colonial, or neo-colonial, capitalist socio-economic 
formation, suffers similar problems of assumptions and practical 
consequences. For, in this approach, the emphasis is firmly placed 
on the study of the impact of extraneous factors which are seen as 
shaping the, backward or modern, behaviour of immigrants in the 
urban context. In other words, the immigrants are here assumed 
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to be ultimately constrained and structured in their behaviour 
by the deterministic mechanisms of the colonial or neo-colonial 
capitalist formation. 
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The immigrants themselves in the urban 
situation are taken as a passive, disposable, and easily manipul- 
ated mass in relation to the dominant system to which they are 
connected by a relationship of "dependency" and "subjugation". In 
the most extreme versions of this type of interpretation, the imm- 
igrants are perceived as "victims" of a wider conspiracy, and in 
order to understand and explain the victims' behaviour, it is suff- 
icient to interpret the interests of the conspirators. 
My critique of this second approach is not based on its 
general assumptions and conclusions, with many of which I agree in 
a general way. And, indeed, I would stress that in my view we need 
far more studies than we yet have to help us to illuminate and 
clarify in detail the ways in which dominant capitalistic interests 
and structures create and maintain situations of compulsion that 
affect the immigrants' behaviour. But I am not satisfied with the 
way in which the empirical evidence on "structuring and constrain- 
ing" has thus far been interpreted and posed to give a picture of 
a situation of contention consisting of a single active contender 
and a one-way pressure mounting. I contend that attempts to do so 
magnify out of all proportion the dynamics of colonial, and by 
extension, neo-colonial capitalism, and thus they portray the 
immigrant urban population as a mass of chanceless victims, and 
posit a scenario of a struggle-free processes. 
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Such an inter- 
pretation is highly ideological as can easily be grasped if we 
consider the practical implications which follow from it. These 
implications are: 
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(a) Either that the ordinary and poor urban masses are 
powerless and quite impotent to offer any resistance 
to the economic dynamics of colonial and neo-colonial 
capitalism to struggle against its political dominance. 
(b) Or that the poor masses have the power but lack the nec- 
essary knowledge to comprehend the nature of their sit- 
uation and use their power appropriately to free them- 
selves from the imposed structure and its constraints. 
In the case of (a) the further implication is that the door 
is open for a third group, which must- by definition- be neither 
the dominant capitalist nor the dominated poor, to emancipate the 
poor from the dominance of the powerful. This group can only be 
one "in between" or "above"- i. e. an elite. In the case of (b), 
the implication is that the poor masses are incapable of under- 
standing the "mysterious" course of events of which they are vict- 
ims, and that this needs to be explained to them by an "educated" 
and learned elite. The only course of action open for the poor 
masses would therefore be to join the "struggle" behind the "van- 
guard elite" and carry out the political tasks assigned to them 
by the "intellectual elite". 
Whether we take version (a) or version (b), this kind of 
interpretation fails to emphasize the nature of the socio-economic 
and political struggle inherent in the behaviour of immigrant mas- 
ses, or to draw attention to the specific ways in which they do 
resist and strive. Consequently, little or no attention is paid 
to the study of urban settlements as historical arenas for class 
antagonisms and struggles. And, whether consciously or not, this 
leads to a negation of a highly dynamic aspect of urban life and 
to the concealment or minimization of contradictions in the pre- 
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wailing structure of interests and in the way in which the poor 
and the "rich" actually struggle and strive. 
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(4)One logical consequence of the negation referred to 
above, the negation of structural antagonisms immanent in the 
urban socio-economic and political formation, is the almost com- 
plete neglect of one of the most fundamental features of urban- 
ization and urban life in the Sudan, namely the pervasive role 
assumed by commercial capital accumulation throughout the history 
of "modern" Sudanese towns. Without any significant exception, all 
urban studies "mention" trade and commerce ( besides administration) 
as the main and most dynamic characteristic of urban development. 
Yet very few have attempted to explore the nature, history, mech- 
anisms, and socio-economic and political consequences of trade 
and commerce in these towns. Among these few, we have one which makes an 
"attempt... to measure central business function tendencies of 
trade types in Omdurman..., and to quantify these tendencies to- 
wards centrality" from a geographical perspective51, and another 
which attempts to "describe the social characteristics of big mer- 
chants and businessmen in El-Obeid where the Majority of the Town's 
inhabitants earn their livelihood as traders of one sort or an- 
other". 
52 Although both studies give fascinating insights into 
the geography and ethnography of commerce in the two towns to 
which they refer, both fail to examine the patterns of commerc- 
ial development in any illuminating way. In particular, attent- 
ion has never been focused on trade and commerce as economic act- 
ivities generating a further- and perhaps more effectual- process 
of capital accumulation. Thus questions about the specific relat- 
ionship between urban trade and the colonial capitalist penetrat- 
ion in the Sudan are still largely untouched. Likewise, the role 
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of local traders in the expansion of capital through the impos- 
ition of forms of commodity production, the social organization 
of trade, its personnel 
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and the social processes of differen- 
tiation inherent in its accumulative character have either been 
assumed as "natural" or taken for granted. 
Two recent studies have indeed attempted to investigate the 
process of capital accumulation, but they again either ignored the 
specific manifestations of antagonisms and of struggle within which 
the process of accumulation develops54, or simply concluded that 
when the accumulation of capital reaches a certain level it cre- 
ates a "basis for a mass struggle against it"55-i. e. the process 
of accumulation itself emerges and develops free of contention. In 
this way, both studies failed to treat and examine the process of 
capital accumulation (mainly commercial) as an antagonistic socio- 
economic process which, from the outset, develops within that ant- 
agonism and according to its conditions; instead, they see it (or 
it. so appears) primarily as a struggle-free process, and they thus 
end up at the same ideological starting point as earlier studies. 
CONCLUSION: 
A proper understanding of the processes of urbanization and 
of the nature of urban life can only be developed, as I see it, if 
we place our inquiries in a clearly defined and adequately charac- 
terized historical epoch. It seems necessary to stress that urban- 
ization and urban life in the Sudan were, and still are, basically 
and essentially different in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. 
It must surely be crucially important to identify the major chara- 
cteristic features and the principal underlying socio-economic pro- 
cesses of any period in order to grasp the significance and to 
correctly perceive the problematic of urbanization and urban life 
in any historical period. The view taken in this thesis is that, 
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by completely neglecting, or by paying far too little attention 
to this conceptual and theoretical aspect, students of urbaniz- 
ation and urban life in the Sudan have thus far made a serious 
methodological. -error. This has important implications. It not 
only renders our efforts inadequate for academic purposes, but 
it is also serious because the ideological assumptions implicit 
in the omission affect the real lives of millions of people. For, 
by failing to dwell on the nature of the colonial and neo-colonial 
capitalist economy of the Sudan, the process of capital accumulat- 
ion, the necessary relation of exploitation which this accumulat- 
ion requires, and the inevitable antagonisms between the interests 
of the "classes" of the accumuZators and the exploited, these stu- 
dies effectively provide an important mystifying and distorting 
ideological component to the situation of struggle immanent in 
the society. They obscure and distort the real nature of "what is 
going on"; thus facilitating the tä; C of maintaining and reproduc- 
ing the status quo. 
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The presence of voluntary tribal alliances in the cities 
may greatly enhance the third process. These alliances- 
some of them, ironically, developed by the educated- 
may prolong the process of detribalization and, there- 
fore, may help inject many of the rural sociocultural 
systems into urban life (original emphasis). See El-Arifi, 
1971, p. 139. 
Also Zahir Al-Sadaty observed that ethnic loyalities and 
backgrounds: 
were not only used as a means of social interaction in 
a complex situation where different peoples of various 
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cultural backgrounds come together under one indust- 
rial urban system, but it was also successfully used 
organize people politically against what the Cardboard 
(a residential area for Westerners in Khartoum North- 
author) dwellers categorized as the Northerners and Khartoum people (emphasis original). See Zahir Al-Sadaty, 
1972, pp. 70-71. 
44. This conception of urbanization as. a one-way process of 
change towards full ''acculturation" and "detribalization" 
has been elaborated in a number of African Studies. See, 
for example, Wilson, M. and Wilson, G., 1945. It is also, 
in very broad terms, a basic postulate of most work on urb- 
anization in Europe and America- of the Chicago School and 
many developments following from the Chicago School thinking. 
45. The theoretical dissatisfaction with the one-way model of 
change, led to the invention of the "alternation" model, 
where the immigrant in the urban context is assumed to be 
"switching" back and forth between two distinct social fields 
or systems (rural and urban). See, for instance, Gluckman, 
M., 1960. 
To account for the "persistence" of "rural tribalism" in 
urban context, later modifications of the "alternation" 
model were developed to allow for this alternation to be 
seen as taking place between various sets of relationships 
within the same social field as a normal and not necessarily 
vanishing phenomenon. The migrant can thus be seen to "sel- 
ect" between "tribal" and "urban" behaviour according to 
the immediate requirements of the "situation". See, Epstein, 
1958, Mitchell, 1960, and Mayer, 1962. 
46. For example, in his attempt to explain the fact that "little 
change appears to have taken place in the traditional nom- 
adic way of life over the past 1000 years" for the Beja 
living in Deim E1-Arab in Port Sudan, and in particular in 
relation to their economic behaviour in that town, Lewis 
sees what he perceives as "improvident fatalism" of the Beja 
as"the natural result of the life they have lived for so 
many generations: to enjoy plenty when good rains fall, and 
to suffer hardship socially when they failed, has become part 
of their mentality, just as the sharing of both with their 
most distantly related kinsfolk is the natural way for them 
to behave" (emphases added). See, Lewis, B. A., 1980, pp. 
588-9. 
47. See Mariotti, A. and Magubane, B., 1978, p. 65. 
48. In one sense, Kameir's study on Nuer Migrants in Khartoum 
gives such an impression by stressing that "that the uneven 
development of Sudan under British colonial rule- and the 
continuation of this process since Independence- are central 
features of the situation which surrounds the Nuer and leads 
them to behave as they do". This is because "their pattern 
of migration, circulation, and concentration results from 
very narrowly restricted alternatives which the social, 
economic, and political structure of the country offers 
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them". See, Kameir, E. M., 1980, pp. 476-7. 
49. Since the process of proletarianization- whether under col- 
onialism or neo-colonialism- has taken, and continues to 
take, the form of imposing the commodity-form of production 
and of class social relations under the dominance of ''cap- 
ital", this has always called for the systematic use of power 
- legal-political power at least- to drive peasants and "tri- 
bal" peoples from their lands, and to destroy their handi- 
crafts and culture in order to create a new class of work- 
ers. This, as the historical evidence from the Sudan sugg- 
ests, has been resisted vigorously. Thus in Cleaver's words: 
"it is important to see that this was indeed a matter of 
struggle and not a one-sided manipulation". Cleaver, H., 
1979, p. 76. 
50. Otherwise one must assume a situation of consensus and har- 
mony. But if one assumes contradiction and antagonisms, it 
it imperative to reveal and explain their manifestations 
and forms in their full complexity. 
51. Kuhn, M., 1971. 
52. Al-Dawi, T. A., 1972. 
53. One study, for instance, "explains" the relatively wide 
involvement in trade of "sedentary riverain people inhabit- 
ing the Nile from Khartoum to Dongola", (i. e. Northerners), 
by simply asserting that "these folk possessed a keen merc- 
antile instinct". See, Ahmed, H. A., 1977, p. 32. 
54. See Omer's study on local traders and agricultural develop- 
ment in Northern Sudan. In particular, see Chapter Six where 
the author traces the forms of commercial accumulation in 
both rural and urban settlements in the area. Omer, E. A. B., 
1979. 
55. Mahmoud, F. B., 1978, p. 218. 
CHAPTER THREE 
HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL PROFILE OF HASSAHEISA 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter forms part of the introductory section of 
the thesis. It sets out to impart some basic information about 
Hassaheisa and mainly about aspects of it which will not be points 
of focus in the thesis, but which are essential knowledge for a 
full understanding and proper analysis of central issues in the 
thesis. In giving a systematic account of the development of 
the town, an attempt is made to show how Hassaheisa of the pres- 
ent day reflects the influence of the colonial regime under which 
it was first established and then developed. I thus attempt to 
provide an analysis of the historical processes through which the 
town was created or "produced", as well as a further analysis of 
its continuing "reproduction". My main concern is to describe 
the inter-related characteristics of the town and show how these 
operate to reproduce the specific urban situation which is the 
object of my analysis. In using this perspective, I attempt to 
provide far more than a nebulous "historical background" to the 
political economy of Hassaheisa; I attempt to analyse the proc- 
esses through which the town has developed its present structures 
and thus to assess and unravel the dynamics of urban growth and 
change in their full complexity. Thus the history of the town is 
not treated simply as an aggregate of "facts" and "events" which 
help explain the present situation, but as an aggregate which it- 
self calls for explanation. In particular, the chapter dwells up- 
on the following: 
(1) the story of the town's establishment and growth. 
(2) The main socio-demographic characteristics of the town's 
various constituent groups, including the dynamics of 
growth of its population as a whole. 
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(3) The general features of the economic life which is 
articulated in this particular urban area. 
(4) The town's ecological structure and the dynamics of the 
functioning and transformation of this structure. 
Before turning to these, however, it may be helpful to loc- 
ate the town and to indicate some of its main features of to-day. 
It is the, second largest, and the second most important, town in 
the Gezira Province of the Sudan. It is situated on the left bank 
of the Blue Nile, which runs north for about 70 miles to meet the 
While Nile at the site of Khartoum (See Map IV) . The land on which 
the town is situated rises gradually to the west from the Blue 
Nile which forms its eastern boundary. The Main Canal of the Gez- 
ira Scheme constitutes the western boundary. To the north, the 
town's official boundary runs along the irrigated fields of the 
Gezira Scheme, and privately owned rain-fed agricultural lands 
lie on the southern boundary. The land lying between the Blue Nile 
and the Main Canal is quite narrow and permits no further exten- 
sion to the east or the west. Hence all recent extensions of the 
town were to the south and the north, and any future extensions 
will perforce be on agricultural lands in the same directions. 
The following facts concerning Hassaheisa's locational 
relation to its immediate hinterlands may be noted: 
Firstly, although the town is not at the heart of the re- 
gion, it functions as the administrative and commercial centre 
of the whole district commonly referred to as Northern Gezira. 
This district, and its southern part in particular', is the rich- - 
est of the Gezira- and consequently of the whole rural Sudan. 
Though not at the centre of this district, Hassaheisa is easily 
accessible from all parts of the area to which it is linked by 
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Table 3: 1 Internal 
Distance 
Transport: Destination, Direction and 
from Hassaheisa, Type, Number and Seat 
Capacity, and Frequency of Journeys of Vehicles 
Based in Hassaheisa Suk, 1980 
Destination Direct 
ion 
Distance 
(K. ms. ) 
Pick-Up (12 seats) Mini Bus (14 
Seats) 
Bus (45 
Seats) 
No. Frequency No. Frequen. No. Freq. 
Wad Shommu S 18 1 2 - - - - 
Tannoub S. W. 35 4 1 - - - - 
Um Tiraibat W 20 1 1 - - - - 
Um Jirais W 35 3 1 - - - - 
Fiteis S. W. 35 6 1 1 1 - - 
Abu A'ddara W 35 3 1 - - - - 
Tabat W 25 69 2 5 2 3 1 
el-Kahamir S 17 2 2 - - - - 
Um Dwana W 35 4 1 - - - - 
Shazali S. W. 18 1 1 - - - - 
Wad el-Sayed W 14 1 2 - - - - 
el-Firaijab W 40 1 1 - - - - 
Meigna W 35 2 1 - - - - 
Arbaji E 6 21 8 4 8 2 5 
Abbeid E 7 3 8 1 8 - - 
Wad Sulfab S. W. 10 6 2 - - - - 
Nile S. W. 19 6 1 - - 1 1 
Wad Kirie S 32 8 1 - - - - 
el-Fugara S 11 3 2 - - - - 
Wad el-Fadni S 18 1 2 - - - - 
Wad Hagga S 19 1 1 - - - - 
Messellamia S 24 2 2 17 2 - - 
el-Dwineib S 20 1 1 - - - - 
Sharaf at N. W. 18 7 1 - - - - 
el-Timaid N. W. 17 2 2 - - - - 
Tyba W 11 8 4 - - - - 
Hilaila/ 
Dulga N. W. 18 3 1 - - - - 
Mustafa/ 
Ghorashi N. W. 17 2 2 - - - - 
Mihairiba N. W. 42 1 1 1 1 1 1 
el-Walli W 30 1 1 - - 
1 1 
Safia N. W. 28 1 1 - - - - 
el-Bashir N. W. 20 2 1 - - 
Abu Usher N 24 63 2 - - 1 
2 
el-Guneid N 18 17 4 - - - - 
A'mmara Taha S 13 1 2 1 2 - 
el-Managil S. W. 70 - - - - 
24 1 
Um O'ddam W 25 - - - - 
3 1 
el-Aikoura S 15 - - - - 
1 1 
Abu Gouta N. W. 85 - - 
2 1 
Nikhaira N 55 - - - - 
2 1 
Wad Medani S 40 - - - - 
5 1 
Khartoum N 130 - - - - 
41 1 
Total Vehicle s 258 
30 87 
_. C Ir -- -ý 
.c4 D ., .-- 
ltI 
Source: Chiet of nassaneisa rollee, 
h At--PULL Lv Liier - --__ 
cue, and Licence Dept., 23.9.1980 (File 39/K/3, N. Gezira 
Police H. Q) 
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a relatively good network of communication and transport. Since 
the mid-1960s, the town has increasingly functioned as the nodal 
point of an intensive transport system covering every corner of 
the district. A recent report on licensed motor-vehicles linking 
Hassaheisa and destinations in the district documents this fully 
(See summary in Table 3: 1). 
Secondly,, as previously noted, Hassaheisa is located on the 
left bank of the Blue Nile, while the older and more "traditional" 
town of Rufa'a lies opposite on the right bank of the river. 
Rufa'a is the administrative and economic centre of the vast 
region of Butana- the homeland of the Shukria Arabs. There is good 
and frequent river transport between the two towns. Twenty kilo- 
metres nothwards on the right bank of the river there is a large 
area of cane fields which supply the sugar refinery plant at Gun- 
eid. 
Hassaheis. a also lies on the main asphalted highway which 
links Khartoum, Wad-Medani, Port Sudan and Sennar-Kosti, and has 
a major rail station which handles the greater part of the Sudan's 
most important cash crop, namely cotton. At the same time, the 
Gezira Scheme receives most of the imported capital goods, which 
are essential for its agricultural operations, through Hassaheisa. 
These goods include fertilizers, machines, fuel, pesticides and 
seeds, all of which are received, stored and then distributed to 
various parts of the Gezira Scheme by the Gezira Light Railways. 
The significance of the geographical location of the town has 
increased steadily since its original selection by the British 
colonial administration as a military base for the strategic com- 
mand of the surrounding region. A detailed account and assessment 
of that decision will be given later. 
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ESTABLISHMENT AND GROWTH 
In order to develop a full historical analysis of the growth 
of Hassaheisa we need to dwell on some of the features of the re- 
gion in which the town is set, and to examine populations move- 
ments and pre-existing patterns of life in the area prior to the 
advent of British colonial rule. The account will, however, be 
limited to knowledge necessary for a working analysis of the cre- 
ation and growth of the town. The purpose of my discussion of life 
in the Gezira prior to British colonial rule is two-fold: first, 
to enable us to assess the nature and extent of changes brought 
about by the colonial presence in whole area; second, to allow us 
to evaluate the processes of change and transformation during and 
since the colonial period which took place in direct correspond- 
ence to urban development. 
The fundamental assumption made for analytical purposes is- 
following Godelier- that, whatever the causes of change and of 
the internal and external circumstances attendant on that change, 
the transformations in the mode of life of any people, and the con- 
sequent contradictions involved, "always have their basis in int- 
ernal properties, immanent in the social structure, and (that) 
they realize unintentional necessities whose logic and laws must 
be uncovered". This assumption is made because, as argued by 
2 
Long, "the seizing of new opportunities is often facilitated by 
the use of existing sets of relationships and resources, and by 
the reinterpretation of traditional norms and values". 
3 The foll- 
owing account of the establishment of Hassaheisa, seen as a pro- 
cess of change, is a case in point. 
The Gezira region, where Hassaheisa is located, is an exp- 
anse of land lying between the Blue Nile and the White Nile. It 
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forms part of the vast area south of Khartoum where an elabor- 
are system of irrigation allows cotton to be grown on a scale 
which has made this product the staple export of the Sudan. "The 
rainfall in the Gezira is erratic and varies from the north to 
the south. In the north it averages something under 250mm per 
year, rising in the extreme south to about 750 mm. concentrated 
in the period from late July to early November, this pattern of 
rainfall enabled the people to create an economy based on the 
cultivation of duüia. (sorghum vulgare) prior to the coming of 
irrigation". 4 
Generally speaking, the Gezira was the homeland of four 
main Arabic-speaking "tribal" groups as early as the fourteenth 
century. 
5 (See Map V). The Dubasin have throughout this period 
been located in the north-western part of the region, where Kab- 
Algidad was their capital village. Their neighbours to the south 
were the Hallawin, with Al-Mihayriba as their administrative cen- 
tre and the seat of their leading "tribal" family. Immediately to 
the south of the Hallawin were the Shanabla spread around the 
urban, administrative, and commercial centre of El-Messelamia 
which dates back to long before the colonial period. Various sub- 
groups of the larger Arabic-speaking "tribal" people- the A'rak- 
yin, were settled between Wad-Medani in the east and Managil in 
the west, with A1-Madina-Arab and Abu-Haraz as their administrat- 
ive and religious headquarters respectively. In addition, there 
were numerous pockets of smaller "tribal" groups scattered throu- 
ghout the region. Typical of these were the Bedayria and Gaaliin 
who lived in scattered settlements along the banks of the Blue 
Nile. Other minority "tribal" groups lived on the western edge 
of the Gezira, e. g. the Kwahla and the Nifaydia, both of whom 
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depended more on the White Nile. 
All these peoples were predominantly pastoralists but also 
engaged in limited subsistence agriculture. Within the geograph- 
ical boundaries of the Gezira, they habitually moved in regular 
seasonal cycles. These moves were made primarily to meet the graz- 
ing and watering needs of their cattle and sheep. In particular, 
they normally spent the period of Kha)Liý (the wet rainy season) in 
Dhahana (the relatively high lands of the Gezira plain some dist- 
ance from the river bank, literally means the back). While using 
the local sources of water (mainly wells) and grass for their 
animals during this period, they engaged mainly in dunna cultiv- 
ation around their settlements in their respective Da)u (homeland). 
In the Da&at(harvest season) they used to collect the durra and 
store certain part of it for future use in Matmouic" (underground 
grain stores). After that, and with the coming of the Sai (hot, 
dry season), they usually moved down towards the river bank, where 
they again found sufficient fresh grazing and water for their ani- 
mals. In this way they systematically exploited the ecological 
features of their region. 
Each "tribal" group had well demarcated and traditionally 
recognized stretches of land along the river bank (Muzhta') pro- 
portionate to its power and influence. The area,. type, and size 
of river lands commanded by each group were afuncti. on of its 
"power" relative to other groups in the region, which explains 
why the Dubasin had the smallest and poorest area, a fact which 
I later discuss. 
Common to all these groups was their traditional mode of 
socio-economic life. Each group functioned as a unit whose memb- 
ers were closely inter-related by marriage and kinship, and who 
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were territorially grouped under the "leadership'' of the most 
senior man among them. While combining agriculture with herding, 
they were semi-nomadic in the sense explained above. They were 
self-sufficient with each group normally producing virtually all 
its needs from the immediate environment. The limited trade that 
took place with the "outside" world of each was usually confined 
to goods of a secondary nature. 
6 
The social mechanisms inherent in this self-sufficiency 
tended to militate against internal sudden change and equally to 
produce opposition to any attempts to impose change from the out- 
side. In the event, it would appear that significant change was 
only possible after the existing structures had either been dest- 
royed or systematical distorted. Historically, this took place 
through a careful articulation of "alien" colonial and certain 
"local" interests against the wider traditional interests, and my 
contention is that the eventual establishment of Hassaheisa is one 
good illustration of how such articulation took place and led to 
far-reaching change. 
Prior to British colonial rule there was no permanent sett- 
lement of any kind at the present site of Hassaheisa, though the 
Dubasin made seasonal use of it. Nor was there any proper or sig- 
nificant settlement during the first decade of the colonial reg- 
ime. The word "Hassaheisa" is a local term denotes "poor sandy 
land", and the fact the Dubasin used the site during the dry sea- 
son period is itself a reflection of their relatively weak posit- 
ion vis-a-vis other groups of the Gezira. Hassaheisa area was the 
smallest, as compared to areas used by other groups, and it was 
also the least fertile. Moreover, the Dubasin had to cross the 
home areas of the Hallawin to reach their riverside lands; this 
'A 
67 
accentuated their weak position, and led to a long and complicated 
history of disputes over neighbouring lands between the two groups. 
7 
In 1908, however, an important event took place in the Hall- 
awin area. As this had a direct effect on the decision of the 
colonial administration to establish and develop Hassaheisa as 
their administrative headquarters, I give in Appendix 5 the full 
text of the event as reported in the Governor-General's Annual 
Report in 1908. But; in short, the event consisted of a rebellion 
on the part of the Hallawin led by Abdel Kadir Wad-Habouba against 
the British occupation of the country, and it was ruthlessly cru- 
shed by the government with active assistance from the Dubasin. 
The view of the Governor-General, as expressed in a letter 
to the Counsul-General in Cairo, was that the rebellion had to be 
crushed at all costs: " Severity is the kindest treatment in this 
country if we are to protect these stupid people against themsel- 
ves". 
8 
Consequently, there were many ruthless executions of susp- 
ects in the area, but the colonial administration remained dissat- 
isfied. Thus, for example, the Province Governor's Report for 1908 
contained the following comments: 
the events of last May have shown that public security in 
this Province rests on less secure foundations than has 
been previously supposed. (.. ) I regret to say that the 
Hallawin District is still in an unsettled condition, dis- 
affection having been more widely spread than was at first 
suspected, and I have in consequence asked for an increase 
of police next year. (... ) Should funds be not forth-coming 
to provide for such an increase of Police, I recommend that 
a detachment of mounted Infantry should be stationed at the 
9 
area. 
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He was thus urging the transfer of the District Headquarters from 
Messalamia to Hassaheisa as a new station for the troops because, 
he wrote, "for various reasons Hassaheisa is obviously the most 
suitable site".. 
10 
A first problem was, however, to establish a population 
other than troops and administrators at the new site. The section 
of the Dubasin group which were accustomed to make seasonal use 
of the site provided an obvious choice for the following reasons: 
(1) The Dubasin had played an active part in capturing Abdel-Kadir. 
Though this may well have been a manifestation of their old latent 
hostility to the Hallawin, it provided a good reason and basis for 
a loose alliance with the British in order to check the Hallawin's 
traditional superiority over the Dubasin. 
(2) As the Hallawin held the Dubasin responsible for the capture 
and execution of Abdel-Kadir, the Dubasin were now naturally sub- 
jest to the hostility of the Hallawin, and opportunities for rev- 
enge were greatly enhanced by the Dubasin's seasonal crossing of 
Hallawin's territory to reach their river lands at Hassaheisa. 
By settling in Hassaheisa, the Dubasin would thus be protected 
from direct contact with the Hallawin, and their security would 
be effectively ensured by Government troops now to be stationed 
locally. 
In fact, however, only leading families of this section of 
the Dubasin and poor families firmly dependent on them could hope 
to secure a regular living away from their traditional lands. The 
way in which these now abondoned their traditional life calls for 
explanation. 
Firstly, the leading families were able to appropriate sufficient 
surpluses from their traditional economic activities to enable 
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them to establish themselves in the new settlement. These surp- 
luses mainly took the form of livestock.. 
Secondly, it would appear that the position of the poorer Dubasin 
was so radically undermined by the difficulties which now preven- 
ted their former seasonal movements that they soon constituted a 
ready "reservoir of labour" for various construction works on the 
new site. 
Thirdly, the colonial administration spared no effort to promote 
and maintain a permanent settlement of the"Dubasin in Hassaheisa. 
It provided the newly permanent settlers with agricultural land 
for the cultivation of dunha and with access to grazing on nearby 
lands confiscated from the Hallawin. In addition there were in- 
creasing opportunities for cash wages in temporary casual employ- 
ment. 
In this way, the Dubasin became a significant group in the 
new town, settling close to the government troops and other gove- 
rnmental personnel. With the extension of the railway line to 
Hassaheisa in 1910/1911, another group- skilled workers drawn 
mainly from the Northern Province- joined the Dubasin as the sec- 
and wave of settlers. 
As a result of the establishment of good transport facilit- 
ies, trade and other commercial activities soon flourished, as 
is explained in Chapter 4, and this opened up opportunities 
for 
further settlers, mainly traders from districts other than the 
Gezira and especially from the North. 
The 1920s and the 1930s were crucially important in the 
development of the Gezira region in general, and of Hassaheisa in 
particular. It was during this period that the 
Gezira Scheme was 
established. This development, which is 
discussed in some detail 
in Chapter 4, had two important direct effects: firstly, it larg- 
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ely stemmed the movement of population from the surrounding coun- 
tryside towards the new urban settlement at Hassaheisa through 
their effective stabilization in their home areas within the 
newly formalized structures of. the peasant economy of the Gezira 
scheme; and secondly, it simultaneously gave rise to the need for 
extra labour from outside the Gezira. This need was expressed in 
1924 by the Governor of the Blue Nile Province: 
For any large extension of the Gezira irrigated Scheme 
an assured supply of casual labour up to 50,000 men will 
be required. Local sources of supply will by then have 
been largely eliminated, and reliance will have to be 
placed on some Sudan source of supply, for example, the 
Nuba Mountains, or the greatly increased body of West 
African pilgrims. 
11 
The scheme was based on the principle of gravity irrigat- 
ion which entailed the construction of a sophisticated system of 
canals and stations spread over the whole region. In 1925 a major 
station was established on the Main Canal at the north-western 
sector of the settlement where a residential neighbourhood for 
employees of the Irrigation Department developed. Most of these 
employees came from the Northern Province. Another important dev- 
elopment was the establishment of the Gezira Scheme Ginneries at 
Hassaheisa in 1926/27. Substantial numbers of people were recr- 
uited from various areas of the Sudan, (with the significant exce- 
ption of the Gezira area itself), to provide the labour for the 
Ginneries. As explained in Chapter 6, this labour force was both 
skilled and unskilled. 
Although very few of the new urban recruits were local, an 
awareness of cash value permeated the whole region with the incr- 
easing involvement of nearby populations in cash-cropping and the 
market economy. Consequently Hassaheisa began to flourish as a 
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commercial centre fostering a new taste for consumer goods as 
a direct result of the introduction of systematic cash cropping. 
This basic economic change, and the resultant change in the con- 
sumption patterns of the region's populations, led to the further 
intensification and diversification of commercial activities to 
the point that trade dominated all other types of economic act- 
ivity in the new town, and this in turn attracted many more peo- 
ple to commercial pursuits (See Chapter 4). 
All these inter-related developments led the Governor of 
the Province to elevate Hassaheisa to the status of a town in 
1927. As the following Notice indicates, this move was intimately 
linked to the colonial administration's concerns to levy taxes: 
In exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 4 
(2) of the Local Taxation Ordinance, 1919, the Governor 
of the Blue Nile hereby with the consent of the Governor- 
General in Council declares the following places to be 
TOWNS for the purpose of the aforesaid"Ordinance" (the 
notice included a number of places in addition to Hassa- 
heisa the boundaries of which were fixed to include) all 
land situated within a kilometre radius of the Mosque. 
12 
The new tax revenues now allowed expenditure on public services 
necessitated by the growth of the settlement. 
THE TOWNS DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE: 
As I have explained elsewhere, the available data on the 
town's population changes and demographic composition do not 
allow much precision. 
13 
The main difficulties I encountered re- 
late to the poor quality of official statistics and the practical 
problems involved in ordering them adequately to produce a comp- 
lete and fully coherent analysis. Crude as the analysis is, 
how- 
ever, it does help to indicate some important aspects of the 
changing urban context of life in Hassaheisa. 
4 
72 
Since the 1955/56 Census was the first to be conducted in 
the Sudan, we shall never know with any accuracy what the popul- 
ation of the town or, for that matter, of the country as a whole, 
was at any earlier dates. We do, however, have opinions and frag- 
mentary estimates of the population at various times in the past. 
Such data have at times been discounted as mere guesses by later 
commentators, but this does not entirely invalidate them for our 
purposes. 
I propose to use an official estimate of the population in 
1936,14 the results of the first census of 1955/5615, the figures 
of the 1964/66 household survey 
16, 
the results of the second cen- 
sus of 197317, and the estimates of the population made for rat- 
ioning purposes by the Northern Gezira Statistics Office at Hass- 
aheisa for the Town'People's Council in 1980.18 A crude assessment 
of the rate of population growth based on the above sources is 
given in Table 3: 2. 
Table 3: 2 The Size and Growth Rate of Population in Hassaheisa 
Date Population Size % Increase Average Annual Percenta 
Rate of Growth Between 
Dates Shown 
1936 3,700 - - 
1955/56 6,933 87.4 4.4 
1964/66 12,315 72.5 7.2 
1973 18,747 55.4 7.9 
1980 30,112 60.6 12.1 
ge 
the 1 '' n 
Before commenting on these figures, a number of reservations 
must be made: 
(1) The population figures for different years are not strictly 
comparable as the boundaries adopted for enumerations and estim- 
ates were often quite arbitrary. The figures based on these bound- 
aries must therefore be used cautiously. 
'A 
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(2) As a regional town, Hassaheisa is an arena for economic and 
political activities of a day-rime population drawn from far bev- 
and its own boundaries, and indeed from an area with a radius of 
30 miles. Also, these activities are much more intensive during 
certain seasons than others. 
(3) The estimates for 1936 and 1980 should be treated with part- 
icular caution because they were made at times of peculiar econ- 
omic difficulties, such as the total absence or extreme scarcity 
of some basic commodities. The estimates were made partly for the 
purpose of rationing so that both the town's administration and 
people may be expected to have exaggerated their numbers in order 
to be given a larger share of the commodities being rationed by 
the central government. 
Despite these reservations about the reliability of the 
figures, let us examine them to see what they appear to tell us. 
The average annual rate of population growth for the entire 
period from 1936 to 1980 (about 8%) was very high compared with 
that of the Sudan as a whole (1.8%), and even compared with the 
rate for the region within which the town is set-i. e. Blue Nile 
Province which had a growth rate of 3.2%. At the same time, the 
rate of increase was fairly close to the average annual growth 
rate for the urban population of the Sudan as a whole (6.85%) and 
even closer to that for all urban areas in the Blue Nile Province 
(7.2170) . 
Although the overall level of urbanization (that is the urb- 
an population as a percentage of the total population) in the 
Sudan is below that of the rest of the world, with the possible 
exception of the average level in "low-income" countries, as 
shown in Table 3: 3, the Blue Nile Province, where Hassaheisa 
is 
situated, is one of the most highly urbanized regions of the 
A 
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Table 3: 3 Level and Rate of Urbanization for Selected 
Types of Countries and the Sudan 
Urban Population as % of 
Total Population (Level of 
Urbanization) 
1960 1980 
Urban Population Average 
Annual Rate of Growth (%) 
1960-70 1970-80 
Sudan 10% 25% 6.9 6.8 
Low-Income Countries 15% 17% 3.8 3.7 
Mid-Income Countries 37% 50% 4.1 3.8 
Ind. Market Economies 68% 77% 1.8 1.3 
Oil Exporters 37% 69% 7.4 6.7 
Non-Market Industrial 49% 64% 2.5 2.1 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981, Oxford Univ. Press, 
pp. 172-3. 
Table 3: 4 The Population of Blue Nile Province and 
Hassaheisa, the Level of Urbanization in 
in the Province, and the Share of Hassa- 
heisa in the Urban Provincial Population 
(in percent), 1955/56-1964/66- 1973 
Blue Nile Province Level of Urban- Hassaheisa share of Hass 
Urban Population ization Population aheisa in the 
Urban Pop. (%) 
955/56 102,200 5.1% 6933 6.8% 
1964/66 151,800 5.7% 12315 8.1% 
1973 260,300 7.17 18747 7.2/0 
Source: Compiled from statistical documents of the 1955/56 Cen- 
sus, the 1964/66 Household Survey, and the 1973 Census. 
I 
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Sudan, with only Khartoum and Kassala Provinces having higher 
levels. i9 Moreover, as shown in Table 3: 4, in spite of the rising 
level of urbanization in the Blue Nile Province as a whole, Hass- 
aheisa's average share has remained stable. 
Generally speaking the growth of urban populations is a re- 
suit of three factors: natural increase, town-ward migration, and 
the extension of urban boundaries. 
20 
The rate of natural increase 
of the urban population in the Sudan (in the intercensal period 
1955/56-1973) has been estimated at about 2.4% per year21, which 
is fairly near the rate estimated for Hassaheisa (2.3670). 
22 
This 
rate is obviously quite high in comparison with that in urban ar- 
eas of Western Europe, though it is of the same order as that 
commonly recorded in other Third World countries. What Davis calls 
a combination of "pre-industrial fertility and post-industrial 
morality"23 can partly account for the kind of result found in 
Hassaheisa and other Sudanese urban situations. There is over- 
riding evidence, even if not as precise as one might wish, of 
falling death rates in the urban areas of the Sudan but of no 
appreciable fall in birth rates. 
24 
Since the reclassification of "rural" areas close to Hass- 
aheisa as "urban" took place mainly during the period after the 
second census of 1973, we are safe in assuming that an appreci- 
able part of the increase in population of 12.1% between 1973 
and 1980 can be accounted for by extensions of the town boundar- 
ies. But not all of this increase, and the growth in population 
for the "old" parts may be estimated at about 7%. There can be 
no doubt that the principal factor of growth has been, and cont- 
inues to be, town-ward immigration. Accepting the figure of 2.36% 
as the average annual rate of natural increase, and assuming 
7% as 
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the overall rate of growth, the rate of net migration can be 
estimated at about 5% per annum. 
Another way of assessing the extent of immigration is to 
examine the places of birth of the present inhabitants of the 
town. In 1955/56 only 37.6% were born in Hassaheisa itself, with 
the balance claiming to have been born elsewhere. 
25 
My own survey 
of 1978/79 shows that only 320 of the 410 heads of households int- 
erviewed were born in the town. 
26 
It also appears from the available data that migrants to 
were 
Hassaheisatdisproportionately of young and middle-aged males as 
has been found in numerous studies both in the Sudan and more 
widely. 
27 
This naturally has a profound effect in producing an 
unbalanced population in regard to sex and age composition which 
in turn conditions the dynamics of demographic growth. 
On the basis of the findings of the two national censuses 
of 1955/56 and 1973, we can make a very fair assessment of the 
main age and sex characteristics of the population as in Table 
3: 5. 
Table 3: 5 Population of Hassaheisa by Sex & Age, 1955/56 & 1973 
Age Group Both Sexes Males Females 
1955/56 1973 1955/56 1973 1955/56 1973 
Under l Yr 3.4 2.89 47.05 47.29 52.95 52.7 
1-4 yrs -12.8 10.89 48.42 50.85 51.58 49.15 
5 yrs to 
under 
puberty 24.2 36.97 57.00 55.09 42.99 44.91 
Over Pub- 
erty 59.5 49.26 56.17 64.01 43.83 35.99 
All groups 100 100 55.1 56.3 44.9 43.7 
Total Pop. 6933 18747 3818 11025 3115 7722 
77 
Table 3: 6 Hassaheisa Population By Age & Sex, 1973 & 1978/79 
Age Group 
'78/79 
Both 
Size 
Surve 
Sexes 
7o 
y 1973 Pop 
Both Sexes 
Size 7o 
ulation Census 
Males Females 
Size 7o Size 70 
Under lyr. 537 2.9 254 47.3 283 52.7 
268 9.4 
1- 4 yrs 2043 10.9 1039 50.9 1004 49.2 
5- 9 412 14.5 2622 14.0 1354 51.6 1268 48.4 
10 - 14 388 13.6 2217 11.8 1144 51.6 1073 49.4 
15 - 19 468 16.4 2093 11.2 1321 63.1 772 36.9 
20 - 24 309 10.8 1765 9.4 1142 64.7 623 35.3 
25 - 29 244 8.6 2011 10.7 1326 65.9 685 34.1 
30 - 34 136 4.8 1323 7.1 857 64.8 466 35.2 
35 - 39 171 6.0 1304 7.0 793 60.8 511 
39.2 
40 - 44 134 4.7 936 5.0 575 61.4 
361 38.6 
45 - 49 107 3.8 613 3.3 410 
66.9 203 33.1 
50 - 54 81 "2.8 462 2.5 298 
64.5 164 35.5 
55 - 59 48 1.7 254 1.4 
164 64.6 90 35.4 
60 - 64 23 0.8 237 1.6 
138 58.2 99 41.8 
65 - 69 25 0.9 116 0.6- 
67 57.8 49 42.3 
70 + 11 0.4 203 1.1 132 65.0 71 
35.0 
Not Sated - - 11 0.1 
11 100.0 - - 
Total 2850 100.0 18747 100.0 11025 56.3 7722 43.7 
Source: Second Population Census, 1973 and Fieldwork Survey 
1978/ 
1979. 
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We see that the percentage of males in the total populat- 
ion exceeded that of females by 10.2% amd 12.6% in 1955/56 and 
1973 respectively. Both the initial excess and the apparent tend- 
ency for this to increase over time are in all 1 ikel ihood due more to 
sex-selective migration rather than to any major natural imbalance 
in the sex ratio at birth. If anything, the ratio of the sexes 
at birth would appear to have inclined towards girls for the 
precentages of females in the "under 1 year" category were 52.95% 
in 1955/56, and 52.7% in 1973. But there is a marked change bet- 
ween the age groups of "5 years to under puberty". Here the sit- 
uation approximates that of the sex composition of the whole pop- 
ulation, withthe males amounting to 57.00% and 55.09% for 1955/56 
and 1973 respectively. It is thus clear that migration tends to 
involve the young male population to a disproportionate extent. 
This observation may be further illustrated by the "over puberty" 
age group of the population where the percentages of females 
drops considerably: 43.83% for 1955/56 and 35.99% for 1973. A 
detailed picture of sex and age imbalance structure is indicated 
in Table 3: 6 which gives the detailed age-group sets for 1973 
census and 1978/79 survey together with the Hassaheisa Population 
Pyramid for 1973. 
The average number of persons per household according to 
the 1973 census, and confirmed by my own survey, is relatively 
high. 28 People living in household units composed of more than 
six persons make up 69.7% and 83.1% of the total population acc- 
ording to the 1973 census and my survey respectively. On the other 
hand, people living in household units composed of more than ten 
members amounted to 27.5% and 33/170 according to the same sources. 
Both enumerations, however, indicate an average household size 
80 
which is very high by Western standards, but similar to that 
found in rural areas of the Sudan. 
29 
These findings indicate two important facts: firstly, the 
general persistence in towns of rural birth rate levels30, and, 
secondly, the continuance of the rural tradition of kinship-based 
residential arrangements which commonly include members of the 
extended family in the household. 
The unbalanced structure of the town's population is ref- 
lected in, and in fact accentuated by, the marital status of the 
population. Here there is a disparity between the numbers of marr- 
ied males (3958) and married females (2756) according to the 
1973 census (See Table 3: 7). 
Table 3: 7 Population of Hassaheisa by Marital Status, Age- 
Group and Sex in 1973 
Sex 
Never Married Married Widowed Divorced Total 
Age Group M F M F M F M F M F 
Under 15 5790 3618 1 8 - 1 - 1 3791 362 
15-19 1287 588 33 174 - - 1 10 1321 772 
20-24 923 154 215 440 - 2 4 26 1142 623 
25-29 608 29 700 610 4 11 14 35 1326 685 
30-34 189 15 650 407 4 14 14 30 857 466 
35-39 77 4 701 450 8 28 7 29 793 511 
40-44 24 5 533 293 5 37 13 26 575 361 
45-49 7 5 391 143 6 35 6 20 410 203 
50-54 10 4 276 104 3 44 9 12 298 164 
55+ 15 16 458 127 23 149 14 17 512 309 
All Ages 6930 4438 3958 2756 53 321 82 206 11025 7722 
Source- Sudan Government, (1977), Table 5; a, b and c. 
This can only be explained by the common practice of migrant hus- 
bands leaving their wives elsewhere. (There is of course no poly- 
andry; on the contrary my own survey revealed the presence of a 
number of polygamous men). 
i 
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The "tribal" composition of the town's population is con- 
sidered more fully in Chapter 7. Here I simply draw attention to 
the extremely heterogeneous nature of the population and, even 
more significantly in relation to my present concerns, to the fact 
that the aggregate of persons from groups residing in the immedi- 
ate hinterland of the town represents a low proportion of the 
population. Migration to Hassaheisa has thus been mainly long- 
distance movement. 
31 
This is to some extent a consequence and 
reflection of the uneven pattern of socio-economic development and 
colonial capitalist penetration in various regions of the Sudan 
which was discussed in the previous Chapter. 
SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN ECONOMY IN HASSAHEISA 
The town's rapid population growth (about 7% annually) has 
taken place at a much quicker pace than European towns at a "comp- 
arable" period of their development when the "fastest urban pop- 
ulation growth (mostly in the later half of the 19th century)" 
took place at an average rate of only 2.1 percent. 
32 
In Hassah- 
eisa, as in many other "developing" towns of the present period, 
the rate of in-migration far outstrips the growth of employment 
opportunities as the local economy is largely unable to accomod- 
ate this "surplus" population in productive occupations. 
In the Sudan as a whole, the available data on the human 
resources indicate that 53% of the population are in the working 
age group (15-64 years). Of these, 72% are in agriculture, 10% 
in industry, and 18% in the service complex in 1980, while there 
were 86%, 6% and 8% respectively in 1960.33 Agriculture thus re- 
mains dominant (though declining), but the main rapid increase of 
opportunities is in the service- sector. Agricultural production 
obviously developed in the countryside, whereas the service ind- 
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ustry grew up almost entirely in the towns. As explained in Cha- 
pter 4, recent developments in the agricultural production sect- 
or (e. g. mechanization and capital intensification) are causing 
further and continuous shrinkages in secure employment for those 
presently engaged in it, and there are clearly no new opportunit- 
ies there. The industrial sector is expanding, but the dominant 
tendency is to use capital-intensive and labour-saving methods of 
production and this obviously militates against occupational exp- 
ansion. Thus the service sector is the only one in which the 
"surplus" labour force- particularly from rural areas- can find 
refuge. And this sector is by virtue of its nature, largely urban 
or urban-based. It is growing in the towns for a number of reas- 
ons: 
(1) As seats of commerce and trade, the towns are providing incr- 
easing employment in trade itself, banking, transport services 
and the like. 
(2) As the residential locales of most members of the dominant 
social groups in the society (merchants, financiers, bureaucrats, 
etc. ), the towns are also the places where most public services 
in education, health, and recreation are increasingly sited, as 
the dominant social groups are the only ones in a position to 
mount pressure on the state for the provision of such services. 
Failure on the part of the state to respond would clearly become 
politically embarassing, 
34 
(3) Finally, the concentration of the high incomes in the towns 
automatically leads to the development of opportunities for employ- 
ment in personal services (e. g. domestic and other informal pers- 
onal services such as car washing, shoe-shining, and even prost- 
itution). 
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Hassaheisa's economy reflects and manifests the same patt- 
ern of dominance and of dynamism in the service sector as other 
Sudanese towns. According to the 1973 census, 10,998 or about 
60% of the total population of the town (18747) were in the work- 
ing age groups (15-64 years), and of these 10998 only 6555 or 
59.6% were actually "employed". The pattern of their occupational 
distribution reveals the primacy of the service sector, the insig- 
nificant role of agriculture, and the modest employment opportun- 
ities in industry. Agriculture employed only 4.07, manufacturing 
industry employed less than 22.0%, while the remainder were eng- 
aged in the service sector. My own survey of 1978/79 reveals sim- 
ilar findings. Out of 668 recorded as employed out of the whole 
sample of 2850, only 27 were in agricultural jobs, 24.5% were in 
manufacturing, and the rest in the service complex. 
The most prominent and most dynamic of all services in 
Hassaheisa was that related to trade and commerce. Traders const- 
ituted 13.5% of my sample, but trading activities provided jobs 
for a further 34.7% of the labour force as sales workers, trans- 
porters, porters, etc. Thus trade and the concomitant process of 
commercial accumulation, dominated in the town's economic life as 
we shall see more fully in Chapter 4. Other economic activities, 
though expanding, are greatly influenced, and in some cases dict- 
ated to, by the dynamics of commercial accumulation. 
35 
The town 
has become, and continues to develop, primarily as a commercial 
centre. 
THE STRUCTURE OF HASSAHEISA ECOLOGICAL FORM: 
It follows from the above, and from the more detailed ana- 
lysis in Chapters 4,5 and 6 that trade is the primary determin- 
ant of any aspects of Hassaheisa's 
life and form. In this section, 
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I attempt to outline the relationship between the processes of 
accumulation, especially in their commercial form, and the phys- 
ical configuration of the town. The ecological structure is of 
importance, as has been recognized in a wide range of urban stud- 
ies especially in American and European countries, both as a 
manifestation of past history and as a powerful influence on the 
present and future of any town or city. 
36 
The physical contours of Hassaheisa in the early 1930s were 
identified for me by local residents on an official map drawn in 
1946 (See-Fig. 2 ). Four important features of the ecology of that 
period are outstanding and call for special comment: 
(1) The first concerns the prominence in the early settlement of 
transport facilities. As trade was to a large extent externally 
oriented (export and import), it is not surprising that the rail- 
ray station emerged as the focal point of the whole settlement. 
Close to the station was the Suit. This was the location of 
trading activities and it reflected in its physical layout the 
state-planned nature of that trade. It was designed by the colon- 
ial administration to facilitate its control in the interests of 
colonial expansion and of the exploitation of the resources at 
the disposal of the local populations of the countryside. The Sui 
was therefore sited so as to allow for the best supervision and 
to facilitate the administration of trade in general. 
Humoudi has reported on this aspect of colonial policy in 
the Sui- of the Gezira and the Nuba Mountains. All markets estab- 
lished in these two areas during the 1920s were designed by the 
government surveyors in a similar way: 
... to surround a rectangular space with the butchery 
and vegetable stalls in the middle (and to) form the 
core of the settlements. Beyond the shops come the 
86 
bakeries and the flourmills, then the merchants' houses 
which form the oldest permanent buildings, together with 
the police station and the British Governors' administra- 
tive areas, if there were any... The indigenous houses and 
huts cluster around this core. (These markets)... serve the 
settlements in which they are located as well as the surr- 
ounding rural villages. Sometimes they also have registered 
animal and crop markets which would be held inside the inn- 
er space, or outside wherever the space permits. 
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Comparing this description with Map for Hassaheisa, it 
is clear that there is a striking similarity. 
(2) The second important feature concerns the position of the 
premises where trades of certain goods were carried out in relat- 
ion to the station which is the effective point of contact with 
outside world. For example, the locations of the Durra market re- 
flect the importance of donna in the local economy during the 
first three decades of the settlement's existence and its signific- 
ance in the process of commercial accumulation. From 1900 to 1916 
the dunna market and depot were at the Mownada (river port) on 
the Blue Nile bank. This was before the construction of the rail- 
way line when it had been transported by boats to Omdurman. Even 
after the arrival of the railways it was deemed useful to build 
a side track to link the Mownada with the main station. At the 
same time, trade in all other goods was conducted from temporary 
shops around the dunna mownada. But the erection of the Durra 
Conditioning Unit by a British commercial firm in 191638 drew 
dunna transactions closer to the station where the Unit was work- 
ing. At this period dunna was an appreciable item in the export 
trade of the Sudan as a whole and the Gezira area in particular. 
Whereas it had earlier been grown mainly for consumption by the 
local population and to enable them to meet their tax obligations; 
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it was now a fully commercial and profit-generating business. 
But the introduction of the Gezira Scheme and the imposition of 
cotton cultivation, led to a sharp decline in the importance of 
the dunna. By the 1930s it was once again limited mainly to meet- 
ing the consumption demands of the town's population. As a result, 
the dunna was removed from the station area and relegated to a 
location behind the SuJ. 
(3) In general, it is clear that both the size of the town and 
its rate of growth were dictated by the dominant role of trade, 
and that the singular importance of commercial accumulation led 
to the almost total exclusion of other economic activities such 
as craft manufacturing and traditional household industries which 
might have competed with imported manufactured goods. This is in 
direct contrast to the situation of early urban growth in, for ex- 
ample, America at a comparable period. 
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The limited range of occupations in Hassaheisa during the 
colonial period was obviously a function of the slow and weak 
rate of capital formation and accumulation in commerce. This in 
turn limited the extent of investment in other branches of the 
economy. Thus, during its first thirty years (up to 1940), Hass- 
aheisa was almost stagnant in its physical size and it developed 
very few new occupations. With the exception of the distinctive 
group of migrant merchants from the Northern Province, virtually 
the entire "local" population lived together in the same neigh- 
bourhoods without exhibiting any clear socio-economic residential 
segregation In differing contrasts to the earlier pre-colonial 
Sudanese urban settlements such as Shendi, Messallamia, and Sen- 
nar where craftsmen existed and were widely distributed among 
various residential areas, and to the more recent pre-colonial 
Sudanese towns such as Wad Medani where artisans dominated a par- 
88 
ticular residential area, like Hay Al-Dibagha (the Tanners' Neigh- 
bourhood), Hassaheisa remained virtually undifferentiated occup- 
ationally as well as residentially. 
(4) In colonial times trade did not directly intervene in the 
production process of crops in the countryside. In effect, trade 
developed in large part as a result of the State's assistance to 
it in the form of maintaining a situation of "dear selling" 
and "cheap buying" by traders. The administration's coercive app- 
aratus was crucial in this, and decisions taken over the location 
and physical laying out of the Suta, the railway station, and the 
residential areas of various groups such as the locals, merchants, 
police, administrators, etc., were integral parts of the overall 
processes whereby the coercion and oppression of the local popul- 
ation was physically symbolized. Such decisions manifested the 
colonial power structure and expressed in the spatial form the 
dominance -dependence relationship between the "colonialists" and 
the "locals". 
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The systematic separation and segregation of the 
residential areas of colonial personnel from those of the local 
populations is another glaring example of the ways in which the 
unchallengeable powers and authority of the colonial administrat- 
ion were used to engender respect and subservience from the mass 
of the local populations and to produce in them a state of mind 
which saw no option but to acquiesce in decisions relating to 
trading practices (e. g. pricing), town planning, and a host of 
other aspects in creation of the "colonial culture". 
The physical layout and the use of space in the town five 
decades later has to be examined in the light of the early devel- 
opments outlined above. A series of observations on the ecological 
map of Hassaheisa in 1981 acquire immediate significance as soon 
as we fully appreciate its history of "development" 
(or, in many 
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senses of "underdevelopment" or "distortion"). 
I have emphasized that trade has continued to occupy prime 
place in the town's economy, but changes in the composition and 
nature of the transactions, in the size and layout of the suk, 
and in the rate of commercial capital' accumulation have been re- 
markable (See Chapter 4 for full details). A first consequence of 
this was that the population grew substantially as new migrants 
were attracted to the town by the "prospects" of its flourishing 
trade. At the same time, the employment opportunities provided 
by the ginneries (however limited and temporal these were), and 
the expanding demand for certain "services" stimulated by the 
0 logic of commercial accumulation, led to the growth of a series 
of new opportunities in the building sector, in public services, 
and in domestic household and personal services. Thus the occup- 
ational structure of the town began to change appreciably and 
especially to include builders and building workers, teachers, 
nurses, physicians, car mechanics and drivers, carpenters, domes- 
tic servants, etc. All of these new groups shared, but of course 
in markedly varying degrees, in the "wealth" siphoned from the 
the countryside through various channels, but mainly through 
trade. 
Before the recent intensification of commercial activities 
and the acceleration of the rybhm of capital accumulation, each 
household in Hassaheisa had its own house and a relatively good 
income. 
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Up to the late 1960s, most people continued to live in 
the residential areas around and near the Sui, and despite the 
changed occupational make-up of these areas, their internal social 
structure remained largely unchanged. Thus the family of a car 
mechanic or a building worker continued to live next door to that 
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of his brother who might be a merchant, and there was so little 
socio-cultural differences between occupational and socio-econ- 
omic groups. One group, however, was a striking exception: the 
very poor, propertyless migrant labourers of Fellata origin (Nig- 
erians) continued to live outside the town boundaries in the 
shanty areas (Kambo Haj Ali) where they had originally found some 
shelter. This group had been systematically denied the opportun--== 
ity to participate in the social life of the town "proper". 
But within this illusive appearance of stability and cont- 
inuity, a number of spatial changes with far-reaching social con- 
sequences were under way. By following some of these transformat- 
ions, we can unveil the logic of the changing ecological struct- 
ure of the town in the recent past and the present. 
(1) RESIDENTIAL EXTENSIONS AFTER THE 1930s: 
The relative prosperity of the town during second half of 
the 1930s and the years of the Second World War (See Chapter 4), 
coupled with and partially resulting in a significant increase in 
population, led to a major housing problem in the previously est- 
ablished residential areas of Wassat and Shargi situated around 
the Suia. Thus, two new areas were established, namely the Karima 
neighbourhood (adjacent to Wassat and near to Sufa) sold to the 
wealthier traders, and later the Jadida; a native lodging area 
where pieces of land were rented by the government. The latter 
lay beyond the then official boundaries of the town and was mainly 
for low-income families. The new residents of both these areas 
were mainly migrants from the Northern Province, who had hitherto 
lived as tenants in the Wassat area. 
In the early 1950s, however, brisk trade and the growth of 
the public services sector again led to a further severe housing 
problem. This was resolved by the creation of another two residen- 
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tial areas. The first of these was the Omda neighbourhood, adja- 
cent to Karima and the SuJ, where many relatively affluent fam- 
flies came to live; most of the inhabitants were either Northern 
migrant merchants or people from nearby villages who were in the 
process of acquiring some wealth due to the flourishing cotton 
cultivation during the early 1950s. The second new area of the 
1950s was Mygouma (the Southern Native Lodging Area), established 
by the government for its lower income employees beyond the town 
boundaries. Most of these came from the central neighbourhoods of 
Wassat and Karima, where they had formerly lived as tenants in 
poor marginal rooms within these neighbourhoods. 
Since 1971 three more extensions have been established, 
Imtidad, Mazad and Arkweit. These were designed as cheap accomod-- 
ation for low-income families from older established areas and 
are located in what is now the outer ring of the town. Some 
recent migrants have also settled there. During the same period, 
many of the wealthier families in the town have begun to buy and 
then rebuild houses near the town centre, especially in Karima, 
Wassat, and Omda areas. 
The main general changes in the residential ecological pat- 
terns are thus that members of lower income groups have progress- 
ively been removed from the centre of the town and relocated in 
the outer "zones", while higher-income families have simultane- 
ously taken up areas in the centre vacated through the relocation 
of the lower paid. To understand and appreciate this general 
change, we need to bear the following considerations in mind: 
(i) The continuation of trade as the prime sphere for capital acc- 
umulation has led to land and houses near the Sui maintaining and 
even increasing- through time- their value. 
A 
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(ii) The long history of uncertain and low rates of commercial 
capital accumulation (See details in Chapter 4), has inhibited 
the merchants and other wealthy members of the community from 
leaving homes adjacent to the Sui for other areas. By not moving, 
they save money and virtually evade daily transport costs. Thus 
I found that 27 out of 30 merchants when I interviewed about the 
possibility of their moving to. the new houses and flats they had 
recently built in the Wad Kamil area (adjacent to the Northern 
Industrial Area) did not wish or plan to move. Instead, they re- 
garded their new houses as investments to bring in rents. 
(iii) With services such as electricity, water, telephones, health 
centres, schools, and above all proper policing and security arr- 
angements well established in the "old" areas around the Sui, the 
geographical locale of the dominant process of commercial accumul- 
ation, and with the increasing difficulties encountered by the 
Council in trying to provide these services in new areas (See 
Chapter 8), the wealthier members of the community are aware of 
the relative advantages of remaining where they are, especially 
with the tendency for poorer inhabitants in these areas to move 
or be moved to peripheral areas of the town. 
(2) THE LOCATION OF INDUSTRIES: 
In considering the nature and location of industrial est- 
ablishments in Hassaheisa, it is helpful to distinguish 
between 
those which first appeared in the colonial period and those 
in 
the post-colonial period (See Chapter 6). The 
location of estab- 
lishments of both periods can hardly be explained in terms of 
technical and spatirt factors alone. I attempt to show that the 
patterns that have emerged are more readily comprehensible when 
we view them as being to a large extent 
functional to, and closely 
'A 
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affected by, the requirements of the underlying process of cap- 
ital accumulation. 
In the 1930s (i. e. during the colonial period), cotton gin- 
ping factories were established a mile beyond the official bound- 
aried of the town. Until 1975, the Ginneries area remained admin- 
istratively independent and politically isolated from the rest of 
the town. In the light of much Western experience, it is easy to 
appreciate why the compäy which established the Ginneries (Sudan 
Plantation Syndicate) did so on the outskirts of the town. Away 
from the central area of the town, such sites provided ideal en- 
vironments for the company to control more effectively the proc- 
ess of factory production and to maximize the discipline of the 
labour force through the minimization of the workers' resistance. 
This is simply because the development of industrial capitalism 
in the "West" had shown that "the basis for industrial profits 
was best secured if and when homogeneous industrial proletariat 
could be most effectively segregated from the rest of soceity, 
42 
and one must expect or assume a degree of awareness on the part 
of that "Western" company about the significance of the above. The 
whole process of labour discipline was achieved in several ways in 
Hassaheisa: 
(i) Removed from the rest of the community, and thus from the 
areas where "traditional" and conservative pre-capitalist sets of 
norms prevailed and where "liberal" commercial sets of values were 
beginning to operate, workers at the Ginneries of different eth- 
nic and regional origins were concentrated in residential camps 
(and in fact this area still retains the name of Kambo, derived 
from camp) where they were relatively insulated from the 
"tradit- 
-'-= } ional", relatively tolerant and undisciplined- system of-values 
-- ý-- "_c ý ý. ý- 
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which might allow them, not only to subscribe to the pattern of 
undisciplined behaviour, but also to assess the qualitz of their 
lives in comparison to the standard of living enjoyed by the 
rest' of; the community. 
(ii) More directly and practically, too, the relative isolation 
of the community of the working people made it much easier for 
managers and owners to identify and control any agents of polit- 
ical agitation, especially under the conditions, and with the dire- 
ct or indirect help, of an oppressive colonial system. 
(iii) The relative isolation of the workers, especially prior to 
the development of nay significant political consciousness, mil- 
itated against a sense of "community" and against the articulat- 
ion of resentment against the privileged "outsiders". In this way, 
the isolation of the workers from the town community contributed 
to the emergence and development of inter-group rivalaries among 
them. Relatively small differences in income, housing, working 
conditions and the like tended under these conditions to be em---. 
phasized, while more basic "contradictions" with the "outside" 
were scarcely perceived and certainly not realized as issues of 
contention. The net result, sought and welcomed by the company 
and the colonial administration, was a weak, disunited, and mysti- 
fied group of workers incapable of any serious resistance to the 
process of accumulation. Such accumulation was largely based on 
the exploitation of their own labour power, but under the cond- 
itions described they were largely unaware of it. 
In the post-colonial era a number of manufacturing firms 
have been located in the Northern Industrial Area of Hassaheisa, 
and the same opportunities for, and attitudes towards, the making 
and maximizing of profits prevail. Now, however, there are some- 
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what different assumptions and arrangements underlying the sys- 
tem. The orthodox economic argu went on patterns of industrial 
location as based on the principle of "agglomeration economies"43 
tends, in the view I take, to seriously distort the nature of the 
process. In brief, the arguement claims that there are over-rid- 
ing advantages for owners of industries to locate their factories 
near to each other. But, as Gordon points out, while the hypothe- 
ses of this arguement "originally proposed as hypotheses about 
economies of scale, they can turn just as easily into hypotheses 
about analogous diseconomies of scale". For the location of too 
many industries in close proximity "can bid up the price of lab- 
our"44 for example. 
The situation that has developed in Hassaheisa would cert- 
ainly seem to require the formulation of an alternative explanat- 
ion for the location of factories well away from the centre of 
the town in the first place. In seeking an alternative we need to 
bear in mind several factors additional to that already considered, 
namely, the concern of factory owners over the discipline of the 
workforce and over reducing possible resistance, and these addit- 
ional considerations are all related, in one form or another, to 
the prime concern of capital accumulation: 
(i) As will be fully shown in Chapter 6, nearly all the factor- 
ies' owners in Hassaheisa are primarily merchants. As such, it is 
not surprising that they should resist the location of industries 
in the Sui area for this could only be done at the expense of 
trading activities. They have thus refrained from encouraging such 
planning on the part of the government (i. e. the Council) and they 
have actually not participated in any such moves themselves. 
(ii) Secondly, the factory owners are reluctant for the poor work- 
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ing conditions and the real extent of their exploitation of the 
work force to be exposed to open view in the cenre of the commun- 
ity. If these conditions were more visible, they would attract 
more criticism leading to a loss of social prestige which is an 
important resource in the urban community's power struggle (See 
Chapter 8). The owners, who are also merchants and important pol- 
itical figures, thus have sound reasons to keep their factories 
where they are in order to stem "romantic and humanitarian" deb- 
ate over the conditions of their workers. 
(iii) Finally, the owners themselves usually work as merchants in 
the Suff, and live with their families in the adjacent residential 
neighbourhoods, hence any location or relocation of industries to- 
wards the centre would threaten their own environmental advantages. 
Not only would they themselves suffer from pollution45. and the 
concomitant down grading of their neighbourhoods, but the finan- 
cial costs of anti-pollution would indirectly be borne by them 
through the cuts that would inevitably follow in the already weak 
rate of commercial accumulation, as would the political costs 
through the difficulties that would arise over finance in the 
Town Council (See Chapter 8). 
All the above considerations are relevant to the whole ques- 
tion of the location of factories when considered from the point 
of view of the town's dominant socio-economic and political gro- 
ups. Moreover, they illuminate the socio-economic "logic" 
behind 
the seemingly "spatial necessities". 
(3) PUBLIC SERVICES: FOR WHOM AND WHERE? 
The paramount concerns of the town planners during the col- 
onial period were related to the centrality of trading space 
(the 
Sula), to the need to ensure its supervision, and to the general 
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question of peace and order in the town. We have seen how these 
concerns led to the central location of the Suk and the railway 
station, and also to the geometrical planning of shops and stores 
and the separation of the Sui from the residential areas by a 
clear open-space in which there were no buildings at all up to 
1950. 
Nor did the colonial administration make any serious attempt 
to promote or develop public services for the local population in- 
cluding the merchants. Such services as the town had were entirely 
concentrated in and around the segregated neighbourhood of govern- 
ment houses occupied by officials (foreign and Sudanese). 
With the drift towards independence and the establishment 
of the town's Local Government Council in 1951, there was the 
first thrust- both by the Government and by the "natives"- to est- 
ablish public services and institutions in the fields of educat- 
ion, health, and recreation. The majority of buildings designed 
to accommodate these services between 1951 and 1971 were erected 
in the open space around the Sui. This was no accident; on the 
contrary, it reflects the growing influence throughout that per- 
iod of the dominant members of the urban community, namely the 
merchants, and it is one manifestation of their success in bring- 
ing about a wider distribution and allocation of public resources 
in their own favour as opposed to that of other less powerful 
groups in the town. As such the whole process indicates and ex- 
presses a wider social antagonistic struggle. 
With the commercial boom of the early 1950s resulting from 
the Korean War and the rise in cotton prices, and with the estab- 
lishment in 1954 of the first national government, by whom the 
interests of the Sudanese urban merchants well catered for, Hass- 
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aheisa merchants gained some confidence in their economic status 
and became less "dependent" on direct state action to ensure their 
security and the protection (physical and economic) of the Suia 
than ever before. This coupled with the arguement that the alloc- 
ation of services and amenities, including their siting, were 
closely related to conflicts and balances of power between var- 
ious groups in the community, and since the merchants were by far 
the most powerful and resourceful of these, and increasingly so, 
<-?: / it is logical for the merchant to sought to locate services close 
to their own residential areas (in the open space) and they were 
largely successful: 
(i) They were the first group in the town to express the need for 
public services, and they quickly acquired positions which enabled 
them to begin meeting these needs for themselves. Thus, for exa- 
mple, the town's Committee For Native Education, formed in 1953 
in accordance with the Non-Government Education Ordinance of 1950, 
was composed mainly of members of this group: 
Name Occupation 
Widdaa Osman 
Yousif Hassan Babiker 
Ali Attal Mula 
Hassan Abdel Latif 
Abdel Kadir Waziri 
Ahmed Alamin Iheimir 
Ahmed Sid Ahmed 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Engineer (Council) 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Omda 
Merchant 
Formal Position in C. N. E. 
Chairman 
Dep. Chairman 
Secretary 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Source: Interview with Mr. Yousif Hassan, Hassaheisa. 
This was the committe which supervised the establishment of most 
schools in Hassaheisa up to the date of its dissolution in 1971. 
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(ii) Being dominant on the Town Council, they had no difficulty 
in securing that public services were located in places which 
suited their direct interests in enjoying these services at the 
minimum possible costs (e. g. transport costs, and, more signific- 
antly, in symbolizing and accentuating their influence and power 
in the local community. 
C4) THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOCATION OF TWO PARTICULAR AREAS 
To complete this review of the spatial pattern of the town 
and of its social importance, I briefly discuss two special areas: 
namely Hay At-Mowaza6in (the Government Officials Residential 
Area) and Zugag AL-Shanamit (the Prostitutes' Area), both of which 
play significant political and social roles in the town, and in- 
deed, so are their locations. 
(a) Hay At-Mowazaýin: 
During the colonial period there was a clear-cut segregat- 
ion on racial lines between various areas of residence for govern- 
ment administrators. The District Commissioner ( At-Mu6at-4h) and 
often senior British officials resided in the far south-eastern 
corner of the settlement of Hassaheisa, and this area was surr- 
ounded by a wide open space next to which were the offices of the 
police and administrative headquarters, (Me)Llaez). Another open 
space separated the Menfaez from the "native" quarter of Shargi, 
which was in turn separated by more space next from the houses of 
the "Sudanese" government officials who were then separated from 
other "native" areas either by the railway line or by more open 
space. In the remote southwestern corner of the town was the res- 
idence of the Assisstant District Commissioner (the Egyptian 
Mamoun) surrounded by an open space beyond which lay the police 
quarters (Sudanese), in turn well removed from other "native" 
areas. This pattern was unchanged by Independence- except, of 
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course, for the change in the racial identities of the District 
Commissioner and his Assisstant. 
The socio-political significance of these spatial arrange- 
ments- whether before or after Independence- was, and quite clear; 
the state, represented by high ranking bureaucrats in particular, 
has a very special status which its senior political personnel 
seek to impose its respected and even glorified image on the ment- 
ality of the rest of the community. The state must be both special 
and above the people; being special, it calls for special treat- 
ment as, for example, its buildings and the high concentration 
of services and amenities which surround its headquarters. It is 
also above the rest of the community in a way which gives it the 
power and the capability first to develop and then to maintain 
ideological distortions concerning its supposed neutrality in 
relation to internal conflicts and antagonisms within the comm- 
unity. Moreover, the state justifies its dominance over the comm- 
unity through the kind of ideology which it develops. 
Viewed from this kind of perspective, the continuing spat- 
ial segregation of the state's representatives as an essential 
symbolic instrument in its own process of legitimation and in the 
maintenance of its capacity to dominate the community and its 
ordinary inhabitants through systematic ideological and political 
subjugation. Ecological patterns in this view are, therefore, very 
much more than "geographical" facts. 
(b) Zugalt Qý-Shahamtt: 
According to local informants, the first colony of offic- 
ially "licensed" prostitutes in Hassaheisa was established during 
the World War II. The prostitutes were mainly drawn 
from Sudanese 
"ex-slave" females and refugees from the Italian occupation of 
1ýý. 
. 
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Ethiopia. Their main residential areas were on the edges of 
Karima and Wassat, but their houses were not strictly separated 
physically from those of other residents. More recently ( in the 
early 1970s) another colony was established in the Mazad area to 
which many of those from Karima and Wassat moved. Though confined 
to a certain part of the Mazad neighbourhood, the prostitutes' 
area is again not physically separated from the rest. Given the 
dominance of the Islamic ideology which strictly prohibits prost- 
itution, the "tolerance" shown by the community, especially the 
dominant socio-economic groups of it, to the residence of prost- 
itutes adjacent to them appears astonishing. The "rationale" be- 
hind such behaviour rests on the following considerations: 
(i) Although the prostitutes are regarded foreigners, "sinful", 
and marginal, they are accepted by the local community (usually 
led by its dominant groups) because they provide an important 
"safety-valve". 46 For example, during the 1930s and 1940s the 
majority of traders and other new comers were bachelors, while 
the main body of local women belonged to the relatively tradit- 
ional and sexually conservative "tribal" group of the Dubasin. 
The local women were therefore largely secluded and thus the 
"foreign" prostitutes came to provide an inexpensive sexual out- 
lays service as compared either to local marriage or travelling 
back to the remote areas of origin from which most the migrants 
came. The acceptance of the institution of- prostitution was thus 
seen as being in the interests of both the migrants who used 
their "services" and the local Dubasin who escaped the "threat" 
to their women which the presence of bachelor migrants posed. 
In more recent years, the institution of prostitution has 
continued to develop despite the increased degree of Islamism 
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among the dominant groups of the town. 
47 
This is because, one 
of the consequences of ever more intensive "capitalist" develop- 
ment has been to prolong the pre-marriage period for young men 
and women in the town community. Another consequence of that deve- 
lopment is the mass town-ward migration of the rural youth. The 
"safety-valve" function of the prostitutes has thus continued to 
have significance as the dominant traditional ideology has cont- 
inued to reaffirm the total sexual seclusion of females before 
marriage and to prohibit extra-marital sexual intercourse. Conc- 
erns among the dominant groups over the established role of the 
"family" and over this aspect of the traditional social fabric 
is deep. But the significant point to note in any analysis of 
the situation is that prostitution as an institution is clearly 
related to the issues of private ownership, the political domin- 
ance of the wealthier groups, and the social reproduction of the 
sodiety which has become established in the town. This is because, 
on the one hand, prostitution is an important and necessary comp- 
onent of a community based on unequal accessibility to wealth and 
power, and on the other hand, it is geared to the benefit of cer- 
tan "important" elements in it. 
(ii) As most prostitutes are habitually homeless and lead lives 
characterized by considerable uncertainity, they contribute very 
substantially to the process of accumulation for landlords. They 
are among the best paying tenants in Hassaheisa and the houses 
they occupy usually yield up to four times as that of houses let 
to others. Their main landlords are drawn from the dominant soc- 
ial group in the community. It is thus justifiable to suppose 
that members of this group have a vested interest in maintaining 
prostitutes in certain areas of the town to the extent that this 
.A 
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does help the functioning of the wider social fabric. 
In relation to this point, it is relevant to note that on 
14.4.1975 the Town Council rejected a motion calling on it to 
close all houses of prostitutes in the karima area. Instead, the 
Council accepted a plan proposed by the Administrative Officer 
of the Council to "reform" prostitution and control it in the 
town. In pursuance of this plan, more prostitutes from Karima and 
Wassat have in fact been moved to the Mazad area. This is another 
example of the general tendency for the removal of old established 
category of inhabitants in the town centre to the outer zones, 
while wealthier families move into the centre. For, the houses in 
Karima and Wassat formerly occupied by prostitutes were demol- 
ished and rebuilt and are being let to members of high-income 
groups, especially government professionals. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
On the basis of the foregoing account, we may now identify 
the salient points that are specifically related to the process 
of the "production" and "reproduction" of the town of Hassaheisa: 
(1) Hassaheisa is quintessentially a town of colonial origin. It 
grew up as a centre from which the regional "development" of cer- 
tain natural resources could be administered and directed (i. e. 
the Gezira Scheme). It is fully in keeping with this origin that 
it was established on a site from which a vast area of primary 
production could be controlled. 
48 
Its location was clearly dec- 
ided with due regard to the facility with which cotton could be 
assembled there, and also prepared for exportation. The same 
principle worked in reverse in regard to the import of manufact- 
ured consumer goods and capital goods for the scheme. Similar 
considerations affecting the establishment of colonial towns have 
A 
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commonly been analysed by others. 
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(2) The indigenous pre-colonial settlement on the site was very 
small and temporary. In this regard Hassaheisa is similar to many J 
other Sudanese towns created during the early years of British 
colonial rule (e. g. Atbara, Kosti, and Port Sudan). 
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On the other 
hand, there were some pre-colonial urban centres in the Gezira 
region such as Kamlin and Messalamia which were ignored as unsuit- 
able for the design of the administration and which either stag- 
nated or declined in the early decades of the colonial rule. 
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(3) Some elements of pre-colonial indigenous structures were not 
only active agents in the course of urban development, but also 
-at some critical points- the beneficiaries of such development. 
This allowed urbanization to proceed despite the fact that, in 
other respects, indigenous structures were eroded by the growth 
of the town. This is well illustrated by the active involvement 
and participation of some traditional dominant families in the 
initiation and acceleration of the process (e. g. the Iheimir fam- 
ily). Such families were able to recapture and reinforce their 
privileged traditional status through identifying with the admin- 
istration and manipulating opportunities offered them in the new 
urban situation. 
(4) Hassaheisa's population grew from natural increase as well as 
from rural-urban migration. The natural increase may be attributed 
to the combination of "traditional" high birth rates and the "mod- 
ern" low death rates. The history of migration to the town has to 
be assessed with due regard to the "push" factors operating at 
the rural pole in some remote regions of the Sudan rather than 
in the town "attraction". These "push" factors were generated by 
the same processes which led to the "disorganization and disint- 
egration" of rural structures in the same regions. In short, the 
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town's growth may be seen as resulting as much or more from a 
''decomposition of rural society than as an expression of the 
dynamism of urban society". 
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It is thus not surprising that the 
urbanization process in the case of a town like Hassaheisa has 
relatively little in common with the processes of urbanization 
in advanced capitalist societies: for example, the immigrants in 
Hassaheisa have continued to produce large families as in rural 
Sudanese communities. 
(5) Since many people move into Hassaheisa and settle there, it 
would appear that the town's economy has considerable capacity to 
absorb them, and that there is some correlation between their im- 
migration and some kind of economic development in the town. But, 
such appearances call for very careful scrutiny. I have shown that 
the town offers strictly limited opportunities of formal employ- 
ment and that such opportunities are particularly scarce in the 
"productive" sectors of the town's economy. The vast majority of 
the economically-active population are engaged in service occupat- 
ions. In short, one may argue that there is little evidence, if 
any, of economic development. It thus seems that Castells 
is 
quite right to conclude that the urbanization process 
in the 
Third World may be considered: 
as an obstacle to development, in so 
far as it immobi- 
lizes resources in the form of non-productive invest- 
ments, necessary to the creation and organization of 
services indispensible to great concentrations of pop- 
ulation, whereas these concentrations do not 
justify 
themselves as centres of production. 
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Or, as expressed by Urquidi, urbanization 
in many parts of the 
Third World is a process of growth, but not necessarily of 
devel- 
54 
opment. 
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(6) The politico-economic and administrative needs and consider- 
ations of the colonial system were obviously a major factor det- 
ermining the ecological form and spatial structure of the town. 
The choice and planning of the site itself and the geographical 
locations of the railway station, the Sua, the ginning factories, 
the police headquarters, the "native" residential areas, etc., 
were designed to produce and reinforce certain ideological per- 
ceptions and political realities conducive to the "proper" funct- 
ioning of the colonial system. The dynamics of the commercial 
capital accumulation, which are clearly of major importance in 
my analysis of the colonial and neo-colonial systems, have to 
be appreciated in order to assess the way in which the physical 
form of the town has developed and, equally, in order to apprec- 
iate how this form continues and contributes to the socio-econom- 
is reproduction of the now established community. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: TRADE 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the present chapter I attempt to examine the role of 
Hassaheisa, a provincial regional town, as a siphon sucking in 
the surpluses created in its surrounding countryside. The town 
performs this role primarily as a regional marketing centre for 
different commodities and services. I shall argue that the town 
is based on a peculiar form of capital-formation and accumulation 
which has mercantilist characteristics in that the main economic 
activities involve a rapid turn-over of capital. Such capital is 
not necessarily, or even mostly, commercial in content, but we 
shall see that in the Hassaheisa situation it has generally be- 
haved as if it were. 
Hence, specifying concretely the nature of the process of 
accumulation of this capital and conceptualizing aspects of this 
process theoretically, will lead me a long way toward the specif- 
ication of the character of the town itself which serves as a 
seat for that process. In this way I hope to acquire a better 
understanding of the whole process and rate of urbanization, and 
of its implications. Urbanization, seen as a process through which 
the countryside's surpluses of products and manpower are drawn 
off, is the central theme of my analysis of the process of capi- 
tal accumulation in the town. But I will begin by giving a general 
picture of the trading community in the present Hassaheisa Suk. 
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HASSAHEISA SUK COMMUNITY: 
THE FINDINGS OF A SURVEY IN 1978, 
During my first period of field work in Hassaheisa, I carr- 
ied out a general survey of the business community. The survey 
was designed to yield information which might serve as a point of 
departure for the more intensive study planned for for my second 
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period of field work in 1979-80.1 here present the main find- 
ings of this survey. The questionnaire used consisted of 16 open- 
ended questions. The questionnaire and a list of the variables 
used in processing the answers are given in Appendix(1) . The 
questionnaire was completed for 220 businessmen out of a total of 
approximately 1037. The method by which these 220 businessmen were 
selected is explained in Chapter 1. A survey of this kind is of 
course static in nature, but the responses are nonetheless use- 
ful in portraying the general character of the business community 
in Hassaheisa Suk. 
1. SEX : 
All the subjects were males, as women's participation in 
the Suk is largely confined to occasional buying and selling. Some 
elderly women (mainly widows) sell home-made items of a limited 
range (e. g. straw mats and bags, Semin- clarified butter, and 
ground spices) but they do not do so from permanent established 
firms. Thus, men dominate the Suk both as owners of business firms 
and as customers. 
2. BIRTH PLACE: 
After a careful preliminary examination of the survey ques- 
tions, I decided to cross-tabulate' the remaining characteristics 
by BIRTH PLACE, so as it illustrates significant aspects of the 
growth of the Suk, The birth place categories used to classify 
my informants are as follows: 
(a) Hassaheisa Town; which includes the sons of the early (orig- 
final) settlers in the town (e. g. Dubasin), as well as second gen- 
eration immigrants, mainly Northerners. 
(b) Gezira Province; which includes the following sub-categories: 
(i) Other towns in the Gezira: Any settlement classified 
as urban according to the Sudan Second Population Census of 1973 
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within the boundaries of the Gezira Province. 
(ii) Hassaheisa Rural: All villages and settlements other 
than towns within the administrative boundaries of Hassa- 
heisa Rural Council. 
(iii) Hallawin Rural: All villages in the administrative 
unit of Hallawin Rural Council (Mihayriba). 
(iv) Rural in Gezira: All villages and settlements other 
than those mentioned in-(i), (ii) and (iii) in the Gezira 
Province. 
(c) The Northern Region: Comprising the two provinces of the 
Nile and the Northern, and including the following sub-categor- 
ies: 
(i) Towns in North: Any settlement defined as urban in 
the Second Population Census and located in the Northern 
Region. 
(ii) Rural in North: Any other settlement in the Northern 
Region. 
(d) Other Towns in the Sudan: Being any urban area outside the 
Gezira Province and the Northern Region. 
(e) Other Rural in the Sudan: 'Being any rural settlement in any 
part of the Sudan but outside the Gezira Province and the North- 
ern Region. 
(f) Other Places: Anywhere outside the Sudan. 
In those tables to follow where the cell contains four 
figures (e. g. Table 4: 3 below), the number in the upper left 
hand corner in each cell is the absolute frequency; the number 
in the upper right hand corner is the row percentage, and the 
number in the lower left hand corner is the column percentage 
while the number in the lower right corner is the total percent- 
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age. For convenience, however, all numbers are rounded. In the 
tables where a cell contains only two figures (cf. Table 4: 1 
below), on the other hand, the upper is the row absolute frequ- 
ency and the lower is its percentage. Slight variations in the 
total numbers are due to 'missing observations'-i. e. where "No 
Answer" was recorded. 
Table 4: 1 Birth Place 
Birth Place Hassaheisa Other Town Hassaheisa Hallawin Rural 
in Gezira Rural Rural Gezira 
umber 52 18 45 16 14 
Eercentage 23.7 8.2 20.5 7.3 6.4 
Table 4: 1 cont. 
irth Place Towns in Rural in Other Town Other Rural Other Total 
---- North North In Sudan In Sudan Place 
umber 10 39 20 4 1 219 
Percentage 4.6 17.8 9.1 1.8 0.5 100 
Various observations may be made on the birth places of 
the participants in the above table. Firstly, it is clear that 
two groups dominate the market numerically, viz., those born in 
the Gezira Province (42.4%) and those born in the Northern Reg- 
ion (22.4%), but as will be clear from the explanation of the 
market development which I will consider below, the vast major- 
ity of those counted as born in Hassaheisa town (23.77) are in 
fact second-generation immigrants from the Northern Region. Sec- 
ondly, the number of people coming from rural areas in the North 
is greater than that of immigrants from towns in the same reg- 
ion, 39 and 10 respectively. Thirdly, traders originating from 
other urban settlements, whether in Gezira, the North or the 
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Sudan as a whole, amount to 21.9% of the total sample. This 
observation raises a question as to the source of attraction of 
Hassaheisa which leads people to opt for trading there rather 
than in their towns of origin. This question will be dealt with 
in the following sections of this chapter. 
3. AGE STRUCTURE 
Table 4: 2 Age Structure 
Age Group 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 
Number 
Percentage 
2 
0.9 
11 
5.0 
18 
8.2 
29 
13.2 
40 
18.2 
58 
26.4 
Table 4: 2 cont. 
Age Group 50-59 60-69 70& over Total 
umber 
[Percentage 
28 
12.7 
26 
11.8 
8 
3.6 
220 
100 
The figures in the above table reveal little more than 
the expected concentration of merchants in the middle-age groups 
(30-59), but the age composition becomes of greater interest 
when it is examined in conjuction with the birth places of the 
informants as shown in Table 4: 3 in the following page. From 
the latter the following observations emerge: 
(a) The traders with origins in the Gezira Province are 
markedly younger than those from origins in the North-i. e. the 
former are concentrated in the 15-49 years ago-groups, with 73 
out of 93 traders or 78.5% of all traders under 50 years of 
age. This observation, in a way, reflects the recent involve- 
ment of Gezira people in the market as will be discussed below. 
(b)The traders from 'other places' in the Sudan are also 
young, 80% of those from towns and all those from rural areas 
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are under 50 years of age. This, again, reflects the growing 
attraction of Hassaheisa market as a trading centre in relation 
to 'other places' in the Sudan. 
(c) By contrast, only 27 out of the 49 traders from the 
North (55.1%) are under 50 years of age. This suggests. a longer 
history of involvement in the market as will be discussed later. 
Furthermore, the foregoing observations acquire further 
significance when we consider with them the length of time for 
which the members of the different groups have been established 
as traders in the Hassaheisa market- a task to which we turn 
now. 
4. LENGTH OF TIME IN BUSINESS 
The most striking observation revealed in Table 4: 4 below 
is that the majority of traders began trading in Hassaheisa in 
the early 1960s. Nearly three-quarters of the sample joined the 
market less than 15 years ago; and almost half the sample has 
less than nine years of involvement. This observation suggests 
the acceleration of trade in the town during what I call the 
'Third Period' in the. development of the market and to which I 
will turn to discuss in detail later in the chapter. 
Table 4: 4 Length of Time in Business 
Period Less than 1-3 4-8 9-15 16-22 23-29 30+ Total 
one year 
Number 15 45 47 50 22 11 27 217 
% 6.9 20.7 21.7 23.0 10.1 5.1 12.4 100 
Again the observations gain further significance when the 
places of origin are examined in relation to the 
length of time 
spent in trading as is shown in Table 
4: 5 below. While the prop- 
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ortion of those who began trading in Hassaheisa after 1960 to 
the total number of traders with common background is relatively 
low for those born in Hassaheisa (67.4%) as for those from other 
towns in the Gezira (5070), it is appreciably high for those from 
rural Gezira in general (81.8% for Hassaheisa Rural, 87.4% for 
Hallawin Rural and 92.8% for other Rural in Gezira). Likewise, 
while the proportion is low for those from towns in the North 
(50%) and rural in North (68.2%), it is 80% for those from other 
towns in Sudan and 100% for both other rural in*Sudan and other 
places. 
5. PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS OF TRADERS 
The following recorded occupational mobility is not simp- 
ly an upward movement into the trading hierarchy. Indeed it re- 
presents, to some extent, movement between categorically diff- 
erent sectors of the economy-e. g. from agriculture into trade. 
In other words, movement into Hassaheisa often involves a move- 
ment out of a productive into a non-productive sector. This be- 
comes clearer when we consider the previous occupations of the 
traders as shown in the following Table. 
Table 4: 6 Previous Occupation 
Previous Govt. Worker Farmer Crafts- Petty Othe No Total 
occupation Salar. man trader 
umber 21 35 37 24 35 10 47 209 
70 10.0 16.7 17.7 11.5 16.7 4.8 P2.5 100 
The above table shows that only 16.7% were traders on a 
smaller scale before establishing their present businesses. As 
many as 22.5% had no previous job and these are mainly second 
ýr 
generation traders, while only 4.8 held some unspecified jobs 
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in the past (mainly in the services sector). Very significantly, 
however, is that 45.9% were directly involved in the productive 
sectors of the economy- agriculture accounted for 17.7%, wage- 
employment 16.7%, crafts 11.5%, while government bureaucrats 
are 10%. As shown in Table 4: 8, those formerly 'productive' 
groups are drawn from rural areas in the main (53.6%). It is in- 
deed clear from the latter table that there is a strong positive 
correlation between certain previous occupations and particular 
types of settlement. Thus 61.770 of those with no previous occup- 
ation came from towns (Hassaheisa, Towns in Gezira, the North 
and other parts of the Sudan) . 83..,. 71of the traders who used to 
be farmers came from rural areas. In the case of former wage- 
workers, the North contributed 42.9% which corroborates a point 
to be made later in the chapter concerning the Northerner's pat- 
tern of involvement in trade in Hassaheisa. 
6. SOURCE OF TRADING CAPITAL 
Table 4: 7 Source of Capital 
Source Savings Private Public Inher- Gift More than Other y 
Loan Loan itance 1 of the w 
previous 
umber 146 15 1 13 3 5 15 198 
1 73.7 7.6 0.5 6.6 1.5 2.5 7.6 100 
The above table shows that the bulk of traders claim to 
have started their respective businesses mainly with capital acc- 
umulated in savings. As one might expect, however, there are 
some important variations between traders associated with their 
previous occupations. These variations are set out in Table 4: 9. 
Sources of capital other than "savings", which provided the 
basis of business for 139 traders (73.570), however, call for some 
123 
o R rt rt O G o o a rt G rv G w 
r 
sv `'" r, 
(t cn Cý ýr, CD sv -r G) CD tv F--ý sv cn G) CD cn 
ty C º--+ N £ N 
v iU i Sb H ºJ ,. ý. (D C 
o +ý G a ýc 0 H. ~ ~. 
co t-i C. C Cl) o n w sv sv 
N 1- + I-ý N C! ) 0 N I I I 1 4> W I I I I '-p %lp Do p G N " 4- " w " o**, 1--, t', ý Oo Oo Ui C) w a'N w 
t-I 
O 
. 
I I I I CD 
. 
U' 
. 
N 
. . 
1 I 1 I N 
. 
N 
. . . . 
O1% 
. 
N) 
. 
N) 
. 
Ra 
O In O W" O In `p º--' ýl N 
r 
LJG I I N) F --+ 00 I" .> Ui U7 00 (x F E 
" ý' O U' N) N W W U' 0 
C'N 
w v rn aý LA) ýt s 
n c 
' (D 
I-ý N) N N LP I" I--' I--' I. f 
C I 1 O U' F-' O 4> tD N) Lu U' O*, % I--' ON N) C) 
ý. I U' O ýO O OD Oý 4> Oý O 4> O U 4> Oo 4 ý1 4> N 
LA) N F-+ I. W I-°+ 1 
ýJ I 1 1 1 1 I ýI I" I I C) O U' I-' Ln O 
w 
" O 4> " LA) " N " H 
CD co OD 4> Oo S 
fD 
I. N W N N º--' 
ýS 
-i I I I I I 1 4> 00 ( 1 I" O I" V1 C TN I-' I I 00 
,J co cN "D OD QO CD N Ln O h-' J N 
LA) 
Ln I I I I N) U' Ui N Ui '1 U' 
" Iý N N F-ý N W N N 
`o ýJ v v I-- " ýI w 
är 
1-ý N N E-' N f 
C 1 I 1 I O LI' I' Ui 
. 
I' 
. 
N) 
. 
O 
. 
-1 
. 
I- N 
. . 
1.0 
. 
1-- 
. 
U' 
. 
-P- . 
ý. 1 U' 
. 
O 
. 
O ý! O N Ui ýl 
:D 
U' N U' fv -l U' 
N N F-ý N 
1 I 4> CD 00 1 1 OD CIA C31% 1 1 U' W Sv 
N . N N . 4> . 4> (31% 
N oo W W 'l O 
In 
I--ý N N 
1-ý I I O U' N kx f-' Ul 1 I F-ý l! ' 
. 
1--' 
. 
U' 
. 
ý' 
. . 
I 1 N 
. 
N 
. 
. 
LI' 
. 
U' 
. 
O 
. 
4> 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
-S 
. 
O 4> O N 
º-ý+ N N tT 
CD I I I I I I C) 1 I O 1 1 1 I I I CD 
" N N 
O O O O ý3' 
c (D 
1 I I 1 1 I F-' U-1 I I º-ý LI' I I 1 1 I 1 N N 
pp O ýI O `D N 
I. --j - 1-+ N 
. I . N . %D . P' " N " IN N " v " CO " 
CD p 
! -ý W Un W LA) LA) 110 
O W 
(D 
N 1-ý LI' 1--ý N I--ý N F-' 4> N 
N O O O 4> Ln 1-ý 1--+ F -ý N F--ý U' F--, ý-' W In W 4> 
4> CD 
" O O W O 'D 4> O N O 4> O In W tJ) 
4 c 4> 
O 
f-3 
I--ý `o F --ý N N 
N O -> " IV QC W 4 C3-, l--+ -l I 1ý 
4> 03 F -+ W 4 
%. O Qn CD " U' " %. o " W tT " ., " CO " ". 
0 W 
N"D Ln -! 
W N -I f--j O' 4 i-- j 
H 
r" 
n 
Z) 
Yy 
J. 
C 
J. 
1 
b 
124 
H 
O O Pl Pl N W O wO r) O 
< G L fJ fD t-h G. 7r 2 n A3 Gi 
'-' ºý -T fD ýC fD Cý '-S P " r) 
2 
rt CD 
G O 
rt a 
W aX N Lu N I-ý O N 'C N Cam, N C 
' " ý) " " cc " ý1 " Ll " UJ 
C) Un 
v º--ý rn v v 00 º--r v 
W W O' w o ý. o w N T Ln w cc o . 
Ui co -l O O cc w O N I 00 O 
I" W 1 I Ui ýI Ui W Ui 
W W N F-+ N W N 
o t-I Co H 
G 
OI\ l-' ýl 1 1 N 00 C) N H Ln W 
. . . rt 
1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 I C) 
C) º-ý t-' b 
" oG 
N" 
C) I I I I I I I I I I I I C) ON i) 
W º-ý I-' N 
C) Ln v 1 I ýJ Ui w 
W N F-_ " Fý N W H 
00 v v I--ý G 
cý 
º-ý N N Pl 
O, 1% N) C) l' C) C) - I I C) N F-' G" H-' O Fý- 
I -+ W I--+ C) Un w V' CO t-ý N O« C) fD 
a 
a" w 
IS I 1 I I 1 I W I I I I 
v w ý'" t-b 
rt 
F--ý F-ý Ln I I I I I I O N 
cN Uri 00 - N 2 
N ON N 0 
1 1 1 1 C) O C) I I 1 I CI) 1'1 
V, I 
`,. ± º-j 
O (D 
O C) O G 
ri rt 
(7 
(D P3 
N 1 1 I I O 4 Co C) N I I 
Oý l. n W O" OO U' CO 
N 1-+ F--+ N F-' O 
hý o, ON w w ON LA) I I rt 
Ln . -> º- N N N) 
v w LA) v w tD 
-lJ N C) O 
. 
C) 
. 
F-' 
. 
00 
. 
º--' 
. 
Ln 
. 
N) 
" 
1-' 
. 
1-- 
. 
O" 
. 
I I 
. . 
ºý 
. 
w U' O v I º-ý - 1-3 
0 
- rt 
Oo N W l. n fJ F-+ fV l--+ W F-ý W ºý W tJ LU 
%ýA O O N L,. ) co %ýD 0" 0" N --ýl Ul 1--' 
pý N O O ýO ýO 
:ý 
:, 
r 
V) 
O 
C) 
0 
m 
H 
L. 
C) 
W 
H. 
rt 
ri 
CD 
C 
0 
0 n 
0 
W 
N" 
O 
125 
comments. Private loans (usually from relatives) were available 
to a minority in the different categories without any particular 
statistical significance. A public loan (from a government source) 
was used by only one trader, a former government employee. Inher- 
ited capital was used mainly by former workers in the formal emp- 
loyment sector (i. e. Government employment), and those with no 
previous occupations who between them accounted for 69.3% of the 
'inheritors'. Other groups had relied much less on inheritance to 
launch into trade. It is also noteworthy that 66.7% of those who 
had started with 'gifts' were men with no previous occupations- 
mainly cases of sons helped by their fathers who were themselves 
traders. 
Table 4: 10 sets out information on source of capital for 
the various regional groups. About 80% of those who claimed to 
have used capital from 'other sources' (which in effect denotes 
some speculative sources), are from the nearby rural areas (i. e. 
Hassaheisa Rural, 53.3% and Rural in Gezira, 26.7%). Shale and 
other forms of agricultural crop speculation were the main sour- 
ces mentioned in this respect. 'Private loans' figured predomin- 
antly among traders coming from the North- an observation that 
indicates a degree of regional and/or ethnic cooperation as will 
be discussed later in the chapter. Of the traders who had used 
'Private Loan', 20% were directly from the North and 26.7% were 
second generation Northerners, while 33.3% were from the Gezira 
people. 
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7. AMOUNT OF WORKING CAPITAL 
Table 4: 11 Size of Working Capital 
Capital 1-1000 Less than Less than Less than Less than 
(L. S. ) 2000 3000 4000 6000 
umber 97- 33 10 5 10 
,0 56.1 19.1 5.8 2.9 5.8 
Table 4: 11 cont. 
apital Less than Less than Less than Less than More than Total 
FL. S. ) 10000 20000 30000 50000 50000 
umber 8 3 1 1 5 173 
% 4.6 1.7 0.6 0.6 2.9 100 
Two important points must be noted in the above Table: 
(a) More than three-quarters of the traders who responded to this 
questionnaire (75.2%) were working with very low levels of capit- 
al (between L. S 1 and less than 200), a fact that illustrates the 
point that there is keen competition from traders ready to trade 
with minimum levels of turn-over as will be clarified further in 
another section of this chapter. 
(b) There was a relatively high percentage of traders (21.4%) who 
were unwilling to disclose the amount of capital at their dispos- 
al. Of these, 10 were from Hassaheisa, 9 from other towns in the 
Gezira, 7 from Hassaheisa Rural, 8 from rural in North, 6 from 
other towns in the Sudan, 3 from other rural in the Sudan, and 
one from each of the remaining regional groups. A probable exp- 
lanation is that the majority work with little or no capital- 
their main resource being their ability to secure 
'permits' for 
access to certain commodities from official channels. Rather than 
trading in the commodities granted, however, these 'traders' seem 
to sell the 'permits' to those interested in obtaining 
the comm- 
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odities and who have sufficient capital to purchase them from the 
official sources. 
The distribution of the amounts of capital available to the 
members of the different groups is shown in Table 4: 12 which sug- 
gests the following points: 
(a) Those with longer histories of trade in Hassaheisa are "over- 
represented" in the category with the largest amounts of capital 
(i. e. more than L. S. 50000). 
(b) The groups with the most recent involvement in the market 
have access to the lowest amounts of capital. These are mainly 
groups from Other Rural in Sudan, Other Rural in Gezira, Rural 
in Hallawin and Rural in Hassaheisa. 
(c) The only exception to (a) and (b) is made up by those coming 
from other towns in Gezira. Thus despite their recent involvement 
in the market, they make up to 40% of the richest category, and 
only 3.1% of the poorest. This reflects the recent movement of 
"established businesses" from smaller towns in Gezira to the 
Hassaheisa market as will be discussed later. 
8. TYPES OF BUSINESS FIRM 
Table 4: 13 Type of Firm 
Type Retail Wholesale Workshop Kushuk Prof. Other. Total 
&Retail Office 
No. 80 12 89 31 6 1 219 
7 36.5 5.5 40.6 14.2 2.7 0.5 100 
The above table shows the following: 
(a) A total of 92 traders in the sample (42%) are engaged solely 
in the exchange of commodities without adding any value to them 
(other than storage). ' T-hey use Dufaavus (i. e. redbrick shops) for 
their businesses. 
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(b) Another 40.6% add some form of value ( mainly labour) to the 
goods they keep for sale or which they process on order. In this 
sense their puiiaºvo are defined as 'workshops' rather than simply 
being ordinary shops. 
(c) Kuohuo (14.2%) include both kinds of business, pure exchange 
of goods and workshop-like firms but in kiosks rather than in any 
other kind of building. 
(d) The professional offices (2.7%) are the business firms which 
mainly offer some kind of supporting professional services in the 
market-e. g. engineering consultation, legal advice or accounting 
and auditing services. 
When these observations are related to the different region- 
al groups (cf. Table 4: 14), they reveal various concentrations 
(i. e. specializations allowing greater degrees of control over 
the market). Table 4: 14 thus shows that 61.1% of those coming 
from 'other towns in Gezira' are concentrated in "workshops". 
Similarily, the 'Rural Hassaheisa' group is concentrated in in 
'Retail' and kiosks, 46.7% and 31.1% respectively. The Hallawin 
Rural are concentrated in Retail (31.3%) and 'workshops' 
(50%) 
while those from Rural Gezira are concentrated in Retail 
(35.7%) 
and kiosks (42.9%). The patterns of concentration also 
indicate 
the development of specific types of business in response to 
particular emerging demand. As the different groups came to the 
market at different times, they tended to establish themselves 
in new fields rather than to involve themselves 
in fields already 
controlled by others. This is clearly confirmed 
by the strong 
correlation between certain groups and certain types of 
firm. 
Table 4: 15 shows the length of time for which the various 
types of firm have been established (compare with Table 
4: 5). 
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Table 4: 16 -, ain Items of Trade 
Item ý, o. Shops percentage 
Me at 8 3.7 
Building ý1Iaterial 14 6.4 
vjood-word; 7 3.2 
Contracts 1 0.5 
Chemicals & Medicine 4 1.8 
Tailoring 8 3.7 
Electrical Appliances 4 1.8 
Books Sý Press 3 1.4 
Snacks Sý Soft Drink 5 2.3 
eady Food 15 6.8 
Household Utensils 1 0.5 
Spare Parts 19 8.7 
Hairdressing 3 1.4 
Ready-made Clothes 17 7.8 
Cloth & Fabrics 21 9.6 
Mechanic Repairs 19 8.7 
Photography 5 2.3 
Footwear 3 1.4 
Fruits & Vegetables 11 5.0 
Liquor 1 0.5 
General Provisions 15 6.8 
Others 35 16.0 
Total 219 100.0 
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Table 4: 17 . 'fain Items by Length of Time in Business 
Item Less Than 1-3 4-3 9-15 16-22 23-29 30+ Total 
One year 
'Ile at - - 2 25 2 25 4 50 - - - - - - 8 100 
Building 
Material 2 14 3 21 1 7 3 21 2 14 1 7 2 14 14 64.2 
I": ood-: cork 2 33 - - 1 17 2 33 - - 1 17 - - 6 83.3 
Contracts - - - - - - 11 - - 1 100 - - - - 1 - 
Tailoring 1 12 1 13 4 50 1 12 - - - - 1 13 8 
82.5 
Electrics. - - 2 50 - - 1 25 1 25 - - - - 4 
75.0 
Book & 
Press - - - - 1 33 1 33 1 34 3 
66.6 
Snack & 
Soft Drinks 1 20 2 40 1 20 - - 1 20 - - - - 5 
80.0 
Ready-Food 1 7 3 20 3 20 - - 3 20 - - 5 33 15 
46.7 
Household 
Utensils - - - - 1 00 - - - - - - - - 1 
100 
Spare Parts 1 5 4 21 7 37 1 5 1 5 2 11 3 16 19 68,5 
Hair 
Dressing - - 1 33 - - 1 34 - - - - 1 33 3 66.6 
Ready-Made 
Clothes 4 24 7 41 4 23 2 12 - - - - - - 17 100 
Cloth & 
Fabrics - - 2 10 1 5 11 52 2 9 - - 5 24 21 66.7 
Mechanic 
Re air 1 5 2 11 4 21 4 21 2 10 3 16 3 16 19 58.0 
Photog- 
ra phy - - 2 40, 1 20 1 20 1 20 - - - - 5 80.0 
Footwear - - 2 67 1 33 - - - - - - - - 3 100 
Fruits & 
Vegetables - - - - 3 27 7 64 1 9 - - - - 11 90.9 
Liquor - - - - - - 1 100 - - - - - - 1 100 
General 53 3 
Provisions 2 13 1 7 2 13 3 201, 2 13 - - 5 33 15 . 
Others - - 10 29 7 21 7 21 4 12 4 12 2 
6 34 70.0 
Chemicals 
& Medicine - 25 3 75 - - - - - - - - 4 100 
Total 
tI5 
7 45 21 47 22 50 23 22 10 11 51 
127 
12 217 
Percentage of shops of same type established since 1962. 
j 
r 
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The new types of firm are associated with the recent in-coming 
The new types of firm are associated with the recent in-coming 
groups. Workshops and kiosks have mainly been established during 
the last 15 years (66. l% and 967 respectively), which reflects 
the newly emerging demand in the district as the following anal- 
ysis of the the distribution of 'items' in the market shows. 
9. ITEMS 
The precentage of establishments distributing different 
kinds of goods and services is shown in Table 4: 16. The figures 
confirm two important points to be made in the following section 
of this chapter. The first concerns the diversity of goods in the 
market; and the second relates to the relative increase in the 
demand for non-basic or luxury items. The years of the introduct- 
ion of these items in the market may be iaged from Table 4: 17. 
The data indicate the shift in the balance of effective demand 
towards new social groups in the area. It is clear that demand 
for most of the non-basic items only developed after 1962. 
10. OWNERSHIP OF PREMISES 
Table 4: 18 Ownership of Premises 
Type Owned Rented Other Total 
Number 
, Percentage, 
39 
18.0 
151 
69.6 
27 
12.4 
217 
100 
The pattern of distribution and building of sites in the 
market is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Here we may 
simply note that the majority of traders do not own the sites of 
their stores. Again it is interesting to draw attention to var- 
iations between groups as shown in Table 4: 19. It may be seen 
that those with rented sites tend to be those from the more dist- 
ant areas of origin (i. e. Northern Region and other parts of the 
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Table 4: 19 Type of Premise Occupancy by Birthplace 
ve 
Birth Plac 
Owned Rented Other Total 
assaheisa 16 31.4 31 60.8 4 7.8 51 
41.0 7.4 20.5 14.3 14.8 1.8 23.5 
Other Town 2 11.1 9 50.0 7 38.9 18 
in Gezira 5.1 0.9 6.0 4.1 25.9 3.2 8.3 
ural in 6 13.3 28 62.2 11 24.4 45 
Hassaheisa 15.4 2.8 18.5 12.9 40.7 5.1 20.7 
Rural 4 25.0 12 75.0 - - 16 
allawin 10.3 1.8 7.9 5.5 - - 7.4 
Other Rural 1 7.1 9 64.3 4 28.6 14 
in Gezira 2.6 0.5 6.0 4.1 14.8 1.8 6.5 
Town in - - 10 100 - - 10 
North - - 6.6 4.6 - - 4.6 
Rural in 6 15.4 32 82.1 1 2.6 39 
North 15.4 2.8 21.2 14.7 3.7 0.5 18.0 
Other Town 4 20.0 16 80.0 - - 20 
in Sudan 10.3 1.8 10.6 7.4 - - 9.2 
Other Rural - - 3 100 - - 3 
in Sudan - - 2.0 1.4 - - 1.4 
Other Place - - 1 100 - - 1 
- - 0.7 0.5 - - 0.5 
Total 39 18.0 151 69.6 27 12.4 217 
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Sudan). This is so in spite of the fact that those from Gezira 
and nearby places have on the whole a more recent involvement in 
trade in Hassaheisa market. This situation calls for explanation 
since the Northerners are among the richest and best established 
traders in the town. The explanation will be provided in Chapter 
5; and it suffices the point here to maintain that it relates to 
the specific historical pattern of land allotment in the market. 
11. RESIDENCE 
The distribution of the informants in the various resident- 
ial areas of Hassaheisa is shown in the following table: 
Table 4: 20 Residence 
esidence Omda Karima Mygouma Shargi Wassat Mazad 
umber 
0 
30 
13.8 
18 
8.3 
10 
4.6 
10 
4.6 
47 
21.6 
11 
5.0 
Table 4: 20 cont. 
esidence Imtidad Jadida, Kambo Other Near-by Near-by Total 
Town Village 
umber 12 15 2 5 4 54 218 
% 5.5 6.9 0.9 2.3 1.8 24.8 100 
When we bear in mind the relative size of the population 
in each residential area (cf. Chapter 3), it is evident that 
there is a strongly disproportionate distribution of traders 
among the different areas. The areas in which they are over- 
represented are Omda (13.8%), Karima (8.3%) and Wassat (21.6%) 
where they constitute 5%, 4% and 14% of the total population 
respectively. On the other hand, there are areas in which they 
are 'under-represented' (e. g. Kambo, 0.97, Jadida-, 6.9% and 
Imtidad-and Mazad, 10.5%). The table thus points to a degree of 
residential concentration on the basis of affluence. 
i' 
I, 
LLjý 
' 
I 
i 
Furthermore, and as Table 4: 21 suggests, there is a pattern 
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of residential segregation based on regional affiliation. This 
is especially so among groups intensely involved in the local 
politics of the town (e. g. the Northerners and the Dubasin as 
will be discussed in Chapter 8). Those coming from the Hassaheisa 
and Hallawin Rural areas tend to continue living in their origin- 
al near-by villages where they can both look after their 'sec- 
ondary occupations' (as explained earlier) and reduce their liv- 
ing expenses. 
In the following section I will trace the history of deve- 
lopment of commercial activities upon which mechanisms the market 
community came to emerge and function. Many of the general char- 
acteristic features of the market find their justification to 
exist in the specific manner by which trade was developed and 
promoted as will be detailed below. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION 
IN HASSAHEISA 
The development of trade as the central activity enhancing 
and furthering, the process of capital accumulation may be viewed 
and understood in terms of three relatively distinct historical 
periods. This periodization will help us to trace the origins 
and development of the structures and dynamics of trade and the 
related activities. The time span covered stretches from the turn 
of the 20th Century to the present day. The three logically and 
chronologically related periods to which I refer are: 
1" THE PRE-GEZIRA SCHEME PERIOD 
Which ran, roughly speaking, from the date of Sudan's occ- 
upation by the Anglo-Egyptian troops (1899) to the establishment 
of the Gezira Scheme in the region around 1930. 
2" THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD 
Which extended from the establishment of the Scheme up to 
Independence in January 1956. 
3" THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD 
Under different national political regimes, from 1956 
to the present. 
This periodization helps us to bring to the fore the sal- 
ient features characteristic of the process of capital accumul- 
ation as-it had, and is currently being, carried out through 
trade in Hassaheisa, but I shall, where necessary, refer to the 
wider national and international levels. I start with three obser- 
vations on the nature and the analytical value of the periodizat- 
ion. 
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(a) As I am dealing with one process (i. e. capital accumulation) 
taking place through and within one activity (trade), the per- 
iods inevitably overlap. There are some elements of each stage 
which remain prominent well after the initial period of their 
development has passed. 
(b) The first observation does not, however, imply that there is 
no qualitative differences over time in the nature, dynamics and 
implications of trade and in the concomitant process of accumul- 
ation. On the contrary, there are several important differences 
to be examined in the discussion below. 
(c) The nature of these differences is explored through the det- 
ailed study of trade in the town with special reference to its 
general configuration, its basic mechanisms and the resultant 
rate of profit. 
THE PRE-GEZIRA SCHEME PERIOD, 1899-1930: 
The process of capital formation and accumulation follow- 
ing the, imposition of colonial rule can only be fully understood 
in relation to the wider process of colonial capitalistic accum- 
ulation. A central and characteristic feature of the latter is 
the need for ever-expanding markets. But as O'Brien puts it: 
this need was not simply an undifferentiated need for 
additional markets of the same sort as those at home... 
It was not sufficient simply to maintain or augument the 
mass of the capitalist's profits; it was also necessary 
to find means of counteracting the continuing tendency 
of the general rate of profit to decline. 
2 
Hence the establishment of a structure of 'unequal exch- 
ange' within which the profit rates could be protected and even 
furthered in the colonies. 
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The process of capitalistic accumulation in the Sudan was 
primarily instigated by the very system of colonization under 
which there were ample opportunities to recover more labour in 
exchange for less labour and thereby to obtain higher than aver- 
age rates of profit. 
3 
Since money was the only recognized form 
in which capital could be realized more easily, the imposition 
of a money-market was crucial because of the need to find cons- 
umers able to buy the commodities manufactured in the coloniz- 
ing country (Britain). Thus the market was used as a device 
through which profits could be derived primarily by the extract- 
ion of surpluses from the population of Sudan. 
In order to create surpluses in 'cash form', however, it 
was necessary in the case of Sudan to transform the local econ- 
omy from a predominantly self-sufficient orientation to one for 
surplus production. Yet during the early stages of capitalist 
penetration this presupposed an effective need for money in 
cash form. It was to this end that the colonial administration 
carried out two sets of coercive politico-economic measures: 
(a) The implementation, through elaborate legislation, of a wide 
ranging system of taxation. The main direct consequence of this 
was to drive the people to seek ways of getting money to meet 
the tax obligations. During the first decade of colonial rule 
in the Sudan, the administration issued a number of ordinances 
designed to create these obligations. Prominent among these 
ordinances with a direct impact on the Hassaheisa District were 
the following: 
1. Herd Tax Regulations Ordinance, 1899. This tax was 
payable annually, within thirty days after assessment, 
at the following rates: 3% on camels, 3% on cattle, 8% 
on sheep, 8% on goats, or at such other rates as shall 
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from time to time be notified, for the whole or any part 
of the Sudan. 
4 
This tax was imposed on Hassaheisa District (then the 
Messellamia District) as from the Ist of August, 1901.5 
2. Land Tax Ordinance, 1899. According to this Ordinance, taxes 
were to be "levied on all cultivable land save land the crops 
grown on which are assessable to Uzhun. 
6 
In accordance with 
this Ordinance, moreover, the Governor General ordered that 
"Land tax shall be levied in the District of Messellamia (i. e. 
Hassaheisa District), Gezira Mudiria, from the First of Jan. 
1903". For the purpose of tax assessment the land had been 
classified into six different categories each with its own rate 
and with the taxes per feddan ranging from P. T. 60 for the first 
rate to P. T. 10 for the 6th rate. 
3. Ushur- Ordinance, 1899. According to this Ordinance, 
all crops grown on rainlands were liable to a tax called 
Ushur which shall be such part, not being greater than 
three twentieths of the said crops. 
A notice to the effect of the application of this tax on the 
Hassaheisa District was issued on the ist of December 1902.9 
Through these measures the taxation system covered nearly 
all the main areas of the region's economic activities which 
were almost entirely based on rain cultivation, animal husband- 
ary and riverain agriculture. On the fringes of this economic 
formation, there were some nomadic groups and also a number of 
sedentary populations inhabiting settlements akin to large vill- 
ages. To cover these, the colonial administration introduced The 
Levying of Tribute Ordinance, 1901 according to which the nomads 
had to pay an annual tribute based upon approximate assessments 
of their herds', and a house tax was levied at the rate of one- 
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twelfth of the annual rental value of houses and buildings on 
the populations of towns and large villages through The House 
Tav nrrl; nnnro 1QQQ 11 
The people were thus compelled to do their best to pay 
these taxes which were effective throughout the Sudan. This dis- 
trict was not an exception as the following table shows. 
Table 4: 22 Revenue from Taxes in Colonial Sudan 
1901-1909 (in Egyptian Pounds) 
Fiscal year LAND USHUR ANIMAL HOUSE TRIBUTE 
1901 28287 6892 9431 372 5163 
1902 33656 8790 12547 1118 7613 
1903 37818 28102 19242 579 13396 
1904 46246 31090 21892 1444 13908 
1905 48970 30453 19381 2093 12494 
1906 55554 50791 24205 2344 14113 
1907 59510 49070 27228 3851 19073 
1908^ 15835 38391 13483 1191 5426 
1909 63610 45800 29915 3000 18540 
* Receipts realized from the Ist. of Jan. to June 30th, 1908. 
Source: Compiled from- the detailed statements showing the 
receipts and expenditure of the Sudan Government for the 
relevant years in various numbers of Sudan Gazette. 
(b) The second set of arrangements designed to encourage 
the people to acquire cash was entirely concerned with the stru- 
cture of the then existing economy itself. Through the imposition 
of a number of legal and administrative measures affecting land, 
which was the sole object of productive activities, the colonial 
government set out to restrict opportunities for the creation of 
any considerable cash surpluses within the pre-existing economic 
structure. This was achieved in two ways: 
1) Keeping productivity within these structures as low as poss- 
Y 
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ible and, in some cases, pushing it 
further down. There is much 
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evidence to suggest that the maintenance of a level of product- 
ivity scarcely above self-sufficiency was primarily a function 
of two socio-economic tactics. Firstly, there was the widely 
reported principle of communal ownership of land which assured 
a free, easy, and smooth accessibility to the group's land by the 
individual members of the particular group. 
12 
Secondly, there was 
the technique of shifting-cultivation which counteracted the ten- 
l3 dency of yields to diminish on the over-used land. 
In order to undermine this seemingly coherent system of 
economy, the colonial administration introduced and implemented 
a number of carefully arranged ordinances. From the beginning 
Lord Kitchener proclaimed some justifications for these ordin- 
ances: 
Whereas claims are being made to land in the Sudan which 
are in many cases conflicting, and whereas ordinances will 
shortly be issued providing for adjudication on such claims: 
It is hereby notified to all whom it may concern that, pend- 
ing such adjudication, no intending vendor of land in the 
Sudan is in a position to give a good and valid title to 
such land. 
14 
In keeping with this injunction the Title To Land Ordin- 
ance, 1899 was issued encouraging a pattern of private rather 
than communal ownership; and a Land Commission was set up in the 
Messalamia District (later, Hassaheisa District) to that effect 
in March 1901.15 To reinforce this ordinance, a Demarcation And 
Survey Ordinance was issued in 1905, giving demarcation officers 
the authority to 
order the owner or occupier of such land within 
a reasonable time to be fixed by such officer to 
demarcate his land and, for the purpose of such 
demarcation, to erect such stones, pillars, posts or other 
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boundary of landmarks as the said officer may dirct, 
l6 
In order to undermine the basic principle of successful 
shifting-cultivation, on the other hand, the colonial administ- 
ration also set about confiscating all unused lands on which 
shifting agriculture could be practised. 
17 
To achieve this, it 
introduced the Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1903 which provided 
for the acquisition of any lands for 'public purposes '18, and a 
Land Settlement Ordinance, 1905 for "the settlement of rights 
over waste, forest , and unoccupied 
lands and to provide for the 
expropriation of such rights" (emphasis added). 
19 
2) Undermining the traditional household industries, particularly 
the local textile industry in Hassaheisa District. In the words 
of an early Deputy Assistant Dirctor of Agriculture and Forests 
Department20, the home crafts of "ginning and spinning and of 
weaving local cloth (Damowi ) of useful quality was in old days 
thinly but widely spread throughout the Arab Sudan". According to 
him, however, this craft "was suppressed by law to avoid the car- 
rying over from year to year of seed which might be infected with 
diseases and pests". These were the main justifications offered 
by the administration for the suppression by law 
21 
of an industry 
which was well established and had for centuries 
been carried out 
to meet the requirements of the local population. 
22 
It was against this background of cash needs being stimula- 
ted through taxation, the expropriation of fallow land, and the 
systematic undermining of traditional crafts that the process of 
money-market penetration developed. The 
local populations found 
themselves increasingly compelled either to work 
for wages or to 
sell animals or grain 
in order to acquire money. 
23 For various 
reasons, however, opportunities 
for wage-employment were extrem- 
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ely limited. The first of these reasons is that the range of both 
government and private investment during the early stages of col- 
onial rule in the Sudan were very limited. Secondly, such opport- 
unities for work as did exist in the public sector were exclusiv- 
ely for skilled labourers who were to be imported from beyond the 
borders of the country 
24. 
Thirdly, unskilled jobs were further 
cut down through the use of semi-forced 'correctional' labour25 
carried out by prisoners and by both obligatory 
26 
and voluntary 
27 
labour. 
The local populations were thus left with no-choice but to 
involve themselves in the money-market through the commercializa- 
tion of agricultural products- an involvement which, particularly 
during the early formative period, was based on two mechanisms, 
each of which was a form of direct exploitation of the surround- 
ing countryside. These mechanisms were-: 
(a) Masked profits deriving primarily from the surpluses 
of peasant producers. The peasants sold their produce cheaply 
because they were desparate for cash. In these circumstances, 
what originally appeared as a relation of exchange binding the 
simple commodity producers to the market tended to assume the 
character of a relation of production binding the producer to= 
capital. The price which the producer received became a concealed 
wage. In this sense, all profits realized through this system 
28 
can be conceptualized as surplus-value. 
(b) This system required, among other things, the use of 
various forms of compulsion and force during the period of its 
formation and establishment. They were used to ensure the mono- 
poly status of the commercial companies 
in the market. 
The ultimate aim of the colonial government was, however, 
148 
to establish and maintain a stable system of production for ex- 
port based on small producers who were in turn bound to the 
market through trade. The colonial administration therefore wast- 
ed no time in encouraging and regulating all-trading activities. 
thus itissued The Trade Licensing Ordinance and The Auctioneers', 
Brokers' and Pedlars' Ordinance in 190529, and The Trade Tax Ord- 
inance in 1913. The Trade Tax Ordinance was designed to regulate 
all "wholesale and retail trade, shipping and forwarding agenc- 
ies... etc. "30 As early as January 1903, the Rt. Hon. The Earl of 
Cromer, His Britain Majesty's Agent and Consul General in Egypt, 
A 
had stressed- while speaking inn Khartoum Hotel to the Sudan Gov- 
ernment officials 
31_ how highly the administration's efforts "to 
introduce order and civilization into this country" were apprec- 
iated by H. M. government. He claimed that the introduction of 
order was bringing confidence, "with return of which, trade is 
beginning to flourish" and he singled out trade as being of a 
paramount importance to the whole fiscal and administrative 
system. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HASSAHEISA AS A TRADING CENTRE 
In the context of these developments in the region and the 
Sudan as a whole, Hassaheisa had gradually been designed to 
fun- 
ction primarily as a centre of trade. But, beside; being a season- 
al location for the Dubasin group- as explained earlier- the site 
had also served, especially during the Mahdist period, as a port 
for boats carrying Vwoi-a of Zaaat to Omdurman. Significantly, the 
personnel used by the Mahdist State 
for the collection and pack- 
ing of the Zatat and the staffing of 
boats, were almost entirely 
Turks and Egyptians who had remained 
in the Sudan after the col- 
32 
lapse of the Turco-Egyptian rule in 
1885. ' Making full use of 
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their knowledge of the place and the people around it, these 
Turks and Egyptians became the main Va dealers following the 
establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial adinistration in the 
Sudan. Using their savings, they bought Vwu from the local peo- 
ple who needed the cash in order to pay the taxes, and transport- 
ed it to Omdurman for sale to the big merchants who either expor- 
ted it or sold it in the local market. During the early period of 
this trade, the producers in the countryside were prepared to 
accept extremely low prices for their grain, leaving substantial 
margins to the middlemen. Table 4: 23 shows the prices of grain 
in both Hassaheisa and Omdurman markets during the first five 
years of colonial rule. 
Table 4: 23 The Prices of Durra per Ardeb* in Hassaheisa 
& Omdurman for Selected Dates (1900-1904) 
Mate Omdurman Market" 
INov. 1900 L. E. 0.340 
INov. 1901 L. E. 0.500 
IFeb. 1902 L. E. 0.470 
IFeb. 1903 L. E. 0.420 
May 1904 L. E. 0.960 
Hassaheisa Market** Margin 
L. E. 0.125 
L. E. 0.130 
L. E. 0.095 
L. E. 0.120 
L. E. 0.215 
L. E. 0,370 
L. E. 0.375 
L. E. 0.3001 
L. E. 0.200 L. E. 0.7601 
Ardeb= 20 Keilas -. local volumetric measure 
^^ Prices as given in Sudan Gazette, issues of the same dates. 
Average prices according to the files of Mr. Ali Musa an 
early grain dealer in Hassaheisa- made availabe to me by his 
son, Abdel-Karim 
was the main item of local trade in Hassaheisa, 
though quantities of animals were also bought 
for transportat- 
ion to Omdurman. Towards the end of the first decade of colonial 
rule, however, there were important 
developments with far-reach- 
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ing consequences for Hassaheisa and the nature of local trade. 
Two of these developments deserve special consideration: the 
Wad Habouba Rebellion and the introduction of rail-transport. 
1. WAD HABOUBA REBELLION 
The Wad Habouba Rebellion of April 1908 took place in the 
Hallawin area adjacent to Hassaheisa. 
33 
The site had been used 
by the government as a bridge-head for its troops which eventual- 
ly put down the rebellion. Following the defeat of the rebels, 
the colonial military commandQr and his troops used the site of 
Hassaheisa as their base owing to its strategic location for the 
pacification of the whole surrounding countryside. One of the 
most important consequences of these events was that the head- 
quarters of the district were moved from the town of Messellamia 
to Hassaheisa. The then Acting Governor of the Blue Nile Province 
reported on 29th October, 1908, that 
Recent events have made it clear, apart from the fact 
that Messellamia itself is a most unhealthy place, that 
the headquarters of Messelamia District should be at a 
more central spot and on the river. For various reasons 
Hassaheisa is obviously the most suitable. It is central, 
on the river, an important grain depot, and in all prob- 
ability it will be found necessary for the proposed Gezira 
Railway to make a station there. I strongly urge that the 
headquarters of Messelamia District should be transferred 
to Hassaheisa. 
34 
This recommendation was appreciated by the Governor-Gene- 
ral and was reported to the Consul General 
in Cairo on March 
27th, 1909.. -The report maintained that "the move of the Messe- 
llamia District Headquarters is now being arranged and the site 
and building requirements carefully considered". 
35 In April, 
1913, the Governor of the Blue Nile Province 
declared that the 
"headquarters of the Messellamia District have now been moved to 
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Hassaheisa and all correspondence should be addressed to the lat- 
ter place. 
36 
Another consequence was-the settlement of the Dubasin 
in Hassaheisa as explained in Chapter 3. The latter group came to 
provide the labour required for the local public works. 
2. THE INTRODUCTION OF RAIL-TRANSPORT 
In 1909 the Hassaheisa Rail Station was established and it 
was officially opened in January 1910.37 The railway effectively 
ended boat-service between Hassaheisa and Omdurman, but of course 
it facilitated the easy flow of goods from Khartoum and other 
places to Hassaheisa. This had indeed served the Greek merchants 
3 
who by that time were "established in every considerable town". 
8 
The latter brought to Hassaheisa the Manchester cotton-piece 
goods and shoddy wares from Birmingham for the local people who 
had so little money that there was no call for anything more 
elaborate. 
39 
They also brought other goods such as tinned peas 
and beans, mainly for the colonial troops. A contemporary British 
official was later to write appreciating the services of the Greek 
traders and maintain that: 
hard things have been said about them and the huge pro--'-'-- 
fits they are supposed to have made, but they were a gal- 
lant folk who risked their money and lives on many occas- 
ions. Without these Greek stores, found in so many of the 
distant out-stations, the life of a British official would 
have been infin&, tely more difficult. 
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We may now recapitulate the significance of these develop- 
ments. Three changes, as far as the dynamics of commercial acc- 
umulation are concerned are unmistakable: 
a) The diversification of the functions of the settlement. 
Thus 
in addition to its original function as a port or a centre 
for 
the collection of grain and animals, the town 
began to serve as 
the seat of the district administration-i. e. as a centre 
for the 
political control over the surrounding countryside. 
Moreover, the 
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main entrepreneurial functions in the district were located 
here. 
b) The establishment of the Hassaheisa market as the main trading 
centre in the district. The introduction by Greeks of manufactured 
imported goods, however limited in range, was an important step 
towards the stable development of a dynamic system of colonial 
commercial accumulation dependent on the extraction of surpluses 
from the peasants in the district through the imposed 'unequal 
exchange' of values. Under such a system the peasants sold their 
products at low prices, and bought imported commodities at high 
prices. The colonial administration was thus in a position (irr- 
espective of whether or not it was aware of it) to achieve the 
aim of establishing a two-way trade to facilitate the expansion 
of industrial production in Britain and to maintain the average 
rate of profit through exchange for (and cöripetition with) the 
the locally produced goods which embodied 'more labour' and thus 
had a higher 'value' than British products. Thus the British man- 
ufacturers could "recover more labour in exchange for less lab- 
our 
41 
c) The dynamics of the emerging process of commercial accumulation 
dictated, by and large, the composition of the settlement's popul- 
ation. 
42 
The economic functions of the town determined the groups 
of people who shared in its life: merchants of different origins, 
Zabourers in supporting jobs (e. g. loading and off-loading) and 
government personneZwho provided the political machine necessary 
for the whole process. People of different backgrounds and occup- 
ations were thus juxtaposed in the small settlement with 
little 
obvious socio-economic residential segregation, apart 
from the 
government personnel who 
lived in their own separate residential 
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residential area as will be explained later in this chapter. 
ACCUMULATION AND THE CONTROL OF MARKETS 
As historical experience shows, " merchants do not make 
their profits by revolutionizing production but by controlling 
markets, and the greater the control they are able to exercise, 
the higher their rate of profit". 
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Accordingly, it is least 
surprising that the colonial government introduced a series of 
organizational measures designed to allow the systematic control 
of a clearly demarcated market-place by the merchants themselves 
under the supervision of the administration. The measures includ- 
ed, in addition to the Traders Tax Ordinance of 1913 at the nat- 
ional level, the following series of local arrangements in the 
Hassaheisa District; 
1. The formal establishment of Hassaheisa 'uff in 1915. Trading 
outside this specified geographical locale was considered 'un- 
official'44, and was systematically discöuraged. In Hassaheisa, 
sites for the erection of 64 shops were carefully chosen and put 
out to tender. By the end of 1915 most of these sites had been 
registered, many were built, though only 16 shops were effect- 
ively opened. Later I will discuss aspects of the ownership of 
sites and the composition of the owners. 
2. The second arrangement was the strict specification of part- 
icular week days as market-days. These days (Saturdays, Mondays 
and Wednesdays) coincided with schedule for arrival and 
depart- 
ure of trains. 
45 Later, the market-days were arranged to be com- 
plementary to those specified for other minor JSut 
in the dist- 
riet-i. e. Messellamia, Tabat, Mehayriba and 
Meya'lig. 
3. The issuing of trading licences by the District Commissioner 
to a number of people during 
1915. Those who were granted licen- 
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ces, and who were reported to be effectively trading on the site, 
were mainly Turkish and Egyptian immigrants, Greeks and Northern- 
ers. These numbered 8,5 and 3 respectively. 
46 
With the increasing involvement of the rural population in 
the cash-cropping of grain and sale of animals (both of which were 
stimulated by the need to meet tax obligations), and the concurr- 
ent development of a taste for imported manufactured commodities, 
the marketing of grain remained the prime activity of the market, 
and a Khartoum-based commercial firm (Contomichalos, Sons & Co. ) 
established a mechanical VwrAa cleaning and packing unit in the 
Hassaheisa Äuk adjacent to the rail station in 1916. The unit was 
used for packing standard bags of 45 K. gs. for export by the mer- 
chants who paid P. T. 8 per ton (later the charge was increased to 
P. T. 12 per ton). 
47 
The steady increase of Du. 4Aa exports, mainly 
to feed the neighbouring countries (Egypt and Eritrea in partic- 
ular), and also to some European countries for poultry and catt- 
le48, enhanced the Da trade and furthered the merchants chan- 
ces of profits. Throughout the First World War there was a strong 
demand for Du a on the world market inspite of the war-time con- 
ditions of sea-borne trade and exports reached record proportions 
from 1915 to 1918.49 
Furthermore, the opportunities for trading were boosted 
through the Bill of Exchange Ordinance of 1917, which codified 
and regulated the issue of any "unconditional order in writing, 
addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving 
it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on dem- 
and, or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in 
50 
money to, or to the order of, a specified person, or to bearer". 
ji 
rt 
t 
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On the basis of this ordinance a credit system was developed in 
order to facilitate the flow of commodities and capital within 
the ranks of the evolving system of trade. The system was strong- 
ly hierarchical with the large import/export commercial firms at 
the apex. These firms were foreign in capital and ownership. 
51 
The multitude of small units of population, scattered over 
a vast area of a country with poor and inadequate transport and 
communication systems, had for long militated against the growth 
of a unified trading system in the Sudan. Subsequent to the col- 
onial intrusion, however, a new trade structure started to emerge 
as follows: 
1) The large import/export firms referred to earlier were 
at the top. 
2) Large wholesale firms, also mainly in Khartoum. 
3) The smaller wholesale and retail merchants in the 
markets of the various provincial and regional towns. 
4) The smallest retail traders located in the villages 
as well as in the residential areas in towns and represent- 
ing the bottom of the trading hierarchy. 
In this highly regionalized trade structure, the Bills of Exchange 
Ordinance of 1917 served a double purpose: 
a) On the one hand, because of the scarcity, and in many cases the 
complete lack , of capital 
(especially at the lower levels of the 
trading community in Sudan), the ordinance facilitated the 
flow 
and distribution of imported goods, thus encouraging the 
foreign- 
owned commercial firms to expand their trading activities. 
b) On the other hand, it introduced'an element of trust- essent- 
ial for a. trade based on credit- between the ethnically heterog- 
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eneous and geographically dispersed participants. This illustrates 
the role of the colonial state in protecting the interests of the 
export/import and wholesale firms (which were often the same) in 
enabling them to get 'their' money through formally legal means. 
In spite of the rapidly developing trade in the country, how- 
ever, the rate of commercial capital accumulation in Hassaheisa 
itself remained relatively low all through this period. This was 
due to the extremely vulnerable position of the town merchants 
and traders in the hierarchy of the trading system. Being at the 
third level of the system, the local merchants were subject to 
constant pressure both from the higher levels and from the state. 
This pressure greatly limited their profits and their opportunit- 
ies to accumulate were, accordingly, a function of their ability 
and skill in establishing and exercising a measure of control 
over the market. But such a control was continuously constrained 
by two sets of factors: 
Firstly, the increasing dependence of the town's merchants 
on the large-scale, foreign-owned commercial firms which were 
virtually unrestrained by the political pressures of the colonial 
state. The local merchants depended on these firms for supplies 
of imported commodities as well as for the ultimate export of 
the local products. Secondly, the interventionist policies of 
the colonial government which checked the opportunities of-the 
local merchants to manipulate trade to their own advantage. 
The second set of factors may be illustrated in the foil 
owing: 
1. The government kept exceptionally close control over prices, 
perhaps to convince the people of its just administration. This 
control was carried out through the rigorous application of the 
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Regulation of Prices Ordinance of 1914 which gave the district 
administration the power "to fix the maximum prices for any one 
or more of the foodstuffs or articles of prime necessity"52 which 
were listed in a schedule. This ordinance was amended in 1919, 
1920 and 1922 to include more and more commodities in the sched- 
ule. 
2. In order to constrain the merchants' ability in manipulating 
supplies, moreover, the colonial administration issued The 
Stocks Declaration Proclamation of 191953 which was strictly 
applied. 
3. When the British Consul-General in Cairo withdrew the Egypt- 
ian annual subvention 
54 
in 1912, the Sudan Government decided to 
raise some taxes. Accordingly, The Traders Tax Ordinance of 1913 
required "every person, firm or company carrying on (whether on 
behalf of himself or any other person) a trade within the Sudan, 
to pay yearly to the Government a tax at the rate assessed in 
the manner hereinafter appearing". The tax-schedule was as foll- 
56 
ows 
Assessed Annual Profit(L. E. 
24-36 
37-66 
67-100 
101-150 
151-200 
201-300 
301-400 
401-500 
501-600 
Tax Payable (L. E. 
0.50 
1 
2 
3 
5 
8 
12 
16 
20 
Above 600 : (L. E. 4 for every completed L. E. 100 
of profits). 
All through the 1920s, thus, the merchants were not only 
suffering from their subordinate position 
in relation to both the 
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government and the foreign firms- a situation which restricted 
01- 
their rate of accumulation- but were also trading underApartic- 
ularly unfavourable set of circumstances prevailing in the reg- 
ion. These circumstances were: 
1. The shrinkage of the Vunna market 
In preparation for the establishment of the Gezira Scheme, 
the colonial government issued the Gezira Land Ordinance, 1921 
under which most of the land in the Gezira area was to be rented 
or purchased by the government. 
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The areas affected by this ord- 
inance included the town's hinterland (Messelamia District) on 
15th March 192458 and the Hassaheisa area itself on 29th Decem- 
ber 1924.59 This course of events deeply affected the area of 
rain-cultivation and, consequently, the production of grain. 
Furthermore, in the period 1924-26 a large part of the 
Gezira was formally included in the irrigated area for cotton 
production. 
60 
With the incorporation of the local people as 
tenant-farmers in the newly-established scheme a major factor 
stimulating crop marketing was effectively removed as the cot- 
ton-growers were exempted from taxes. 
61 
2. The absence of other spheres for investment 
The monopoly which the government exercised over rail and 
river transport62, coupled with the inadequacy of road motor 
transport (the development of which was discouraged by the gov- 
ernment) 
63 deprived merchants of any real chances of profitable 
investment in the transport sector. The only other sphere for 
profit-making in the area was agricultural 
land, but even this 
sphere was curtailed in the 
Gezira as a whole, and Hassaheisa 
District in particular, through the notices 
issued by the 
Governor-General regulating (or, more accurately, prohibiting) 
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"the land sales by natives to foreigners in Merkez of Wad Medani, 
Messellamia, and Kamlin in the Blue Nile Province". Although the 
"transfer of rights or ownership to other natives of the same 
locality" was later permitted, "no disposition of land is to be 
made by natives without the written consent of the Governor". 
64 
Such was the official policy which was to be embodied later in 
the Gezira Land Ordinance of 1921.65 Since the bulk of the town's 
merchants were either 'foreigners' (e. g. Greek) or 'immigrants' 
from within the Sudan '(Northerners), and consequently considered 
not of "the same locality", the merchants stood virtually no 
chance of acquiring agricultural land in the district. 
The foregoing difficult circumstances contributed to the 
prevalence of a low rate of capital accumulation and led, direc- 
tly and indirectly, to a number of the town's merchants either 
moving to other areas (e. g. the Greeks moved to Khartoum), or to 
become bankrupt. In March 1925, for example, Hassan Ali Musa 
(once the 'chief-merchant' in the market) petitioned the Medani 
Civil Court to be adjudged bankrupt. A meeting of his creditors 
was held66 and in October 1925 the court eventually appointed 
Hussein Alloub (another big merchant and a relative of Hassan) 
as official receiver to look after the business of Hassan and 
to arrange for the repayment of debts. 
67 
TRADERS RESPONSES: 
The low rate of commercial capital accumulation was lowered 
further by the economic depression and the aggravated situation 
resulted in various responses by the merchants. The net results 
by the end of the 1920s were as follows: 
1)The Greeks: Their endeavor to introduce, and create a market 
for, imported tinned food was largely frustrated by the slow 
development of a taste capable of creating an effective demand 
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F i, g .4 Genealog ies Showin g the Interrelations of Three Leading 
Merchant Families in Hassaheisa up to the 1940s 
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1. Alloub Ali Fallah 
4. Zamzam Alloub 
7. Saffiya Hussein Alloub 
1O. Mohamed Hussien Alloub 
13. E1-Nur Hussein Alloub 
16. Yousif Ali Musa 
19. Abdel Kadir Ali Musa 
22. A/Rahim Ali Musa 
25. Hussein Waziri 
28. Abdel Kadir Waziri 
31. Daughter of Ali Eid 
34. Nafisa Eheimir 
37. Musa A/Rahim Ali Musa 
2. Fatima el-Sikini 
5. Beshria Alloub 
8. Niema Hussien Alloub 
ll. El-Tayib Hussein Alloub 
14. Arabi Hussein Alloub - 
17. Hannana Ali Musa 
20. Osman Ali Musa 
23. Waziri S. Alalfi 
26. Batoul Waziri 
29. Zainab Waziri 
32. Fatima Abashar 
35. Abbas Bashir 
38. Daughter of Abdel Kadir 
3. Ahmed Alloub 
6. Hussein Alloub 
9. Rahma Hussien Alloub 
12. Ahmed Hussein Alloub 
15. Ali Musa 
18. Abdel Karim All Musa 
21. Hassan Ali Musa 
24. E1-Tayeb Waziri 
27. Hassan Waziri 
30. Husna Haroun 
33. Mohammed el-Sikini 
36. Saida Ibrahim Eid 
Waziri 
Source: Interview with Mr. Abdel-Karim Ali Musa and historical 
accounts on these families in Hammadalla, 0. (1960). 
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for such items in the region. Most of the Greek merchants thus 
had to leave and only two of them remained to confine themselves 
to the quasi-monopolized trade of liquor. One of the two later 
committed suicide when he was due to be tried for an alleged 
offence relating to the liquor-trade. 
68 
2. The Northerners: Their rather late involvement in the 
(from 1917), combined with the smallness of their investments, 
placed them on the fringes of the 6ük trade. They engaged mainly 
in the TJ ha4ha trade-i. e. they were peddlars who would "travel 
from place to place or market to market". In this way they 
69 
managed to escape taxation and licence fees altogether. As they 
moved around on their donkeys, they sold mainly products of the 
Northern Province-e. g. dates, beans, lupins, tick beans, lentils, 
fennels, cumin, caraway, and coriander. The Northerners, more- 
over, were virtually all bachelors with no fixed residence, and 
the cost and standard of their living were evidently very low. 
Thus they managed to cope with the prevailing difficulties in 
the commercial activities in Hassaheisa. 
3. The Turkish and Egyptian Immigrants: Despite the hardship the 
members of this group encountered in the 1920s, they largely 
maintained their dominant position in the 4uta. The factors which 
allowed them to do so were the following: 
a) They had enjoyed earlier access to both the local DuUha trade 
and trade in imported goods and consequently they had better 
chances of accumulation than the rival groups (e. g. the Greeks). 
b) They were also able to establish very good relations with the 
local District Commissioner through their general obedience to, 
and acceptance of, the latter's authority as well as through 
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their help to government officials. 
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This ensured good trading 
conditions for them and also helped them in obtaining the trust 
of the wholesale commercial firms in Khartoum. In this regard it 
is relevant to mention that the semi-official post of 'Chief 
merchant' in Hassaheisa market (an appointment made by the Dist- 
rict Commissioner to help represent and reflect the views and 
interests of the merchants) was filled by a member of this group 
throughout the period 1915-1935. 
c) To maintain their dominant position during the depression, 
moreover, the members of this group established effective co- 
operation, help and coordination among themselves. This was fac- 
ilitated by the fact that the members had a distinctive identity 
among the groups in the market. They were in some cases partners 
and were also linked to each other as neighbours and not infrequ- 
ently by marriage and kinship as well. The three leading immig- 
rant families71 (Ali Musa and Waziri who are Turkish in origin, 
and Alloub Ali, of, -Egyptian origin) illustrate the extent of 
marriage and kinship interrelations (See Fig. 4). ). 
THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, 1930-1955 
Commercial accumulation in this period may be-better analy- 
sed and understood with special reference to the following chara- 
cteristic features: 
1- The establishment of the colonial system of peasant 
cash crop production in the Hassaheisa' hinterland-i. e. the 
establishment of the Gezira Scheme. This achievement was crucial 
since the colonial pattern of accumulaton mainly rested on the 
transformation of the population of the countryside into export- 
oriented producers from whom only the surplus was removed. Thus 
the peasants were in practice left with only enough of their own 
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produce to ensure their physical survival and reproduction. 
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2. Since this population was no longer producing all its 
needs (because of the reorientation of the economy) but had 
surplus cash to obtain some of these needs, trade necessarily 
developed. Thus the available evidence show that throughout this 
period the role of the Hassaheisa market was enhanced compared to 
the previous period. The process of commercial accumulation in 
the town was consequently consolidated. By this time, moreover, 
the trading activities consisted more in selling goods than buy- 
ing cashcrops. 
3. The data for this period also reveal the growing ability 
of the merchants in controlling the market and manipulating it to 
their advantage. This, naturally, led to an acceleration in the 
rate of accumulation in the town; and there were soon to emerge 
far-reaching consequences for the ecological and social structure 
of the whole community. 
4. It must be stressed, however, that the underlying struc- 
ture of the colonial capitalist trade (dominated by foreign cap- 
ital and involving the local merchants only in subordinate and 
dependent positions) remained largely unchanged. All efforts to 
change this situation by the local merchants failed. Indeed, these 
efforts only resulted in their continuing dependence rather than 
in any emancipation. 
To discuss in some detail the schematic outline presented 
of this period, however, we need to engage in a historical recon- 
struction of the events in the region during this period in order 
to take note of their chronological significance, how they were 
effected and oriented, and how and why they yielded particular 
results. 
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With the construction of Senner Dam on the Blue Nile, the 
irrigated area of the Gezira Scheme was, between 1925 and 1930, 
to cover nearl. y all the area of the then Northern District of 
Gezira-i. e. nearly the whole of the region of which Hassaheisa 
was the headquarters. Table 4: 24 below gives data on the irrig- 
ated Blocks of the Messellamia and Wad Shair groups. In the Tab- 
le, however, I have excluded the Northern and North-Western 
groups because, though administratively attached to Hassaheisa, 
their trade was effectively oriented elsewhere. 
To complete this outline of the emerging pattern of peasant 
economy in the district, the following points must be added: 
a. By this time, virtually all adult males had been allot- 
ted tenancies in the Scheme. In fact, the administration 
had to draw people from outside the region as well as from 
outside the country to fill the tenancies. 
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b. A further factor stabilizing the population and keeping 
it on land-a crucial condition for the peasant economy- 
was the "prospect of an assured, irrigated grain crop"74. 
c. The tenants of the Scheme were exempted from Land Tax 
and uL hun . Only the Hut and Animal taxes were 
levied. The 
Hut Tax was constant, but since the animal tax was decreas- 
ing over time (because of the decrease in the area of land 
available for grazing which by 1953/54 constituted only 
19% of the irrigated area) 
75 
the direct tax burden became 
a minor concern for the tenants. 
d. Concern over the establishment of a stable peasantry 
led the colonial administration under the light of the 
accumulated experiences elsewhere, to adopt a system of 
partnership. Gaitskell explains, for example, why they 
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Table 4 : 24 Blocks under Irrigation, Date of Establ i shr ent 
Total : lumber of Tenancies, and Areas of Cotton 
and Durra in Feddans1 
: tame of Block Date No. of S. Ts .2 Cotton Area Durra Are 
4vad Shair Group 4207 42070 21035 
El-Nueila 1929/30 846 8460 4230 
Feteis 1929/30 824 8240 4120 
El-Amara Kasir 1929/30 507 5070 2535 
El-Keteir 1929/30 838 83.80 4190 
Turris 1936/37 666 6660 3330 
E1-Fowar 1936/37 526 5260 2630 
lessellamia Cr. ; 4578 45780 22890 
Abdel Galil 1925/26 290 2900 1450 
Wad Saadalla 1925/26 310 3100 1550 
Abdel Rahman 1925/26 323 3230 1615 
Wad Hussein 1929/30 435 4350 2175 
Nidiana 1925/26 616 6160 3080 
Wad Sulfab 1925/26 327 3270 1635 
Dolga 1925/26 503 5030 2515 
Istrihna 1925/26 610 6100 3050 
E1-Rukun 1925/26 707 7070 3535 
El-Tebub 1925/26 457 4570 2285 
Grand Total 8785 87850 43925 
(1) Feddan= 1.038 acres= 0.420 hectares 
(2) Standard Tenancy (S. T. )= 10 Feddans cotton plus 5 each for Durra, 
Lubia and fallow (cf. Gaitskell, 
1959: 152-3). 
Source: Sudan Gezira Board Archives, Barakat, compiled 
from various 
files. 
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refused the rent-system in the following terms: 
To get tenants at all, rents had to be low, for 
the idea of a fixed rent, regardless of the crop 
yields attained, was strange to the local cultivat- 
ors, accustomed as they were to the considerable 
fluctuation in yield from natural hazards, locusts 
and variations in the river. 
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According to the 'partnership' system that was adopted, the 
'profits' from cotton were to be 'shared' among the part- 
ners in the scheme as follows 
77 
: 40% for Sudan Government 
as landlord, 40% for the tenants who provide labour and 
20% for the concessionary companies (Sudan Plantation Syn- 
dicate and Kassala Cotton Company) as managers. 
Following on these developments, the people of the region 
at this period were thus (a) assured of their grain supplies with 
relatively low tax burdens and (b) in receipt of regular cash 
payments for their cotton. The pattern of life which developed 
in the area as a whole greatly influenced the local process of 
urbanization and, equally, of commercial capital accumulation. 
That these processes were inevitable becomes clear if we con- 
sider the sums received by the people of the district from cotton 
production which was wholly oriented to the market. These sums 
met the increasing needs of the tenants' families for goods that 
were only available in the market-e. g. sugar, coffee, tea, cloth, 
shoes, cooking oil. Table 4: 25 shows the income of tenants in 
the period 1930-1956. 
The general conditions of the local people during this per- 
iod have unquestionably been improved through the establishment 
of the Gezira Scheme. In fact, as early as the late 1920s, the 
Scheme was considered by the government to have kept "native 
trade solvent during the last few years of drought and misfort- 
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Table 4: 25 Jet Average Profits For Tenants in ', jesse ll ami a 
and i""ad Shair Group s , 1929/30-1955/56 (In £E) ,, 
Season : ý. A. P. 1 Nessellarnia2 ; ad Shair3 Total 
1929/30 
1930/31 
1931/32 12 54936 42492 97428 
1932/33 
1933/34 5 22890 17705 40595 
1934/35 17 77826 60197 138023 
1935/36 16 73248 56656 129904 
1936/37 24 109872 84984 194856 
1937/38 11 50358 46277 96635 
1938/39 11 50358 46277 96635 
1939/40 17 77826 71519 149345 
1940/41 21 9613Y8 88347 184485 
1941/42 23 105294 96761 202055 
1942/43 33 151074 138831 289905 
1943/44 28 128184 117796 245980 
1944/45 54 247212 227178 474390 
1945/46 49 224322 206143 430465 ii 
1946/47 96 439488 403872 843360 
1947/48 204 933912 858228 1792140 
1948/49 221 1011738 929747 1941485 
1949/50 281 1286418 1182167 2468585 
1950/51 800 3662400 3365600 7028000 
1951/52 276 1263528 1161132 2424660 
1952/53 205 938490 862435 1800925 
1953/54 227 1039206 954989 1994195 
1954/55 138 631764 580566 1212330 
1955/56 229 1048362 963403 2011765 
The Egyptian currency was used in Sudan up to April 8th, 1957. 
(1) Net average Profit per standard tenancy (10 fedda ns). They 
data are taken from (a) Gaitskell, 1959, p. 270 for 192 9/30-1949/ 
50 and Abdel Sallam, M. M., 1979, p. 371. 
(2)The Messellamia Group consisted of 4578 Standard T enancies. 
(3) The Wad Shair gr oup consisted o f 3541 Standard Te nancies up 
to 1935/ 36 when incr eased to 4207. 
(4) This total does not make up all the sums of money received 
by tenan ts as there were also cash advances to tenant s in return 
for the execution of certain agricu ltural operations. The total 
thus rep resents the actual amounts recieved by tenants as ten- 
ants. 
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une by providing employment and putting money into the home 
market". 
78 
Gaitskell later commented on this period as follows: 
The steady production of grain and forage from 
the irrigated area, in years when others were 
experiencing poor rains, continued to make the 
scheme immensely attractive locally. There were 
large numbers of applications for tenancies on 
each extension, and labour was drawn to it as 
to a magnet, from districts alongside it, from 
the White Nile. and Blue Nile, from Berber and 
Dongola (particularly for positions requiring 
skill and ability to read and write), from the 
Western Sudan, from French Equatorial Africa, 
and from Nigerian. =pilgrims on their way to 
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Mecca. 
The large volume and varied nature of migration to the 
Gezira was quite crucial for the future pattern and rate of 
urbanization and for the growth of trade in the region. For var- 
ious reasons, each of the above mentioned categories of migrants 
developed different kinds of connections with the area. These 
could be summarized as follow: 
a) The White Nile Arabs first practised a type of circulatory 
migration and only gradually settled in their home areas-espec- 
ially in the Abdel-Magid Agricultural Scheme from 1937 to 1943 
as part Of the governmental Alternative Livelihood Schemes 
consequent to the establishment of Jebel Awlia Dam on the 
White Nile. 
80 Under this same scheme many private pump-schemes 
were established in various areas of the White Nile in the 
late 1930s. But the development of the Managil Extension of 
the Gezira Scheme (from 1958) put an end to all migration from 
the White Nile to the Gezira. 
b) A number of pump-schemes (Qundal, Muzeigila, Hurga, Abu 
Hashim, etc. ) were established along the Blue Nile in the 
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1940s and many people from Sennar and south-wards settled there 
and consequently stopped all kinds of active migration to the 
Gezira Scheme. 
c) The immigrants from Nigeria and French Africa and Westerners 
generally settled mainly in the Gezira as agricultural labourers. 
The government used various arrangements to accomodate them and 
keep them as a source of cheap labour in the area. 
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d) The immigrants from the Northern Provinces of the Sudan, es- 
pecially from the Berber and Dongola Districts, were primarily 
recruited as skilled labourers. They developed a very different 
pattern of settlement. An analysis of the way the members of this 
group had established themselves in important for the understand- 
ing of the development of Hassaheisa town as well as of the pro- 
cess of commercial accumulation in it. 
The incorporation of the members of the latter group could 
be briefly pointed as follows. As they were mainly employed as 
skilled labour on the Gezira Scheme, the wages they received were 
both regular and relatively higher than. the unskilled agricultur- i 
al workers. Coupled with the fact that during the early years 
few of the Northerners had families with them and that their 
living expenses were low, they were able to make relatively sub- 
stantial savings. Moreover, the Northerners were also favourably 
positioned and could have contacts with both the urban and the 
rural communities of the Gezira and as such enjoyed wider access 
to information about the region which they manipulated later in 
their trading activities. In this respect it should be pointed 
out that the jobs of the Northerners were related to 
both the 
headquarters of the various departments of the scheme administ- 
ration (where most of the technical operations were carried out- 
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e. g. ginning), or at administrative stations throughout the Gezira, 
e. g. irrigation and canal regulating stations. They were thus in 
contract with both the urban and the rural communities of the Gez- 
ira, and they enjoyed wider access to informations which they were 
to manipulate skillfully in their later trading activities. Also the 
permanent nature, but seasonal character (June to January in the 
field for some, and January to June at headquarters for others) of 
their jobs, made them effectively free of work duties for almostly 
six months per year respectively. This induced many of them to trade 
during that free time. In the course of time many became so absorbed 
in trade that they resigned from their jobs in the Scheme. 
In contrast, members of other groups in the region, local 
tenants in particular, never accumulated sufficient capital (See 
Table 4: 25) to trade effectively. Nor did they have the necessary 
urban contacts and information or the free time to allow for activ- 
ities other than agriculture. Thus the Northerners eventually domin- 
ated the Suk and had a virtual monopoly of local trade. A break down 
of the list of licence-holders in Hassaheisa Suk in 1936 into reg- 
ional or ethnic groups confirms this (See Table 4: 26). 
Another important point to note is that the Northerners 
had relatively early contact with, and integration into the market 
economy. 
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It should, however, be noted that all Hassaheisa Suk trad- 
ers developed their businesses during a period of instability and 
crisis rather than of steady and smooth development, and this had 
a profound impact on their trade and the involved accumulation. Three { 
particular periods of change and instability must 
be borne in mind: 
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Table 4: 26 The Main Groups of Licensed Traders 
In Hassaheisa Market, 1936 
Group Number 
Turco-Egyptian Immigrants 8 
Greeks 2 
Yemeni 1 
Dubasin of Hassaheisa 5 
From Nearby villages (mainly Hallawin) 3 
Immigrants from Northern Province 83 
Total number of traders 102 
Those from Northern Province started 
to trade in the market: 
1. Before the Gezira Scheme 11 
2. After the Scheme (ex-employees in G. B. )59 
3. After the Scheme (with capital from 
elsewhere) 13 
Total Number of Northern traders 83 
Percentage of total market traders 81.4% 
Source: The original list of traders' names is taken from a 
letter dated 24.6.1936, from the Suk's Sheikh to the Asst. 
District Commissioner. The letter is in af ilex titled 
'Miscellaneous Correspondence, Hassaheisa Merket' in the 
office of the A. D. C in Hassaheisa. The group affiliation of 
the traders in the list was established mainly through inter- 
views with some of the survivors during the course of my 
fieldwork in September, 1980. 
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(a) The period of the World Depression during which the Gezira 
Scheme had the lowest yields (cf. Table 4: 25). According to 
Gaitskell, "the tenants were getting hopelessly into debt". 
He considers that except for the continued finance by the Syn- 
dicate, the tenants could not have been expected to carry on 
and the scheme would have collapsed without them. 
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This period 
extended from 1929/1930 to 1933/34. The 1934/35 crop of cotton 
marked the beginning of recovery. The Annual Report of the Blue 
Nile Province for 1934 thus claimed that "the financial position 
of some tenants, particularly in the Northern, has improved". 84 
In 1937, moreover, the District Commissioner of Northern Gezira 
(i. e. Hassaheisa District) was able to report on the general 
condition of what he called the 'merchant class' that 
The large sumes of money paid out (to the tenants) 
by way of profits, appreciations and rents brought 
brisk business in (the) train (of merchants)... 
Generally trade was a shade better in 1936 and the 
debt position is much better. 
85 
b) This slight boom, however, was short-lived. In 1939 World War 
11 broke out and it immediately affected both the volume and com- 
position of exports and imports which put considerable constraints 
on local-trade. One of the main difficulties was the increased 
level of government intervention which was to affect the oppor- 
tunities of profit-making and capital accumulation, especially 
at the level of retail trade. 
c) With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, there came a per- 
iod of relatively stable development, but it was also short-lived. 
It was interrupted by the record yields of cotton in the Gezira 
Scheme which coincided with the Korean War (1950) when the pri- 
ces of cotton, due to the war, reached a record level as well. 
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The resulting boom brought a number of difficulties for the 
government as the increased incomes led to a sharp rise in 
demand for imported goods. The government was anxious,, trying to 
hold back the negative effects of inflation and therefore applied 
anti-inflationary measures which affected trade. It imposed some 
monetary and fiscal controls to restrict the purchasing power, 
exercised more direct price-control, and attempted to limit the 
volume of imports through increasing supplies from domestic pro- 
duction. 86 In the following section I attempt to outline the 
responses of the government, the foreign firms, and the traders 
at Hassaheisa level. The objective is to examine the attempts 
made by these parties to protect and secure their respective 
interests which, ultimately, influenced the process of capital 
accumulation in Hassaheisa town. 
The Government 
As already noted, the government had adopted a policy of 
monetary and fiscal controls to combat inflation at the national 
level. It was also concerned with the stable organization and 
controlled development of trade. During the troubled times, this 
concern involed, among other things, the careful planning of the 
distribution of goods to the public. Thus we find the following 
interventionist policies being carried out: 
a) Restrictions and controls on sugar trade through the establ- 
ishment of a State Monopoly. This monopoly was tightened during 
and after the depression to the point that, in the District 
Com- 
missioner's words reporting his success in executing the govern- 
ment policy in Hassaheisa market in 
1937: 
No merchant now looks for a profit from this commodity, but 
the fact that he is a middleman brings people to his shop 
where they are induced to buy other goods on which a profit 
can be made. 87 
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b) During the War, steps were taken to control the prices of 
various necessities in the local markets. In the case of Hassa- 
heisa, the Assistant District Commissioner used the police to 
intensify daily inspection visits to the shops in order to en- 
sure that the maximum retail price ceilings were being observed 
by traders. With the exception of one court case in Hassaheisa 
Criminal Court tried in July 1943, however, I was unable to find 
any other recorded evidence of enforcement, but the recollections 
by some merchants recorded during my interviews suggest that the 
government policy was strictly enforced by local administrators 
but also on occasions it was met with considerable defiance. 
c) In order to control the effects of severe shortage of imported 
goods resulting from the disruption of shipping routes during the 
War, the government introduced a rationing system. The District 
Commissioner presided over a Traders Committee88 which was given 
the direct responsibility of rationing commodities for members of 
the public or their representatives. This in fact weakened the 
traders' position but we shall see that it did not prevent the 
growth of a black market. 
d) In order to counteract inflation, moreover, the government 
also continued to increase the Business Profit Tax. as shown in 
Table 4: 27 
Table 4: 27 Percentage of Business Profit Tax in the 
Sudan During the War Years 
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Source, Beshai, A. A. Export Perormance and Economic Development 
Development in Sudan 1900-1967, Ithaca Press, London, 1976, p. 302. 
The government also increased the fees charged for trade 
licences by 50% (to L. E. 1.50 per annum for shop traders and L. E. 
0.750 for peddlars). The multiplied effect of these measures was 
to depress the margin of profit available to the merchants and 
hence the reduction of the rate of capital accumulation. 
THE FOREIGN COMMERCIAL FIRMS 
At the national level, foreign firms continued to monopol- 
ize the export and import trade to the exclusion of local Sudan- 
ese firms. The foreign firms also developed a system of sole- 
agency for the import and/or export of the main goods which en- 
abled them to secure even greater margins of profits. Companies 
such as Sudan Mercantile Co., Gellatly, Hankey & Co., and Mitchell 
Gotts & Co., were virtually monopolies. They were in their respe- 
ctive spheres the sole agents of British and other metropolitan 
firms and in this way they handled the main bulk of imports and 
exports. 
Internally, the foreign firms developed a system of 'app- 
ointed agents' over the whole country. This was mainly a devel- 
opment of the 1940s in response, it is said, to the growth of 
'nationalistic' attitudes among the urban merchants. Under this 
system the foreign-owned export/import firms appointed a number 
of local traders as distributors of their imports in their resp- 
ective localities, but it was rare that a merchant was granted 
a sole-agency in any locality. As it was obviously in the 
int- 
erest of the foreign firms to see their agents succeeding, they 
were commonly lending and supplying goods as well as stock-keep- 
ing, monitoring and supervising performance. 
One result was that 
the Sudanese local traders became increasingly 
dependent and much 
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more vulnerable to the control of the foreign-firms- a result 
which was contrary to the original aims of the local merchants 
to secure what they regarded as the "national interest". The 
following are only some examples of the system of appointed-agents 
in Hassaheisa market by 1952: The New Industries Co. (Sudan) which 
produced Pepsi Cola under licence had 23 agents in Hassaheisa, 
Bata (Sudan) had 17, The Nile Import and Trading Co. (Petrolium) 
had 3, and Mitchell Cotts & Co. had 7 agents. In this way, the 
foreign firms secured during the times of instability a greater 
command and control over the market and, consequently, a larger 
margin of profit and wider chances for accumulation as well. 
THE HASSAHEISA SUK TRADERS 
As a result of the increasingly weak and dependent position 
of the traders in Hassaheisa, the margin of profit available to 
them continued to shrink. Their natural response was to try and 
move away from the least profitable fields of trade to the more 
profitable which meant moving into more capital-intensive part- 
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icipation. To this end, the merchants followed all available 
avenues, legal and illegal, economic and extra-economic. Some of 
these methods, which were often accompanied by little success, were 
as follows: 
1. Specialization 
One way of improving the chances of profits is, of course, 
to establish some kind of monopoly. In the Hassaheisa market it 
was common to find a concentration of one group of traders, with 
4 
common tribal or village background, handling one particular com- 
modity and being identified with it. In retrospect, 
it is diffic- 
ult to state precisely the exact 
factor (or factors) which stim- 
ulated various operational specializations of 
this kind, but the 
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available evidence suggests that we can consider them as consci- 
ous responses to the circumstances of the time with the aim of 
enhancing capital accumulation. This makes more sense than the 
rather- simple, yet widely held, interpretation of this phenomen- 
on as a 'mysterious' inherent inclination for traders with comm- 
on background to cling together out of some gregarious instinct. 
On the bais of accounts given by my informants, I would instead 
posit the following reconstruction and explanation.: 
a) A newcomer usually resided with one of his kinsmen and would 
be recruited to help in the shop. After some time, he would acq- 
uire basic knowledge of the particular trade. Thus when the opp- 
unity came for him to establish his own business, he would most 
likely trade in-the commodity with which he was most familiar. 
b) In those cases where the newcomer brought with him some cap- 
ital, he would most likely choose a trade which was the special- 
ity of his kinsmen and/or fellow-villagers in the market. For 
various obvious reasons, the latter were also the people most 
willing and able to share their fund of 'experience' and trade 
'secrets' with him. They would introduce the newcomer to the 
main supplier in Khartoum or elsewhere, and familiarize him with 
the main body of potential customers. During the period 1940- 
1960, thus-, each of the tribal groups in Hassaheisa market was 
quite clearly associated with a certain speciality as shown in 
Table 4: 28. 
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Table 4: 28 The Places of Birth, Tribal Origin, Province 
& Specialization of some Prominent Hassaheisa 
Suk Traders 
Place of Birth Tribal Origin Province Specialization 
Amentego 
Ganetti 
Merowe 
Berber 
Debba 
TangasI 
Zeidab 
Kabushiya 
Abu Fru 
Marru Island 
Affat 
Hassaheisa 
Arbaji 
Nubian 'Mahas' 
Bidairiya 
Shaigiya 
Rubatab 
Dongolawi 
Shaigiya 
Gaaliyn 
Gaaliyn 
Hallawin 
Bidairiya 
Shaigiya 
Dubasin 
Gaaliyn 
Northern Cooked food & Bread 
Northern Machines' spare-parts 
Northern General Provisions 
Northern Cloths & Textiles 
Northern Wood 
Northern Gold & Jewelry 
Northern Footwear 
Northern Hides & skins 
Gezira Red Bricks 
Northern Building materials 
Northern Car repairs 
Gezira Spices & Herbs 
Gezira Fruits & Vegetables 
Source: Osman Hamadalla, Book of Kinship & Lineage in Rufa'a 
and Hassaheisa, Dar El-Thagafa, Beruit, 1965 
(in Arabic), diff- 
erent pages, in addition to my own interviews. 
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2. Skillful Crisis Management 
As I mentioned earlier, the general economy of the Sudan 
was passing through a series of crises during this period. These 
crises were manifested in recurring commodity shortages, ration- 
ing and price fluctuations. With the passage of time, the traders 
of Hassaheisa in general, and the Northerners in particular, dev- 
eloped the skill and ability to manage these crises to their ben- 
efit. They did this mainly through the use of extra-economic res- 
ources which they commanded. The following are some examples: 
During the War (1939-1945) the Northerners constituted the 
majority (5 out of 7) in the Merchants' Committee which was res- 
ponsible for the distribution of the rationed commodities. By 
virtue of this the Northerners had access to an important source 
of information, particularly the precise knowledge of the quanti- 
ties of commodities allocated and their destinations. Accordingly, 
they were in a position to persuade those who had been granted 
quotas to sell the goods to them in return for some appreciation. 
In some cases, people allotted quotas were either unwilling to 
receive the goods because they had no immediate need for them 
or were unable to pay the recommended prices in cash. In such 
cases the commodities usually ended in the merchants' stores and 
were subsequently sold on the black market to those who needed 
them and who had enough resources to pay higher prices. 
This was 
common knowledge in the market at that time. Even the 
District 
Commissioner, who presided the Merchants' Committee, reported 
his own anxiety about its spread and asked 
for advice on the 
"proper methods to stop it". 
90 
Despite the anxiety of the District Commissioner and 
his 
determination to combat black-marketing, 
however, the traders 
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were often able to manipulate their regional and kinship connect- 
ions with the District Police Force personnel to abort attempts 
to check illicit trading. According to police records, 93% of the 
police force in the town in 1949 were born in the Northern Prov- 
ince. 91 Many of my informants recalled this 'collaboration' with 
pride and expressed the view that it was indicative of the "good 
manners and character" of the policemen. 
Furthermore, the traders during that period (1930-56) had 
similarly manipulated their special relationship with the Assist- 
ant District Commissioner (Mamour) with even greater success. This 
'special' relationship was underpinned by two considerations: 
firstly, while the first Sudanese Assistant Commissioner in the 
town was not a Northerner, the three who succeeded him (from 1940 
onwards) from Berber, Shendi and Darner (all in the Northern Prov- 
ince) and they had social links with the Northern traders. Secon- 
dly, the second half of the 1930s witnessed the emergence of the 
nationalist movement in the Sudan which was led by the Graduates 
Congress, of which the Mamours were members by definition. During 
the 1940s the Congress was very active seeking support from the 
public against the British and their collaborators (e. g. the 
Native Administrators). In the urban areas- and Hassaheisa was 
no exception- the graduates found resourceful allies in the mer- 
chants who had their own grievances against the colonial govern- 
ment which consistently denied them the opportunities 
it had 
offered to the foreign export and import 
firms. A political all- 
iance thus developed between the merchants and the Mamours who 
had extensive powers. A detailed account of this alliance and 
its 
implications is given in Chapter 8. Here I will simply 
draw att- 
ention to the way in which 
Mamours sought opportunities to help 
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the merchants by making them aware of price-changes at the ear- 
liest possible time. The merchants were thus able to store or 
'discharge-off' the goods. Continuous changes in the retail pri- 
ces of basic consumption items made this help worthwhile. The 
following table shows some changes during this period. 
Table 4: 29 Retail Prices of Some Consumer Goods 
In Selected Years (in Egyptian Pounds) 
Item Unit 1938 1949 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Sesame Oil Rottle 0.015 0.065 0.085 0.090 0.060 0.078 
Coffee Rottle 0.025 0.090 0.200 0.250 0.280 0.220 
Sugar Rottle 0.019 0.035 0.040 0.050 0.050 0.050 
Wheat Flour K. g. 0.012 0.056 0.053 0.048 0.046 0.060 
Charcoal Kantar 0.230 0.340 0.700 0.650 0.650 0.600 ii 
Kerosine Gallon 0.045 0.086 0.123 0.100 0.100 0.105 
Soap Piece 0.005 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
Dra on tob 30 . ards - _. 
0.440 1.950 1.800 1.800 1.800 1.800 
Source: 
-Mininstry_of 
Finance & Economy, Economic Survey., 1957. Kh. artoum 
p. 19. 
(N. B. Kantar=100 Rottle; Rottle=0.992 lb. =449.28 grammes). 
3. Trade Networks (Zaboun System): 
The region over which Hassaheisa town enjoyed, and contin- 
ue 
' I, ßä 
to enjoy, effective administrative and commercial influence ýI{ 
may be conceptualized as a semi-circle west of the Blue Nile. 
The diameter of this semi-circle stretches along the river for 
approximately sixty kilometers, with Hassaheisa town at the cen- 
tre. The circumference closely follows the administrative bound- 
aries of the town's area of influence with a radius of about 
thirty kilometers (See Map ). This area contains about 200 
villages inhabited by tenants and agricultural 
labourers of the 
16 Gezira Scheme Blocks to which I refered earlier. Since the 
Hassaheisa market functioned as the main trading centre for this 
region, the efficient 
distribution of commodities was of prime 
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importance for the smooth functioning of the trading system and, 
by implication, for capital accumulation. Efficient distribution 
of goods, however, was rendered more difficult by the establish- 
ment of the Gezira Scheme as the newly-established peasant eco- 
nomy meant that the production process necessitated an even 
greater degree of stability and continuous presence of tenants 
and labourers in the fields. Furthermore, the relative ineffic- 
iency of. the transport system and the traders' interest in acc- 
elerating the turn-over of commodities combined to create a sit- 
ution in which the establishment of trade networks was of para- 
mount importance. 
It was thus necessary for traders to develop a distribut- 
ion system to serve certain particular interests and require- 
ments. Firstly, because the initial capital costs involved were 
very low, the system needed to be such as to cover any value 
added costs. Secondly, although traders were urban-based and 
strangers to the rest of the area, they had to conduct themselves 
in such a way that they could engage the good will of rural cus- 
tomers towards them, particularly through a localized village- 
trader. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, there was considerable comp- 
etition between the different merchants in the market in estab- 
lishing effective networks of clients in the villages (Zaboun2s ). 
These networks were necessarily based on a credit sytem because 
the rural people rarely had the capital sums required to initiate 
trade. And even when individuals did command sufficient cash, 
the merchants were anxious to help their village agents so as 
to ensure their clientship. 
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The village-agents recruited by the merchants were 
drawn from three main categories. Firstly, there were the Sheikhs 
(headmen) of the villages as well as other local notables whose 
ps i 
existing administrative duties involved frequent contact- with 
government offices in the town. Secondly, there were those kins- 
men and close friends of the merchants and who had originally 
worked in the field-jobs of the Gezira Scheme. Thirdly, there ° 
were those recruited from among the newcomers from the Northern 
Province. The recruitment of the latter, it is interesting to 
note, served the double purpose of relieving the merchants of 
the responsibility of providing accomodation and food for these 
tlt; new-comers, while also supplying fresh "trustworthy clients" with 
kinship or regional links to the merchants. The course of events 
later showed how important these latter clients were for the 
merchants when every single village in the area had at least one 
pukan Sha-. gam (Shaiki's Shop). IF 
Being well aware of the manner in which tenants received 
their cash payments in the Scheme (regular installments spread 
over the year), the village agents introduced another system of 
credit called Ganauna (i. e. credit account). This involved the 
selling of groceries on credit to the tenants and others which 
was convenient to both the shopkeepers and the customers in the 
villages. Gulwick's study93 conducted in the villages of the 
Gezira Scheme in 1953 shows clearly how widespread indebtedness 
was in the local village communities. Table 
4: 30 documents asp- 
ects of this indebtedness. 
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Table 4: 30 shows the total debt which includes in addition 
to the 'shop account' debts the I. O. U. debts (straight loans in 
cash which might be given for the purchase of stock in-trade). 
But the study also shows that "shop accounts made up about 80% 
of the total recorded in this enquiry, with a distribution patt- 
ern very similar to that of the total debt, except in the case of 
traders themselves. The latter recorded 60% of their total indebt- 
edness in this form and 40% in the form of I . 0. U. s. 
94 
Table 4: 31 The Percentage and Average Amounts of Debts 
For Those With Shop Accounts and I. O. U. Debts 
By Occupation in Gezira Villages (1953) 
Occupation Shop 
% of ind- 
ebted 
Accounts 
Average 
Amount(L. E. ) 
I. O. U. s 
% of Indeb- 
ted 
Average 
Amount, 
2 S. U. T Tenant 23% 34 23.7% 23 
1+ S. U. T. Tenan t 32% 49 36.8% 38 
Shop-keepers 3.2% 60 9.3% 92 
Agro-labour 34.5% 11 25.3% 15 
Skilled Labour 2.6% 12 2.57 6 
Other Occup. 4.4% 15 2.2% 22 
No Occup. 0.2% 11 - - 
All Occupations 100% 30 100% 31 
Source: Compiled from Gulwick, op. cit., p. 201. 
The above data confirm that the productive groups in the 
L. E. 
peasant economy (tenants and agricultural labourers) constituted 
the main subjects of the credit system at the village level 
(890 
and 85% of those who were indebted through shop-accounts and 
I. O. U. respectively). Traders and shopkeepers were the main cred- 
itors; 77% of the shopkeepers were recorded as having "money 
owing to them in their shops". 
95 These same shopkeepers were, 
however, themselves indebted to another group. The high average 
186 
amounts of their debts, together with the circumstantial evidence 
in Culwick's study point to the fact that this other group was 
based outside the villages, with bigger financial capabilities, 
and was undoubtedly composed of merchants in the urban market. 
The system of trade networks developed in this manner, but 
not without difficulties and problems. The fluctuations in tenants' 
incomes (cf. Table 4: 25), coupled with the steady growth in their 
demand for imported goods, increased considerably the burden of 
debts among them. The tenants commonly failed to pay back outst- 
anding debts in their shop-accounts. Despite their failure to 
discharge the debts, however, the tenants were protected by the 
Gezira Land Ordinance of 1927 which stated the following in sect- 
ion 13: 
Every transaction to which a cultivating tenant 
is a party whereby such tenant is or may become 
liable for the payment of any sum of money to be 
calculated by reference either expressed or implied 
to the value of any crops growing or intended to be 
grown on the land comprised within a cultivating 
tenancy shall, if entered into without the consent 
in writing of the Government, be absolutely void 
and of no effect. (... ). No execution under the pro- 
visions of Order XV of Schedule 1 to the Civil Just- 
ice ordinance shall be granted by seizure and sale 
of the crops of any cultivating tenancy. 
Prominent among the implications of the ordinance was the 
tenant's 'immunity' which effectively meant that the village 
shopkeeper was to shoulder the responsibility of paying his 
debts to the town's merchants while he could not guarantee the 
discharge of debts by tenants. Owing to the weak position of 
the shopkeepers, and the low levels of their profits, they often 
failed to discharge their debts. Unlike the tenants, however, 
the shopkeepers were liable to prosecution in the civil courts, 
and the growth in the number of debt cases in that period ref- 
lects the uneasy relationship that developed between shopkeepers 
187 
and the merchants of Hassaheisa and indicates the growing tens- 
ion within the trading networks (See Table 4: 32). 
Table 4: 32 Debts and Other Cases In Hassaheisa Civil 
Court in 1942 and 1952. 
Cases Tried 1942 1952 % of Increase 
Debt Cases 
Other Cases 
189 
56 
639 
59 
238% 
5.3% 
Total 245 698 184.9% 
Source: Computed from figures in Culwick, op. cit., p. 193. 
Of the above debt cases, those involving the recovery of 
cash loans increased by 392.6% (from 27 in 1942 to 133 cases in 
1952), and cases of payment for goods increased by 205.3% (from 
132 in 1942 to 403 cases in 1952). 
97 
The situation underlying 
these developments prompted the merchants to alter and re-organ- 
the trade networks. They began once more to rely on 'trust- ize 
worthy' clients (i. e. those with whom they had kinship or reg- 
ional relationships), and thus to limit their networks to vill- 
age shopkeepers with a clear Northern identity. In some extreme 
cases a number of brothers distributed themselves in the major 
villages of the district to ensure closer supervision and cont- 
rol over their common trade-network. The following examples ill- 
ustrate the point. 
Case 1. The Abdel-Latif sons: These were five brothers of Shaikia 
tribal origin (Kudongab), a Northern tribe, who first came to 
Hassaheisa during the early 1930s: Ahmed in 1930, Mohammed Ahmed 
and Alamin in 1933 and Hassan and Abdel-Gadir 
in 1934. By 1952, 
the brothers distributed themselves as follows: Mohammed Ahmed 
and Hassan remained in 
Hassaheisa market (though in 1962 Mohammed 
Ahmed moved to Wad Medani town), Ahmed moved to 
Messellamiä mar- 
188 
ket, Alamin to Tabat market and Abdel-Gadir to Wad Raiya market. 
All of them are now doing very well in their respective localit- 
ies, 
Case 2, The Hajaj Sons: Originally from Kaboushiya in the North- 
ern Region and of Jaalin tribal origin. The first member to come 
to Hassaheisa was Yousif, in 1917. The other members came in the 
1930s (Mohammed el-Hassan, Mohammed and Abdel-Moneim). They trad- 
ed together in Hassaheisa market up to the mid-1940s, and then 
they dispersed; Yousif stayed in Hassaheisa, Mohammed went to 
Tabat, Abdel Moneim moved to Azazi and Mohammed el-Hassan to 
Messellamia (but recently he returned back to Hassaheisa market). 
Case 3, A Regional Group: Osman Hammadalla (a Jaali from Shendi 
District) was an agent in Hassaheisa for a Khartoum-based comm- 
ercial firm (Abustoulu Bros. ) dealing in hides and skins. Osman's 
clients in the different villages in the district were mainly 
from Shendi District in the North. The clients were Abdel Majed 
in Mihayriba, Mohammed Ahmed and Mohammed Nur in Hallawin, 
Dafa'allah in Me'ssellamia, Mohammed el-Tayib in Nayal, El-Tayib 
in Ruf a'a, Salim Haj el-Sidig in Tabat and Mohammed Ahmed in 
Mustafa-Gourashi. 
98 
The above examples, taken in conjunction with further obs- 
ervations made during the course of my fieldwork and which will 
be discussed further below, illustrate clearly the development 
and use by the Hassaheisa merchants of the trade networks. 
Early Pattern of Merchants' Urban Domestic Life 
The pattern of life adopted by the majority of traders, 
particularly those from the Northern Region, during the early 
period of-their involvement in the market was marked by extreme 
189 
austerity (of which they are still proud). 
99 
Their frugal pattern 
of consumption in the market must be stressed. 
Firstly, in the early 1930s, nearly all of the merchants 
(and the Northerners in particular) were young men in their late 
teens or early twenties. The majority were unmarried and those 
married among them had left their wives at home. They usually 
organized themselves in "bachelors' bands" sharing one cooking- 
pot. The principle of grouping in these bands was a common local- 
ity of origin or affiliation to the same tribal sub-group. The 
sharing of cooking facilities and food made appreciable savings 
possible for them. This pattern of life stood in sharp contrast 
to that of other groups of traders who had been in the market 
since the pre-Gezira Scheme period. Those who had established 
themselves earlier were, however, a minority and a few of them 
survived as merchants into the third period. 
Secondly, being single or without their wives with them, 
the Northern merchants in particular were able to take residence 
where convenient without having to worry about families. Thus 
they commonly lived on the front verandas of their rented shops. 
In the 1930s, the rent of a shop ranged from 10 to 20 piastres 
per month. In this respect it should be noted that all of the 
established 64 sites in the market were owned by members of 
groups other than the Northerners. The usual domestic possessions 
of the Northern trader then consisted simply of a bed, a cotton 
mattreses, sheets and a metal trunk for clothes. In addition to 
this, each man normally had. the right to share in the utensils 
which were collectively owned by the band. This pattern of liv- 
ing was, however, disturbed in 1938 when the police introduced 
new security regulations to combat burglary and theft in the 
190 
market. The new regulations included the prohibition of the 
"presence of any person, without authority, in the 1ou(a area 
between 10 p. m. and 5 a. m. " 
100' 
which compelled the Northern 
merchants to move out of the market and dwell in the nearby res- 
idential quarter of the town (Wassat) where tenants in the Scheme 
had houses to let. Again, however, the merchants commonly shared 
residence to cut the cost of living. 
Thirdly, as relative new-comers to the town, the merchants 
shared little in common with the rest of the established commun- 
ity. They therefore had few social obligations to observe such 
as PJugta (cash contributions in wedding ceremonies), Ka4hij 
(cash contributions for funerals and mourning ceremonies) and 
Khatta (cash contributions on the occasion of disaster and 
crises). These voluntary and customary obligations were observed 
by a wide section of the Sudanese communities, especially in the 
central and riverain parts of the country. Being away from their 
own communities, however, the Northern merchants in Hassaheisa 
were not obliged to conform to these traditions in the new comm- 
unity because they were 'strangers', nor did they contributed to 
those in their home because they were 'away'. 
THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD, 1956- 
During the last twenty five years (i. e. since flag Indepen- 
dence in 1956) retail and wholesale commercial activities, espec- 
ially those carried out by local Sudanese merchants, have come 
under increasing pressures and constraints mainly 
from the side 
of the national governments. The specific 
form taken by the Sud- 
anese State at the different points of 
its post-colonial history 
was, and is, the outcome of intensive struggles and rivalries 
191 
between the different fractions of the dominant class in the 
Sudanese social formation-i. e. merchants, traditional leaders, 
and bureaucrats. 
101 
The relative gains achieved by any of these 
factions are on the whole expressions of the dominance it could 
command within and over the state apparatus. 
102 
The state appar- 
atus has proved to be a coherent and highly effective instrument 
for the control of the national socio-economic and political 
scene as significant shifts have taken place in the attitudes and 
practical policies of the state towards the merchants and their 
trading activities. In the early years of Independence the State 
gave the merchants enthusiastic assistance and protection, and 
the merchants in turn helped to elect, and supported, the first 
national government of the Unionist Nationalist Party. 
103 
Some 
examples of direct assistance afforded to the merchants are: 
a) In the first Sudanese Parliament (1953-1956), the government 
was called upon to establish and actively assist the national 
commercial companies for export and import as well as for int- 
ernal trade-which it did. 
104 
b). The government intervened in the competition between the 
'Sudanese' and the 'foreign' commercial firms, and clearly helped 
the former by, for example, favouring them in the issuing of the 
import licences. 
105 
In 1959,30% of all import licences were re- 
served for 'Sudanese' firms. 
106 
c). In cooperation with the merchants, moreover, the government 
also established the Sudanese Commercial Bank in 1960 to help 
finance the import and/or export trade of 'Sudanese' merchants. 
There was also new legislation to control and regulate the est- 
ablishment of commercial agencies for foreign manufacturers in 
order to secure them for 'Sudanese' rather than 'non-Sudanese' 
192 
agents. 
107 
Later, however, there was a significant change in the bal- 
ance between the 'traditional' group and the most powerful sect- 
ion of the State bureaucrats, namely, the military. 
108 
As a res- 
ult the merchants began to lotse State support, and even became 
subject to continuous harassment and unfavourable controls. The 
following developments were to affect the position of the merch- 
ants in significant ways: 
1. The adoption of an open-door policy in foreign trade during 
the early 1960s. 
109 
This 'liberalization' of foreign trade had 
the direct effect of undermining the privileged position which 
was accorded to the 'Sudanese' merchants during the term of the 
first national government. 
2. In spite of the limited concessions made to the merchants dur- 
ing the brief period of non-military rule (1965-1969), such as 
the Sudanization of trade in tea, coffee and salt in 1968, the 
second military government deprived them of most of their priv- 
ileges. 110 This government has nationalized all the commercial 
banks, and most of the commercial firms engaged in foreign trade, 
and established state-controlled corporations to monopolize the 
foreign trade. 
ill 
At the same time, this government resorted to 
systematic political coercion in order to establish its legitim- 
acy. 
112 
The oppressive state apparatus accordingly expanded, and 
this led to more public expenditure. One consequence was that 
more revenues were needed to finance the rising expenditure. 
113 
One obvious source of such revenue, over and above the surpluses 
realized through the state monopoly over the larger part of for- 
eign trade, was taxation. In addition to certain amendments to 
the Business Profit Tax designed to "increase this tax base" 
114 
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(with the burden falling mainly on the commercial sector since 
the other sectors-e. g. industry- were either completely or part- 
ially exempted) 
115, 
and the Defence Tax at the rate of 2% of any 
income 116' the government relied heavily on indirect taxes, which 
were levied mainly on imported goods. 
7 
With all its regressive 
ll 
impact (i. 'e. the rate of the tax increases as income falls), this 
tax tended to minimize the ability of merchants to enlarge their 
profit-margins since this only would produce a cut in effective 
demand. Also, in its desperate attempt to gain legitimacy, the 
government posed as the defender of public interests. Thus we 
find that in his report to the Sudanese Socialist Union national 
conference in January 1977, the President stressed the government's 
determination to look after the "people's" welfare through the 
strict and "rigorous application of the Foodstuffs and Necessar- 
ies Price Regulation Act which involves the set-up of Price 
Courts and a Central Prices Control Apparatus". 
18 1 All these arr- 
angements virtually reduced the merchants' capability to exercise 
effective control over the market. 
The foregoing brief background on trade at the national 
level during the third period is intended to allow us better und- 
erstand the various developments at the regional level which had 
a more immediate bearing on the conditions of trade in the town 
of Hassaheisa and on the concomitant process of local capital 
accumulation. 
CapitaZistic Intensification In Gezira 
Since Independence the structural relationship between the 
Sudanese economy and the centres of the international capitalist 
monopolies was steadily consolidated; and it is this structural 
relationship that I call neo-colonialism. The main characterist- 
194 
is feature of this neo-colonial situation is its reliance on 
economic structures determined by the interplay between a sect- 
or in which the producers are export-oriented (mainly in agricul- 
ture through primary export production) and a sector in which a 
minority of the population with high purchasing-power could cre- 
ate demand for luxurious imported goods. 
119 
The expansion of the 
two 'disarticulated' sectors was allowed and encouraged by the 
successive post-colonial governments, and this served the req- 
üirements of the neo-colonial situation in two main ways: 
1. It ensured the in-flow of imported goods for the dom, nant 
groups 
120, 
which further stimulated their interest in extracting 
surpluses from the producers either through the intensification 
of production or by diversifying the spheres of production. 
2. Simultaneously, moreover, it ensured the out-flow of surpluses 
to the centres of the capitalist economies as is shown by the 
steady rise over the years of imports despite the adoption of 
import-substitution policies, and the progressive deterioration 
both both balances of trade and payment. 
121 
The dom/inant local groups in Hassaheisa region were the 
urban merchants and the tribal and religious leaders of the 
countryside. Like other dominant fractions in the country, these 
struggled to gain access to the resources that would give them 
power. This struggle was particularly true of the tribal and 
religious leaders who had very limited economic resources, and 
who consequently sought closer links with the state 
bureaucrats 
in the hope of transforming and overcoming the inherent const- 
raints of the 'egalitarian' set-up of the colonial peasant econ- 
omy in order to remould it into what 
best serves their interests. 
195 
Since the tribal and religious leaders of the countryside 
were, and still are, dominant in the main representative organ- 
izations of the peasants (namely the Tenants' Union), they easily 
accompilished their aims through deals made with the state bureau- 
cracy. Two main areas. of activity are of particular significance 
to both the peasant economy and the trade in the urban market. 
These are the mechanization of the agricultural operations in the 
Gezira Scheme and the diversification of crop production-both of 
which resulted in the intensification of the agricultural landuse 
in the Scheme. e. 
1. Mechanization: Since Independence production in the Gezira Sch- 
eme has been continuously affected by the injection of new impor- 
ted implements such as tractors and combined-harvesters. During 
the past ten years machines were used for the undertaking of 50% 
of the operations concerning cotton, 40% of Vunna , 100% of wheat, 
and 60% of groundnuts production. 
122 The increasing mechanization 
was accompanied by another process with highly significant socio- 
economic implication: machinary-ownership has become concentrated 
in the hands of a few rich tenants, mainly the members of the dom- 
inant rural group and the Tenants' Union officials. Results of a 
survey123 of agricultural machinery in the Gezira indicate that 
about 80.2% of tractor-owners and 63% of the combine harvestor- 
owners are 'trader-tenants' in the Gezira villages, most of 
whom are originally village head-men as indicated earlier in 
this Chapter. An important factor contributing to this concent- 
ration of ownership appears to be the credit policy adopted 
by 
the state-owned Agricultural Bank of Sudan which offers credit 
"only to those who satisfy the capitalist principle of credit 
196 
worthiness irrespective of whether they are tenants or not". 
124 
The owners tended to hire out their machines to poor tenants at 
considerably high rates. Table 4: 33 shows the extent of the mono- 
poly enjoyed by these private owners in the different operations 
of the four main crops in the Gezira. 
Table 4: 33 Percentage of the Share of the Different 
Sectors in the Mechanized Operations in 
The Gezira Scheme. 1978. 
Crop Public Sector 
7o 
Tenants' 
Co-0 .% 
Private 
Sector 70 
Total 
70 
Cotton 12.4 - 14.3 26.7 
Wheat 7.6 2.6 12.9 23.1 
Groundnut 4.9 - 22.0 26.9 
Durra 6.2 3.2 13.9 23.3 
Total 31.1 5.8 63.1 100 
Source: Compiled from Farah Hassan Adam, op. cit., p. 40. 
What can be drawn from the above table is that the private 
sector plays a major role in the mechanized agricultural operat- 
ions. In fact, the 'Tenants cooperatives' had almost all disint- 
egrated125 as a result of competition from the private sectorl26 
The virtual monopoly by the private sector has affected the peas- 
ant community in Gezira in two main ways: 
Firstly, it has contributed substantially to the phenomenal 
increase in the costs of production. As table 4: 34 shows, the 
costs of production form an increasing part of the total output. 
Given the extent of mechanized operations, and taking into acc- 
ount the large share of the private sector, one can well imagine 
the high level of capital accumulation which led to the emergence 
of an affluent and wealthy group in the Gezira countryside. I 
shall examine the impact of this emerging group on trade and 
capital accumulation in Hassaheisa in 
further detail below. 
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Secondly, mechanization equally contributed to the prog- 
ressive impoverishment of the masses in-the countryside as evidenced, 
on the one hand, by the steady fall in the real incomes of poor 
tenants in the context of severe inflation nation-wide and, on 
the other, by the fairly rapid decline in opportunities for man- 
ual work in the Scheme. Table 4: 35 shows the income of a tenant 
with a standard tenancy (i. e. 10 feddans of cotton, 10 of wheat, 
and 5 each for sorghum and groundnuts) over a number of years. 
This income level, it should be emphasized, is received by only 
a minority of tenants as over three-quarters the total number of 
tenants cultivate half-tenancies only. 
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One significant conclusion thus is that the rich rural 
group managed to establish itself as a decisive socio-economic 
force in Gezira. It effectively controls the land, dictates the 
production process, and appropriates the major part of the sur- 
pluses through ownership of machinery. 
2. Diversification and Intensification: 
The fluctuations in cotton yields, coupled with the need 
for new avenues for capital accumulation, led to the adoption of 
a new policy in the Gezira Scheme. The main props of that policy 
were laid down in the Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Devel- 
opment (1960/61-1970/71). 
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The plan was drawn by the Economic 
Planning Secretariat under the direct supervision of experts 
employed by the international capitalist-monopoly institutions- 
the World Bank and US AID. 
129 Rather than achieving 'economic 
and social development', however, the plan effectively served 
to consolidate the neo-colonial situation in the country insofar 
as it emphasized the need to broaden the Sudanese economy and 
the need for an appreciable increase in exports and import- 
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substitution. 
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Thus the Government launched on a programme of crop diver- 
sification in the Gezira with the introduction of wheat and ground- 
nts and the more intensive use of available land and water. The foll- 
owing Table illustrates these developments. 
Table 4: 36 The Development of Areas Under Different Crops 
in Gezira for Selected Years (in Feddans). 
Season Wheat Groundnut :. Durra Cotton Al I Crops 
1961/62 6843 56623 233863 468259 765588 
1964/65 75065 59960 254707 508229 897961 
1967/68 114688 101610 279689 553388 1049375 
1970/71 141252 148465 294172 588372 1172261 
1973/74 247124 216285 300736 589517 1353662 
1976/77 504603 250817 351810 499435 1606665 
1979/80 362500 228545 327295 541048 1459388 
Source: Compiled from figures supplied by Department of Planning and 
Development, Sudan Gezira Board, Barakat. H 
With the possible exception of cotton, which was up to 
1980/81 produced under a partnership arrangement between the Govern- 
ment, the Board and tenants, all other crops have been, and are, ýý 
grown by private tenants only. But given the deteriorating returns 
from them as a result of the rise in costs, tenants have been less 
and less able to finance their production. One outcome has been 
that tenants have increasingly resorted to methods of finance which 
in effect enhanced the chances of accumulation by the rich group and, 
by the same token, accentuated their own impoverishment. Two forms 
of finance were, and still are, widely recognized and reported by 
various observers: 
(a) The ShaiZ system; which is a kind of pledging -open or disgu- 
ised- of crops. It usually takes the following form. A tenant in: need 
of cash to finance his, usually, agricultural operations accepts money 
from a financier (usually a shopkeeper in the village) under the cond- 
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ition that the tenant will make a repayment in kind (usually the 
crop being financed) and also in cash. At harvest time, when the 
crop prices usually drop, the financier receives an amount of the 
crop far in excess of that which could have been bought by the 
money originally paid. Another form of Shale operates when a ten- 
ant invests all the cash at his disposal in the agricultural oper- 
ations and finds himself in dire need for money to meet subsist- 
ence requirements. He would then buy grain, or any other commod- 
ity, from a shopkeeper at a higher price on credit. When he re- 
aps his crop and the prices are lower, as is usual after the har- 
vest, he sells a larger part of his produce to the shopkeeper in 
order to discharge his debt. 
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The reported average rate of 
interest gained by the financier in Sha, it by either method is 
about 300%. 
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b) Land sub-letting and share-cropping: A large number of tenants 
(usually from among the less energetic and the elderly) pull out 
of production altogether and their incomes are then derived from 
'rent' received from the settled landless and/or unemployed work- 
ers, or as a 'share' in a particular crop after deducting the 
costs. In either case the labourer who cultivates the land is 
again obliged to seek finance from a shopkeeper in addition to 
paying the increasing costs of hiring agricultural machinery 
(usually from the shopkeeper himself). 
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This type of capitalistic intensification has affected com- 
mercial accumulation in the area in a number of ways. For our 
general analysis, we need to note two particularly significant 
effects on trade in Hassaheisa. Firstly, the incomes of the 
people in the surrounding countryside have dropped even below 
the stipulated minimum level of income of the unskilled wage- 
202 
labourers in the Sudan as a whole. 
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Coupled with the sharp in- 
crease in the cost of living idex135, this has inevitably forced 
the bulk of the population to restrict their spending to the min- 
imum and necessary possible levels. The effective purchasing-power 
has thus been cut back with the inevitable consequence of a large 
reduction in the level of effective demand at the market place. 
Secondly, at the same time, the incomes of the rich rural 
group have increased sharply in a relatively short period of time, 
with the concomitant development of a luxurious pattern of consum- 
ption among the wealthy people which has led to the progressive 
emergence of demand for a wide range of imported c Omer-goods. 
The traders, who are anxious to exercise a degree of control 
over the market, have of course responded positively to all these 
developments. Their ultimate purpose is, understandably, to maxi- 
mize their profits and to enhance their ability to accumulate. 
To this end they have promoted two major changes in the hitherto 
prevailing pattern of trade. The first of these changes relates 
to the nature and quantitity of commodities handled in the mar- 
ket. Whereas during the early period (1900-1930) DunJQ and ani- 
mats were dominant and were later supplemented by basic items of 
imported food such as sugar, coffee and tea, in the second per- 
iod (1931-1956) trade was mainly dominated-by these imported 
basic items with a marked decline in the volume of Norma and ani- 
mals bought and sold. In the third period (since Independence), 
however, there has been a large increase in trade in new non- 
basic items and services such as spare-parts, building materials, 
electrical appliances, photographic items, watches, cosmetics 
and perfumes , ready-made clothes, wood and metal 
furniture, 
legal advice, iced water, etc. (cf. Table 4: 38). The increase 
1 
.; ' 
ä 
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in this kind of trade can only be conceived parimarily as a res- 
ponse to the growing effective demand by one group in the area, 
namely, the wealthy rural group. Another change which can be obs- 
erved is the recent reintroduction of trade in punna and animals. 
At present, however, these are not for export as was the case ear- 
her, but to feed the growing urban population. 
The second major change in the trading activities concerns 
the trading networks which, as explained earlier, developed dur- 
ing the second period. The change in the networks has been dram- 
atic and far-reaching involving both the personnel and the func- 
tions of the networks. Earlier I showed how during the 1940s and 
the 1950s the merchants were quick in establishing networks of 
village clients financed through credit. These clients were mainly 
recruited from among two groups, the Sheikhs and traditional not- 
ables in the village communities on the one hand and, on the oth- 
er, the merchants' kinsmen (mainly from the Northern Province). 
I have also explained the logic of the increasing reliance on 
kinship and regional affiliation in the functioning of these 
networks, and described the impact of the then prevalent ineff- 
icient system of transport on the development of the networks. 
During this third period, however, the process of capitalistic 
intensification in the region has affected the two groups eng- 
aged in the trading networks in different ways. When I discuss 
the effects on each group, the logic underlying the change in 
the trading networks becomes evident. Earlier I showed how 
risky it was for a shopkeeper to participate in Sha. L1 
because 
forward selling of the irrigated crops was 
forbidden by the Gezira 
Land Ordinance and no repayment could be secured through courts. 
To benefit from the ShaAl system it was then necessary to enter 
204 
into special arrangements which were virtually possible only for 
sheikhs and notables. In other words, to overcome the legal con- 
straints more reliance had to be placed on 'traditional authority' 
and kinship relationships with tenants. The shopkeepers from the 
North were clearly disadvantaged in these respects. So with the 
spread of the Shah system as a result of the programme of crop 
diversification in the Gezira, the traditional beneficiaries of 
trade commanded more and more opportunities for accumulation. 
Furthermore, being a tenant himself, a shopkeeper from the 
local group of Sheikhs and notables could find legal avenues for 
the discharge of the accumulated crops (as the output of his own 
tenancy). That was so mainly because the government was the sole 
legal customer for these crops. A Northerner could not benefit 
in this respect because he was not a tenant, but solely in the 
village as an agent of the urban merchants. Likewise, a member of 
the 'local group' generally enhanced his opportunities in the 
Shalt system through hiring his agricultural machinery on Shalt 
basis. Originally he only had access to machinery by virtue of 
his tenant status which gave him the right to enjoy the credit 
facilities of the Agricultural Bank and the financial backing of 
the Tenants' Union. 
Finding themselves in such an unfavourable situation, the 
Northern shop-keepers began to pull out from the Gezira villages, 
and very few were left by the mid 1960s. Most of them had moved 
to Hassaheisa or to other smaller urban centres in Gezira. In 
Hassaheisa many of them invested heavily in establishing canteens 
(small shops in the residential neighbourhoods of the town). As 
result of their movement out of the villages, one main pillar of 
the trading networks, that of kinship, virtually collapsed. 
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Earlier I have discussed how the poor state of transport 
in the region during the 1930s and 1940s indirectly served to 
promote the development of the trading networks. With the accele- 
rated rate of accumulation during the third period, by the vill- 
age traders in particular, investment in mechanical transport 
increased markedly, and from the mid 1960s Hassaheisa began to 
function as the centre of an intensive transport network cover- 
ing the whole district as is maintained in Chapter 3. The follow- 
ing are some important concomitant developments: 
1) Hassaheisa market is increasingly becoming the main 
'shopping centre' of the whole district. The number of shops rose 
rapidly in the last three decades- by 292% between 1950 and 1980 
as shown in Table 4: 37. 
Table 4: 37 Number of Shops in Hassaheisa Market 
Over the Period 1915-1980 
Year No. of Sites Increase Percentage Remarks 
1915 64 -- Establishment 
Date 
1950 107 43 67 
1960 290 183 171 
1970 363 74 25 
1980 419 56 15 
1950-1980 - 312 292 
Source: Survey Office, Hassaheisa Merkaz, various files. 
A further indication of the intensification of trade in 
Hassaheisa is the rapid growth in the number and functions of 
kiosks (shops built of cardboard, zinc sheets or even jute sheets 
and wood) which increased from only 55 in 1950 devoted solely to 
trade in herbs and spices to 553 in 1980 with a much wider range 
II 
of functions as Table 4: 38 shows. 
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2) The village shops began, in the meantime, to function 
increasingly as finance houses rather than shopping places. The 
main items with which they dealt, especially during the 1970s, 
were rationed commodities such as sugar, kerosine, cooking oil 
and other basic household supplies. 
3) Many of the village tenant-traders moved into Hassaheisa 
market as well. A significant aspect of this movement is that they 
usually continued to reside in their respective villages (commut- 
ing to the market by car) while also maintaining many of their 
village-based business activities-e. g. shops, machinery, tenan- 
cies, etc. The case of Ibrahim is a good example to illustrate 
the case of these tenant-traders. 
Ibrahim is 52 years old and from Hallawin tribal origin. 
Born in Gannib village (15 K. m. north of Hassaheisa), he and his 
father moved in 1952 to Mihairiba, the largest village in the 
Hallawin, where they established a shop. Both are tenants in 
Turfs Block. Since 1966, they invested heavily in agricultural 
machinery and managedLto own 4 combine harvestors and three trac- 
tors with their accessories. In 1977 the father died and in the 
following year Ibrahim moved into Hassaheisa. In a very short 
time he established himself--as an importer, wholesaler and ret- 
ailer of general provisions. He continues to live in Mihairiba, 
and is still. a tenant and owner of 5 combines, 2 tractors and 
2 lorries. His younger brother, Omer, runs the shop at Mihairiba. 
TRADING PRACTICES IN HASSAHEISA SUK 
It may be useful at this stage to recapitulate some basic 
features of trade in Hassaheisa market. The first of these is that 
the primary way in which capital can 
be accumulated is through 
trade, especially retail trade. The 
future level of capital acc- 
ýs 
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umulation depends critically on the rate of accumulated achieved 
through trade. Secondly, this accumulation is essentially commer- 
cial in character-i. e. it depends on commercial profits which 
are a function of the traders' ability to buy cheaply and sell 
at higher prices and in so doing exercise a degree of control 
over the market. To achieve accumulation, thus, it is not necess- 
ary to intervene in the production process of the goods exchanged. 
But, thirdly, the ability to control markets has been severely 
limited throughout the history of Hassaheisa market by the depend- 
ent position of traders on other organizations and forces with 
deep interests in commercial profit. First and foremost, the state 
(both colonial and neo-colonial) has had its own general interest 
in controlling profits. This general interest has been, and is, 
a function of the interests of specific dominant social forces in 
the state apparatus, represented mainly by the bureaucrats who 
are always interested in state revenues (taxes and even state- 
controlled commercial activities). In addition, all bureaucrats 
are also interested in the strict imposition of price controls 
for other reasons- partly to defend their own household budgets 
since they are salary-earners and partly as a means of gaining 
credibility and preserving legitmacy among the masses. The prov- 
ision of goods and commodities has largely remained out of the 
direct control of traders who are totally dependent on foreign 
manufacturing and commercial firms even though they are assumed 
to control the circulation of goods and to benefit from profits. 
The major changes effected by the intensification of the process 
of capitalist accumulation in Sudan, whether at the national 
level (the state monopoly over foreign trade and, to a lesser 
B, 
degree, over import-substitute industries) or at the regional 
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level (the emergence of a powerful social group with an increas- 
ing effective demand for luxurious goods) did not appreciably 
reduce the traders' dependent position. On the contrary, these 
changes had the net effect of consolidating that dependence and 
of maintaining the s#ll limited margins of profit attainable in 
the market. 
Furthermore, the low margins of profits have been accentua- 
ted by the increasing intensive competition for a limited body 
of customers. The immediate reason for this is that there has 
Qý '7 
been no mechanism to limit the number of licences, and my new 
traders (particularly from the Gezira region itself in recent 
years) have begun to trade in the market with extremely low cap- 
ital to achieve the lowest possible profits. Very few of these 
newcomers could accumulate any substantial capital without recou- 
rse to non-economic means violating the rules of a strictly free 
market. 
In addition to the practices that were widely developed dur- 
ing the second period of the market's history (austere domestic 
life, specialization of kinship groups, manipulation of contacts, 
and the development of the trading networks), the merchants have 
progressively resorted to the following stratagems to enlarge and 
maximize their profit margins during the third period. 
MANIPULATION 0. F THE PRICING SYSTEM AND THE TRADING HIERARCHY 
Firstly, according to the Prices' Control Act of 1914, the 
Governor (later, the Commissioner) of any Province in the Sudan 
may fix the maximum prices for any imported or locally produced 
commodity at the different stages of its distribution. The 
foll- 
owing are some examples: 
1. An imported commodity, Rice: The price of a sack of 100 
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Table 4: 38 Business Firms (Dukan or Kushuk) 
1 
in Iiassaheisa, 1980 
Type of Firm Dukan Kushuk Total 
Cooked Food 27 9 36 
Tea & Coffee Shop 24 17 31 
Soft Cold Drinks 5 37 42 
Motor Spares 9 - 9 Pharmacy- 4 - 4 Building Materials 12 - 12 Electrical Appliances & Repair 8 4 12 
Stationary & Books 3 - 3 Spirits & Alcohol 4 - 4 Photography Studio 7 - 7 Goldsmith 13 - 13 Watch-maker & Retailer 1 38 39 
Motor Repair2 79 68 147 
Petrol Station & Service 4 3 7 
Ready-made Clothes 13 64 77 
Cosmetics & Perfumes 3 6 9 
Shoe-maker & Retailer 6 39 45 
Grocery 17 55 72 
Cloth & Fabrics 27 18 45 
General Goods Provision 56 - 56 
Tailoring 4 75 79 
Butcher 32 - 32 
Fruit & Vegetables 1 49 50 
Bank 2 - 2 
Hairdressing 4 34 38 
Durra - 9 9 
Carpentry & Wood-work 32 - 32 
Domestic Utensils 21 5 26 
Metal-work & Furniture2 39 22 61 
Mattress-maker & Retailer 19 - 19 
Advocate 5 - 5 
Animal Sale - 1 1 
Hotel 3 - 3 
Agricultural Machinery & Repair 1 - 1 
Printing House 2 - 2 
Ice-making & Retail 1 2 3 
Hide & Skin 3 - 3 
Bakery & Bread Retail 13 10 23 
Total 504 533 1037 
In addition to the firms listed there are in Hassaheisa the following firms 
which are not situated in the market area: Private Clincs 9 
Canteens (Grocery-shops), 110; Flour Mills, 21; Laundries, 17; Tailors, 7 
and Large Industrial Firms, 7 
(1) Dukan isa redbrick store while a Kushuk is a shop built of cardboard, 
zinc sheets or jute sheets - the Kushuk could also be a stall. 
ý'., q 
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(2) Mainly situated in the Light Industrial Area. 
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Kilogrammes were fixed by the Commissioner at the following levels: 
From the importing firm to wholesaler L. S. 58.105 
From wholesaler to the retailer L. S. 61.000 
From retailer to consumer (@ P. T. 70 
per kilo) L. S. 70.000 
2. A locally manufactured commodity, Zapata (solid blue), 
the prices fixed by the commissioner for a box of 1792 pieces were 
as follows: 
From manufacturer to wholesaler L. S. 26.535 
From wholesaler to retailer L. S. 27.800 
From retailer to consumer (@ 3.5 P. T. 
per 2 pieces) L. S. 31.360 
In order to make the maximum legal profits from such comm- 
odities, the merchants therefore often sought to amalgamate diff- 
erent ranks in the hierarchy of trade. Thus one commonly encount- 
ers a merchant operating as both wholesaler and retailer of a 
certain commodity and, in other cases, the merchant figures as 
an importer (or manufacturer) as well. 
My analysis of the licensed business firms in Hassaheisa 
market in 1980 revealed the situation set out in Table 4: 38. 
Out of 504 shops (kiosks excluded), 16 were not directly involved 
in commodity circulation (2 banks, 4 hairdressers, 5 advocates, 
3 hotels and 2 printing firms). Of the others, 468 were retailers 
only, 16 combined retail and wholesale trade, while 4 operated as 
importers, wholesalers and retailers. 
136 To appreciate the signif- 
icance of these figures, however, it must be stressed that the 20 
firms falling the last two categories are all general provisions 
stores-i. e. 20 out of 56 (cf. Table 4: 38) and that these 20 firms 
dominate the town's trade. The smaller retailers who do not oper- 
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ate as either wholesalers or importers cannot-according to the 
law and following the system of quota distribution supervised 
and administered by the Ministry of Trade and Supplies- buy direct 
from the manufacturer, nor could they import goods. Their trading 
is thus-squeezed between the big wholesalers (who have the right 
to import, and often manufacture, goods in addition to their acc- 
ess to the banks for finance) and the intense competition gener- 
ated by the kiosk traders who are prepared to operate at the abs- 
olutely minimum possible profit-levels. Not surprisingly, this 
situation has led to tension in the market. 
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In the early 1970s 
this culminated in a major confrontation between the wholesalers 
and the licensed retailers which led to the formation of a retail- 
ers' union on 4th October 1972. The union pressed for direct quotas 
from the manufacturers and importers; and their pressure included 
a strike in which all retail shops were closed. A result of these 
events the retailers managed to secure direct quotas in a number ]ý. 5 
of commodities (prominent among which were sugar, grey fabrics, 
and lentils). In this way they succeeded in altering their sit- 
uation appreciably. 
Secondly, since the general tendency has been for the prices 
of the main commodities in the market to rise by sudden 
leaps and 
bounds, often at the whim of the government, early or advance 
knowledge of any increase naturally affects trading decisions 
and can be crucial in making big gains and, more occasionally, 
in avoiding losses. For example, the government- 
in pursuance 
of particular budgetary policies- abruptly raised 
the price of 
a no tLe of sugar from 
3.5 P. T. in 1951, to 4 in 1952, to 5 in 
1954 to 6 in 1961, to 7 in 1965, to 
8 in 1971, to 16 in 1975 
and to 20 in 
1981. Early or advance knowledge of the dates of 
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such changes can only be gained through the careful manipulation 
of contacts with state bureaucrats who may be of the same polit- 
ical party or share the same tribal or regional allegiances as 
some of the merchants. In the particular case of sugar, one can 
refer to the following well-recorded cases which, surprisingly, 
are openly confessed by the merchants involved. 
Case 1: Yousif, a big merchant in Hassaheisa, used to be a prom- 
inent member of the then ruling National Unionist Party, and a 
main financier of the party's political activities in Hassaheisa 
constituency. In the second half of May 1965, he began to invest 
heavily in sugar, and bought and stocked some 30000 sacks (225 
notttez per sack). In late June of the same year, the Minister 
of Finance announced in his budget speech that the price of sugar 
was to rise immediately from 6 P. T. to 7 P. T. per 'ottie. Yousif 
thus made about L. S. 67500 within a few weeks. 
Case 11: Abdel Rahim, another prominent merchant, was also invol- 
ved in a case concerning sugar. It so happened that in 1975 a 
Gezira Province influential official was of Abdel Rahim's tribal 
origin and from neighbouring villages (about 10 miles apart). 
Sugar was then included in the list of rationed goods. Two weeks 
prior to the price increase of that year, Abdel Rahim began to 
buy large amounts and offering prices higher than those stipul- 
ated. He stock filed about 17000 sacks in his village-stores. 
When the President proclaimed the rise in price from 8 P. T. to 
16 P. T., Abdel Rahim made L. S. 306000. His 'coup' was, however, 
marginally frustrated by the police raids on a number of 
his stores 
during which 6000 sacks were taken away and put 
for sale at the 
old price. 
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Table 4: 39 Official Maximum Retail Prices of Some 
Consumer-goods and Actual Prices--for. 1981 
(In Sudanese Pounds) 
Item Unit 19571 19702W 19793 19814 1981 
(Actual) 
Sesame-Oil rottle 0.080 0.093 0.500 0.700 0.850 
Coffee rottle 0.195 0.172 1.200 1.300 2.100 
Sugar rottle 0.050 0.070 0.160 0.260 0.600 
Wheat Flour Kilogramme 0.044 0.040 0.500 0.260 0.550 
Charcoal Kantar 0.600 0.400 3.500 6.000 7.000 
Kerosine Gallon 0.100 0.105 0.800 N. A. N. A, 
Soap (Indus- 
trial) Pience 0.020 0.020 0.105 0.130 0.150 
Dragon 30 Yards 1.800 1.750 11.00 9.310 16.293 
Meat (Mutton) Kilogramme 0.200 0.290 1.600 2.500 4.000 
Meat (Beef) Kilogramme 0.100 0.170 1.200 2.00 3.000 
Sources: (1) Ministry of Finance & Economics (Sudan Government), 
Economic Survey, 1957, Khartoum, p. 19. 
(2) and (3) The Sudanese Communist Party, Studies in the Sudan- 
ese Economy, No. 6, April 1980, Khartoum, p. 26 (In Arabic). 
(4) E1-Sahafa (Daily)- government-controlled newspaper in Khart- 
oum- 20th July, 1981. 
(5) Personal correspondence with Mr. M. J. Abu Shamma, Secretary 
General of Hassaheisa Retail Traders Union, Dec. 1981. 
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The opportunities for such profiteering may be better app- 
reciated if we consider the scale and frequency of many price 
changes as shown in Table 4: 39, and also the large differences 
sometimes obtaining between the official and the actual market 
prices. The difference between these two last as in 1981 is shown 
in columns (4) and (5) in the Table. 
NEW TRADING NETWORKS 
In general, it is common to find that the town luxury items 
are abundant while the basic items are scarce, while the reverse 
is generally the case in the countryside. The merchants are of 
course the main suppliers of all goods to the region. But since 
they can only sell luxury goods in the urban market at relatively 
profitable prices, they commonly have the problem of selling the 
basic items profitably. This cannot be esaily achieved in the 
town because of the heavy police presence. (The police may at 
times be bribed to keep quiet, but this costs money). One way 
out is therefore to sell the basic goods where the police presence 
is least-i. e. in the villages. 
138 The urban merchants, however, 
do not normally run that venture themselves which is usually left 
to the village shopkeepers who benefit from bringing goods to the 
villages at inflated prices but only to sell them again at even 
higher prices. For the village shopkeeper, this is imperative if 
he is to keep his shop stocked. Many. of the town merchants and 
village traders are thus bound together through mutual trading 
interests. The merchants provide the (often artificially) scarce 
goods, and the shopkeepers bring them to the 
'people' on a highly 
speculative basis. 
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COMPLIMENTARY INVESTMENTS: 
Since pure trade has a limited margin of profit, the merch- 
ants commonly attempt to expand their activities to spheres pre- 
viously regarded as specialized areas of investment. For example, 
the transportation of goods from their places of manufacture or 
from ports of entry into the country was earlier performed mainly 
by truck-owner-drivers. But in the second half of the 1960s, some 
merchants, especially the wholesalers, began to invest in lorries 
(10 ton Bedfords and Austin Morris B. M. Cs. in particular). By 
1980 the 707 diesel lorries registered in Hassaheisa were owned 
by the following categories: 97 were owned by 20 wholesale merch- 
ants, 404 by 468 retailers and only 202 were owned by non-traders 
(mainly drivers). Another example of change is a bakery owner who 
opened a restaurant in the market to sell bread directly to the 
consumers. 
TAX EVASION: 
Tax evasion usually develops through a few well defined 
stages. The first of these is when traders 
considerable success, to avoid taxes altog, 
have to 'persuade' the taxation officer to 
liable to taxation by having their profits 
L. S. 300 per annum- which is the exemption 
the Tax Ordinance amended in January 1970. 
attempt, 
ether. To 
classify 
assessed 
limit ac 
Rates of 
often with 
do this they 
them as not 
as less than 
cording to 
tax above 
the L. S. 300 limit are as follows: 
The First L. S. 300 Not Taxed 
The Next L. S. 200 
15% 
20% 
The Next L. S. 500 30% 
The Next L. S. 3000 40% 
The Next L. S. 6000 50% 
The Next L. S. 20000 60% 
More than L. S. 30000 
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From the statements obtained from the Tax Office in Hassa- 
heisa, it is evident that many merchants have avoided all taxes 
since the establishment of the office in 1973, and that this is 
so partly because of the virtual absence of any regular auditing 
system in the town. The whole responsibility of assessment is thus 
thrown on the Tax Officer, who is extremely susceptible to the 
merchants' pressure and persuation for various reasons- not least 
because of the limited income of the officer. 
The second stage in evasion is again to put some pressure on 
the tax officer to make him under-assess the real profits achieved 
and so the merchant could pay less than he would had his profits 
been accurately assessed. The third stage is to attempt open tax 
evasion through delaying tactics such as court appeal against 
assessment, or by using one's influence to obtain an exemption 
a for possibly extr'neous reasons. This is usually the result of 
pressure exercised at the central government levels. Table 4: 40 
shows the tax performance in Hassaheisa since the establishment 
of the office in 19 73. 
Table 4: 40 Amounts of Assessed & Actually Paid Business 
Profit Taxes in Hassaheisa Town (1973-1981) 
Fiscal Year Assessment Actually Paid Difference 70 
1973/74 102397.035 81284.885 21112.150 21 
1974/75 111353.184 87761.732 23591.452 21 
1975/76 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
1976/77 125949.967 119938.462 6011.505 5 
1977/78 161070.079 159024.952 2045.127 2 
1978/79 193485.562 168976.983 24508.579 13 
1979/80 189195.040 139999.729 49195.311 26 
1980/81 264412.632 215187.363 49225.269 19 
1981(Jan. -Nov)448645.348 215697.719 232947.629 52 
Total 1596508.847 -1187871.825 408637.022 25 
'I i+ 
Source: Compiled from various files in the Tax Office, Hassaheisa. 
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5. Other CommerciaZ Investments: 
To enhance their profit-making chances, traders also invested 
in new fields (urban property and manufacturing) but these aspects 
are the subject matter of the following two chapters. 
CONCLUSION: 
The two major characteristics of 'local' capital accumulation 
in Hassaheisa over the past seventy years or so have been: 
(1) Its almost total reliance on trade in the Suk, a feature which 
is not accidental or simply 'natural' in the sense that it der- 
ives from some 'instinctive' inclination of this particular 
group of local people (Northern merchants) to pursue commercial 
dealings. On the contrary, this feature arises out of a perfect- 
ly 'rational' assessment that in the course of Sudan's history 
as a dependent colonial economic entity, it is only through 
commerce that profits could be made. 
(2) The fact that, due partly to the dependent position of the 
local traders seeking to make profits, and partly to the syst- 
ematic transfer of surpluses to the outside world, a minimal 
share of profits has accrued to local enterpreneurs. This in is 
turn meant that the process of local accumulation and capital 
formation took place at a low rate and slowly. 
This overall situation was, and continues to be, not simply 
maintained by 'market forces', but actually promoted and maintained 
by the interventionist measures of colonial and neo-colonial state. 
A main consequence has, thus, been the emergence of a merchant class 
which is basically and essentially dependent on 
foreign customers 
and/or supplies as well as on the state's political powers. 
Under 
such conditions, this merchant class 
has always relied on extra- 
relations (social, ideological, and political) to give a economic 
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limited degree of security and certainity to its economic purs- 
nits. 
,a 
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+I 
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INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter contains an analysis of the process of accum- 
ularion in the sphere of urban land-i. e. real estate. The analyt- 
ical framework I adopt is based on a historical and politico-eco- 
nomic assessment of two fundamental processes: 
(a) The process of urban land privatization by which I 
mean the transfer of an increasing proportion of land 
from public to private ownership. 
(b) The process of land commercialization by which I mean 
the increasing abstraction of land into an object for 
commercial transaction and the way in which it has pro- 
gressively assumed an exchange value rather than a mere 
use value. 
My aim is to analyse these processes as integral aspects of 
the general process of capital accumulation particularly in its 
commercial form. The privatization and commercialization of land 
are clearly not independent of other forms of accumulation and 
their dynamics can only be understood in relation to local devel- 
opments in trade and the general policies of the colonial adminis- 
tration. 
Equally, of course, the changing nature of the value of 
land has developed upon, and to some extent reflected, the sheer 
growth of the town. Moreover, the "land question" reveals and 
expresses a contradictory feature of the process of urbanization 
in the colonial capitalist economy for this economy presupposes 
the stabilization of cash-crop producers in their rural community 
while also promoting urban land investments which then undermine 
the stability of the surrounding countryside by promoting immigrat- 
ion, etc. as a condition for the creation of urban land market at 
all. 
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THE PROCESS OF LAND PRIVATIZATION 
By the turn of this century most lands in the Sudan, and urban 
land in particular, were effectively Government or public property. 
' 
To appreciate how this situation had arisen we may briefly refer to 
the developments under Turkish and Mahdist Rule. 
During the period of Turkish Rule (1821-1885), towns were few 
and small, and most of their residents were foreigners2 who were 
later evicted following the Mahdist Revolution. 3 While during the 
brief Mahdist Rule (1885-1898) urban land was not registered in the 
name of any particular person or institution, many of the residents 
of the towns were there only on a transitory basis as warriors or 
prisoners". 
4 
In the early years of British colonial administration, this 
general situation was made more formal by a series of legal enact- 
ments which had the net effect of consolidating Government ownership 
of existing urban land. New legislation also extended state ownership 
to newly demarcated urban areas (i. e. land specifically set aside to 
accommodate the new urban populations). 
Over the course of the past eighty years, however, this situat- 
ion has changed very appreciably. In the analysis to follow I attempt 
to account for the pattern of change in urban land use and ownership 
in Hassaheisa, in particular to pay attention to the dynamics of the 
changes which have taken place and to highlight the socio-economic 
implications of the whole process. 
The initial policy of the colonial administration in regard to 
land in established Sudanese towns was developed on the principles 
set out in the Town Lands Ordinance of 1899 and its amendments of 
1901. This ordinance was at the time of its issue intended primarily 
to deal with the towns of Khartoum, Berber, and Dongola which "had 
been reduced to ruins". The ordinance specifically states that it: 
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was expedient that (these towns) should be laid 
out anew and re-built in such manner as to make 
proper provision for the health and convenience 
of the inhabitants. 
With this aim in view, and to allow for full control over the re- 
building operation, the ordinance declared that 
All lands and building sites, whether occupied 
or not, within the town are the property of the 
Sudan Government and have ever since the reoccup- 
ation of the country been so considered. 
It was clearly stated, moreover, that the Governor-General 
retained the right to extend the ordinance to any town other than 
those specified in the ordinance. 
6 
According to an amendment to 
the ordinance issued in 19027, such individuals as had been all- 
otted pieces of land in these towns were required to build on 
them: 
Every allotment shall impose upon the allottee 
the obligation to erect upon the land allotted 
within two years from the earliest date at which 
such allotments=shall be made, or one year from 
the date of the particular allotment, whichever 
period shall be the longer, a building according 
to the TANZIM Regulations:.. all lands allotted 
but not built on in accordance with provisions of, 
and within the time specified by, this ordinance 
should become and be the absolute property of the 
Government. 
In the case of Khartoum Town, however, the Governor-General dec- 
lared 8 in November 1901 that: 
Whereas there are a considerable number of all- 
otments in the town which have not yet been built 
on in accordance with the ordinance of 1899.... 
all these lands shall become and be the absolute 
property of Government. 
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The Governor-General made a series of arrangements to allow for 
the forfeiture of such lands with the specific provision that 
such arrangements "shall not be suable for at law". 
The terms of the 1899 Ordinance were particularly applicable 
to towns and settlements like Hassaheisa which were being newly- 
developed in lands that are the absolute property of the Govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, in both new and old towns, a policy effect- 
ively surrendering this "absolute Government's property" into the 
hands of private owners was promoted and adhered to since then. 
Various measures to this effect were, and indeed continue to be, 
applied with the net result of a continuous decrease in the public 
(government) property and a corresponding continuous increase in 
private landownership. The measures that were applied in the case 
of Hassaheisa were the grant of land policy, grant of land for 
houses for Government use, Government land purchase, lease and 
rent. Each of these measures will be reviewed briefly below. 
1. THE GRANT OF A PIECE OF LAND 
In October 1915 (six years after the selection of the site 
of Hassaheisa as a military-administrative station) the Governor 
of the Blue Nile Province, on behalf of Sudan Government, and in 
consideration of proof produced to the satisfaction of the Land 
Settlement Officer that had formerly possessed land within the 
Hassaheisa Town Boundaries (as defined in the Sudan Gazette, no. 
141 of ist August 1908), granted to those people, their heirs 
and assigns certain pieces of land under certain clearly defined 
conditions. These conditions were such that=any grantee is: 
I. 
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bound to build on the said piece of land within 
two years from the date of the issue suitable res- 
idential buildings with surrounding walls in accord- 
ance with plans and specifications approved by the 
inspector... in the event of non complaince with this 
condition, the Government may re-enter upon the said 
land without payment of compensation and all build- 
ings then standing thereon shall become the property 
of the Government. 
9 
In accordance with these conditions, 66 pieces of land of 
different sizes were granted to persons, mainly of the Dubasin 
group, who then began to build permanent abodes in the Shargi 
neighbourhood of the town to the east of Hassaheisa Rail Station. 
Members of the Iheimir and Feki el-Zwain families (who were head- 
ed by a tribal leader and a religious leader respectively) became 
the owners of most of these 66 pieces.. The remaining members of 
the Dubasin population who had been persuaded to settle in the-then 
being established town were mainly poor people and in many cases 
ex-slaves of the leading families. They were allotted pieces west 
of the rail-line in Wassat neighbourhood. Paradoxically, the rel- 
atively rich immigrant trading families of Turco-Egyptian origin 
were also granted some pieces in this neighbourhood (from 1915 to 
1 1; 1927, a total of 99 pieces of land averaging 550 sq. metres were 
granted here). 
2. THE GRANT OF GOVERNMENT HOUSES: 
Being aware of the practical need to stabilize certain sec- 
tions of the town's newcomers and, in a sense, as a measure nece- 
ssary in the process of reproducing them as a labour-force, the 
colonial administration launched a house-building project on gov- 
ernment lands in the town for the exclusive accommodation of its 
own administrative personnel. In addition 
to houses for the senior 
ýý1 
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colonial administrators, the following houses were built between 
1915 and 1935: 70 houses for the police-force in the south-west 
corner of the town, 12 houses for the prison guards adjacent to 
the Merkez, 19 houses for skilled and administrative employees 
of Sudan Railways around the station, and 21 larger and well fur- 
nished houses for the Merkaz staff north of the Shargi area. In 
addition to these, relatively large compounds were established 
for the residence of the Ghorashi Irrigation Station workers in 
1925 and for the Ginneries administrators (Jamalounat) and workers 
(Kambo) in 1927,1928 and 1929 respectively. In the course of time, 
government houses were also built in the town for senior govern- 
ment professionals such as teachers, physicians, water and elect- 
ricity administrators and engineers and the like. Such housing was 
exclusively for the more privileged sections of the population who 
had permanent jobs and who were by virtue of their status granted 
In 
the use for extended periods (sometimes for life: ) of houses built, 
owned and maintained by the government out of public expenses. 
3. GOVERNMENT-LAND PURCHASE 
The sale and purchase of Government land was governed by the 
Regulations For Applications For the Purchase or Lease of Govern- 
ment Lands10 issued in 1905 which stipulated various procedures as 
follows: 
The sale of town lands will be effected by public 
auction or tender. -Public auctions of town lands 
will be held periodically, the date of sales being 
advertised as long before hand as possible. The auc- 
tioneer has the right to fix a reserve price. However, 
the highest bid shall, whether or not such bid exceeds 
the reserve price, be regarded as an offer to the Govern- 
ment by the bidder to buy the land at a price"equal to 
the amount of such bid, which the Government shall be 
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entitled to accept or refuse as it thinks fit. 
Upon payment of the purchase price the purchaser 
shall be entitled to be let into possession or 
receipt of the rents and profits of the land ex- 
ecuted by the Governor-General or some official 
authorized by him in that behalf. 
Under the terms of these regulations, the District Commi- 
ssioner sold 64 sites in the market area of Hassaheisa for the 
building of shops in 1915. Only a few local traders were at that 
time able or willing to buy any of these sites. In consequence, 
most sites went either to members of the dominant family of the 
Dubasin group or to headmen of nearby villages and tribal groups 
who were actively encouraged or persuaded by the administration 
to buy them. The main argument put to these prospective-purchas- 
ers was that the establishment of the market was a sign of the 
development of 'their' town and that the flourishing commercial 
of the town would ensure good revenues from rents. 
" 
future As 
trading activities in the market developed over time, further sites 
were sold in the same way: 43 sites in 1943/44,183 in 1955,77 
in 1963 and 56 in 1979. The buyers were mainly local merchants who 
could by then afford to buy and develop sites out of their trad- 
profits and the manipulation of their political powers in the ing 
Town's Coucil. 
The relative commercial prosperity enjoyed by the market 
traders during the second half of the 1930s12, and the early years 
of the Second World War, also led them to persuade the 
local gov- 
ernment administrators to hold auctions of new town 
lands for res- 
idential purposes. This particular pressure came mainly 
from the 
traders of Northern origins (Shimmat--n) who 
had, hitherto, lived 
as tenants in houses owned 
by members of the Dubasin group in the 
61 
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Wassat neighbourhood. A series of auctions resulted in the sale 
of 136 plots in what has since been called Karima neighbourhood 
(named after a town in the Northern Province). During the same 
period, moreover, those Dubasin who benefited from rent revenues 
began to anticipate further opportunities as landlords, and were 
able to persuade the local administration through the influential 
Omda of the town, a Dubasin himself, to sell them most of the 161 
plots auctioned in the Wassat neighbourhood, just north of thezu1a. 
Following the boom caused by the increase in cotton prices 
in 1950/51, the rich merchants manipulated their contacts in the 
Town Council 13 to promote an auction of residential land in 1953. 
On this occasion, however, the plots were defined as Second Class 
(with all kinds of services) as opposed to the other neighbourhoods 
which had been defined as Third Class. A total of 124 plots were 
sold in what came. to_, bä the Omda neighbourhood- so named as the 
site was of agricultural land assigned for the Omda by the colon- 
ial administration. Most of the owners of plots were wealthy mer- 
chants and Dubasin tribal leaders, who moved out of their former 
neighbourhoods to congregate in the. -)new Second Class area- and 
since residence: -. in--this neighbourhood was considered as symbol of 
relative wealth, status and power in the community. 
In response to the generally worsening problem of housing, 
the Town Council decided to develop new areas as Third Class ext- 
ensions. in 1970/71.314 plots were thus auctioned to form the 
Mazad neighbourhood (lit. "auction"); and all the plots went, as 
expected, to the wealthy residents of the town. 
4. GOVERNMENT LAND-LEASE 
The Regulation For Application... Ordinance to which I ref- 
erred earlier also stipulated various provisions concerning land- 
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lease. These regulations are still operative and the Town 
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Coucil has used them quite extensively on behalf of the Govern- 
ment over the past 10 years. In brief, the regulations contain 
the following provisions for leasing Government lands: 
a) The Government may lease a piece of land for a specified term 
of time. 
b) The leasee must pay a yearly rent (at present 45 P. T. per sq. 
metre) in equal quarterly payments in advance of each quarter. 
c) The leasee must discharge all rates, taxes and impositions and 
perform any duties and liabilities to which the premises may be 
subject. 
d) The leasee must by a specified date, at present not more than 
one year from the lease date, erect a house, shop or warehouse in 
conformity with building, sanitary and other regulations and ord- 
inances and in accordance with plans and specifications to be app- 
roved by the Government. 
e) The leasee has the right to transfer or transmit his interest 
under the lease, partially or completely. In this case he is re- 
quired to give a notice in writing about transmission to the 
Government within six weeks of its occurrence. 
f) The lease is renewable but the lessee must give notice at least 
twelve months before the expiration of the granted term if he 
wishes to renew. 
g) The Government my require the premises for a public purpose 
at any time but must give six months notice of such requirement. 
In leasing land within the terms of these regulations, the 
Town Coucil has used certain criteria of eligibility: length of 
residence of applicant in the town, type of present accommodat- 
ion (if rented or not), and size-and income of the applicant 
family. In practice, however, the decisive criterion is always 
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the amount of pressure an applicant can put on the Councillors as 
will be explained in Chapter 8. Land leased over the past ten 
years for dwelling houses has been mainly in two areas: 1) Imtidad, 
which is a residential extension in the northern part of the Town 
and has 258 plots first leased in 1972 as a Third Class area and, 
2) Arkwit, another extension, in the southern part of the town 
which has 596 plots first leased in, 1976/77 as a Second Class 
area. 
Furthermore, as part of the Council's 'plan to encourage 
industrial development in the town', 56 plots (totalling 196500 sq. 
metres) are under distribution on lease for manufacturing purposes 
in the extreme northern part of the town since 1975. The criteria 
of eligibility for leasing were, and remain to be, exclusive in 
nature: they are based on considerations such as the financial 
ability of the applicant, on possession of a permit from the ind- 
ustrial authorities, and an approval by the Town Coucil's Committee 
for-Development of Industry. Effectively, then, these criteria 
are satisfied by the wealthy merchants in the town to the exclus- 
ion of other categories and groups. 
5. GOVERNMENT-LAND RENT 
On 11th November 1912, the Governor-General issued the Govern- 
ment Town Lands (Native Occupation) Ordinance; 1912.14 The Ordinance was 
l` 
intended to regulate the occupation by 'natives' of government land 
in or close to towns where villages and De1mI had been allowed to 
develop. The ordinance stipulated the following conditions for the 
continuation of such occupation or for allowing new settlements to 
develop 
(a) Whenever it shall appear to the Governor 
desirable that natives frequenting a town should 
be allowed to occupy government land outside the-town 
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for the purpose of establishing thereon a deim 
or village, the Governor may appropriate a suit- 
able site on such land for such occupation and 
may allot to natives suitable plots within such area. 
According to the Ordinance, such areas were to be known as 
Native Lodging Areas. 
(b) An allottee was required to erect a shelter or a building 
in conformity with the regulations of health and order. 
(c) An allottee might, with the consent of the Governor, assign 
his rights to another native of the Sudan; and upon his death, his 
heirs might succeed to the occupation of his plot. 
id) No person other than a native of the Sudan or of some part 
of Africa lying within the tropics may reside in or acquire 
any interest in a native lodging area, except by express 
permission of the Governor. 
(e) Upon allotment of a plot the Governor may fix a rent pay- 
able to the Government by the occupier and recoverable in 
the same manner as rent from a tenant. 
(f) But the occupation of government land in any native lodging 
area, for any length of time, whether with the express per- 
mission of a Governor or not, or whether expressly under 
the Ordinance or not, shall not entitle the occupier to any 
ownership in the land. 
Under the terms of these conditions the town's authorities de- 
Glared, surveyed, and allotted the following three Native Lodging 
Areas around the town of Hassaheisa starting in 1946. Prior to that, 
some of the inhabitants of these newly-designated areas lived there 
"illegally" (Fur", while others (Jadida and Mygouma) had been in the 
town centre. These areas are: 
1. Al-Hilla A1-Jadida (the 'new village'), was established in 1946 
mainly to accommodate persons coming from the Northern Province, 
and who were initially living in the town centre. With their jobs 
being in both the market area and the Ginneries of the Gezira sch- 
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eme, the new inhabitants constituted a relatively low-income gro- 
up. A total of 308 plots, of 300 sq. meters each, were distributed 
and the annual rent was fixed at P. T. 1 per meter. The rent system, 
however, was applied in the first year only and was subsequently 
abandoned when the town administration exempted the inhabitants 
from payments. 
2. Hillat Fur (The village of Fur) was established in its present 
form and according to the ordinance in 1954, although it had been 
there since 1930s. It was distributed for persons from Western 
Sudan, but mainly of Fur tribal origin. These were primarily emp- 
loyed as unskilled workers in the Ginneries. A total of 214 plots 
were assigned, each of 300 sq. meters, and at the same rate of 
rent as in Al-Hilla Al-Jadida. 
3. Mygouma: was established in 1951 with the original aim of prov- 
iding plots for different low-income government employees-e. g. 
policemen, prison-guards and local government workers who could 
not be accommodated in government houses while their incomes did 
not allow for either buying or renting in the town centre. A total 
of 140 plots (300 sq. meters each) were distributed free of all 
rent charges , which measure was 
intended as a subsidy for govern- 
ment low-income employees. 
The present patterns of the 'ownership' and use of land in 
Hassaheisa which came into existence through these five ways of 
transmission of public lands into private owners are a reflection 
of the prime process of privatization and commercialization throu- 
ghout the town's history. The most dynamism of this process mani- 
fests itself in the continuous decline in the proportion of public 
property compared to the resultant continuous 
increase in the pro- 
portion and absolute size of private property. 
The changing pict- 
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Table 5: 1 The Structure of Landuse in Hassaheisa, 1980 
Functional use Name of Area Size (sq. m) 70 (1 ) 70 (2) 
Private Resid- Shargi 032368.75 
ence Awssat 120731.25 
Karima 086962.50 
Omda (part) 085000.00 
Mygouma 042000.00 
Arkweit 238200.00 
Jadida 099600.00 
Imtidad 106800.00 
Mazad 097012.50 
Fur 085000.00 
Wad el-Kamil 013125.00 
R. Res. W. /K. 161250.00 
R. Res. Shargi 018880.00 
Total 1186930.00 16.49 30.77 
Public Resid- Police 033762.50 
ence Omda (part) 006250.00 
Merkaz 004758.75 
Officials 041187.50 
Kambo 240500.00 
Gamalonat 161650.00 
Others 051674.25 
Total 539783.00 7.5 13.99 
Manufacturing N. Indust. Area 196500.00 
Industries & Light Ind. Area 050500.00 
Related Ginneries 1020390.00 
Total 1267390.00 17.61 32.86 
Trade & Related Suk of Town 026462.50 
Suk of Jadida 001250.00 
Suk of Mazad 027600.00 
Suk of Arkweit 017500.00 
Wood Mourada 009906.25 
Marisa Shops 009000.00 
Petrol Depots 015750.00 
Trad. Bakeries 004312.50 
Auto. Bakeries 004600.00 
Table Cont. 
r 
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Table 5: 1 Cont. 
Functional Use Name Of Area Size 70 (1) % (2)_ 
Trade (cont. ) Butcheries 001400.00 
Hotels 002900.00 
Durra Mourada 002587.50 
Animal Pound. 001575.00 
Total 114843.75 1.6 2.97 
Education 
Total 
Ahliya Int. Sch. 045500.00 
Girls Int. & Sec. 011750.00 
Girls Primary 1 006175.00 
Boys Primary 002587.00 
Girls Primary 2 002250.00 
Shaabiya School 011250.00 
Govt. Sec. Sch. 026406.25 
Mygouma Primary 005775.00 
Technical Sch. 218750.00 
Erkeweit Sch. 023500.00 
Imtidad Sch. 008000.00 
Fur School 006400.00 
Teachers Inst. 060500.00 
Mahalig School 006175.00 
Sec. Sch. Adm. 002400.00 
437418.75 6.1 11.34 
Health Services Civil Hospital 044256.25 
Erkeweit H. C. 010125.00 
Child Centre 001500.00 
Total 055 1.25 0.8 1.44 
Administrative & Post Office 001200.00 
Community Services Rates Office 002100.00 Local Govt. 003500.00 
Merkez (Police) 005000.00 
Rail Station 028125.00 
Agriculture 005625.00 
Labour & Service 002625.00 
Water & Elec. Co. 002500.00 
Mosques (4) 010500.00 
Other Govt. Dept 001800.00 
Total 062975.00 0.9 1.63 
Recreation & Open Space 087190.50 
Sports Town Stadium 021750.00 
Play Grounds 022500.00 
Clubs 002000.00 
Cinema 001925.00 
Park 051687.00 
Muolid Square 005400.00 
Total 191453.00 2.7 4.96 
Other Lands Reserve 124387.25 
Roads, stree is 3179038.00 
Cemetry 035000.00 
Total 32.46.4 'TT 
% (1), is total as percentage of tot al land area; % (2), total 
as a percentage of all land effectiv ely used in town. 
Total Town Area: 71 95100 sq. meters; Area effectively used: 
3856675 sq. metres= 53.6% of total l and in town. 
Source: Calculated from Map SSD Town s, T 3247,2513; Hassaheisa. 
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ure is striking. Table 5: 1 summarizes the situation in 1980. 
Privately-owned land has arisen from nil percent in 1900 to just 
over 40.0% in 1980, a rise which is probably typical of towns in 
the Sudan in general and those established by the colonial adm- 
inistration in particular. The following observations are of par- 
ticular significance: 
a) In the public sector (Government-owned land) which contains 
around 60.0% of total land, land use is largely confined to "soc- 
ial" services such as education, health, administration and sub- 
sidized housing (in Chapter 8I shall argue that ultimately these 
services are serving the particular private interests of capital 
accumulation in various ways). Where manufacturing is concerned, 
we shall later (cf. Chapter 6) see that public ownership is in 
fact of help and support to private owners engaged in accumulat- 
ion and that there is no case of public-owned property being used 
to generate surplus for the 'State'. 
b) Apart from the personal accommodation of owner-occupiers, land 
in the private sector is used almost entirely in activities with 
a very high profit turn-over (mainly commerce, housing and manuf- 
acturing). In this way, privatization of the town's lands does 
not resolve the problems of housing as the original intention was, 
but intensifies this problem in the course of its surplus-gener- 
ating use which conduced the development of the other process of 
commercialization to which we should turn now. 
THE PROCESS OF LAND COMMERCIALIZATION 
In order to appreciate the nature of the process of commer- 
cialization of land during the town's 
history, we must refer to 
the conditions which have allowed a 
high rate of turn-over in 
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land ownership in the private sector. 
15 
In the absence of these 
conditions, the commercial use of land would not have progressed 
as it has. The following conditions have been particularly impor- 
tant: 
1. Although the legal status of most of the lands occupied by 
private individuals was never fully secured- because the Govern- 
ment reserved the right to repossess them, especially leased and 
rented land which constituted the greater proportion- in practice 
the occupiers have never been deprived of their titles. 
16 
This 
has been so inspite of the fact that in many cases the 'qualif- 
ications' of particular groups 'entitling' them to land have 
changed appreciably through time-e. g. when poor low-paid workers 
have effectively moved out of their former socio-economic categ- 
ory. Nor has any allottee's move to transfer his 'rights' over 
land occupied ever been challenged, Security of occupancy has 
thus contributed to a situation which allowed and promoted the 
use-value attached to land to be transformed into exchange-value. 
The main reason for the government unwillingness or impotence to 
enforce more strictly its own regulations and policies in regard 
to land allocation and occupation was simply that groups interes- 
ted in maintaining the status quo had over time acquired too much 
political power to allow for such policies and regulations to be 
applied. The identification of these groups will emerge shortly 
in my analysis of the various aspects of the process of land 
commercialization. 
2. The circumstances which gave a positive stimulus to commerc- 
ialization were several and include: 
a) Compared to the difficulties and uncertainities surround- 
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ing capital accumulation in the main field of economic activity 
(i. e. trade), investment in urban land was very safe and constit- 
uted a secure way of safeguarding investors from the ravages of 
inflation which has been high throughout the main period of the 
town's growth. 
b) Since the mid-1930s, real estate (urban land in part- 
icular) was the only form of property acceptable to the commer- 
cial banks as security for loans made to individuals, and the 
role of the banks in financing internal trade has assumed ever 
increasing importance. 
c) From 1951 to 1964 in Hassaheisa (and even earlier in some 
other Sudanese towns), the right to participate in local government 
institutions was strictly restricted to rate-payers-i. e. to house- 
owners. 
17 
Thus the wealthy sections of the population (merchants 
in the case of Hassaheisa) were understandably axious to purchase 
houses not only for themselves, but also for members of their fam- 
ilies who were all potential voters. The importance of securing 
a hold on the local government council in the town for these 
wealthy sections is discussed in Chapter 8. 
d) With a steadily increasing population containing many 
recent comers seeking houses while often still ineligible for 
land allocations, houses soon acquired the power to generate very 
substantial incomes through rent. And houses soon proved to be 
a highly secure and profitable form of investment. In this conn- 
ection, it may be noted that most urban housing 
legislation has 
a strong bias in favour of the 'owners' at the expense of tenants, 
and this has a long history going back to the 
first legal document 
regulating the contractual relationship 
between 'owners' and ten- 
248 
ants prepared in 1910 by the Legal Secretary's Office, and appr- 
oved by the Committee of the Sudan Chamber of Commerce. 
18 
e) With a general increase in the severity of the housing 
problem, especially during the past twenty years, the, wealthy 
inhabitants of the town have become highly conscious of both the 
real and potential value of urban land- whether or not developed. 
Speculative transactions in the land market have now reached unprecedented 
levels and there is, in consequence, increasing concentration of 
land in the hands of fewer and fewer wealthy persons. 
THE PROCESS OF COMMERCIALIZATION: AN ILLUSTRATION 
The 
-various ways in. 
--which'- plots. of land. have been transf- 
erred within the private sector need to be illustrated in some 
detail if we are to appreciate how the process of commercializa- 
tion has developed over the years. I will thus present a number 
of cases selected to illustrate,. Lntei at-a, (a) the close relat- 
ionship between capital accumulation in trade and urban land, (b) 
the way in which the latter was derived from, and supported, the 
former and, (c) the manner in which kinship relations have, in 
situations of economic hardship for the poor, been manipulated to 
the benefit of those with the means to take advantage of the over- 
all social and legal positions governing property by serving as -a 
lubricant mitigating the whole process and its impact. 
(1) Cases I and II are drawn from the Shargi and Wassat resid- 
ential areas where granted lands were held on a system approxim- 
ating that of free-hold property (M. U1 Hu)L ). Most of the original 
occupiers were poor members of the Dubasin group subsequent to the 
out-movement of the wealthy elements-as explained earlier. There 
were frequent property transactions among them to the 
benefit of 
non-resident wealthy relatives. Case I 
illustrate the way in which 
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a piece of land might find its way into the hands of a wealthy pers- 
on-as a "solution" for a family problem arising out of an inheritance 
dispute. Case II is an example of a not uncommon situation in which 
a "sale'. ' advantageous to a wealthy person taken place to allow mem- 
bers of a poor family to move to, and build upon, a new plot of Gov- 
ernment-leased land in a "cheaper" peripheral area of the town while 
vacating an older plot in a more "expensive'' area nearer to the centre. 
CASE I: Wad Hamid was granted Plot No. 7 in Section 12 of the 
Shargi area in October, 1915, according to land certificate regis- 
tered under Title No. 74/1915. The area of the plot was 428 sq. 
meters. Wad Hamid died in the early 1950s and his plot was then 
divided between his heirs according to Islamic Sharria Law. Acc- 
ording to the court verdict No. 33/1954, issued on 20th March, 
1954, the plot was sub-divided and re-registered as follows: 
Amna (his wife), 53 sq. meters, Al-Tirifi (son) sold his share 
to his brother Hamid who also bought the share of his, sister Fat- 
ima and thus acquired 233 sq. meters, Abdel Bagi (son) got 93 sq. 
meters while Al-Risala (daughter) inherited 47. The remaining 12 
meters were reserved for marking out the limits between the diff- 
erent sub-divisions. Since Hamid could not afford to buy out all 
the shares of his siblings, and Al-Risala was married and moved 
to her husband's residence, a bitter dispute developed in the 
family (basically between Al-Risala and Abdel Bagi) about the use 
of their respective shares. Al-Tahir, a merchant and relative of 
the family, was then asked by the members of the family to buy 
the shares of all those who were in dispute as a way of elimin- 
ating the conflict. This eventually took place on 14th June, 1962 
when the land causing the dispute was re-registered in the name 
of Al-Tahir. 
CASE II: In 1915 Babiker was granted Plot No. 5 in Section 17 of 
the Wassat area. The plot was 830 sq. meters in area. Babiker re- 
registered 250 meters in the name of his eldest son when the lat- 
ter married in 1943, keeping the rest of the family on 580 sq. 
meters. Babiker had six other sons and two daughters, and three 
of the former married and lived with their wives on their father's 
plot. When Babiker died in 1963, the siblings 
did not divide the 
plot among themselves. In 1970, however, they applied 
for four 
plots in Imtidad where 
land was being distributed on lease. Only 
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two plots of 400 sq. meters each were allocated to them- Plots 
76 and 169- in the names of Hassan and Ali (the eldest sons). 
Following the allotment, however, they realized that their sav- 
ings were insufficient to finance the buildings required. As 
they did not have access to formal credit, they sought informal 
help within their network of relatives. They approached a relat- 
ive and 'close friend' of the family- Latif, a merchant- and 
struck a deal with him. He rejected any suggestion of financing 
them on formal credit terms, but agreed to buy the 580 sq. meters 
of the old plot plus 200 meters which made up half Plot No. 76. 
Using Latif's money and building materials from the old demolished 
plot, the siblings erected a "reasonable and decent" dwelling on 
Plot 169 and the remaining half of No. 76, and were "grateful for 
Latif's generous help" as they put it. 
(2) Cases III and IV below illustrate some of theýways in which the 
wealthier members of the community have been able to take advant- 
age of the periodical public auctions of land in the market, parts 
of Wassat, Omda and Mazad areas, while the poor sections of the 
population were always fettered by their financial inability to 
make use here or-even to participate. 
CASE III: I mentioned earlier that 64 sites were auctioned in 1915 
for shops in the market. At that time, the Omda of the settlement 
along with a few Sheikhs of the nearby villages and tribal groups 
were able to purchase the sites. The Omda and his family bought 
21 sites, the traders 9, and the sheikhs 34. The buyers from the- 
se three groups were all at that period virtually the only people 
with access to the financial resources necessary for land acquis- 
ition. The Omda and the sheikhs were receivinga percentage of the 
taxes collected from their respective populations and the traders 
were able to utilize their profits. 
CASE IV: More recently, in 1953,124 plots were auctioned in 
Omda residential quarter. Much the -same occurred as 
in 1915 al- 
though in this occasion the status of the buyers reflected the 
changing profile of wealth and power 
in the community. As seen 
in Chapter 4, and as will be discussed further in Chapter 
8, the 
merchants had by then 
begun to thrust their way towards the apex 
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of the pyramid of wealth and power, while the traditionally weal- 
thy and powerful native tribal administrators (in the town as well 
as in the countryside) had already lost considerable ground as a 
result of the establishment of local government administrative 
units on the one hand and, on the other, of the exemption of the 
population in the district from most taxes. The consequent changes 
in the status of those who were successful at the auctions are 
clearly reflected in the following table. 
Table 5: 2 
of Bu No. of Plots Percent 
erchants with 1 plot each 39 31.5 
Merchants with more than 1 plot 23 18.5 
ear-by villages (traders mainly) 22 17.7 
Members of the Omda's family 16 12.9 
Others 24- 19.4 
Total 124 100.0 
Distribution of Purchased Plots in Omda Area 
Between the Various Groups As in 1953 
Source: Files in the Rates Office, Hassaheisa Town. 
(3) Cases V and VI, moreover, are drawn from Mygouma, Jadida 
and Fur areas where rented lands had originally been allocated to 
the poorer sections of the population as Native Lodging Areas. Over 
the past twenty years, however, there have beery----- intensive and 
speculative transactions here, partly as a result-of the inclusion 
of these areas in the town boundaries in 1960. No steps had been 
taken to check the transfer of land into the hands of the wealthy 
speculators with the result that as land values rose in response 
to actual or artificial increases in populations, many transact- 
ions took place. In the immediate particular cases, these trans- 
actions served the interests of both the 'sellers' and 
'buyers', 
but as part of a general process they contributed both to the 
accumulation of wealth in limited hands and to the growth and con- 
solidation of a 'new' community in which 
land 'ownership' was acq- 
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uiring fresh significance. Both cases are illustrations of the 
kind of immediate concerns and interests which led the poorer 
members of the community to )! eJld their plots to the wealthier. 
CASE V: The 'sale' of a rented plot sometimes arises out of a 
poor family's need to meet an outstanding debt. When the family 
of a low-income worker has incurred a sizeable debt there will 
normally be no way in which this can ever be met without the dis- 
posal of the family's only valuable asset, namely land. This was 
the position in which Abdulla Hassan's family found itself. Abd- 
ulla first came to Hassaheisa from Argi village in the Northern 
Province in 1946. In 1949 he found a regular permanent job in 
the council as a worker in the Town Health Bureau. When the Gov- 
ernment distributed the land of Mygouma in 1951, Abdulla was all- 
otted a plot of 300 sq. meters on rent, where he built a small 
house of mud and sun-burnt bricks. Since then, his family has 
grown considerably and now consists of 8 members: himself and 
wife, one son and five daughters. Between 1972 and 1975 he was 
prevented by illness from working regularly and he received only 
half his basic salary. During this period, he began to borrow 
money for both medical treatment and family sustenance. In Aug- 
ust 1975, however, he was eventually sacked from his job and 
received ES. 450 in gratuity. His 19 year-old son was by then 
working as teacher in an elementary school, but the f amily, 's debts 
were mounting and in June 1977 they 'sold' their house and the 
plot of land (No. 13, Section 2) to Al-Nour (a merchant and 
urban-property owner) for ES. 4000. They met their debts of about 
ES 2700 and the remaining sum of money was used by Abdulla to 
start trading in a kiosk. At the same time, the family moved to 
a smaller rented house in Imtidad where they pay E. S. 11 per 
month. 
CASE VI: Abbakar Hussein came to Hassaheisa in 1950 and got a job 
with the Social Services Department of the Sudan Gezira Board. 
Initially he was living in a house owned by the Board, but in 
1954 he was allotted Plot No. 65, Block 89, in the Fur area. He 
brought his family from Um-Kaddada in Western Sudan to join him 
in 1956. His two daughters and three sons (all born in Hassäheisa) 
attended different schools in the town. In 1978 Abbakar died; and 
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though his family received some money from the Board, they dec- 
ided, or more accurately, were persuaded to sell their house to 
Mr. Latif, the merchant referred to earlier, for only ES 3000. 
The members of the family subsequently moved to Um-Kaddada in 
1979 to live with their relatives. 
Cases VII, VIII and IX, moreover, are examples drawn from 
areas where government land was leased from 1970 onwards. In gen- 
eral terms, the process of commercialization is seen to be oper- 
ating in an even more intensive and 'articulated way than we 
have so far illustrated. It may well be that the rapid rate of 
transfer and of polarization in relation to leased lands is due 
to the fact that leasing was first undertaken with speculative 
interests. Though this is difficult to prove empirically, it is 
certainly true that the wealthier sections of the population have 
benefited most despite the fact that leasing was initially inten- 
ded, at least according to the formal government statements, as a 
measure to provide housing areas for those with limited incomes. 
The way in which the wealthier persons have taken advantage of 
opportunities arising over leased lands is illustrated by the 
following cases. 
CASE VII: Not uncommonly, a wealthy person applies for several 
plots through his relatives (sons, parents, brothers, etc. ) who 
are not necessarily entitled to leases, but who benefit from the 
influential contacts in the Council by the wealthy person who is 
providing them. The following is a case in point. Ismail, Deputy 
Chairman of the Town Coucil and a merchant in the market, lives 
in Fur area in his 'own' house. In 1976, he applied for, and was 
awarded, a lease for a plot of land in Block 
91 of Arkweit (the 
southern extension) area in the name of 
his son, Hassan, who was 
in Saudi Arabia since 1975. He then persuaded his cousin Mohammed 
Adam to apply for two plots, one in the latter's name, the other 
in the name Iof Mohammad's son. Both applications were successful. 
ýýýý 
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The terms of the 'deal' were such that Ismail was helping Mohamed, 
who up to that time lived in a rented house, to acquire property 
on the condition that the latter would agree to sell the second 
plot, of Mohamed's son, to Ismail. Ismail thus acquired Plot No. 
195 in the name of his son, Hassan, and Plot No. 252 through pur- 
chase from Mohamed's son, while Mohamed acquired Plot No. 169. 
Case VIII: In other cases, leased land has been acquired through 
a process of gradual "purchase". This may happen when an original 
leaseholder is unable to finance building on his land from his own 
resources. In the absence of any formal system of building credit, 
leaseholder then has one option only which is to seek credit from 
informal sources, normally merchants, who are usually most willing 
to make advances because they know that chances of the leaseholder 
ever repaying his debt are uncertain. In due course, the leasehol- 
der often finds himself under pressure to "sell" his land in order 
to make the repayment. The following is a factual case: 
Ali Abdel Majid, a worker on Sudan Rail since 1957, had a family 
of seven living in a one-bed-roomed house, owned by Sudan Rail and 
adjacent to the Station. In 1971 he applied for, and was granted 
a plot in Imtidad area. He used up all his savings to buy a small 
fraction of the total amount of building materials necessary to 
build a small humble house and then began to seek credit for the 
rest. Mr Yousif, a merchant and a relative, readily made him a 
loan and began to build the house in 1972. With sharp rises both 
in the costs of materials and in the wages of builders, however, 
it was soon apparent that the initial loan would be quite insuff- 
icient. In 1973 he attained a further loan, again from Yousif, 
but in due course this again fell short of the total required 
especially for the roof of the house. In 1974, Ali again approached 
Yousif who, however, was either unable or unwilling to make fur- 
ther advance saying that he had already used all his available 
finances for an important commercial deal in Khartoum. Ali again 
approached Yousif on several further occasions, but was refused 
each time with different aplogies. Meanwhile he continued to live 
in the house provided by Sudan Rail though this was most inadeq- 
uate. In due course it became apparent to him that he would never 
complete his new house, especially in view of the high rate of in- 
flation in the country as a whole. Thus when Yousif put it to Ali 
that he (Yousif) was prepared to help 
him (Ali) by buying the 
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house under construction, deducting the loan and paying out the 
balance, Ali accepted immediately. Consequently, Plot No. 82, Block 
88, Imtidad area, is now leased to Yousif, rather than to All, the 
original leaseholder. 
Case IX: Land speculators also acquire land through direct ''purch- 
ase" from leaseholders who do not wish or not able to keep their 
plots for extraneous non-financial reasons. This is the case, for 
example, when a person who is not eligible for a plot is allocated 
one corruptly, and then naturally wishes to get rid of it. Or, in 
another situation, a person who is eligible to hold a plot may sim- 
ply not wish to build there. He is therefore willing to "sell" that 
plot in order to have the price to "buy" elsewhere or for other 
purpose. This was the position with Abdul-Sallam- a petty trader 
and resident of Hassaheisa since 1951. He and his family of ten mem- 
bers lived in a rented house in Wassat area for many years. In 1975 
he applied for a leased plot and was allocated Plot No. 46, Block 
92, in Arkweit area. Since the rent for his accommodation was rel- 
atively low (only ES 12 per month) he had no intention of moving 
and he immediately sold the plot to Abdel-Rahim (a merchant) using 
the money to further his (Abdel-Sallam) own trading activities. 
In addition to the cases listed above, it is not uncommon for 
persons to acquire land with the help, and at the instigation, of 
influential political patrons in the Council, and for the land to be 
subsequently sold to such patron. We shall encounter such cases in 
Chapter 8 on the local politics of the Town Council. 
To depict the degree of concentration of land in fewer and 
fewer hands, I collected full information on the holdings of eight 
"well known" land owners in the town. It must be stated clearly 
that I collected the information about them on the bases of general 
knowledge of their property in the town community. My reasons 
for 
adopting this procedure were two. Firstly, there 
is systematic 
classified registry of urban 
land ownership in the names of the real 
owners because the 
big owners tend not to register all their lands 
in their own names. Instead, they use the names of wives, sons, 
daug- 
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hters, parents, etc. as a precaution against the possible confisc- 
ation of property by the courts in the event of bankruptcy (usually 
in commerce). Secondly, I often found it difficult, and even imposs- 
ible, to obtain reliable data from owners through interviews. Almost 
all of them were unwilling to be questioned in detail and in some 
cases gave information which I knew to be misleading. I therefore 
abandoned my initial attempts to gather such data on a random sample 
basis. The information I give is therefore illustrative rather than 
strictly representative. 
After selecting eight "well-known owners", I set about collect- 
ing the names of all their dependents and and close relatives from 
key informants. This is a considerable task in a Sudanese community. 
Not only it is the practice to keep women's names confidential to 
families, but of course husbands and wives do not share the same 
surname. Despite these difficulties, I compiled lists which I have 
reasons to believe are accurate. The full lists of relatives and 
dependents of the eight owners were then checked against the files 
of registered town lands in the Rates Office. Table 5: 3 gives the 
numbers of plots in different areas "owned" by each of the eight 
owners whether as "freehold", rented, or on lease. 
The following observations may be made on this table together 
with Table 5: 4 which is based on my own survey of 410 households in 
different areas of the town: 
(1) The rich of Hassaheisa town are not only free of the housing 
problems which the poor have to suffer but they effectively control 
the town's property market. 
(2) Land and property has increasingly geared to the generation of 
profits and to capital formation and accumulation. 
(3) The main form of profit, beside occasional speculation, comes 
from the widespread practice of renting. That is why, as shown in 
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Table 5: 4 Housing Occupancy in Hassaheisa, 1980 
Area Owner-Occupier Tenants Free Houses2 Average Rent 
No. 7o No. % No. 7o per House3 
Omda 9 64.3 4 28.6 1 7.1 30 
Karima 12 57.1 9 42.91 - - 25 
M gou:: ia 5 41.7 7 58.3 - - 12 
Shar i 13 68.4 5 26.3 1 5.3 10 
Awssat 42 62.7 22 32.8 1 1.5 20 
Mazad 20 64.5 11 35.5 - - 15 
Imtidad 23 63.9 13 36.1 - - 12 
Jadida 35 71.4 14 28.6 - - 13 
Fur 21 56.8 16 43.2 - - 15 
Kambo - - - - 86 100.0 - 
Wad Kamil 15 100.0 - - - - - 
Other Areas - - 2 9.6 19 90.4 10 
Total of Sam 1 195 48.2 103 25.4 107 26.4 
(1) Owner-occupier houses includes 
government-leased sites. 
houses on free-hold as well as 
(2) Free housing is provided by Sudan Government- usually to senior 
government officials, but may also be for unskilled workers as in 
the case of Kambo area in Hassaheisa. 
(3) The average rent (calculated for rented houses only) is for a 
calendar month (in Sudanese Pounds). 
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Table 5: 4, only 48% of householders dwell in their own houses (free- 
hold, leased, or rented from the government), while some 25% are 
rent payers. This is so despite all political pronouncement by the 
Town Council concerning the "eradication of the housing problem". 
As the Table shows, the situation is worst in the Suta area where 
small traders often pay relatively high rents in addition to init- 
ial payments to those who leave the site and which they succeed 
(Khito-RijAf). As was shown in the previous Chapter, only 18.1% 
of traders own shops and 69.4% rent them, while 12.5% hold them 
under special arrangements with the Council. 
CONCLUSION: 
The "greed" for urban land, and the consequent "land problem", 
in Hassaheisa and, I believe, more generally in urban Sudan, orig- 
inated through the specific mode of capital accumulation engened- 
ered by the imposition of the colonial and neo-colonial capitalist 
economy. Those who have some capital and are anxious to accumulate 
more (usually merchants), have had good opportunities to invest 
their capital in land as an auxiZiary source of profit, and this 
has been facilitated by the urban land policies_pursued by the 
colonial and neo-colonial states. Such merchants as were able to 
invest in urban land, saw this as a way of providing a hedge against 
the insecurities inherent in their main sphere of accumulation, 
namely commerce. In this way, the processes of privatization (the 
transfer of public land to private ownership), and of commerciaZ- 
S 
ization (the transformation of land use values into exchange values) 
have become essential aspects of the reproduction of the main pro- 
cess of commercial capital accumulation 
in trade. From the point 
of view of the individual merchant, the possibility of acquiring a 
stake in urban property was often seen as a 
helpful supplement to 
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main concern of pursuing capital accumulation through commerce. 
Thus he is kept content and satisfied with his "minimum" share in 
trade profits. 
_ýi 
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V 
1. Cf. Awad, M. H., 1971, pp. 212-28; and Warburg, G., 1971, 
pp. 155-164; and Ahmed, A. M., 1982. 
2. As it was the case in Suakin and Khartoum. The case of Khartoum is illustrated in Stevenson, R. C, 1966, pp. 1-35. 
3. For example, Gover-General Gordon's evacuation of Khartoum 
as pointed by Mclean, W. H., 1911, pp. 577-8. 
4. Cf. E1-Bushra, E., 1971, pp. 14-17. 
5. The Ordinance had been originally issued in Sudan Gazette, 
No. 2,27th May 1899, and amended in Sudan Gazette, No. 26 
ist August 1901. 
6. The application of the Ordinance was later extended to other 
towns in Sudan, e. g. Kassala, Al-Gadarif, Eddueim, and Al- 
OBeid in 1904/ 
7. Sudan Gazette, No. 33, March 1902. 
8. A Governor-General Proclamation, Sudan Gazette, No. 30, 
1st December, 1901, pp. 70-2. 
9. See Appendix No. 4 for a full text of a typical Land Certi- 
ficate in Hassaheisa, obtained from Land Registration Office. 
10. Sudan Gazette, No. 79,1st August 1905, pp. 351-60. 
11. A recorded interview with Mr. Yousif Al-Amin Iheimir on 
5th November, 1980, Hassaheisa. 
12. This situation was reported with apparent "pleasure" by the 
District Commissioner, Northern Gezira, Annual Report, 1937 
Sudan Archives, Durham, Box 214/3, p. 8. -ý'{. " 
13. Since 1951, and as a result of the Local Government Ordin- 
ance of 1951, the local Town Council in Hassaheisa was re- 
cognized as "a corporate body of perpetual existence", with 
its own financial resources, and power to maintain its own 
staff, to provide important local services, to make and ex- 
ecute policies, and to pass laws of local application. Mer- 
chant was always dominant in the Council, see Chapter 8. 
14. Sudan Gazette, No. 225,23rd November 1912, pp. 700-3. 
15. Throughout this chapter, I refer to the "ownership" of land 
ro cover both legal ownership and secure occupation- tant- 
amount to ownership- through leasing and renting. 
16. There was only one significant exception to this, that of 
the recent eviction of a Fellata resident group and of 
Merrisa (Local beer) shops from their respective areas with 
the use of the government's powers of eviction. A more det- 
ailed analysis of this case is provided in Chapter 
8. 
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17. Mahmoud, F. B., 1978, p. 138. 
18. The full text of this was "published for the information 
of all persons who may wish to us. e it", in Sudan Gazette, 
No. 76, June 1910, pp. 291-2. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I focus on the analysis of those aspects of 
the town's economy where capital accumulation has taken place 
through the whole or partial manufacturing of particular commodit- 
ies whether on on a large or small scale. For the purpose of 
discussion I have classified firms as large or small according to 
the number of workers they employed- 20 or more and less than 
20 respectively. 
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURE 
Contrary to the situation in many parts of the Sudan', 
"modern manufacturing" industry (i. e. industry based on factory 
production) had begun early in this century in the case of Hass- 
aheisa. The reason for this is that, prior to World War II British 
colonial policy was directed mainly to the creation of an export- 
oriented economy based solely on primary agricultural products 
and, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the Gezira Scheme was set up 
in 1925 specially to produce cotton for export; and although the 
intention clearly was that the Sudan should remain a large "agri- 
cultural farm", the intensive development of cotton production in 
the Gezira had important industrial side-effects in the region. 
Thus the establishment of cotton-ginning factories close to the 
area of cotton cultivation marked the first appearance of modern 
industry anywhere in the Sudan. During the years 1928-29 the con- 
cession company, Sudan Plantation Syndicate, established four 
ginning factories in Hassaheisa, each consisting of eighty gins. 
These factories were soon ginning about half of the cotton prod- 
uced in the whole area of the Gezira Scheme. 
Ginning simply consists of "the removal of cotton seed from 
its woolly outer covering of cotton fibre, so that it can be 
spun into yarn, and eventually woven into cloth". 
2 As such, it 
264 
never developed beyond its primary nature of being essentially 
a preparatory processing operation necessary for easy freight 
and handling. At present, however, there are seven ginning fact- 
ories in Hassaheisa, all of which nationalized in 1950 together 
with the whole Gezira Scheme. But these factories, whether oper- 
ating under the Concession Company or, later, under the Sudan 
Gezira Board - which is a public corporation- have played a pro- 
minent role in the process of private capital accumulation thro- 
ugh the contractor-worker arrangements by which labour for the 
factories was, and still is, hired and ultimately exploited. 
(These arrangements are discussed in the course of this chapter). 
The outbreak of the World War II provided the first chance 
for the development of privately owned manufacturing industries 
in the Sudan. When certain manufactured goods could no longer be 
imported owing to the conditions of war, it was considered nec- 
essary to ensure a local supply. Thus the government's War Supply 
Department was in 1942 required to set up a 
Local Industries Investigation Committee to 
advise on what industries should be established 
... that could utilize 
local raw materials and 
so relieve the country of the need to rely on 
imports. 
3 
In consequence, some very small industrial enterprises were 
established in the country; in Hassaheisa they included oil-pres- 
sers, mineral water-bottling and ice making plants, and wood work- 
shops. When importation was resumed after the end of the War, 
however, these industries were unable to withstand the competit- 
ion of imported goods. As a result, most of these establishments 
closed down between 1948 and 
1950 and similar firms did not re- 
4 
open for at least 20 years. 
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In the intervening period, especially after 1955, some 
repair work-shops were established in the Light Industrial Area 
of Hassaheisa4, which was in that year established and distrib- 
uted by the town's administration to the south of the market. It 
was mainly an area of small workshops (blacksmiths, mechanics, 
carpenters, etc. ) originally performing various repairs of metal 
items, motor cars, agricultural machinery, and wood furniture. 
During the past ten years, however, these firms began to produce 
commodities as well (e. g. the metal and wood workshops have begun 
to produce items such as chairs, tables, doors, windows, and beds 
for the market). I shall shortly analyse the pattern of accumul- 
ation in this area of manufacturing. 
On the other hand it was only in the mid to late 1970s that 
large scale manufacturing industries began to operate in Hassah- 
eisa as a sphere of capital accumulation and investment and of 
labour employment by private investors. While one large factory 
was established in public ownership- the Friendship Textile Fact- 
ory erected in 1976 with Chinese aid to manufacture Gezir cotton 
and with a capacity of 16 million metres per year- eight privat- 
ely owned factories were established in the Northern Industrial 
Area of the town for the manufacture of several commodities (min- 
eral water and ice, vegetable oil, yeast, and bread). In addit- 
ion, two large-scale workshops for the repair and service of 
agricultural machinery were opened with private capital. 
PATTERNS OF ACCUMULATION-INDUSTRY 
In this section I briefly outline the different patterns 
of accumulation in each of the' several industrial 
firms. The main 
purpose, in addition to the general aim of characterizing the 
nature of manufacturing industry 
in the town, is to identify the 
specific historical configuration of 
industry as a form of capi- 
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tal accumulation in a Sudanese urban setting. 
ustry in both public and private sectors. 
(1) The Public Sector 
(a) Hassaheisa Cotton Ginneries: 
I dewell on ind- 
The ginneries had originally been established in 1927/28 
by the British-owned Sudan Plantation Syndicate. The need for 
centralized processing of cotton prior to export was the main 
reason for this initiative. The machines were financed by company 
and imported from Britain. The senior supervisory and skilled 
jobs (i. e. administrators, engineers, cotton classifiers, acc- 
ountants, etc. ) were exclusively filled by foreigners5, and this 
continued even after nationalization in 1950. The labour force 
was, and still is, classified into the following different cate- 
gor ie s 
(i) Labour employed by the Syndicate (later the Board) which in- 
cludes labour employed directly in the ginning factories. This 
labour force is sub-divided into three categories6: 
Permanent: those members of personnel whose work is of such a nat- 
ure that they have to be employed continuously (e. g. engineers); 
they are all people with specialized skills and know how and in 
Hassaheisa in very recent years they have increasingly been of 
Northern Province origins, though they used to be foreigners. 
Semi-Permanent: those whose work is of such a nature that they 
need to be laid off for periods of time in excess of their nor- 
mal leave but whose services the management wishes to retain (e. g. 
factory carpenters, machine operators, and greasers). 
Seasonal: those who are normally employed for 3-4 months during 
cotton movements at factories (e. g. cotton receivers, weighers, 
doorkeepers, yardkeepers, markers, and ghaffirs). 
The total number of this labour force is currently 690 workers. 
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(ii) Labour Employed by Contractors: 
This is all seasonal labour employed by ginning contract- 
ors for largely unskilled jobs both outside and inside the fact- 
ories. Usually the management asks a contractor to provide labour 
to perform such work at the factory site. The contractor is paid 
according to an agreed rate per kantar of ginned cotton. The con- 
tractor's responsibility includes the recruitment, transport to 
the work site, as well as the supervision of such labour. His ult- 
imate interests (to allow accumulation to take place) depends on 
his ability to depress the costs of the labour force (e. g. wages, 
transport, supervision costs) as much as possible and to achieve 
the highest possible productivity. 
Outside the factories the factories, these workers are load- 
ers and off-loaders, entry gang workers, hod porters, seed room 
porters, and bale weighing porters, (on average 267 workers per 
factory); inside the factories they work as gin feeders and do 
other miscellaneous jobs (on average 309 workers per factory). 
Thus the contractor controls (and in effect exploits) over 4000 
workers at the seven factories situated in Hassaheisa. The maj- 
ority of outside workers are normally recruited from the Sennar 
and Singa Districts (south of the Gezira Province), while others 
come from the Gedarif, Kosti, Um-Rwaba and E1-Obeid Districts. 
Most of these workers are Fellata (Nigerians), Taisha and Bagg- 
of Western Sudan. Initially they used to return to their res- ara 
pective 
}. I 
districts after the ginning season at the expense of the 
contractor, but since 1940 certain groups have been persuaded to 
stay permanently in the residential camps established 
by the Syn- 
dicate, and have been given pieces of land in the irrigated area 
for durra cultivation. This was prompted by two reasons; first 
? 
ýýý 
268 
to save the contractor the transportation expenses and depressing 
the costs of labour, and second to use this labour- Fellata in 
particular- during the off-season in loading cotton seeds for 
exportation and other casual jobs. Most of the inside workers, 
where jobs expose them to the most health hazards, are given usu- 
ally to Fellatta or migrants recruited annually from Eritrea. 
To enhance the contractor's opportunities for accumulation, 
the Syndicate (and later the Board) have subsidized the costs of 
labour reproduction through the provision of free "housing" and 
free water supply and two meals (lunch and dinner) and morning 
and evening tea daily during the ginning season. 
8 
The contractor/ 
labour relationship is a one of direct and open exploitation and 
extraction of surpluses necessary for further accumulation which 
is only possible by virtue of the existence of the ginneries. To 
substantiate this assertion, I dwell in some detail on arrange- 
ments for the season 1980/81, and then examine the finances of 
the contractor in the previous four seasons for comparison. 
When the management called for tenders for the provison of 
labour for the ginning of the cotton crop of the season 1980/81, 
Mr. Abdel Azim Saeid and Abdel Khalig won the contract. They were 
both prominent merchants. Their considerable financial ability 
was clearly a major factor in gaining the contract. Their bid was 
for a contract valued at ES 0.680 per kantar and this was accep- 
ted. The crop of this season was particularly low9, and the total 
amount ginned was only 542273.14 kantars giving a return of ES 
368,745.735 (i. e. 542,273.14 kantars multiplied by ES 0.680). The 
daily wages paid ranged from ES 0.900 to ES 1.250, with an aver- 
age of ES 1.0 per day per worker. As the normal season 
lasts 3 
to 4 months, we may calculate on the basis on 120 working days, 
giving a total wage bill of ES 48,384.000 
(i. e. 120 days multi- 
plied by 4032 workers multiplied 
by ES 1.000). The gross profit 
left to the contractors would thus have been ES 320361 from which 
they would have been expected to pay the stipulated Business Pro- 
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fit Tax (though this can usually be evaded either partially or 
wholly), the cost of labour transport (which has been drastically 
cut down during the past fifteen years as more workers have been 
accommodated in the Board's residential area), and the supervis- 
ion costs which are usually kept low by using ordinary workers 
in supervising capacities, and also by asking them to do much of 
the recruiting in reward for relatively higher wages thus absorb- 
ing these costs in the differential structure of wages. 
The following Table gives comparable data for the seasons 
1976/77 to 1980/81. Column (1) gives the total amount of cotton 
actually ginned and processed each year in kantars; Column (2) 
shows the bid value per kantar agreed by the contractors to prov- 
ide the labour; column (3) the approximate sums actually received 
by the contractors; and column (4) the average daily payment to 
each worker during the ginning season. The total wages paid may 
therefore be arrived at by multiplying the average daily wage by 
the normal length of period (up to 120 days) and by the total max- 
imum number of workers (say, 4032) per season. 
Table 6: 1 Proceeds to Ginning Contractors, 1976-1981 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Season Ginned Cotton Bid Value per Proceeds to Average Daily 
in Kantars Kantar (ES) Contractor wage per worker 
(£S) 
1976/77 875,003.76 0.350 306,251.3 0.340 
1977/78 1100,346.14 0.420 462,145.4 0.460 
1978/79 825,264.76 0.520 429,137.7 0.680 
1979/80 707,876.81 0.650 460,119.9 0.810 
1980/81 542,273.14 0.680 368,745.7 1.000 
Source: V arious files for different years in Hassaheisa Ginning 
Factories 
Saeid, a 
Administrative 
clerk at this of 
Office (I 
fice, who 
am indebted to 
identified and 
Mr Rashid Hamza 
provided the 
files). 
As the Table shows, the operation has consistently been pro- 
fitable. Significantly, these contracts for ginning- labour used to be 
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exclusively awarded to foreign commercial business firms, especially 
during the period of the Syndicate administration. The most reput- 
able of such firms were Alexandre Saphidly, Petro Steridons and 
William Ferwa. After Independence in 1956, however, some local busi- 
nessmen began to win contracts (e. g. Abdel Rahim Ahmed, Ahmed Awad 
Sid, E1-Jack Omran, Sadik al-Faki and Mohammed Salih Jirays). The 
names in both groups are mainly of urban merchants, and all treated 
the activity in a mercantilist fashion: they 'bought' the labour 
power of the migrant workers at the lowest possible price (wages) 
and 'sold' this labour to the Syndicate or the Board at a higher 
price (the contract value) whereby they realized a 'profit' (the 
surpluses appropriated) that enhanced the general process of cap- 
ital accumulation. 
(b) The Friendship TextiZe Factory: 
Using a loan of LS 19 millions from the People's Republic of 
China, the Government of Sudan, through the Public Corporation for 
Industrial Production, imported, built and equipped a large factory 
in Hassaheisa in 1976. The factory benefited from Chinese technical 
help and was designed to spin and weave a substantial part of the 
Gezira cotton crop. The factory has a capacity-to produce 
16 million 
meters of treated fabrics, but so far it achieved only 
60% of its 
maximum capacity. The factory employs 1500 permanent and 
400 casual 
workers in the different sections and phases of 
its production pro- 
cess; and the labour force is organized into two working shifts 
(morning and evening) of eight hours each. A considerable section 
of the working force (some 500) was recruited 
from near-by villages. 
The factory owns a fleet of 10 buses and hires a 
further 12 to 
transport the workers daily and 
between shifts from their places of 
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of residence ( whether in the town or in near-by villages) to the 
factory site and back. It may also worth noting that about 300 of 
the workers are women.. 
As State-owned enterprise, the factory transfers systematic- 
ally its surpluses to the central government whenever it realizes 
any. The factory's management has little or no knowledge of various 
aspects of local reinvestment, expansion and promotion. 
10 
Neverthe- 
less the process of private capital accumulation at the town level 
benefits in a number of ways. In addition to the general increase 
in the effective demand for various commodities and services result- 
ing from incomes out of employment in the factory, transport contr- 
acts provided a considerable source for profiteering. This was, and 
continues to be, particularly true in the light of the fact that 
most of the factory's buses (6) are presently virtually defunct. 
Thus during my stay there in 1980 there were 18 private buses hired 
by the factory management at an average daily charge of LS 30.000. 
Another way of how this public venture boosts private capital acc- 
umulation is seen in the opportunities it provided to investors in 
the building and housing sectors. Most of the vacant lands of the 
near-by village of Al-Sadaga (Friendship) have been bought by some 
Hassaheisa merchants and houses were built on them to provide acc- 
ommodation if or tenants brought. in. by the: f actory. Chances of accumul at- 
ion are also enhanced by the fact that this residential area, though 
only separated by a road from the town, is officially considered 
outside the boundaries of the town. (i. e. part of a village under 
the administration of Wad Habouba Rural 
Council) and thus building, 
letting and all incomes derived therefrom are 
legally immune from 
urban taxation and 
fees. 
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2. THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
As explained in Chapter Four, private investments in industry 
are seen by those who enter into them as one way out of the stagn- 
ant, and even declining, rate of commercial capital accumulation 
in trade in Hassaheisa. The town has thus become a locale of a nuber 
of private industrial firms, both small and large scale. 
(a) SmaZZ-ScaZe Industry 
This category includes a number of workshops producing various 
household items such as furniture and doors. There were at the time 
of the field study 62 workshops producing metal goods and 13 prod- 
ucing wood goods. They are normally organized to cater for both 
commodity production and for individual orders. Almost all the 
materials (e. g. metal and wood sheets, bolts, paints, welding elec- 
trodes, glue, and other finishing materials) are imported from 
foreign sources, as are nearly all the equipment and implements 
(e. g. planes, hammers, screw-drivers, saws, drills, paint brushes 
and other engineering accessories). 
The average size of the labour force per workshop is five. 
Individual workers are usually recruited as apprentices, but are 
often relatives of the owners. Thus they receive very low wages; 
usually little more than is required to cover their barest living 
costs (Shaghat-BL-Batnu). The wole production process is organized 
in such a manner as to allocate these workers crude manual tasks, 
and the owner of a workshop as a master (Uzta; Mu'atLm) is in eff- 
ect also a kind of team leader and general manager. Owners of work- 
shops usually perform all the technical work 
invovled in production 
as well as all supervisory and organizational 
functions of the act- 
ual job. In principle, owners are generally expected 
to transmit 
their skills to the workers and to guide them 
into establishing 
their own independent workshops, but in practice this 
is seldom the 
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case and my data have led me to the following conclusions: 
(a) In spite of the increasing demand for the products of these work- 
shops, the rate of establishment of new ones has declined over the 
past twenty years. 
(b) Thus, fewer and fewer workers have been able to benefit from 
their status as apprentices to establish their own independent busin- 
esses. This is in part due to the soaring prices of equipment and 
materials so that the initial capital sums have risen very appreci- 
ably. 
(c) The periods of apprenticeship have therefore become longer and 
the worker have acquired greater skill. Yet, given the difficulties 
of extricating themselves from their positions, they are being ass- 
igned jobs with more technical content than in earlier times, while 
the owners increasingly devote themselves to purely managerial roles. 
There has thus developed a new pattern of relationship where the own- 
er is decreasingly the Mualim, (the teacher) of the apprentice, and 
increasingly a capitalist-manager presiding over a waged labour force. 
(d) Concomitantly, the workshop is loosing its earlier character as 
a family enterprise and is being transformed into an essentially 
surplus-generating economic unit-i. e. a capitalist establishment in 
which the rate of realizable surplus depends increasingly on the exp- 
ansion of profit-making base. All these changes are accompanied, as 
expected, by tendencies to import more equipment and labour saving 
machines, and by increasing and almost exclusive dependence on train- 
ed and highly skilled labour. 
The following case-chosen from many similar cases- illustrates 
in some detail several of the points made above. 
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Mr El-Fatih was born in a near-by village in 1931 and educated 
at Messellamia elementary school. He first worked with his father 
who was a tenant in the Gezira Scheme and a village shop-keeper. His 
father owned some agricultural tractor in whose operation and maint- 
enance El-Fatih showed considerable interest. In 1956, El-Fatih moved 
to Hassaheisa where his father established a shop trading in agric- 
ultural machinery spare-parts. El-Fatih's main work in the shop, 
beside general management, was to fit the spare-parts. In due course 
he acquired basic skills as a tuner and he thus began to adapt and 
even to manufacture simple spare-parts.. At this point the shop began 
to be transformed gradually into a workshop. By 1965 El-Fatih was 
employing a younger brother and three more apprentices who all came 
from Messallamia. In 1971 El-Fatih was in a position to buy new equi- 
pment and to employ three more workers. At this point of time he 
began to adapt his workshop for the production of metal goods such 
as doors, windows and household furniture, though all production was 
still for order by individual customers. In 1973, however, and with 
the rising demand for such goods, he bought the neighbouring shop 
and more electric equipment after which the workshop began to prod- 
uce goods in a systematic way for general sale rather than at indiv- 
idual order. His brother has now become the managing director of the 
firm, and the most senior skilled worker (Osman) has become effect- 
ively the acting MuatLm (i. e. the technical supervisor of the work- 
shop and the leader of the labour force during the production proc- 
ess). As El-Fatih abondoned his managerial and technical responsi- 
bilities in the firm, he became involved in the town's politics. In 
1974 he was elected representative of the People's Local Council of 
the Southern Industrial Area, composed of business owners there, in 
the Town Council; and in 1977 he was elected to a key post in the 
Town Council. Over the last five years, moreover, he has invested 
in other fields of capital accumulation as well. 
He has speculated 
in urban land, became a major shareholder 
in an automated bakery, 
and is now preparing for the establishment of a 
factory producing 
welding electrodes. 
(b) Large-Scale Industry: 
In addition to the two large agricultural machinery workshops 
of Hassouna Engineering 
(established in 1972) and Savanah Products 
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Company (established 1980) both of which specialize in the provis- 
ion, servicing, repair and maintenance of spare-parts, there are in 
the Northern Industrial Area of Hassaheisa 4 oil-seeds mills, one 
yeast factory, and one ice and mineral drink factory in addition to 
two large automated bakeries situated near the market-place. Table 
6: 2 gives basic data on these eight establishments. The following 
observations are relevant to the present analysis: 
(1) These large-scale industries are primarily oriented to the 
production of highly demanded basic consumer-goods intended to subs- 
titute imports. 
(2) Most of the firms were established quite recently and there 
is additional evidence that the pace of factory establishment is acc- 
elerating. For example, at a meeting of the Town Council Planning 
Committee held on 9th October 1979, the following applications for 
land for the purposes indicated were approved: 
Table 6: 3 Names of Applicants and Types of Planned Industries 
Approved by T. C. P. C. in its Meeting on 9/10/1979 
ame of Applicant Area Allotted (in Type of Planned 
sQ. metres) Industry 
dam Abdel Gadir 900 Metallic Furniture 
Ali Abdel Mutalib 300 Metallic Beds 
Awad el-Nwairi 1500 Ice 
Ali Mohd. All el-Haj 1500 Ice 
Ahmed Obeid A. Mutalib 1500 Ice 
Hassan Osman 300 Furniture 
Abdin Mustafa 1500 Turnery 
Abdel Salam Sal ih 5000 Oil Mill 
Habiballa Ahmed 300 Wood Furniture 
M. A. Gadoura 1500 Mettalic Furniture 
Siddig Arbab 500 Soap 
Abdel Ba i Ibrahim 300 
Furniture 
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Table 6: 3 continued 
ame of Applicant Area Allotted Type of Industr 
hmed Abdel Rahim 500 Soap 
1-Mubarak 2850 Tahina Sweets. (sesame) 
hidir Abdal la 500 Clothes 
bdel Rahman Bella 5200 Oil and Soap 
Source: By kind permission of the President of the Council, I att- 
ended the meeting of 9th October 1979 the details of which proceed- 
ings are contained in File No. 16/G/2, dated 9/10/1979, Hassaheisa 
Town Council. 
(3) Nearly all the firms listed in Table 6: 2 are working well 
below their maximum capacity inspite of acute shortages in the local 
market of the commodities they produce. I will consider this issue 
in more detail below. 
(4) The casual labour force employed is generally larger or 
at least of about the same size as the permanent labour force. 
(5) In contrast to the small-scale industries in the town, 
the large-scale firms depend largely on local raw materials (e. g. 
groundnuts, wheat flour and sugar). 
(6) Most investors in the industrial field are drawn from the 
merchant group, -a fact which indicates some affinity 
between the 
trade and industrial sectors of the town's economy. 
Against the background of the information so far given we may 
now turn to two crucial questions about the dynamics of industrial 
development in the case of Hassaheisa, viz., 
(a) What is the essential nature of accumulation in the ind- 
ustrial sector in terms of the origins, 
dynamics and orientations 
of capital? 
(b) What is the specific nature of the relationship between 
11 
r ýi 
* 
iI 
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the historical development of industrial capital accumulation on 
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the one hand and urbanization and urban growth on the other? 
To answer the first question it is necessary to reiterate that 
commercial capital has served as the base for industrial investment 
and that a 'commercial mentality' underlies all investment in ind- 
ustry. As we saw in Chapter Four, merchants have made profits not 
by revolutionizing production but by controlling the market. This 
mercantilist character has revealed itself once more in the sphere 
of industrial investment in two ways, both of which reflected a 
deeper concern on the part of industrial investors to control the 
market. Firstly, we have seen that manufactures are limited to con- 
sumer-goods, which enables the merchants better to capture the ris- 
ing demand for these goods especially under conditions of very lim- 
ited supply due to import restrictions, to a severe shortage of 
foreign exchange, and to an "active" policy of import substition in 
the country as a whole. Secondly, the quantity of goods manufactured VI 
is again strictly controlled and generally kept at low and manage- 
able levels despite the fact that most factories usually work well 
11 ý below maximum capacity. This perpetuates the shortage of goods and 
allows the owners to behave as merchants-i. e. to ensure a high rate 
of commodity turn-over, and in turn to keep to a minimum (or even 
to eliminate) costs of storage, distribution and advertisement. It 
also leads, of course, to the rise of prices in the black market. 
Furthermore, the nature of these commercial investments in 
industry, it appears, is such that they are incapable of developing 
into a self-perpetuating process of accumulation. This is so by 
virtue of the following: 
(a) All industrial investments are highly dependent on foreign 
sources both for the provision and maintenance of machinery and 
for technological know-how. This dependency leads industrial inves- 
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tors to have no capability of expanding and developing their firms 
on the basis of more local perpetual capabilities. 
(b) Even if these capabilities were provided, the industrial inves- 
tors would scarcely be interested in such industrial expansion bec- 
ause of the relative smallness of the size of the market (which 
prevents other investors from establishing more industries of the 
same kind) and the high level of protection against imported for- 
eign goods (which minimizes potential competition) and thus work to 
depress the impulse to expand or improve the technical basis of 
industrial production. Thus the interests of such industrial inves- 
tors are generally defined by monopolistic and commercial consider- 
ations and their outlook and economic behaviour is mercantilist 
rather than industrialist in character. 
11 
(c) More significantly, it has been empirically established in my 
study of Hassaheisa that substantial sums of surpluses achieved in 
these industrial firms are being directly channelled into the fin- 
ance of trade and commercial dealings in the market. Future plans 
of industrial expansion are thus being limited to the possibility 
of furthering this aspect. Two of those investors revealed that 
more than two thirds of the profits made in industry were used in 
trade during 1980.12 
Any attempt to answer the second question must 
depend on our 
ability to delineate with some accuracy various aspects of the 
inter- 
relationship between the specific configuration of 
industry in the 
town of Hassaheisa and particular features of the pattern of urban- 
ization and urban growth developing there. 
In Chapters 2,3 and 4 
I have argued that the process of urbanization and urban 
growth in 
Hassaheisa is intimately related to the 
dominant pattern of accum- 
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ulation (commercial capital accumulation) and in particular that 
the dynamics of the latter dictated in various ways the rate of urb- 
anization, the selective nature of town-ward migration, and the or- 
ientation and impact of urban growth. The dominance of commercial 
activities and of capital accumulation through trade has meant that 
a limited range of occupations has developed in the town (cf. Chap- 
ter Three). The rate and pattern of migration has of course been 
affected by this and especially by the slow rate of change in the 
occupational structure. Moreover, the situation in Hassaheisa has 
naturally been affected by that in the Sudan as a whole in which 
colonial policies have led to a particular kind of commercially 
dominated economy dependent on a system of unequal exchange between 
the metropolitan centres of capitalism and colonial areas of primary 
production from which there was only very limited urban-ward migra- 
tion. These were the essential features underlying the town's slow 
rate of growth during the first five decades of its history as 
indicated in Chapter Three. 
The relative persistence of pre-colonial, pre-capitalist, 
"traditional" sets of social relations and the urban community's 
pre-capitalist social form is to. a large degree explained by the 
continuing dynamics of commercial accumulation which has by its very 
nature done very little to disrupt the internal social structure. 
Put another way, commercial activity has scarcely intervened in the 
production process or in the social relations of production. But 
this does not mean that there are no contradictions and conflicts 
of interests between the various socio-economic groups 
in the town. 
On the contrary, there are basic conflicts of 
interest inherent in 
the process of commercial accumulation 
itself (between buyers and 
sellers, merchants and customers). 
But the town has nevertheless 
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retained the traditional transparencies of immediate, intimate, pers- 
onal and integrated social relationships which characterize pre- 
capitalist social forms. 
In the overall urban context, signs and symbols of unequal dis- 
tribution of wealth (manifested mainly in the uneven levels of cons- 
umption in food, clothing, housing, domestic possessions, etc. ) have 
been partially obscured and distorted by the socio-cultural differ- 
ences between groups of people despite their close physical proxim- 
ity. 13 This has made it extremely difficult for private investors 
to accumulate capital through industrial production because, as 
Gordon has argued in relation to the case of the West, the system 
of factory production depends quite centrally on two main factors: 
First, problems of both cost-minimization and labour discipline 
required the continual homogenization of the labour process; craft 
jobs were compressed into semi skilled operative work and almost 
all factory workers were subject to the same discipline of factory 
control. Second, the system required the continual availability of 
a reserve army of the unemployed- jobless workers, available for 
immediate employment, whose presence could help discipline those 
inside the factory gates. 
14 
In the case of Hassaheisa, however, both these factors were 
either non-existent or insufficiently developed. Two points need 
to be stressed here: (a) the minimal effect of commercial accumul- 
ation upon internal socio-cultural frames of relations meant that 
the residents of the town who were accustomed to earlier pre-indus- 
trial relations resented any attempt to impose the relentless, un- 
compromosing, impersonal discipline of factory life. Moreover, in 
a situation where living standards were being defined with reference 
to the immediate socio-cultural and residential context, it was 
difficult to persuade people to accept a level of wages allowing 
282 
only for a standard inferior to that enjoyed by the of tenl y neigh- 
bouring capitalist investor. This required a comprehensive decomp- 
osition of the prevailing social structure. (b) The virtual absence 
during these early times of a sufficient reserve army of unemployed 
people added to the difficulties of industrial Investment. The town'--s 
slow rate of population growth was, as we have seen, itself a conse- 
quence of the somewhat negative dynamics of commercial accumulation. 
There was thus a vicious circle preventing the development and emer- 
gence of an industrial labour force. 
The foregoing discussion of the historical experience of Hassa- 
heisa, it should be noted, runs counter to the hypotheses put for- 
ward by orthodox economic historians who maintian that industrial 
development depends largely on the presence of the kind of factors 
stressed in the conventional theories of "locational" economics. 
15 
But, in the view I adopt, these hypotheses cannot by themselves 
explain the late development of industrial investments in Hassaheisa 
because many of the "favourable" factors- from a "locational" point 
of view- were in fact present well before the period when industrial 
investment finally took off. These 'favourable' factors, in addition 
to the unqualified presence of not employed body of population, were 
(1) Government encouragement and the availability of generous State 
concessions over many years since 1956.16 
(2) The secure, relatively efficient, and cheap transport network 
linking the town with the rest of the country and the world- e. g. 
railways since 191017 and asphalted roads since 1970.18 
(3) The ample supply of water (from the Blue Nile) and the presence 
of a good water-pipe system since 1936. 
(4) The availability of a cheap source of 
industrial energy (elect- 
ricity) since 1958.19 
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(5) Ready access to cheap raw materials suitable for industrial 
manufacturing-e. g. cotton and cotton seeds since 192820, groundnuts 
since 196021, sugar and molasses since 196322, etc. 
(6) The ready availability of loans from the Industrial Bank since 
196123, and equally the fact that some merchants had already accum- 
ulated sufficient sums of capital which could be invested. 
(7) The presence of relatively good provisions for feasibility stud- 
ies and training opportunities for the technical labour force since 
1962.24 
(8) An ever expanding market of consumers in the local region and 
the presence of well-established marketing and storing institutions 
in the town's market since 1916. 
It would thus seem that investors (of private capital in part- 
icular) were in effect waiting for something else; a qualitative as 
well as quantitative transformation in the labour force which had 
hitherto been missing. The whole process of factory production dep- 
ends on the availability of a labour force which is mobile, control- 
lable, amenable to discipline and, most crucially, abundant. Up un- 
til recent years, the town's "old" labour force was not only insuf- 
ficient but also largely uncontrollable and disinclined to submit 
to industrial factory discipline. As established members of a 
community developed on the basis of rural agricultural and urban 
commercial pursuits, they had little incentives to follow fresh 
occupations. 
11 
The "new" labour force is, however, different and finds it- 
self in a completely different situation. It has been drawn to the 
town as a direct result of the intensification of capitalist 
devel- 
opment in the Gezira Scheme (cf. Chapter 
4), and indeed in other 
rural parts of the country, and 
it consists largely of people who 
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are mobile, responsive to new opportunities, and mostly 'strangers' 
in relation to the other members of the established community of 
the town in many respects. As such, these newcomers are ready sub- 
jects for the discipline required in industrial factory production. 
Firstly, they are not only 'strangers' and newcomers, but also poor 
and often desparate to find employment, any kind of employment, un- 
der virtually any working-conditions. They are thus 'willing' to 
submit themselves to the rigorous discipline of factory organizat- 
ion. Secondly, the relatively large number of newcomers means that 
the available labour force is only partially employed and that there 
is constantly an excess or surplus force available. The visible pre- 
sence of this surplus labour outside the factory gates is a power- 
ful deterant against those "lucky enough" to be inside the gates 
and clearly reduces the ability and desirability of those with will 
to resist the demands made on them by employers. Thus it not surp- 
rising at all to find no trade union movement among the workers of 
the private sector in Hassaheisa inspite of the government's offic- 
ial encouragement and the existence of the necessary legislations 
however insufficient they are. Moreover, ever since its establish- 
ment in Hassaheisa, the industrial area witnessed almost no strike 
or protest at all inspite of the considerable deterioration in the 
incomes of workers in real terms. 
25 
It is, however, equally true that this "new" labour force is 
for the most part inefficient and insufficiently skilled and soph- 
isticated for many of the jobs required in the industry. And this 
largely explains why manufacturing industry 
has been capital-inten- 
sive and with imported advanced technology and machinery which char- 
acterizes factory production 
in Hassaheisa as well as in the Sudan 
as a whole. Relaince on 
labour-saving methods allows employers to 
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avoid many of the problems which they would otherwise have to face 
with this kind of labour force. The fact of the reliance on capital 
intensive methods in the Sudanese manufacturing industry can be ill- 
ustrated by the following table which shows a comparison of capital 
intensity in a number of industries in Sudan with those in U. S. A. 
and Pakistan, indicating that they are several times higher in the 
Sudan than in the USA or Pakistan. 
Table 6: 4 Capital-Intensity (Capital/worker) in Sudan, USA, 
and Pakistan at Comparable periods (in US $). 
Type of Industry USA (1955) Pakistan (1962) Sudan (1971) 
Cotton Textile 475 2418 6455 
Leather Goods 422 1164 6223 
Rubber Goods 269 2764 2125 
Chemicals 1100 4082 3352 
Basic Metals 2558 1546 12562 
Wood Products 367 652 2970 
Source: Naseem, S. M. (1977), p. 72. 
Also we should mention the fact that the lack of experience and 
training of the 'new' labour force explains why most of the industr- 
ial workers are employed in non-skilled, casual, and supporting jobs, 
such as loading and off-loading, packing, mending, etc. It is only 
for these kinds of jobs that it is much cheaper to use the available 
"desparate" labour force than to import machinery, and by and large, 
it is (the labour force) is kept at the margins of the production pro- 
cess. 
CONCLUSION: 
The recent entry of commercial capital 
into manufacturing ent- 
erprises is not an expression or 
indication of any qualitative change 
in the mercantilist character of 
the capital involved or in the basic 
characteristics of the 
Sudanese economy. As we have seen, this entry 
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of commercial capital into 'industry' has, for various reasons, arisen 
from a deep concern on the part of the merchants to consolidate their 
control over the trading market. ]us the movement of capital may be 
seen more as an expression of crisis than of success in the develop- 
ment of commercial accumulation. And this is bound to be the case as 
long as local commercial pursuits (as opposed to world capitalism) re- 
main dependent, yet intact and 'functioning'. 
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI 
1. In a general way, it is usually held that "modern manufact- 
uring industry is of recent origin in the Sudan, dating back only to 1955/56, the year of political Independence". 
See Nimeiri, S. M., 1976, p. 77. 
2. Algie, R. F., 1954, p. 16. 
3. Nimeiri, S. M., op. cit., p. 77. 
4. Plots of land in this area were distributed to craftsmen by 
the Executive Officer of the Local Government Council in 
June, 1955, 'in accordance with a decision taken earlier by 
the Council. See File No. 17/M. R. H. /D3, dated 17.5.1955, 
Hasshaeisa Council Office. 
5. Algie, R. F., op. cit., p. 17. 
6. This account is based partly on my field data and partly on 
two sources: Abdalla, O. M., 1954, pp. 21-3, and Abu Sabah, 
M. A., 1977. 
7. For more details see Hassoun, I. A., 1952, p. 90. 
8. Lunch or dinner and morning or evening tea are only provided 
for workers actually present on morning or evening shifts. 
9. The productivity was only 2.661 Knatar per Feddan in this 
particular season as compared to an average of 4.327 Kantar 
per Feddan for the period of the previous ten seasons (i. e. 
from 1969/70 to 1978/79). 
1O. This assertion follows the statements made to me by Mr. 
Farouk A1-Sheikh, the Managing Director of the factory, and 
I have every reason to accept his views. 
11. Similar statement is put by O'Brien, J. & Shazali, S., 1979, 
193. 
12. Reference is to statements made to me by Mamoun Yousif Hassan, 
Manager of Furat Cola, and Abdel Salam M. Salih, Manager, 
A1-Shazali Oil Mills in Hassaheisa. 
13. See, for example, Chapter 7 where the pattern of socio-econ- 
omic residential arrangements is explained. 
14. Gordon, D. M., 1978, p. 37. 
15. The location factor is mainly defined as an advantage that 
a "locational unit" will gain by locating at a certain place 
rather than an other. "This advantage is expressed 
in terms 
of accomplishing the entire productive and 
distributive pro- 
cess of the given industrial product at the 
lowest cost". See 
for details, Suliaman, E. E. A., 1981. 
{ 
9 
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16. After 'Indpendence', the State actively encouraged all kind 
privately owned industries, especially if they are to be 
established in the Sudanese rural areas, through the con- 
cessions and facilities contained in the 1956,1967,1972, 1974, and 1980 Acts of Industrial development. 
17. The Gezira rail line connecting Hassaheisa to other parts 
of the Sudan as well as the only sea port of the country, 
was built in and officially opened in 1910. 
18. The first all-season asphalted road running through Hassa- 
heisa between Khartoum and Wad Medani was officially opened for public use in 1970. 
" 19. Hassaheisa was connected to the national electricity supply 
generated from Sennar Dam in 1958. 
20. An important by-product of the ginning process, established 
in Hassaheisa in 1928, is cotton seed which can be used for 
edible oil industries, soap manufacturing and animal cake. 
21. As we saw in Chapter 4, the diversification of crop product- 
ion in the Gezira Scheme in 1960 led to to the introduction 
on a rotation bases, of groundnuts. 
22. The first sugar refinery factory in the Sudan was estab- 
lished in Guneid (15 miles North of Hassaheisa) in 1963. 
23. The Industrial Bank of Sudan Act of 1961 provided for cash 
loans, at low rates of interests, of up to 2/3 of the total 
costs of any private industrial project assessed as econom- 
ically sound. "By the end of 1971, the IBS had extended ass- 
istance to 128 projects", See, Kameir, 1980b, p. 52. 
24. In 1962, with the help of the United Nations, the Govern- 
ment established the Sudan Industrial Research Institute 
to provide feasibility studies, and the Management and 
Productivity Centre for the training of technical personnel; 
the latter was in addition to various training centres for 
the improvement of the skills of the industrial labour force. 
25. While the rate of inflation is currently reported to be 
over 50% (Al-Amin, R. 1983), the average rate of annual 
increase of wages in Sudan is only about 3.5%. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I attempt an analysis of "tribalism" in the 
town of Hassaheisa. I use the term 'tribalism' to refer to the var- 
ious sets of relations obtaining between groups of people of diff- 
erent 'tribal' origins as they interact within the overall urban 
socio-economic formation which is Hassaheisa. 
Two general points must be stressed at the outset. The first 
is that 'tribalism' is a salient and pervasive feature of virtually 
all Sudanese towns and indeed of many urban settlements of the so- 
called Third World. As such it has rec eived a great deal of atten- a 1 
tion in a wide range of literature and has been examined from as 
" i 
many sociological perspectives as have been used in the analysis 
and interpretation of urbanization in the Third World in general. 
l 
Some of this literature is relevant an d useful for us, but much of 
it is not -except for general factual comparison or to i llustrate 
certain lines of interpretation which the approach I use explicitly 
2 
or implicitly rejects. 
The second point is that the approach I use categorically 
denies the existence of "tribes" in any effective sense. The 
tribe as "a relatively undifferentiated society, practising a 
primitive subsistence economy and enjoying local autonomy"3 no 
longer exists in Hassaheisa, the Sudan or even in Africa at large. 
This is so simply because such "societies"- to the extent that they 
previously existed- were altered out of all recognition by colonial- 
ism and the capitalist penetration which drew them into the world 
economy and the world market. 
4 
What is clear, however, is that in 
Hassaheisa as in other Sudanese towns there are groups of people 
who have "tribal ideologies" and that these groups are 
historically 
differentiated internally as well as effectively integrated extern- 
a. 
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ally. My general argument is that such tribal ideologies are in ess- 
ence forms of false consciousness, and that this kind of conscious- 
ness effectively mystifies, distorts and obscures the real nature 
of socio-economic and political relations between groups of differ- 
ent origins and varying degrees of difference in ethnic identity and 
culture. It is, therefore, the main aim of this chapter to trace, 
illustrate and explain the specific manner in which the phenomenon 
of "tribal ideology" has developed in the particular case of Hassa- 
heisa. 
The need for a systematic analysis of the phenomenon stems 
from the obvious recurring significance of the "tribal factor" in 
various aspects of the political, economic and social life in the 
town discussed in other chapters. In one sense, the tribal factor 
would seem to expalin all aspects of life in the town. It is this 
very centrality of the phenomenon which demands its careful invest- 
igation in order to explain it rather than to accept it as an exp- 
lanatory variable. 
To develop my analysis and explanation, I use two sets of data 
gathered during the course of my fieldwork. The first set is drawn 
from the census-type survey I conducted in 1978/79 in an attempt to 
gather as much general information as possible on the community and 
its people. 
5 The data collected through the survey are necessarily 
exploratory and very general in character, 
but they supply an out- 
line profile of the tribal composition of the urban community and 
the structure and composition of the various 
"tribal" groups in 
socio-economic terms. A full analysis of 
these survey findings is 
presented first. 
The second set of data was for the most part gathered after 
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the completion of the survey and an initial analysis and appreciat- 
ion of its findings. This second set is drawn from a series of in- 
depth case-studies of "tribal" groups in the town. I make use in 
some detail of material relating to three groups in particular: the 
Dubasin, the Shammaliin and the Fur, to illustrate and substantiate 
a range of statements and conclusions about "tribal" groups in gen- 
eral. It will be seen that the three groups for which I give detail- 
ed information were chosen because of the significant role they play- 
ed, and continue to play, in the production and reproduction of the 
"tribal ideology" in the town. In addition they make the oldest gro- 
ups in the town and this makes the information about them involve 
a more illuminating historical dimension. 
RELEVANT FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY 
The data presented in Tables 7: 1 to 7: 16 have been drawn up 
to illustrate three fundamentally important features of the "tribal" 
profile of the town and to allow us to begin assessing and interpret- 
ing these features. The first is that Hassaheisa contains a broad 
mix of populations claiming different 'tribal' origins and that this 
heterogeneity is, by and large, a characteristic feature of the town 
which sets it off from rural and other smaller "urban" settlements 
in the district. The second is that there is considerable variations 
between groups in socio-economic characteristics and in the access 
which they have- in average terms- to various collective services. 
This has in the past served, and continues to serve, as a base upon 
which inter-tribal competition has developed and often 
been politic- 
ally manipulated. The third important 
feature, which is equally evid- 
ent from the Tables, is that there are appreciable 
measures of diff- 
erentiation within each particular group. 
Differences in socio-eco- 
nomic characteristics and 
in access to resources between various 
292 
members of the same group could conceivably lead to internal strug- 
gles and cleavages within the group. So far this has not happened to 
any significant 'extent, and we shall see that the growth of internal 
divisions have been suppressed and checked through the manipulation 
of dominant 'tribal ideologies' in a way which has concealed antag- 
onisms and blurred objective differences. 
6 
It may be seen that some of the data presented in the Tables 
to follow refer to households and heads of households, while others 
refer to all the members of the households in the survey sample. The 
total number of households in the sample is 409 and the total number 
of persons in these households is 2850. In all cases where the table 
does not add up to either 409 households/heads or 2850 persons, the 
discrepency will be explained. 
THE TRIBAL COMPOSITION 
The overall profile of Hassaheisa's composition in 'tribal' 
terms has changed little during the past thirty years. 
7 
Some relat- 
ively minor changes have, however, been important in regard to part- 
icular developments relating to the overall process of urbanization 
in the area as is explained in Chapter Three and Four in the case of 
groups from the town's hinterland. 
The 'tribal' distribution of the whole sample is shown in Table 
7: 1 which reveals three points of particular significance: 
(1) The aggregate number and the proportion of people affiliated to 
tribal groups from the town's immediate hinterland (Shukria, Halawin 
and Arabs from the Centre) remained very 
low inspite of some increase 
in the recent past. These people constituted 
11.2% of the town's pop- 
ulation in 1955/568 and 14.6% according 
to my survey in 1979. Vari- 
ous groups in this category are originating 
in the Gezira and its 
adjacent areas (for the purposes of analysis 
in this chapter I am 
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Table 7: 1 The Distribution of Sample According to Tribal Origin 
Tribal Origin Number Percentage 
Gaaliin 423 14.9 
Shaikia 620 21.9 
Shukria 20 0.7 
Halawin 97 3.4 
Arabs from the North 138 4.9 
Arabs from the Centre 305 10.8 
Nubians (North) 117 4.1 
Nuba (West) 192 6.8 
Dubasin 411 14.5 
Baggara 51 1.8 
Others from Kordofan 129 4.6 
Darfurian Tribes 125 4.4 
Westerners (Foreigners) 155 5.5 
Southerners 15 0.5 
Gwamaa 27 1.0 
Total 2834^ 100.0 
* 16 failed to state their tribal origins. 
keeping the Gezira-originated group of Dubasin separate from other 
Central Arab groups for reasons that shall emerge with the progress 
of the analysis). In, many ways the relatively low representation in 
the town of peoples of the immediate hinterland was, and is, a ref- 
lection of the uneven development in the country at large. The dev- 
elopment of rural Gezira on the lines of a colonial peasant economy 
has meant that local peoples did not have the same 'incentives' for 
migration to towns as did others from much farther afield. It also 
shows how "alien" the town's community is in relation to the surr- 
ounding district communities. 
(2) Secondly, the community of the town contains some limited repres- 
entation from a wide variety of 
'tribal' groups throughout the Sudan, 
a country "with 
five hundred and seventy-two distinct tribes". 
9 Thus 
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the town must be conceived as a social formation in which people of 
diverse socio-economic backgrounds and of widely heterogeneous "eth- 
nic" origins interact in face-to-face situations in daily life in a 
way quite unknown to them in their respective home-areas. They meet 
in Hassaheisa in the wake of long-distance migrazitions from widely 
separated areas in the country (See the 'tribal' map of Sudan). 
(3) Thirdly, these various groups are far from equally represented 
in. numerical terms. As Table 7: 1 and the accompanying diagram show, 
the proportional representation of various groups ranges from 0.5% 
in the case of Southerners (who are themselves drawn from several 
different 'tribes') to 21.9% in the case of the Shaikia. These num- 
erical differences have served, and continue to serve, as the basis 
for a series of differential processes in the town, e. g. until recen- 
tly the combined forces of the groups from the Northern Province of 
the country have enjoyed an unchallenged dominance in the formal 
politics of the town and, of course, access to many resources. This 
has affected the emergence and development of alliances among other 
smaller groups and influenced the formation and functioning of the 
Local Town Council as will be seen in detail in the following chap- 
ter. 
REGIONAL BACKGROUND 
Table 7: 2 gives the distribution of members of the sample acc- 
ording to their respective provinces of birth and 'tribal' affiliat- 
ion. The Table confirms the expected association between certain 
'tribal' groups and various provinces. Excluding the Gezira Province 
where the majority of second-generation migrants of different groups 
were born, the Table shows that 71.6% of those born in Enneil Province 
(in the Northern Region) are Gaaliin, 64.0% of the immigrants from 
the Northern Province are Shaikia, 90.7% of those born in South Kord- 
of an are Nuba, 45.4% of those born in North Kordofan are in fact 
296 
» Ö10 
rr -t 0 m 0 C " 
r+ rf 
? 
C 
m 
' 
C w -1 11 cl' 
C C 
m 
S 
4+ 
al 
- 
i 
º' 
M 
O 
m 
tL .ý h 
v 
w 
n 
? 
n 
fD 
r 
C 
0. 
0 
m 
m 
m - .. m 
" 
t7 < 
". 
if iA fD ýI ºI Ml 1º E 
m 
C 
m 7c 
K 
ý 
y 
m 
ºr ", 3 
n ( 7 ý. m rD m z m ri ID C rD m C m 0 m 
Cko 
CD r1 7 - R 't "1 
rr " co m m o rr o h m C "ý S C 17 m 
F' 
O W º-' I. w I-+ 7c 
o 111 l! 1 'D W I I I I 0' N I I Qý N Oý 1J un LI' W ý-' N º-' ýD W S 
W r? 
1 0% 1 1-+ 1 I 1 1 t N 1 1 1 º-+ 1 /--" 1 . I ý--' 1 N 1 I 
O 
F3 
O N º-r W 1--ý u 
O V -J 
N 1-' LJ lý 1--' L. '. D r r--ý V N I I r I I W '--ý W V N W 
u Z 
1--ý 1 r 1 1--' 1 V I Q. ' 1 º-+ 1 1--ý 1 1 1 1 1 t N 1 1--ý 1 ý'- 
fD 
0 N N W N E 
O N t 1 1 I 1 I LI' F-' W lP Q' co '. D N I I I I I I W Um V+ I. - 
Z 
º-r t 1 I 1 1 1 I I--" 1 r 1 r t 1--' I I I I I I I ý--' 1 I '--' 
I9 
N - 1--' r 1-+ 1 W 
co w O O co NJ Z- W c) O w t r Co um - r v' ON rn co v+ v+ .o r . i .a O L. ) Ln w m 
O N N 
V N %0 V -J Q' Q' $. - %D 1. n Qo CN V ºý V M 
co 1 .o v+ t w '0 w CO ON . co . V w O w v+ rn N N .a m 
h- '. O ý. V V 
0 V+ 1 1 ý' Fý 1 1 t 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 N N O ýD O, LI' N Z 
W 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I fV 1 V fV N C' fD 
Z 
0 
i--ý N 1--ý - I-+ º-+ t. ) Q*. W 1--A 11 
O 
r ý' u N t1+ O 1 
1 1 1 1 I w t 1 1 1 V lý Qý W r In V r 
Q f' ? 
i 
V 1 r 1 N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1ý 1 1 1 1 I -i N ºr 
-_ 
r V'+ f) 1 -+ W 
~ 
I 
0 
rt 
En 
rt pi 
rt m 
rt 
H 
n 
rt 
H 
a E- 
0 c 
0 
En 
r1 
ri 
(D 
(D 
n 
o w 1 i 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 t 1 1 I 1 1 1 t 1 1 
Q 
Q lJ I I 00 
m O m 
1 I 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1--. I 1 m 
V+ I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 
Q 5 -' 1 1 1 1 1 I 
N 
Q º-' 
N 
Q ý-' 
l- 
Q N fD 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1--ý 1 1 1 º-ý 
CD 
DD 
O V 1 1 ý' º-' 1 1 N N Co co V' r 0- 0- Q 
W 
%D I I N N I I I 1 0 Z 
O rT 
m 7C 
N N 0 
W I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1--' 1 Qý h-' 1 1 1-+ Q I I 1 1 1 1 1 11 
n. 
0 
O 
4- 
W 
N 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
-J 
1 
W 
1-' 
I 
1 
1 
1 
%0 
I-- a 
1--' 
w 
%O 
O 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
En 
x 
O 
a 
E, 
O 
w 
- 1 1 w º-r I 1 
rý 
w r 
LP 
v+ -+ rn v' w - w 
' 
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 ? 
O 
- I 1 I 1 1 1 1 L. -' 
r I N 1 I 1 º-' 1 N 1 1 1 I I 1 
G 
mý 
1 
`" V) 
O o 
I t I I I 1 I I 
v 
O V 
w 
O w 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 G 
-r C 
O 
1 1 1 1 I 
1 1 1 1 1 O' 1 r--" I 1 
1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N ö 
O 
0 
l. /ý 
N 
Q r-+ 1 1 
QN 
C) W 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 
1 1 1 1 I 1 
i 1 a 1--' 1 
"l 
G 
n 
I V 1 1 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
O CO 1 1 
I 1 1 CO r 1 1 Q' I 1 
I I 1 I 1 1 1 V w I 1 ,,, ý . 
O 
0 m 
ý"' 1 1 I 1 1 I 
C) I 1 1 v 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 CL 
ö 
r 
"- 
co 
r 
N 
v+ 
o 
r r N v o r rn o 
I 
r r 
x 
cc 
: -- 
oo 
ö{ 
w 
w n 
ý, 
Ir 
- - «-. - "__. .ý 
r, of o CD o c , 
ro n 0 
n 
0 
rt 
I 
D 
3 
t 
r 
D 
7 
) 
t 
i 
il 
H 
m 
cr 
m 
v 
Ni 
-3 
7 
r 
D 
a 
D 
i 
D 
r 
t 
Y 
0 
7 
i 
r 
L 
d 
r 
s 
a 
n 
0 
s 
r 
r 
297 
1-3 y o E d 7, o z z z > > cn n Y 0 0 
? 
r W O G G O r- o 
rt r vt -t ti cr - Q m - S< p, tb fD r º,, a m m n ý" 01 Cr 
µ 
to " 't tD G O n S co to to ý- - y to ýI ti r+, IPý O - ,... n 
ý-. 
7 ... DO G M to f7 z m '- 
O et 
dp r G) a In f: O 7 0 
m v: CD r, rt 
" 
0 ý 1 1 V ýp ý-' N N W w W 4 Qý I 1 tf v QD N ý 1 1 rý ýp 
N 
N c. Qý 0 Mm 
m 
" mm 
W P, I--ý co N r N N 
m is 
1 
O 
0 
. ~ 
N ~ O 1 I O O 1". ' O O - I 1 O N 1 I '--+ O N O ý' 0 OS 
Cm 
eM 
N 1 if V w N I cr 1 Ol N N 
O 
0 N 1 1 l! + W 07 I 1 1 1 -j N I 1 oD N ýJ tom: cr 
z 
C 
W 1 r V` I I -lJ I N ý--ý N N 
O ýO 1 I ºý " ºý N N I I I I N N I I r- 
rr 
fý ý9 
N 1 t, ý+ t, 1+ W W I I Q' N 
l j--ý 
V 1""r N N h-ý I" 1--ý Ci 
UI I 1 . - W I 1 4 W 1-+ 00 . W '. p V '. D N LP co '. p . 
N 
1 O 
I- 
"1 
Ib 
I--' 1-' I. - $. - N i- N N 
00 1 . 1 .o . .0 L. ) co .n r 
Fý w - v N 
Q ºý W ý-+ 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 W 1--" w º-ý %D ON N z 
O 
rr 
v+ w 
OD C) 1 I 1 I I 1 N tT V OC 
FJ O, 
O o I 1 t I 1 1 N I I I I 00 UI I I lJ co C' N v . 
0 
O r 
tD 
- r 
Ul I 1 I w 1 1 Fý t r v V O 
UI U ß 
N 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 O F-+ C) ý--ý t I t 1 I ( O OD 
O m to 
ý"-' I 1 I 1 1 1 . N 1 I 1 
1-" I 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I O - 1 O C) 
0 C', 
ft 
I I 1 t 1 1 1 1 I t 1-+ 1 CID 
a 
O o I I VI ý-' U' I- U' Un 1 I Ln Lo I 1 t I I 1 I t t O" O "' 
CD 
o 
U' 1 U' U' pý I t-"" I I I I I 
N º ýJ 
O . I I I I 
co N W W I I I V P I -' . I I I I I I M. N 
0 0 
O to O 
ON 1 I O ýD 1 W N 1 1 
0 UI 1 1 W N W co V . 1 t 1 I V 
ý-' I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 /.. ý 
z 
0 "oi d 
L. ) 
Ib 
X- 1 %0 00 N I I . I I I 
I 
0 V I I I 1 V . %D N 1 1 
1ý 1-r t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t M fA 
O hd 
~ 
N I 1 '. D tT 1 . 1 I 1 I 
I 
0 N C) O ý-' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 I 1 fn 
fD O 
0 ý't C 
7n 
U 
1 I 1 1 1 1 
S 
O I In 1 1 
º. 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 0O 
0 N 1 1 C) N 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ý, 
O mS O n ro 
ID "1 
1 .p 1 1 1 I 1 
1 I 1 1 
tr N V+ N 00 w tT N UI N N 1. n 
Cr 11 l! + O 
O 
r 
. N " NJ " 
º. + " W W V -J " cc %D co r+ O 
A ý' 'ý vý ýo oc N 0 .a v+ 
O o o c Cl 
ö ö c C) 
C) 
C 
C 
C 
0 
r 
A 
r 
r 
I- 
I- 
f 
r 
F 
A 
F 
S 
h 
C 
c 
I-C 
U 
r 
C 
U 
U 
Q 
F 
U 
N 
r1 
II 
0 
(D 
AJ 
It 
t1l 
0 
r" 
0 
(D 
C 
-3 
-, 
T 
'1 
r. 
b 
7 
i 
D 
i 
7 
b 
7 
i 
b 
y 
D 
7 
7ý 
D 
7 
b 0 
T 
ý p 
II, 
i 
D ;. 
3 
298 
Kordofanian tribesmen, 70% of those from South Darfur are members 
of Darfurian tribes, 77.8% of those born abroad are Westerners, and 
60% of those born in Southern Sudan are people of Southern tribal 
origins. 
Furthermore, the figures indicate the degree of isolation from 
each other of the members of the different 'tribal' groups before 
coming to Hassaheisa. (One must stress here the vastness of the cou- 
ntry- a million square miles- and the remoteness of different reg- 
ions from each other). This point acquires further significance 
when we turn to Table 7: 3 which classifies the place of last resid- 
ence , by province, for the heads of all households in the survey. 
It can be seen that most members of each 'tribal' group had come to 
the town directly from their respective home areas, especially if 
we consider the second-generation immigrants who recorded Hassaheisa 
itself as their 'Previous Place of Residence'. The Table shows, for 
example, that 37.9% of Gaaliin came directly from Enneil Province; 
47.2% of Shaikia from the Northern Province; 44.47 of Arabs (North) 
from Northern Province; 43.0% of Arabs (Centre) from Gezira Province 
while 63.0% of Nuba come from S. Kordofan Province, 80.77 of Dubasin 
come from Hassaheisa itself. 54.6% of Kordofanians came from the two 
Provinces of North and South Kordofan, 57.17 of Darfurians from South 
and North Darfur Provinces, and 50.0% of Southerners came to the town 
from the Southern Provinces. 
Ä close study of Table 7: 4, moreover, reveals the degree of 
residential segregation of tribal groups in the town's various res- 
idential reas. With the exception of Omda (a First Class Area where 
people from different tribal groups reside together as an expression 
and symbol of their high status) and Kambo (originally a workers' 
camp-hence the name- for people recruited in the Ginneries as exp- 
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lained in Chapter 6), all the other residential areas of the town 
are to some extent 'tribal colonies'. Karima is dominated by Shaikia 
(70.970), together with their traditional allies in the town- the 
Gaaliin (6.370) and Arabs from the North (7.170)- making up to 84.37 
of the total population in that neighbourhood. These three allied 
groups similarly dominate Mazad (75.8%) and Jadida (79.2%) and cons- 
titute a majority in Imtidad (57.0%). Looked at in another way, 71.5% 
of all Shaikia, and 35.3% and 61.5% of Gaaliin and Northern Arabs 
respectively, live in only three neighbourhoods Mazad, Jadida and 
Imtidad. 
Again, 58.7% of Dubasin group reside either in Shargi or Wassat 
where they constitute 53.8% and 41.1% of the total population of 
these tow areas respectively. In the case of the smaller groups, the 
figures in the Table also reveal 'tribal' residential concentration. 
Thus, for example, 60% of the Darfurian groups reside in the Fur 
area, 69.0% of Kordofanians in Kambo and two-thirds of all southerners 
in the Fur area. 
The survey data thus amply confirm that the . population of the 
town is made up of widely diverse 'tribal' groups; that it is drawn 
from many different regions in the country and that there is str ng- 
tendency for people to reside close to their fellow 'tribesmen'. This 
naturally contributes to the development of 'tribal' ideologies and 
to the maintenance of 'tribal' identities, and these concentrations 
also acquire further significance through the specific pattern of 
differential allocation of various resources in the town to the dif- 
ferent residential areas as we shall see in the next chapter. 
INTRA & INTER-GROUP VARIATIONS IN_SOCIO-DEMOGRAPH IC CHARACTERISTICS 
The data on age and sex also exhibit variation between the 
various 'tribal' groups. As may be expected, under the 
dominance of 
301 
Table 7: 5 The Distribution of Persons According to 
Tribal Origin and Sex 
Tribal-Group MALE FEMALE -TOTAL 
Gaaliin 236 55.8 187 44.2 423 100 
15.5 14.2 14.8 
Shaikia 326 52.6 294 47.4 620 100 
21.4 22.3 21.8 
Arabs North 77 55.8 61 44.2 138 100 
5.0 4.6 4.8 
Nubians North 66 56.4 51 43.6 117 100 
4.3 3.9 4.1 
Nuba West 104 54.2 88 45.8 192 100 
6.8 6.7 6.7 
Dubasin 203 49.4 208 50.6 411 100 
13.3 15.8 14.4 
Kordofanians 113 54.6 94 45.4 207 100 
7.4 7.1 7.2 
Darfurians 73 58.4 52 41.6 125 100 
4.8 3.9 4.4 
Westerners (Foreingers 78 55.3 63 44.7 141 100 
5.1 4.8 5.0 
Southerners 7 46.7 8 53.3 15 100 
0.5 0.6 0.5 
Others 7 50.0 7 50.0 14 100 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
nrn1% n rn, r%t- -w- n 
L24 53,1 198 46.9 442 00 
. 14.7 15.0 14.8 
Total 1526 53.5 1318 46.2 2850 100 
Total (7 ) 100 100 100 
17 did not state their tribal group(s): 6 also did not state their 
their sexes, 7 males and 4 females. 
'i iý 
i 
i 
4ý- 
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the tribal ideology, these variations are commonly emphasized in 
daily life. 
SEX: 
Table 7: 5 shows the distribution of the sample according to 
sex and tribal group. The disparity between males and females in the 
town (53.5% and 46.2% of the total population respectively) is, we 
know, a common feature of many Sudanese towns. 10 In fact, the aver- 
age proportion for 111 settlements classified as urban according to 
the Second Population Census of the Sudan 53.1% are males and 46.9% 
females', while in most rural communities this distortion is partly 
reversed, particularly in those areas suffering heavy out-migration 
(Northern Provinces the ratio is 46.2 males and 53.8% females while 
in Kordofan its 48.9: 51.1; in Darfur 47.1: 52.9.12 In Hassaheisa, 
with the principal exception of the Dubasin group which displays a 
relatively well-balanced proportion between the sexes, other tribal 
groups tend to show the same imbalance as the whole population and 
to share the socio-psychological consequences, 
13 
AGE: 
According to the Second Population Census of 1973, the age- 
group of under 15 years in the country as a whole constitutes about 
half the total population (47%). In Hassaheisa- which reveals a sit- 
uation similar to that in other Sudanese towns- as shown in Table 
7: 6 the under 15 years make up only 37.5% of the sample. This is a 
general distortion accounted for largely by patterns of migration 
with younger adults coming towns without childern or with few. But 
the degree of this 'distortion' varies between 'tribal' groups. For 
example, 13.4% of the Southerners were under 15, while others like 
the Gaaliin were above the town's average (39.1%). Similarly, the 
populations of the most productive age (15-49) was considerably above 
the average for the Sudan as a whole, and again varied from one 'tri- 
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bal' group to another, corelating to some extent with the relative 
degree of socio-economic distortion and underdevelopment in the are- 
as of origin of the different groups. Certain regions would appear 
to "push out" larger proportions of this age-group than others (e. g. 
Southerners, 73.3%; Darfurians, 61.670; Gaaliin, 53.0%; Shaikia, 57.5% 
and Nubians, 52.9%). 
FAMILY SIZE: 
Table 7: 7 shows the variations between the different 'tribal' 
groups in family size. It can be seen that the average size of f am- 
ily ranges from 8.3 in the case of Arabs from the Centre to only 4.9 
for Nubians from the North. Certain tribal groupings, moreover, have 
markedly smaller families-i. e. those from the West (Kordofanians, 6.3 
and Darfurians, 5.9 while the Westerners have a family size of 6.4). 
Looked at in another way, it is a striking fact that these particular 
groupings have higher than average proprotions of small families 
with only one to four members. 
The above data on the sex, age and family size show in various 
ways the variant profile reflected by each group which in turn infl- 
uences the image about each held by the rest of the community. For 
instance, ina community largely influenced by traditional conserv- 
ative attitudes towards the relation between the two sexes, it is 
generally held that male dominated group is a threat to society and 
should be treated with special caution. At another level of analysis 
the sex, age, and family size profile given by a certain group has 
a decisive impact on its chances of acquiring some of the most imp- 
ortant resources in the town-e. g. housing land. As the way in which 
urban land distribution is undertaken is based on an eligibility 
criteria in which the applicant who is married (marital status), 
with longer time of presence in the town (age) and responsible of 
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many dependants (family size) is more favoured than one who is not, 
we can appreciate the role played by the differences in terms of sex, 
age and family size between the various groups in structuring a pat- 
tern of differential resource distribution of resources in the town 
among the different 'tribal' groups. 
DIFFERENTIAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
I will now turn to the data on the differential allocation of 
the resources in the town between the various "tribal" groups as well 
as within particular groups. A first assumption might be that the 
patterns of allocation and distribution revealed in the following 
tables should tend to unite across 'tribal' lines the large majority 
of those who are underprivileged and systematically deprived of res- 
ources. We shall see, however, that the evidence does not bear this 
out. On the contrary, the facts of deprivation are by and large mani- 
pulated by the dominant groups to mobilize the members of each group 
against all members of other groups as being the causes and sources 
of their deprivation. 
JOB AND EMPLOYMENT: 
Table 7: 8 gives the numbers in each 'tribal' group of those 
who are actively employed as against those who are not (the unemploy- 
ed plus most women and children) as well as the sector in which they 
are employed. It can be seen that the proportion of the unemployed 
ranges from 19.6% for Arabs from the North to 25.1% for the Dubasin; 
but the more significant fact is that there is much wider variation 
in the proportions for each group employed in the public and private 
sectors. 
Some groups enjoy much higher chances of employment in the 
public sector, which is far more secure and rewarding. Thus it can 
be seen that members of some groups tend to be concentrated 
in the 
public sector in greater than random proportions. Whereas the aver- 
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age percentage of all workers in the public sector is 65.0%, the 
corresponding figures for some major groups are rather high: Gaaliin 
68.0%; Shaikia, 68.1%; Arabs from North, 85.7%; Dubasin, 64.1% and 
the Nuba of Western Sudan, 85.770. It should be noted, however, that 
the Nuba group is concentrated in certain jobs not by virtue of any 
power, but, on the contrary, because these jobs are low paid and have 
low 'status'-e. g. jobs associated with sewage and rubbish collection. 
The groups with markedly lower proportions of workers in the public 
sector, on the other hand, are Kordofanians, 53.1%; Darfurians, 51.3% 
and Westerners, 15.2% while all the others groups have participation 
of 33.3%. Correspondingly, and in contrast, these latter groups are 
being represented in the private sector by a higher than the 15% 
average of employment in the town, and it is in the private sector 
that jobs are on the whole lower paid, less secure and less protected. NI 
The data on the distribution of self-employed people reveal a 
less regular pattern, but in considering these figures it must be 
stressed that there is much variation in the quality of different 
self-employed jobs. While the majority of persons from the first 
category of "tribes" discussed above (Gaaliin, Shaikia, Arabs from 
North, Nubians and Dubasin) are self-employed as traders and crafts- 
men, those from the second category (Kordofanians, Darfurians and 
Westerners) are self-employed as unskilled manual workers (porters, 
car washers and shoe-shiners) as shown in Table 7: 
9 discussed below. 
OCCUPATION: 
From Table 7: 9 it can be seen how members of the Nuba (West) 
group are concentrated in the categories of unskilled workers(50.0%) 
and to a smaller extent in that of skilled workers 
(23.7%) and in 
the regular forces and the Prison Department 
in particular- all of 
which are jobs in the public sector. The table shows, moreover, 
the 
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extent to which the other tribal groups are "over-represented" in 
the relatively well-paid jobs of the public sector (senior and Jun- 
for professionals). Thus 17.8 0 of Gaaliin, 22.0% of Shaikia, 33.3% 
of Arabs from North, 29.8% of Arabs from Centre, 24.1% of Nubians 
of the North and 27.7% of the Dubasin are employed as senior and 
junior professionals as against only 2.6% of Nuba (West), 10.0% of 
Kordof anians , 2.7% of Darfurians, and none of the Westerners and 
Southerners. Similarly, the Table reveals how the Shaikia and Duba- 
sin dominate trade with 20.3% and 27.1% of all small traders in the 
town respectively, and with 50.0% each of all big merchants in the 
whole sample. The Gaaliin constitute 16.9% of the small traders and 
the Arabs from the Centre constitute 12.9%, while the less privileged I'I 
groups such as the Nuba (West), Kordofanians, Darfurians, Westerners 
and Southerners make up only 1.1%, 4.7%, 2.2% and 7.1% of this occ- 
category respectively. The Table also shows the extent to upational 
which agricultural work- small as it is- is in the hands of members 
of particular "tribal' groups. Thus the Dubasin account for 30.8% 
'I! 
of the "Farmers and Farm Workers", a fact which is clearly related r 
{Ii 
to the proximity of Hassaheisa to the fields of the Gezira Scheme 1ý1 
where many of the town's Dubasin are tenants. The remaining agricul- 
tural workers are mainly Darfurians (15.4%) and Westerners 
(53.870), 
and most of these are labourers rather than farmers. None of the 
other 'tribal' groups participate in agriculture. The percentages:.: 
given in the column "Regular Forces", which includes the police, 
prison guards and the military, shows these areas of employment are 
filled mainly by Northerners: 10.3% Gaaliin; 
34.5% Shaikia; and 10.3% 
Arabs from North- making up to 55.1%. As stressed in Chapter Four, 
Northerners predominate in the police force, while members of the 
Nuba of Western Sudan make up a large proportion of 
the prison guards. 
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Nubians, Arabs from the Centre, Kordofanians and Darfurians have 
very few of their members in this category; and the Dubasin, South- 
erners and Westerners have none at all. 
M 
The pattern of participation in the occupational structure of 
different tribal groups is naturally reflected in the pattern of in- 
come distribution. Table 7: 10 gives the relevant data on the incomes 
of populations by 'tribal' group. 
14 
The first observation to be made 
relates to the marked variation in average income between the diff- 
erent tribal groups ranging from the lowest average of LS 9.1 per 
month in the case of the Nuba (West) to LS. 18.8 per month in the 
case of the Shaikia. It can be seen too that the Southerners, West- 
erners, the Darfurians and the Kordofanians can be classed with the 
Nuba (West) as being concentrated in the income-levels of less than 
LS 5.5 with 10070,85.370,76.370,67.0% and 84.1% of their respective 
members earning less than that figure per month. Other groups such 
as the Gaaliin, the Shaikia, and the Arabs from North have markedly 
lower proportions of their members in this income category, only 
49.5%, 51.4% and 50.0% respectively. The corresponding situation at 
the higher levels of income is that groups such as the Kordofanians, 
the Darfurians, the Westerners, the Southerners, and the Nuba (West) 
have no members with more than LS. 200 per month and very few with 
LS. 150-200. Other groups which are well represented in these higher 
income categories are the Shaikia and the Dubasin. 
The uneven pattern of income and occupation examined so far 
is in turn related to uneven patterns of access to, and consumption 
of, various services and amenities in the town. I therefore turn now 
to a brief review of education and housing and of the various amen- 
ities relating to accommodation. 
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FDUCATION : 
Educational attainment is of relevance to the study of inter- 
tribal relations both because education is a channel of social mobil- 
ity and because it is a sign of status and prestige. Education is a 
mainly publicly financed serviced and the pattern of educational att- 
ainment clearly reflects the differential accessibility of various 
groups to this public service. Table 7: 11 shows, for=ieXample, that' 
total lack of formal education is most common among the Nuba West 
(58.30) and least common among the Dubasin (22.1%), while higher 
education (university & equivalent) is concentrated with particular 
groups such as the Shaikia (26.1%), the Arabs from Centre (20.0%). 
the Dubasin (20.0%), the Gaaliin (13.30) and the Arabs from North 
Other groups are clearly "under-represented" as far as higher 
education is concerned- e. g. Nuba (West) and the Westerners have no 
members at all in this category while the Darfurians and Southerners 
have 3.3% of their respective members in the category of highly educ- 
aced. The Table equally shows a similar pattern of 'under-' and 'over- 
representation' in relation to primary, intermediate and secondary ed- 
ucation. 
HOUSING AND AMENITIES: 
From Table 7: 4 it is evident that there is an important measure 
of residential segregation along 'tribal' lines. This has to be con- 
sidered in conjunction with the fact that various residential areas 
differ in regard to 'class' of land, size of plots, and access to 
services. Residential segregation thus also implies some measure of 
correlation between particular 'tribal' groups and particular kinds 
of neighbourhood and residential advantages. Thus, for example, from 
Table 7: 12 it can be seen that 79.4% of all owner-occupier houses 
belong to members of four 'tribal groups' - Gaaliin, Shaikia, Arabs 
from Centre and Dubasin, who constitute, respectively, 13.8%, 29.2% 
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Table 7: 12 The Distribution of Households According to 
Tribal Origin and Type of House Occupation 
Tribal Origin Owned House 
U 
Rented House Other Type'-- Total 
aaliin 27 46.5 10 17.2 21 36.2 58 100 
13.8 9.4 20.6 14.2 
Shaikia 57 64.1 25 28.1 7 7.9 89 100 
29: 2 23.6 6.9 21.8 
Arabs North 7 38.9 7 38.9 4 22.2 18 100 
3.6 6.6 3.9 4.4 
Arabs Centre 23 45.1 14 27.5 14 27.4 51 100 
11.8 13.2 13.7 12.4 
Nubians North 7 29.2 8 33.3 9 37.5 24 100 
3.6 7.5 8.8 5.9 
Nuba West 1 3.7 9 33.3 17 63.0 27 100 
0.5 8.5 16.7 6.6 
Dubasin 48 84.2 6 10.5 2 3.5 57 100 
24.6 5.7 2.0 13.9 
Kordofanians 5 15.2 9 27.3 19 57.6 33 100 
2.6 8.5 18.6 8.1 
Darfurians 6 28.6 11 52.4 4 19.0 21 100 
3.1 10.4 3.9 5.1 
Westerners 13 59.1 6 27.3 3 13.6 22 100 
(Foreigners) 6.7 5.7 2.9 5.4 
Southerners 1 50.0 0.0 1 50.0 2 100 
0.5 1.0 0.5 
Total*^ 195 47.7 106 25.9 102 25.9 409 100 
Total (7) 100 100 100 100 100 
Other house occupation refers mainly to Government's houses and 
Squarer accommodation. 
^^ 7 did not state their Tribal Group(s); 5 did not state the type of 
their occupancy, 1 tenant and 1 other occupancy. 
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11.8% and 24.6% of all owner-occupiers in the sample. The other seven 
tribal groups make up the remainder in small proportions (from 0.5% 
for the Nuba of Western Sudan and Southerners to 6.7% for the Wester- 
ners). Conversely, the seven groups with low proportions of owner- 
occupiers tend to make up large proportions of tenants. 
The column headed "Other" in Table 7: 12 includes government 
houses and squatter shelters. It is thus not a homogeneous category: 
the relatively high proportions of Gaaliin (20.6%), Arabs from the 
Centre (13.770), Nubians from the North (8.8%), Shaikia (6.970) and 
Arabs from North (3.9%) in the column reflect their relatively easy 
access to government houses (as it is the case with all other public 
public assets in the town), while the substantial percentages of Nuba 
(16.7%) and Kordofanians (18.6%) in the same column reflect their 
significant presence in squatter areas. 
unnAuc . 
Table 7: 13 shows the number of rooms per household in the 
houses of members of the different 'tribal' groups- rooms having been 
defined as bed-rooms and living rooms only. Though these rooms natur- 
ally vary in size and quality from one residential area to another, 
and between different households, the Table serves to bring out some 
important differences between groups. The average number of rooms per 
household ranges from 1.8 per household for the Nuba of Western Sudan 
to 2.9 for the Dubasin. Another indicator of this variation is prov- 
ided by the percentages for each group falling in the several column. 
In the "One Room" column, the percentages for groups such as Southern- 
ers , Nuba 
(West), Darfurians, Kordofanians and Westerners clearly 
exceed the corresponding percentages for other groups 
(50.0%, 40.7%, 
33.3%, 27.3% and 22.7% respectively). The relevant figures for the 
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Table 7: 13 The Distribution of Households According to 
Tribal Origin and Number of Rooms per House 
Tribal Group Singl Two Three Four Five or Total 
Room Rooms Rooms Rooms Rooms 
Gaaliin 5 8.6 36 62.1 14 24.1 2 3.4 1 1.7 58 100 
6.8 19.1 16.9 4.3 9.1 14.2 
Shaikia 11 12.4 44 29.4 18 20.2 11 12.4 4 4.5 89 100 
15.1 23.4 21.7 23.4 36.4 21.8 
Arabs 4 22.2 9 50.0 2 11.1 3 16.7 -- 18 100 
North 5.5 4.8 2.4 6.4 4.4 
Arabs 10 19.6 25 49.0 11. 21.6 5 9.8 -- 51 100 
Centre 13.7 13.3 10.6 10.6 12.4 
Nubians N 6 25.0 11 45.8 6 25.0 1 4.2 -- 24 100 
8.2 5.9 7.2 2.1 5.9 
Nuba West 11 40.7 12 44.4 3 11.1 1 3.7 -- 27 100 
15.1 6.4 3.6 2.1 6.6 
Dubasin 3 5.3 23 40.4 15 26.3 11 19.3 5 8.8 57 100 
4.1 12.2 18.1 23.4 45.5 13.9 
Kordofan- 9 27.3 15 45.5 4 12.1 5 15.1 -- 33 100 
ians 12.3 8.0 4.8 10.6 8.1 
Darfur- 7 33.3 6 28.6 6 28.6 2 9.5 -- 21 100 
ians 9.6 3.2 7.2 4.3 5.1 
Westerners 5 22.7 6 27.3 3 13.6 6 27.3 1 22 100 
(Foreign) 6.8 3.2 3.6 12.8 9.1 5.4 
Southerners 1 50.0 - - 1 50.0 - - -- 2 100 
1.4 1.2 0.5 
Total 73 17.8 188 46.0 83 20.3 47 11.5 11 2.7 409 100 
Total (%) 
11100 11100 11100 11 100 11 100 u 100 
*7 did not state their Tribal Group(s): 5 also did not state the number of rooms 
in their houses, 1 with one room, and 1 with two rooms. 
318 
Gaaliin in the "One Room" category is 8.6%, for Shaikia, 12.4%, 
while for the Arabs from Centre and the Dubasin it is 19.6% and 
5.3% respectively. Conversely, the Gaaliin, Shaikia, and Dubasin are 
clearly much better housed according to this indicator, and are with 
more rooms per household than all other groups except the Westerners 
who have very small rooms in their houses which have relatively poor 
amenities as may be seen from the tables to follow. 
ELECTRICITY: 
Although the town was connected to the national network in 1958, 
there is still a substantial minority of households in Hassaheisa 
with no electric supply. As shown in Table 7: 14, there is again app- 
reciable variations between 'tribal' groups in regard to this amen- 
ity, with the Gaaliin, Shaikia, Arabs from North and Nubians (North) 
and Dubasin being better served than the Nuba (West), Kordofanians, 
Darfurians and Westerners. The Table, however, does not show the 
considerable variations in the amounts being consumed by each group 
of electricity which indicates another kind of differential enjoy- 
ment of public energy in domestic life. 
BATH ROOMS & LAVATORIES: 
Bathrooms and lavatories may be taken as further indicators of 
good housing and, more generally, of a family's position on the scale 
of affluence to deprivation. From Table 7: 15 it can be seen that the 
Shaikia and Dubasin whom we have already noted as having higher than 
average incomes, enjoy the best bathrooms, while the 'tribal' groups 
with lower incomes depend more largely on bowls (a simple and less 
hygienic type of bathroom). 
Table 7: 16 gives the distribution of households by 'tribal' 
group according to lavatory facilities. It can be seen that syphon 
lavatories, the best and most modern, are enjoyed by very few house- 
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Table 7: 14 The Distribution of Households According to 
Tribal Origin and the Provision of Electricity 
Tribal Group With Electricity Without Electricity Total 
Gaaliin 53 91.4 5 8.6 58 100 
15.0 9.8 14.2 
Shaikia 86 96.6 3 3.4 89 100 
24.4 5.9 21.8 
Arabs Centre 42 100.0 9 17.6 51 100 
11.9 17.6 12.4 
Arabs North 18 82.4 - - 18 100 
5.1 - 4.4 
Nubians North 23 95.8 1 4.2 24 100 
6.5 2.0 5.9 
Nuba West 22 81.5 5 18.5 27 100 
6.2 7.8 6.6 
Dubasin 53 93.0 4 7.0 57 100 
15.0 7.8 13.9 
Kordofanians 28 84.8 5 15.2 33 100 
7.9 9.8 8.1 
Darfurians 13 61.9 8 38.1 21 100 
3.7 15.7 5.1 
Westerners 11 50.0 11 50.0 22 100 
3.1 21*. 6 5.4 
Southerners 2 100 - - 2 100 
0.6 0.5 
Total*, 353 86.3 51 13.7 409 100 
Total (%) 100 100 100 
7 did not state their Tribal Group(s): 5 of them 
did not state also 
the provision of electricity in their houses, and 
2 with electricity 
in their houses. 
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Table 7: 15 The Distribution of Households According to 
Tribal Origin and Type of Bathroom 
Tribal Group Shower Modern Bowl Total 
Bath 
Gaaliin 51 87.9 - -7 2.1 58 10 
16.1 9.2 14.2 
Shaikia 76 85.4 4 4.5 7 7.9 89 100 
24.0 - 50.0 9.2 21.8 
Arabs North 16 88.9 - 2 11.1 18 100 
5.0 2.6 4.4 
Arabs Centre 37 72.5 - 14 27.5 51 100 
11.7 18.4 12.4 
Nubians North 22 91.7 - 2 8.3 24 100 
6.9_ 
. 
2.6 5.9 
Nuba West 21 77.8 - 6 22.2 27 100 
6.6 7.9 6.6 
Dubasin 49 86.0 4 7.0 4 7.0 57 100 
15.5 50.0 5.3 13.9 
Kordofanians 22 66.7 - 11 33.3 33 100 
6.9 14.5 8.1 
Darfurians 10 47.6 - 11 52.4 21 100 
3.2 14.5 5.1 
Westerners 10 45.5 - 11 54.5 22 100 
(Foreigners) 3.2 14.5 5.4 
Southerners 1 50.0 - 1 50.0 2 100 
0.3 1.0 0.5 
Total-; 317 77.5 8 2.0 76 18.6 409 100 
Total 100 100 100 100 
7 did not state their Tribal Group(s): 5 also did not state the 
type of bathrooms in their houses, and 2 with showers in their 
houses. 
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Table 7: 16 The Distribution of Households Accordinato 
Tribal Origin and Type of Lavatory 
Tribal Grou Syphon Bucket Pit lat- Communal Other Total % 
rine 
Gaaliin - - 34 58.6 20 34.5 - - 4 6.9 58 100 
12.9 23.8 11.1 14.2 
Shaikia 4 4.4 57 64.0 23 25.8 - - 5 5.6 89 100 
44.4 21.6 27.4 13.9 21.8 
Arabs - - 14 77.8 3 16.7 - - 1 5.6 18 100 
North 5.3 3.6 - 2.8 4.4 
Arabs - - 42 82.4 1 2.0 1 2.0 7 13.7 51 100 
Centre - 15.9 1.2 9.1 12.4 
Nubians N. - - 19 79.2 4 16.7 - - 1 4.2 24 100 
7.2 4.8 2.8 5.9 
Nuba W. - - 14 51.9 5 18.5 4 14.8 4 14.8 27 100 
- 5.3 6.0 36.4 11.1 6.6 
Dubasin 5 8.8 43 75.4 6 10.5 - - 3 5.3 57 100 
55.6 16.3 7.1 8.3 13.9 
Kordofan- - - 20 60.6 7 21.2 3 9.1 3 9.1 33 100 
fans - 7.6 8.3 27.3 8.3 8.1 
Darfur- - - 8 38.1 7 33.3 1 4.8 5 23.8 21 100 
fans - 3.0 8.3 9.1 13.9 5.1 
Westerners - - 9 40.9 8 36.4 2 9.1 3 13.6 22 100 
(Foreign) - 3.4 9.5 18.2 8.3 5.4 
Southerners - - 2 100% - - - - - - 2 100 
0.8 0.5 
Total* 9 2.2 264 64.5 84 20.5 11 2.7 36 8.8 409 100 
Total (%) 00 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*7 did not state their Tribal Groups: 5 also did not state the type of their 
lavatories, and 2 with Buckets. 
i 
1 
i 
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holders and that these are either Shaikia or Dubasin. Bucket 
facilities, provided by the public Hygiene Department in return 
for an insignificant annual fee, again tend to be available to 
the groups with higher than average incomes and political power, 
while pit-latrine facilities (with minimum hygiene specificat- 
ions) and communal lavatory facilities tend to be most used by 
the tribal groups with lower than average incomes and least pol- 
itical influence. 
The rough pattern of correspondence between the allocation 
lr, 
of certain kinds of services and resources with particular 'tri- 
bal' groups served the development of "tribalism" as a social 
relation of conflict between the groups in two ways: firstly, 
those who are relatively enjoying bigger share in the town's 
resources 'tribalize' in order to defend and acquire more pri- 
vileges and, secondly, those who are deprived also 'tribalize' 
themselves against the privileged who are conceived as the 
source of their sufferings. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'TRIBALISM' AS AN IDEOLOGY 
I have so far confined myself to describing and illustrat- 
ing instances of inequality between 'tribal' groups as revealed 
by the survey data gathered at a particular point in time. The 
profile revealed by the data is inevitably static and calls for 
interpretation and evaluation in a historical perspective which 
can only be supplied by an assessment of the dynamic processes 
of political, economic, and ideological change in the urban com- 
munity. This in turn calls for a critical analysis of the devel- 
opment - often rapid and extensive- of 'tribalism' in Sudanese 
society in general, and with particular reference to the changes 
stemming from the following: 
(1) The impact of Arab culture and Muslim ideology, 
(2) The development of the State in Sudanese society and the imp- 
lications at local levels of this development and, 
(3) The impact of the particular mode of accumulation which we 
have reviewed in Hassaheisa, as being negatively or positively 
conducive for 'tribalism'. 
My concern is primarily with 'tribalism' as manifested and 
expressed in a particular region of the Sudan, namely the North- 
ern Sudan comprising the six northern provinces. Thereasons for 
this is partly because I am studying a northern town, but mainly 
because the South for long 'enjoyed' a degree of political, cul- 
tural, and economic isolation from the North. 
15 
The processes 
of change in the South were therefore little affected by devel- 
opments in the North. 
We are thus in essence dealing with 'tribalism' among the 
'Arabs' of Northern Sudan, taking the term Arab to refer gener- 
ally to all Arabic-speaking groups in the Sudan whatever their 
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ethnic origins may have been. 
16 
The creation of culturally 'Arab- 
ized' peoples in the Sudan was of course a cumulative result of 
the gradual penetration of large numbers of Arabs. These had 
come to the area along various routes, by different means, and 
over a long period of time. 
17 
The genealogical traditions now 
current in the Northern Sudan are interesting evidence. We know 
from documentary evidence that they have been current for at least 
three centuries, 
'8 
and they clearly indicate the high degree of 
Arabization in this region. The widespread use of Arabic for 
many generations is of course another indicator of the cultural 
process to which I refer. 
Taken as a whole, the historical evidence suggest that dur- 
ing the seven centuries that preceded the fall of Soba (the cap- 
ital town of the Christian kingdom of Allawa) in 1504, Arabs had 
drifted into the Sudan in numerous small scale parties, rather +ý 
V 
than in large scale migrations, and many of the small groups had 
19 different 'tribal' origins. There was thus no single tribal 
or ethnic influence in the process of Arabization. According to 
the available historical accounts, the small groups of migrants 
were of two main types. The first type chose to live a sedentary 
life among the riverain groups with whom they intermarried and 
mixed freely, even adopting their languages. 
20 
The second type 
consisted of parties of Arabs who chose to continue the kind of 
pastoral-nomadic life to which they were accustomed before ent- 
ering the northern areas of the Sudan. 
21 
Over the course of time, the small parties who remained 
nomads began to crystallize into small groups interrelated by 
kinship and marriages as well as other socio-political relation- 
ships, and united by the common ownership of the animals and 
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and materials (e. g. tents) on which they depended for their ex- 
istence. These groups developed stability and intimacy but their 
overall social organization remained highly amorphous and also 
flexible and changing. 
22 
As nomadic pastoralists, these groups 
constantly encountered other groups living similar lives and var- 
ious kinds of alliances were established. Such alliances were usu- 
ally temporary and transient. They usually depended on the nature 
of such mutual benefits as could be attained from sharing in the 
control and management of a particular strategic resource (usu- 
ally a watering place). And the pattern of authority relations 
which arose in controlling and managing such strategic resources 
usually allowed for, and in fact virtually structured, a certain 
kind of power centres within alliances. Over time, larger group- ;: '; 
'' 23 
ings of the constituent small kin-groups were eventually formed, 
and these larger groupings were mainly defined by the socio-cult- 
ural features of the groups nearest to, or atithe -"pbwer_ centres" 
that haves emerged. Finally, at certain points in their respective 
histories, these large groupings began to assume the status of 
'tribes' and to function as such. Yet the designation of a group 
by the name of a certain tribe did not necessarily imply that all 
the members of the group belonged to that particular tribe; the 
fluidity and flexibility of the system of organization meant that 
each group was constantly liable to be affected by the formation 
of new alliances, by the adoption of different names and habits, 
and even, on occasions, by collapse and disintegration. 
24 
The relatively peaceful nature of Arab penetration into 
the Sudan began to change towards the end of the fifteenth cen- 
tury, as did the early pattern of tribal structure. There was 
a re-emphasis of former tribal traditions and a new consolidat- 
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ion of them. Many factors appear to have affected this develop- 
ment. Firstly, there were the clashes which developed between 
the original inhabitants of Allawa kingdom and the 'invading' 
Arab groups. It is easy to conceive how and why conflicts occur- 
red over the control of pastures in the rich riverain lands in 
particular. 
25 
And local clashes ultimately developed into tribaZ 
warfare. Secondly, encouraged by the weakness of the Christian 
kingdom and by their own numerical superiority, the Arab groups 
began to act decisively against the tyranny of the Anaj kings 
of Allawa. This tyranny, or ZuLum, which provoked the Arabs had 
two aspects; there was the specific aspect of the kind of react- 
ion that may be expected of any 'Muslim' group against being 
ruled by Christians, and there was a more general reaction aga- 
inst the demands of the rulers that the Arabs should pay 'taxes' 
and obey the laws of Al l awa . Soon after defeating the Ana j in 
Allawa, the Arabs had to contend with a new and formidable enemy, 
namely the Funj who began to push northwards down the Blue Nile 
River. 26 
All these factors induced the Arabs to consolidate their 
socio-political organization and to formalize their institutions 
in order to be be able to carry out the immediate and relatively 
specific tasks of ensuring their survival through 'tribal war- 
fare'. When all hostilities ended through the final establish- 
ment of At-Sattana At-Zanga ('the Black Sultanate) in Sennar in 
1504, which lasted up to 1820, the one small but well articulated 
kin-groups had already assumed the character of 'tribes', which 
were relatively stable in their allegiances and well settled in 
various regions. This situation was then reinforced and more 
firmly established through the particular relationships developed 
between the kings of Sennar and these 'tribes'. These relation- 
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ships took the following forms: 
(a) There was full recognition of the authority of the Sheikhs 
of these tribes over their respective groups, especially in the 
case of the Abdallab. 
27 
Each Sheikh and his immediate kinsmen 
became the nucleus of their respective tribal groups. As such 
they were delegated the responsibility of collecting tribute, 
seeing to the orderly functioning of the land tenure system, and 
of the exploitation of agricultural resources in their areas. They 
performed these functions in the name of the Funj monarch and 
were thus involved in the administrative apparatus of the Funj 
state and, in consequence, the formerly fluid tribal organizat- 
ions became relatively rigid. 
(b) The state recognized, and even encouraged, the consolidation 
of tribal ideology through its inducement of the formal recording 
of the NAoba (genealogy) of each group, whether genuine or recon- 
structed on the basis of oral tradition. This process of record- 
ing genealogies and ideological codification had the immediate 
divisive effect of sorting out and classifying the 'Arabs', and 
in the long run it served as justification for the further con- 
solidation of tribal groups. 
The reasons for the Funj state to act in this way are not 
difficult to appreciate. The Arabs were its main rival contend- 
ers for authority and influence and they were its most immediate 
threat. The policy of fostering inter-group rivalries (tribalism) 
was an effective way to 'divide and rule'. 
It is relevant to 
recall that only 13 years following the establishment of 
the 
Funj kingdom, it was threatened by an invasion by Sultan Selim 
who had conquered Egypt in 
1517. Omara Dunkas (the first Funj 
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monarch) throught it well to write to Selim to explain that the 
inhabitants of his kingdom were Arabs of exalted lineage. In this 
respect, MacMichael, quoting Naum Shukair, claims that: 
With this letter he sent a book of the pedigrees of the 
Arab tribes in his kingdom compiled for him by el Imam 
el Samarkandi, one of the learned men of Sennar; and 
when this book reached the Sultan Selim its contents 
delighted him and he renounced the attack on Sudan. 
28 
The above are some of the main ways in which the mainly 
Arab population of Northern Sudan was increasingly involved in 
the process of tribalization. In the end, this process under- 
mined both the loose and amorphous nature of the original 'tri- 
bal' structures and Arab unity as one cultural group, and it led 
instead to the emergence of semi-closed tribal groupings. 
In addition to the socio-economic and political factors 
already discussed, the process of tribalization was also facil- 
itated by two other factors. The first was geographical: the vast- 
ness of the country, with extensive lands of pasture, give each 
group ample opportunity to develop a degree of independence and 
isolation from the others. The second factor was religious; in 
their attempt to revive and impose patriarchal ideology (accord- ' 
ing to which they could organize themselves along the lineage 
system dominant in their land of origin) in the place of the 
matriarchal ideology found in the Allawa kingdom, the Arabs were 
strongly stimulated by Islamic ideology. Patriarchy is, of course, 
fundamental to Islamic thought and lies at the base of a number 
of its socio-economic and political doctrines-e. g. inheritance, 
leadership, etc. 
The advent of the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule in the Sud- 
an (1821-1885) did not affect the 
basic factors through which 
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the process of tribalization had been formed and developed. Aft- 
er an initial period of resistance and displacement of the coun- 
try's populations, the inauguration of Mahu Bey as Governor of 
Sudan in 1825 marked the resumption of the state's policy of 
reconciling tribal Sheikhs. Their powers over their subordinates 
were fully reinstated, as was their status as effective leaders 
within the general administrative system of the Turks. 
29 
The Mahdist State (1885-1898) advocated a return to pure 
Islamic traditions (where sectarianism, however based, was irre- 
levant), but practical considerations and pragmatic administrat- 
ive attitudes led it to adopt somewhat different policies. Thus 
the Mahdi set out to win the support of various political groups 
by trying to persuade their Sheikhs to join his movement. 
30 
Later, 
after the establishment of the 'Revolutionary State', the adminis- 
trative structure was in fact built up with the cooperation and 
involvement of the Sheikhs, with an increase in their numbers, 
and with their appointment as EmLno (governors) of their resp- 
ective groups. 
31 
In addition, it is relevant to note that consi- 
derations of political balance led the new State to rely more 
heavily on certain tribes rather than others- e. g. more on the 
Ta'aisha than the Kababish. 
32 
This led to jealousy and resent- 
ment among groups such as the Kababish so that rivalry and comp- 
etition between the different groups was inevitably fostered. 
33 
I have tried to sketch out the process of tribalization 
over a long period of history in order to stress some of its com- 
plexity. The facts of central interest to us are, however, that 
at the beginning of this century the 
'tribal' situation was char- 
acterized by the following: 
(a) Various tribal-groups, formed around 'power centres' 
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in the various regions were maintained as the central government 
maintained and supported the 'power-centres'. Indeed, the state 
actively encouraged the formation and perpetuation of new ones. 
(b) In spite of the continuous growth and increasing stab- 
ility of the socio-economic and ideological bases of these 'cen- 
tres', the boundaries between different groups were often flex- 
ible and unstable. Both geographical limits and organizational 
structures were liable to change. 
(c) Conflict, rivalry and competition over local (as oppos- 
ed to national) issues were common, and these were salient feat- 
ures of 'tribalism' as described by many observers. Competition 
over local strategic resources was always marked- e. g. the Bat- 
ahin against the Shukria in the Butana (1802)34; the Hallawin 
against the Kwahla in Western Gezira (1790-1805)35; and Gaaliin 
against the Shaikia in the eighteenth century. 
36 
(d) Participation in conflict and warfare of this type and, 
to a lesser degree, the receipt of benefits deriving from these 
localized struggles, affected and involved most members of the 
groups concerned. This was so because internal mechanisms of 
socio-political structure and the whole process of reproduction 
of the group functioned according to relatively "egalitarian" tra- 
ditions. 37 For example, the defence of territory or the acquis- 
ition of new land or of water sources affected all members in a 
group and were therefore a matter of concern to the group as a 
whole. 
'(e) In spite of the continuous presence of a strong central 
state, 'tribal' groupings remained relatively autonomous local 
units practising a poorly developed subsistence economy. This 
relative autonomy was in effect readily allowed by the state 
whose effective demand was limited to the collection of tribute 
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or taxes. 
38 
Also, in the absence of any nationally coordinated 
economic activity, the 'tribal' groups naturally tended to main- 
tain a considerable degree of mutual economic independence. 
Having noted the main features which characterized what I 
call 'old tribalism', we may now devote our attention to 'modern 
tribalism'. 
With the introduction of British colonial rule in the Sudan 
in 1898 a completely different process of tribalization began to 
develop. The colonial policies which allowed and promoted this 
were all based on the clear recognition of the basic political 
and economic functions performed by the 'tribes', and the colon- 
ial government's first concern was to pacify and resettle the 
tribes while gaining their loyality. As Abdel Ghaffar puts it: 
It was part of the colonial policy in Sudan to 
stabilize the power centres as they found them 
and even to draw on historical tradition and 
cultural heritage in building new units. When 
this was done the colonial rule tried to set 
physical boundaries to these units through the 
39 
utilization of the concept of Dar (home). 
The clear and persistent adherence by the colonial admin- 
istration to this policy marks up a significant aspect of the 
systematic external pressures brought to bear on the people of 
the Sudan to consolidate tribalism and even, in some cases, to 
form tribes anew. 
40 As part of these policies, concerted press- 
ure was exerted on 'tribes' to stabilize and perpetuate their 
existing social, political and geographical 
boundaries. The sig- 
nificance of these policies can, 
however, only be fully appreci- 
ated if we note that they were part of a major contradiction 
in 
the development of the colonial capitalist economy. 
For, while 
'tribal' groups were pacified, resettled and stabilized within 
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the clearly demarcated boundaries of their respective Dann (homes), 
the development of the new capitalist economy worked- through un- 
even penetration as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3- to undermine 
the very basis of the policy of tribal segregation and stabiliz- 
ation. 
The emphasis on primary export production, coupled with in- 
tense efforts to boost production in particular regions, called 
for a pool of cheap labour in or around the regions in which 
this production was being promoted. In the case of the Gezira 
Scheme, an extensive range of developments was required to accom- 
pany the new plantation agriculture. Labour therefore had to be 
stimulated in various ways. The relatively sparsely populated 
region of the Gezira, began to receive an inflow of migrants 
drawn from remote regions, some of which were far located from 
others. 
41 
As these migrants found themselves in a completely new 
situation of co-existence with people from different 'tribal' 
groups, a basic aspect of colonial tribal policy (that of boun- 
daries) was effectively transcended. 
In the towns in particular, the people began to establish 
new kinds of boundaries in a manner which was directly influenced 
by the mechanisms of the colonial capitalist economy. The history 
of Hassaheisä under colonial administration, as outlined in Chap- 
ter 3, illustrates this point. By the mid 1940s the town had al- 
ready emerged as a multi-tribal settlement. Its development, like 
that of all colonial urban centres, was closely inter-related to 
that of its rural surrounds. The Gezira Scheme was syphoning off 
a substantial number of peoples from various and different regions 
of the Sudan to provide for both skilled and unskilled labour 
needed in the Scheme, as well as in the towns. In the specific 
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case of Hassaheisa, the people came to provide labour for the 
irrigation station, the ginneries, workshops, and various trans- 
port facilities, in addition to those who joined the trading sec- 
tor. 
The urban community which developed thus was largely govern- 
ed by the conditions and requirements imposed on it by the colon- 
ial capitalist economy. As seen in Chapter 2, the labour system 
which developed assumed that the subsistence of-workers and their 
families for the off-work season should be provided by means other 
than wages received during the work season. These other means came 
primarily from the indigenous consumption-oriented systems, wheth- 
er in the rural areas or in the towns (where they form a major 
section of what is now being called the informal sector). Thus the 
so-called 'traditional sector' was in effect made to bear the cost 
of maintaining the worker's family, of providing for its social 
services, of absorbing them when they were ill or unemployed. Un- 
der such a system, workers' wages could be paid below the histor- 
ical value of their labour power. This value would, of course, 
have been very high if it had covered the costs of reproduction 
and satisfied workers' needs at a level corresponding to that att- 
ained by metropolitan workers in Europe. In fact, quite the cont- 
rary occurred, with workers finding themselves in an economic sys- 
tem which effectively severed the link between the capacity to 
produce and the capacity to consume. In this way, the workers 
were integrated into the colonial capitalist economy as producers 
but not to any corresponding extent as consumers. 
42 
In consequence, the lack of security which inevitably 
deve- 
loped in such a system gave birth to a distinct pattern of 
behav- 
iour (i. e. the movement back and forth between the centres of 
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colonial capitalist economy (the modern export sector) and the 
'native reserves' (the traditional sector). Similar situations 
have often been noted in other Third World cities such as Cairo 
(Abu-Lughod)43, East London (Mayer)44, Lagos (Marris)45, and Mex- 
46 ico City (Lewis). These and many other studies have suggested 
that 'urban villages' exist in the hearts of cities and towns. In 
these 'villages', as Pahl has noted, there is a high level of soc- 
ial cohesion based on interwoven kinship networks and also a high 
level of primary contacts with strangers who rapidly become fam- 
iliar faces. At first sight, it may seem difficult, as Pahl finds 
it, "to understand how the city can both be a melting pot and seg- 
regate people into distinct neighbourhoods at the same time 
47 
In the particular case of Hassaheisa, given the nature of 
the colonial economy, it is evident that people's engagement in 
this kind of double life was in fact a kind of response condit- 
ioned by the mechanisms of that very economic system. In a certain 
sense, the people were compelled (they never freely 'chose') to 
build and maintain informal social networks ('urban villages') 
through their strong adherence to sets of cultural values and soc- 
ial normative frameworks based on their rural 'tribal' norms. These 
were only forms for what they were essentially trying to do; stren- 
gthening the only reserves of socio-economic security available to 
them under the given conditions. And this, then, provided the 
bases for the cultivation of 'modern tribalism' in the urban con- 
text and its continuous reproduction. 
To substantiate the above assertions, I will now examine in 
detail the emergence and development of social, economic, polit- 
ical and psycho-cultural reserves (the tribal units) of three 
specific groups in Hassaheisa: the Dubasin, the ShammaiiLn(North- 
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erners), and the Fur. Whatever definition of these groups we may 
adopt (geo-cultural or geo-ethnic units48, categories of social 
interaction49, ethnic groups50, or any other), the concomitant 
pattern of interaction between them is what I call 'tribalism'. 
THE DUBASIN 
The Dubasin make about 15% of the total population of Hassa- 
heisa (See Table 7: 4). 51 In Chapter 3 we noted the particular way 
by which the members of the Dubasin group came to settle in the 
town and the particular relation which they had with the site 
prior to the colonial period. These influenced to a great extent 
the manner through which they developed their 'tribal' unit, as 
well as the way in which they conceive their relationship with 
the place and the other groups which subsequently arrived there. 
The Dubasin believed, and continue to believe, that they were the 
'original' inhabitants of the town. This gives them the 'right', 
as they see it, to claim 'ownership' of the place; in their own 
eyes they are the most 'patriotic' inhabitants as opposed to the 
other groups which are only 'invaders' whose loyalties lie else- 
where. 
52 
The manner of the Dubasin's settlement also influenced the 
process of their constitution into a 'tribal' unit and thus the 
main features of this unit. In the course of making their perman- 
ent abode there, their cooperation and collaboration with 
the 
administration was largely, at the 
instigation of the colonial 
authorities, through one particular 
family rather than through 
the group as a whole. 
53 
Generally speaking, the Dubasin group is subdivided into 
the following sub-sections 
54: (1) Saifab, (2) Hetaykab, (3) 
Gif aynab, (4) Ghadayf ab, (5) Bilayab, 
(6) Gebelab and (7) 
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Raydab. All of these used to live in the region of Northern Gez- 
ira immediately to the south of Khartoum. Up to the early years 
of this century, they were for the most part nomadic, but they 
never wondered more than about seventy miles to the south of 
Khartoum. Their settlement in Hassaheisa was undertaken by a num- 
ber of families, the Daghala of the Saifab subsection, the Iheimir 
of the Raydab, the Feki el-Zewayn family of the Hetaykab, ... etc. 
But the colonial administration singled out the Iheimir family and 
gave it the role of leaders. Although I was unable to establish the 
exact course of events which led to this particular decision, it 
would seem from the "care, 
55 
shown by the administration in estab- 
lishing Hassaheisa and from the instructions laid down by Kitchener 
in his "Memorandum to Mudirs"56, which asked the District officers 
to be 
thoroughly in touch with the better class of native, through 
whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population 
... to know personally all the principal men of their 
district, 
and shown them, by friendly dealings and the interest taken in 
their individual concerns, that our object is to increase 
their propserity. (emphasis added). 
One would think of the following factors as being decisve: 
(a) The Iheimer family was the largest to settle in Hassaheisa. 
57 
(b) The position of the family as a 'power centre' among the Dub- 
asin was built up since Turkish rule and through the period of the 
Mahdia, when its head (Iheimir) served as Magadam in the Khalifa's 
army in the Eastern front58, even though he never challenged the 
status'of Kheir el-Seid who held important position among the 
Dub- 
59 59 
(c) The high degree of dependence of his family on the colonial 
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administration due to the family's alleged involvement in the 
capture of Abdel Kadir in 1908 through which they reinforced the 
enemity of the Hallawin. 
60 
Whatever the precise historical development may have been, 
the avialable materials clearly show that the Iheimir family rece- 
ived direct and regular encouragement and assistance from the col- 
onial administration in making their bid for recognition as the 
leading Dubasin family. We know, for example, that many of the 
Hallawin convicted for taking part in Abdel Kadir's Rebellion of 
1908 had their lands confiscated 
61 
and many of these lands were 
then registered under the name of the Iheimir family as a reward 
for its potential collaboration (cf. Chapter 5). 
62 We also know 
that, by appointing the leader of this family as a Sheikh and thus 
making him a 'Public Servant' associated with administration, the 
government was deliberately concerned 
to raise the status of the Sheikh as far as possible 
in the eyes of his people by trying to impress on them 
(and on him) that he is the representative in his own 
village of the Government. 
64 
After his appointment as Sheikh of Hassaheisa in 1913, El- 
Amin Iheimir was entitled to a remission of 5%0 on the taxes he 
collected according to the Taxation of Animals Ordinance65 of 
1903 and the instructions of the Civil Administration Order of 
the same year. He was then promoted to Omda and in 1918 he recei- 
ved a 3rd Class Robe of Honour from Sir L. Stack "in recognition 
of his good services to the Government". 
66 Later he was to acquire 
very considerable administrative powers when the "policy of admit- 
ting the native to share in the management of affairs and helping 
him to fit himself for the increased responsibilities involved" 
67 
was finally declared in the Powers of 
Sheikhs Ordinance 
8of 
1927. 
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These administrative powers were further enhanced by the estab- 
lishment of a native court in Hassaheisa in 1930 with the town 
courts' powers69, and his concomitant appointment as a "magist- 
rate of the Third Class under the Code of Criminal Procedure for 
the purpose of sitting on major and minor courts". 
7 0 
Five months 
later, on the occasion of H. M. King George V's Coronation Day, 
E1-Amin Iheimir was awarded another Robe of Honour, this time of 
the 2nd. Class "in recognition of his good services to the Govern- 
ment". 
71 
The above course of events led to an excessive concentrat- 
ion of administrative, legal and economic powers in the hands of 
the Iheimir family vis-a-vis other Dubasin families and others. 
By the early 1930s it had emerged as the undisputedly most power- 
ful family in the town in general and among the Dubasin in part- 
icul ar. 
Finally, the colonial administration spared no effort in 
furthering the interests of the Iheimir family through the prov- 
ision of education and government employment in a way not avail- 
able to others. In laying down the policy of education in Sudan 
at large, Cromer had in 1908 stressed the need to limit general 
education to small class of Sudanese, believing that this would 
weaken the development of a nationalist anti-colonial movement, 
as the natural consequence of education was considered to be the 
rise of a class of people who would demand the end of foreign 
rule. 
72 To create a small group of educated Sudanese, senior 
administrators toured the country trying to persuade 
leading 
families to enrol their children in government educational inst- 
itutions. 
73 Education, it was stressed, would "enlarge their out- 
look, increase their efficiency and standard of comfort, and bring 
them into closer sympathy with government". 
Education, for the 
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colonial administration in particular, would "produce a new 
generation of native chiefs of higher integrity" (emphasis added); 
they would be "efficient,, loyal, reliable, and contented- a race 
of self-respecting native gentlemen '' 
74 
. These efforts of the col- 
onial administration at the national level were intensified after 
the events of 1924 and the perception of a growing threat from the 
Sudanese who had been educated by the Egyptians before and during 
the Condominum period. Thus the colonial administration was inst- 
ructed to "admit the children of native notables of good birth 
and position"75 in its schools, because "native chiefs without 
education would not be able to stand up to the eýjend. L(educated) 
class ". 
76 
Under these policies, the children of E1-Amin Iheimir, the 
Omda of Hassaheisa, enjoyed ample educational opportunities, and 
they consequently enjoyed exceedingly good access to government 
employment later. This not only added to the family's social stand- 
ing, but also diversified its sources of income. As evidence of 
these statements, I give below a list of the names of the sons 
of Omda E1-Amin Iheimir with their level of education and their 
occupations. All had been educated between 1920 and 1938 mainly 
in Khartoum because the first Elementary school was not establish- 
ed in Hassaheisa until 1931, and the first Intermediate school 
not until 1950. 
In the light of the above review of the assistance granted 
to the Iheimir family, it is not surprising that the family devel- 
oped into a quite formidable political, economic and social 
inst- 
itution. As would be expected, too, there was considerable resent- 
ment and uneasiness among other 
Dubasin families in the town who 
felt that they had been victims of discrimination. Yet such resent- 
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ment was relatively muted and eventually came to be rechanneIIed and 
used on behalf of the Dubasin against non-Dubasin threats to the 
supermacy of the Iheimir family and especially against the threat 
of the Shammatiin merchant power which, as explained in Chapters 
3 and 4, began to emerge in the early 1930s. 
A List of Omda Iheimir Sons, Level of Their 
Education and Occupations. 
Name Level of Education Occupation 
Ahmed Intermediate Omda of Hassaheisa 
Taj el-Din Intermediate Omda of Hassaheisa 
Mohammed Gordon Memorial College Financial Controller 
Yousif Gordon Memorial College Section Manager 
(Sudan Railways) 
Sheikh Idris Elementary Unknown 
Abdel Kadir Intermediate Judge, Hassaheisa 
Abdin Unknown Unknown 
Hussein Intermediate Administrator (Gez- 
ira Board) 
Mahmoud Gordon Memorial College Irrigation Inspect. 
Mohammed Ahmed Unknown Unknown 
Abdel Alla Military College Army Officer 
Khalil Gordon Memorial College Engineer 
Source: Interview with Sayed/ Yousif El-Amin Iheimir (currently 
Director, Rates Office, Hassaheisa), -'5.11.1980. 
THE SHAMMALIIN 
Literally, the word ShammatUUn means Northerners. But in 
Hassaheisa it has been, and still is, used to refer to all groups 
coming to the town from the entire Northern Region (i. e. both the 
Northern Province and the Nile Province). At the present time, the 
ShammatU-n make up some 36% of the total population of the town, 
and are drawn from various tribal groups in the Northern Region. 
These groups include the Gaaliin_with the whole range of sections 
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that they comprise (i. e. Zaidab, Aliab, Kitiab, Mukabrab, Shaad- 
inab, Omerab, Hasaballab, Nafa'ab, Sa'adab, etc. ) and the Bedayria, 
Skaikia, and some Nubians. 
77 
As explained in Chapter 4, the inhabitants who came from the 
Northern Provinces are employed either in government departments 
and the Gezira Board or in trade. We also saw how they tend to 
monopolize the commercial activities in the SuI. It is in the 
commercial sphere that they have displayed the most dynamic aspect 
of their history and development in the town78, and it is in comm- 
erce that some of their families have established themselves as a 
new centre of power in the town. In particular, a few Bedayria 
families from Ganetti have over time succeeded in rising to import- 
ant positions in political and social spheres as well as in econ- 
omic life. Through the direct and active efforts of a few person- 
alities (i. e. Yousif Hassan, Ali Eisa Bishara, and the sons of 
Sid Ahmed) the Bedayria emerged as the nucleus around which other 
ShammatLJn agglomerated to form a group able to match, and even 
defeat, the previously dominant Dubasin. 
From the 1930s onwards the history of political development 
in the town was increasingly characterized by rivalary between 
the Iheimir family and the Bedayria Muswab. The main competition 
has been over certain key positions of power and influence. I have 
explained the ascendancy of the Iheimir family over the Dubasin, 
and now need to account for the ascendancy of Bedayria Muswab 
families over the Northerners. Again, the available evidence sugg- 
ests that a crucial role was played by the State : 
(1) It is well known that the Khatmiya Taniga (a religious sect) 
is firmly established in Northern Sudan since the early years of 
Turco-Egyptian rule. 
79 
With the imposition of the British colonial 
rule subsequent to the destruction of the Mahdist State, a vacuum 
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benefit. The colonial government, on the other hand, was most anx- 
ious to gain political support among the population and despite 
its tendency to regard religious movements as superstitious fan- 
atics, the Khatmiya "received special treatment from the author- 
ities, including financial aid' 
80 
in return for support and coll- 
aboration. In Hassaheisa town it appears that two factors influen- 
ced the administration's selection of the Bedayria Muswab famil- 
ies to perform locally the kind of service provided by the khat- 
miya nationally. The service was to act as intermediaries with 
the Northerners and to help win their acceptance and cooperation 
without expecting in return any formal position in the administ- 
rative system. 
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The two factors which probably influenced the 
choice of the Muswab families at the local level were (a) the 
relatively large numbers of them among the Northerners in Hassa- 
heisa, and (b) the firm loyalty of the family to the Khatmiya 
sect combined with the fact that in 1928 the head of this family 
had been appointed as Omda in their Northern home in Ganetti. 
82 
Thus in recognition of this group's cooperation and stim- 
ulating future collaboration with the government, one of them who 
was the chief merchant of the Hassaheisa market received a 3rd 
Class Robe of Honour in 1937.83 
(2) From about the time of the outbreak of World War II, the Mus- 
wab family began to assume a greater role in the town politics 
and administration at the expense of the traditional authority of 
the Iheimir family, and they increasingly controlled the main eff- 
ective channels of contact between the 
local population and the 
colonial administration. This position was achieved and secured 
through the careful and skillful manipulation of their relation- 
ship with the government at two 
important levels. Firstly, as seen 
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in Chapter 4, they had a virtual monopoly over the Merchants' 
Committee, and this gave them the opportunity to develop direct 
contact with the British Inspector of the District. This helped 
them to lay their own interests and those of other Northern 'foll- 
owers' before the government and, as a result, they acquired a 
good deal of preferential treatment in housing, jobs, health ser- 
vices and the like. The administration was thus better able to 
control. the Northerners, while the Muswab family, who were effect- 
ive agents in this, were able to use their position of virtual 
"contact monopoly" as a lever to gain further privileges and to 
consolidate their status as 'patrons' of their Northern 'clients'. 
Secondly, this special relationship acquired a further dimension 
by the development of a politico-tribal relationship between the 
members of the Muswab and local junior staff of the administration 
living in the town. The convergence of the political attitudes of 
this group (as Sufa merchants) and of the junior administrators 
(Nationalist Graduates) is explained in Chapter 4. The regional 
and/or 'tribal' origins of the two groups being the same, their 
political alliance in the town was an important 
factor in their 
joint efforts to build popular support among the Northerners. 
This 
they did mainly through the systematic channelling of services, 
and the provision of certain public resources, to which 
the Muswab 
had easy access, to members of the wider group 
to which they belon- 
ged. 
At the same time, the influence and powers of the 
Iheimir 
were being eroded as a result of the adoption 
by the gov- family' 
ernment of a policy of 
'local government' rather than 'native adm- 
inistration'. 
84 The leading Muswab thus found increasing opport- 
unities to occupy wider 
intermediary position between the adminis- 
tration and the town's population at 
large. The relatively large 
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number of their supporters and the alliances they had established 
with leading rural families in the surrounding area85, had combined 
to enable them to take control of local government institutions 
from about 1941 (this is explained in Chapter 8). 
(3) Another factor which helps to account for the ascendency of 
the Bedayria Muswab families over other Northerners is their own 
high ability in manipulating different aspects of the 'tribal' 
ideology of the Shammatiin. While offering themselves as a group 
of patrons in relation to the wider Northern groups, they spared 
no effort to emphasize and demonstrate the unity and togetherness 
of the whole Shammaliin. As is illustrated below, they engaged in 
active 'propaganda' which stressed the factors of unity among the 
Northerners, and played down those which were divisive. The foll- 
owing are examples of how this was done. 
(a) From the beginning the Muswab were actively opposed to 
the use of particular tribal names by and for groups such as the 
Bedayria, the Shaikia and the Gaaliin. 
86 
Instead, they used, and 
encouraged others to use, the term Shammaiiin as a label of ident- 
ification. They thus tried to avoid the fragmentation of the wider 
group into the 'real' tribal affiliations of various Northerners, 
and they equally strove to prevent any collapse of Shammat-i. Ln iden- 
tity which might have taken place if they had tried to impose their 
own tribal identity of Bedayria on the whole group. In this conn- 
ection, it is relevant to note that when I carried out my survey 
I interviewed 189 heads of households from these Northern groups, 
but on1 y 47 gave me their original 'tribal' identification in res- 
ponse to a question on 'tribal origin'. Of these 47,24 were Nub- 
ians who are only loosely connected to the wider group of the 
ShammaL'L'n, and 23 were Gaaliin. The rest (142) all gave the word 
ShammatL (Northerner) as their first response, and I had to press 
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my question before I could obtain any more specific answer. The 
vast majority of these turned out to be non-Gaaliin and non-Nub- 
ians. The use of the term 'Northerners' thus serves to blur the 
differences between various Northern 'tribal' groups and also obs- 
cures the genealogical and regional 'distinctions' between them. 
(b) To bring the various elements of Gaaliin into the wider 
'Northerners' group and to maintain the Gaaliin allegiance to the 
latter, the leading Bedayria group worked persistently to emphas- 
ize such common genealogical origins as they share (See the gen- 
ealogy of the Bedayria). On the other hand, the genealogical aff- 
inity between the two groups was seldom brought to the attention 
of other Northerners; for doing so might only have undermined their 
relationship with other non-Gaaliin, though Northerner, groups. 
(c) The Shaikia are one of the most important non-Gaaliin 
groups of Northerners, and for them the Bedayria employed a quite 
different mode of common identification. In this case, the Bedayria 
relied heavily on the concept of 'common locality', as the Beday- 
ria of Hassaheisa came mainly from Ganetti which is located in the 
Shaikia region in the Northern Province (i. e. Merowe Rural Coun- 
cil). Thus they tried to secure the loyalty of the Shaikia by 
appealing to locality rather than to any real or supposed common 
ancestory. And because the Merowe area is generally 
known as a 
Shaikia home area, many of the Bedayria in Hassaheisa 
(especially 
those with low incomes) tended to give 
'Shaiki' in response to my 
question on tribal identification 
(after having first given the 
response of Northerner). But I had 
in such case to use my prior 
knowledge of the informants and to press my inquiries to obtain 
the final response. Common locality or merely proximity of origin 
are used by the Bedayria 
in their attempts to identify with other 
Nubian groups in Hassaheisa, 
but they have had far less success 
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Fig. 9 The Nisba (Pedigree) of Bedayria Muswab in Hassaheisa 
Hashim (the grandfather of Hashimite Arabs) 
Abdel Muttalib (Grandfather of Prophet Mohammed) 
El-Abbas (Uncle of Prophet Mohammed) 
Abdul la 
El Fadl (Ancestor of all Gaaliin in Sudan) 
Saad 
Ibrahim el Gaali 
Mohammed el Yemeni 
Ahmed el Hegazi 
Masruk 
Harkan 
Budaa 
Abu el Dis 
Kerdam 
Serrar (Ancestor of Gaaliin Proper) 
Samra 
Bedayr (Ancestor of all Bedayria in Sudan) 
Dahmash 
Muhammed 
Salah 
Mohammed 
Musa the elder (Ancestor of Bedayria Muswab) 
Sal ah 
Nasrul la 
Mohammed 
Hammad 
El Malik Musa el-Sughayr (the 'younger') 
Abu el Kasim (Ancestor of all Bedayria Musawab families 
in Hassaheisa, originally coming from Genatti 
in Northern Province and which include: 
a. Awlad ('sons') Sid Ahmed 
b. Awlad Abdul Rahim 
C. Awl ad Babiker 
d. Awlad Bishara 
Source: related to me by Mr Ali Eisa Bishara, Hassaheisa, 
but cf. 
with the Nisba (pedigree) of Ahmed 
ibn Ismail el Azhari in Mac- 
Michael, op. cit., p. 80. (N. B. last generation at bottom of Nisba) 
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in this than with the Shaikia. Most of the Nubians are no more 
than fringe members of the Northerners group with whom they have 
very loose connection. 
It should, however, not to be thought that the Bedayria eng- 
aged in any thing like conspiratorial socio-political activity. My 
observations are made simply to indicate the type of subtle manip- 
ulations which take place in everyday life, often in a quite spon- 
taneous way. The juggling of identity claims promote the image of 
the Northerners group in contradistinction to that of other groups 
in the town. And Northerners identity is used to served the ends 
and interests of a particular group, namely the Bedayria Muswab. 
More generally, my observations serve to show how a particular 
interest group is commonly ready to invent, compromise, even sac- 
rifice its own identity in order to secure wider support necessary 
for the service of its particular interests in both the short and 
the long terms. 
THE FUR 
My interest in the study of the process of tribalization 
of the Fur in Hassaheisa stems from two distinct concerns: 
(i) The first is epistemological in nature. It relates to the gen- 
eral need to know more about, and try to explain, the way in which 
a form of dominant ideology- tribalism in this case- is propogated 
primarily to serve the particular interests of dominant groups in 
the community, and the ways in which this ideology penetrates the 
minds of the dominated groups. 
(ii) The second is empirical and more specific. It derives from 
the need to domenstrate how certain members of the 
dominated gro- 
ups can use the deprivation and 
disadvantages of the group first 
to agitate and to mobolize support 
from the group, and then to 
9 
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use this support as a lever to elevate their own socio-economic 
status. And, clearly related to these interests, is our need to 
see how, in the overall ideological process, the real bases of 
antagonisms between different groups are minimized and distorted. 
The process of tribalization of the Fur in Hassaheisa began 
with the arrival of a number of people, originally from Dar Fur, 
in the town towards the end of the 1920s. They had been drawn to 
the area in response to the rising needs for labour in the Gezira 
Scheme. As I explained in Chapter 6, the nature of the Gezira Sch- 
eme ginneries at Hassaheisa called only for partial and seasonal 
employment from a considerable section of the labour force. Those 
who came from Darfur constituted an important section of the new 
workers. In spite of their heavy involvement in seasonal agricul- 
tural operations in the Gezira cotton fields during the off-season 
in the ginneries, their position remained largely insecure and 
precarious. In addition to reasons which applied to many other 
workers, those from Dar Fur had the difficulties of distance from 
their homeland to contend with, including the high costs of jour- 
neys. It was therefore a matter of dire necessity for them to 
build some kind of 'native reserve' or 'urban village' or other 
informal social institutions to enable them to have some resources 
to fall back upon at all times, and particularly when faced with 
personal and/or family crises. 
At first they lived near the Ginneries' area in temporary 
'houses' of poor quality. But from 1940 onwards they began to 
build permanent houses in the present area of Hillat Fur, which 
was outside the town boundaries. In 1954, in accordance with the 
Government Town Lands (Native Occupation) Ordinance of 1912, the 
area was officially declared a 
legal residence and was replanned 
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and systematized. 
87 
As a group of low socio-economic status in the urban comm- 
unity, the Darfurians were continually squeezed between the powers 
of the Dubasin in the administration and judiciary on the one hand, 
and the exploitation of the Northern traders on the other. More- 
over, they were inevitably in competition with other better-paid 
and more able groups over the limited resources available in the 
town. Hence their community turned into a seed-bed for 'anti-soc- 
ial" and "anti-order" practices and they came to be seen as ser- 
ious threat to the 'public order' and to the community. As early 
as 1937, the Northern Gezira District Annual Report pointed out 
that: 
Between the 1st and 26th of February there were no less 
than 16 affrays in which knives were used without fatal 
results. Most of these cases were tried by the native 
courts: the accused were all blacks. 
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The Report refers specifically to the people who were liv- 
ing in the residential area of the Fur and to those from Western 
Darfur as the Black settlers (as opposed to other Arab groups) who 
-the blacks- "are a not unlikeable community of hooligans who work, 
drink and fight their way through life with commandable joy". The 
"drecrease in the number of convictions for offences against pro- 
perty" in that year was conceived by the Report as "evidence of 
8 
a greater respect shown. for property by the black community". 
9 
Despite these optimistic and light hearted references to the Fur, 
it was not in dispute that they were regarded as being given to 
violence and theft. 
It seems from this kind of reports, from stories about the 
Fur, from the attitudes attributed to them, and from accounts of 
the history of this "black community", that their general 
image 
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was one of rebelliousness and intransigence and that they them- 
selves partly subscribed to it. Whatever the case, the administr- 
ation perceived a need to try to facilitate their incorporation 
in the economy and society through their acceptance of the role 
and position as low-paid and unskilled. To this end, a particular 
family- that of Mohamed Fur- was selected for elevation and for 
social and economic promotion. Below I give a brief account of 
the way this was achieved. 
Following 'disturbances' in Khartoum in 1924 involving Sud- 
anese military unit against the British, the 11th battalion was 
disbanded, and all its elements were either tried or expelled from 
the Capital. 
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Mohammed Fur had been a soldier in this battalion. 
After serving a short prison sentence, he was sent to Hassaheisa 
to work in the newly established Ginneries. 
91 flr_spite of his abil- 
ity to read and write, he was given a seasonal semi-skilled job. 
2 
But, as the number of people coming from Western Darfur for work 
in the Gezira Scheme fields and ginneries increased, the need 
arose to control and discipline them primarily as a work force and 
to tame them as a social category. Thus Mohamed Fur was promoted to 
the status of Sheikh Ommat (chief-worker) to help in the organiz- 
ation of this control. From then on, Mohammed Fur and his family 
were continually promoted and assisted by the authorities in var- 
ious ways until they achieved certain recognition as a power cen- 
tre among Darfurians in the town. 
To appreciate the significance of this series of promotions, 
we need to ask ourselves how and why the colonial authorities chose 
Mohamed Fur for favoured treatment rather than anyone else? The 
answer can be constructed in relation to the need of 
the colonial 
administration to find an 
intermediary between itself and Darfur- 
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ians so as to enable a measure of mitigation and control- econ- 
omic-as well as political- to be developed over them. Mohamed Fur 
was apparently one of the very few "candidates" considered suit- 
able because 
Firstly; Mohamed was one of the very few literate among 
the Darfurians in Hassaheisa, and he was also experienced in for- 
mal government employment; he spoke the Fur language and Arabic 
whereas the majority of the Darfurians in Hassaheisa in those 
early times were only able to understand the latter. 
93 
Secondly, 
Mohamed claimed to be a descendant of the Sultan Yahia and Sultan 
Ali Dinar of Darfur 
94, 
and this was of particular value in view 
of the heterogeneous tribal origins of Darfurians; by emphasizing 
Mohamed's "noble ancestory" it was possible to make a broad appeal 
for support from all who came from Darfur, and also, more cruc- 
ially, to justify the favourable treatment for him by the admin- 
istration. 
Mohamed Fur's "career" can then be seen in the light of his 
selection as a leader and the impact of this on the formation of 
a "tribal" group among the Fur in Hassaheisa. 
(1) By making him a chief-worker (Sheikh Ommat), the administrat- 
ion was in fact giving him the opportunity to earn higher wage 
than that of his average fellow men, and it was also in his cap- 
acity as a chief-worker that he became a key figure in the dist- 
ribution and allocation of available jobs to Darfurians. In effect, 
he thus became a recruiting agent for the administration. 
(2) In 1941 he was appointed as administrative Sheikh, under the 
Omdaship of Iheimir, of Hillat Fur95(i. e. Fur's village), a name 
which derived from his own rather than from the Sudanese "tribe" 
known as Fur. As a Sheikh he was fully incorporated in the admin- 
istrative structure and was empowered with considerable authority 
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over his fellow residents and he served as an active consultant 
in all disputes involving members of Darfurian tribes in the 
town. 
96 
(3) During both the periods of the establishment of Hillat Fur 
(i. e. the squatting of 1940 and the formal land planning and dis- 
tribution of 1954) Mohamed Fur exercised considerable power in 
the allocation of land among the people around him. Through this 
power- which was apparently a result and consequent for his occup- 
ation of the position of contact with the administration- he was 
able first to form and subsequently to strengthen abase from which he 
could claim support and loyalty from his fellow men. 
(4) Being better-off financially than most of his fellows, he was 
able to educate his sons and to prepare them to take over the fam- 
ily's privileged position in the 'black community'. Thus his son 
Ismael received primary education in addition to Khatwa, and is 
now a trader in the town, who has since 1970 been the "represent- 
ative" of the Fur Residential Area on the People's Town Council; 
in the most recent council session of 1977-1981, he was elected 
as deputy leader (See the next Chapter for further details and 
analysis on this point). 
(5) Finally, the powers of his family were, and are still being, 
consolidated by extra concessions from various contending fact- 
ions in the town's politics (from the Dubasin and Shaikia in part- 
icular). In the next chapter, we shall see that in the absence of 
a clear majority for either of the two main political 
factions, the 
Fur representative has, together with other minority representat- 
ives, extracted significant political and economic concessions 
in 
the course of skillful politics on the Council. 
From the foregoing account about the way Mohamed Fur's fam- 
ily developed into a power centre around which Darfurians in Hass- 
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aheisa allied, one can easily discover the possibility of its 
development into an "agitating agent" if it were not systematic- 
ally incorporated and promoted since the colonial rule up to the 
present. 
PARTICULAR MANIFESTATIONS OF "TRIBALISTIC" BEHAVIOUR 
Under the political and socio-economic conditions of the 
colonial economy and society, which had first given rise to, and 
then sustained, tribalism, leading families like those referred 
to above spared no effort in encouraging and rewarding responses 
from the followers which led to a sense of 'tribal' cohesion, to 
loyalty to the "tribal" group, and to a confirmation of tribal 
identity. I now give accounts to particular examples of this 'tri- 
balsim' in the Hassaheisa community. 
1. Clubs: 
The establishment of clubs based on 'tribal' groupings, and 
the extent of participation in them, are important indicators of 
the nature and degree of 'tribalism' in the urban community. Though 
different sports (football in particular) are the main activities 
of many clubs, their social and political functions are also imp- 
ortant. Most of the local clubs bear names such as the "Sports, 
Social, and Cultural Club of so and so", and all these types of 
activity are often referred to on their official certificates of 
registration. But as socio-political institutions, most of these 
clubs are established along tribal lines, though they were by no 
means. exclusively tribal in membership. In 1951 the ShammaLiin 
established E1-Hi l al (Crescent) Club which was initially composed of 
people of Bedayria 'origin' and of higher income groups. In reply 
the Dubasin established E1-Ahli (the 'Native') Club in 1954. Two 
further clubs were established in 1956, one El-Mareikh (Mars) 
Club mainly for Turco-Egyptian immigrants, and the other Ghalb el 
354 
Gezira (Heart of Gezira) for persons from near-by villages in 
the Gezira. A year later in 1957 a group of Gaaliin in Mygouma 
residential area established El-Zahra (Venus) Club and in 
1962 another group of Northerners (mainly Shaikia) established 
El-Shabiba (The Youth) Club. Then in 1964 the West Darfurians 
established El-Islah (The Reformation) Club. 
All these clubs have been very important institutions of 
'tribal' identification. While sport is the main activity of 
most of them, the membership is largely recruited from within the 
respective tribal groups and the office holders of each are pre- 
dominantly members of the tribal group on which the club is based. 
Thus, given the poor facilities of public entertainment available 
in the town, the clubs functioned as the places where people come 
together and entertain. This worked in fact to strengthen the feel- 
ing of togetherness and, at the same time, maintain the distance 
between various groups. This is again being reinforced by the fan- 
atic support each group gives to its club in the regular football 
matches competitions. 
INTERMARRIAGE: 
The extremely low level of inter-marriage between various 
tribal groups may be seen in Table 7: 17. This is at once an ind- 
ication of inter-group exclusiveness, and as such also an 
indicator 
of the strength of the factor working to enhance and 
further the 
process of tribalization in the community. 
The Table is compiled 
from the responses of the heads of households in the survey sample 
to a question about the tribal origins of themselves and 
those of 
their spouses. It is clear that there is a 
high level of 'tribal' 
endogamy with approximately 
87.3% being endogamous in the sense 
described. But close scrutiny of different cases (particularly 
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those of the Dubasin and Northerners), suggests that, taken in 
their known historical contexts, there are interesting changes 
taking place. It would seem from the available data that inter- 
marriage during the early times (before 1930s) between the Dubasin 
and newcomers to Hassaheisa was fairly general and had been taking 
place with most of the immigrant groups and particularly with those 
from Northern Sudan. 97 (e. g. Mohamed Ali Haddad came to Hassaheisa 
in 1918 from Awlad A'bid, Moura Island, Northern Province, and one 
year later married Mariam Oshari Al-Faki Al-Zewayn, a Dubasin wo- 
man from Hassaheisa; Sulayman Kharoumi came from Zaidab in North- 
ern Province in 1916 and soon married Birra Bint Osman Salih, also 
a local Dubasin woman; during the same early period Mohamed Ismael 
A1-Mahasi came to Hassaheisa from Al-Naf a'ab, to the east of Kurti 
in Northern Province, and married another Dubasin woman; similarly 
Yousif Abu Saif and Ahmed Sulayman Thabit, both of Egyptian origin, 
married Dubasin women, the first to Zainab Bint Abdalla A1-A'eis, 
and the second to Batoul Bint Bakheit. The Omda E1-Amin Iheimir 
whom we referred to as a singularly important character in the 
town's history, married Batoul Bint El-Sid, a woman of Egyptian 
origin and a relative of the above mentioned Thabit, in addition 
to his three Dubasin wives, while his daughter, Nafisa, was marr- 
ied to Hussein Aloub from Berber, Northern Province. Also, Mohamed 
Suleiman Al-Barbari, a Nubian from Artigi in the Argin area of 
Half a, Northern Province, married Shamma Bint Al-Rughum, a Dubasin 
woman). And even shortly after the onset of "tribal" competition 
for local leadership in the 1930s, many Dubasin men married North- 
ern women (e. g. Yousif Al-Amin Iheimir, Mubarak Hassan Osman, 
Ali 
A'tta Al-Mula, Mohamed Eisa, and Ya'akoub Al-Dubasi). But, while 
it could-be difficult to prove conclusively 
from my data, it would 
seem that in more recent times the rate of inter-marriage 
has 
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sharply declined, which would, if further substantiated, serve 
to support my general proposition that intermarriage tends to 
decrease in response to the intensification of tribalization and 
of its concomitant hostilities in the one community. 
98 
3. POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: 
Since tribalism in the town has, according to my analysis, 
developed mainly through competition and conflict over the dist- 
ribution and allocation of resources in the town and over posit- 
ions of power in the local political arena, it is reasonable to 
expect that it is in urban politics that tribalism may be most 
widely manipulated. This will be further analysed in the next 
Chapter, but the following general observations serve to illust- 
rate the point I am making. 
(i) The local patterns of affiliation and allegiances to national 
political parties clearly reflect a "tribal" factor and we there- 
fore need to examine the considerations which underly these patt- 
erns. From the earliest emergence of national political parties, 
the Dubasin chose to support the Umma Party, while the ShammatiLn 
strongly backed the other main competitor for supermacy, namely 
the Nationalist Unionist Party. 
99 Through the four national elect- 
ions held under the party political system (in 1953,1957,1965, 
and 1967) the polling results showed the extent of the split in 
the town along tribal and party lines. 
(ii) Affiliation to various politico-religious sects in the town 
also reflects the contentions which divide 
different "tribal" gro- 
ups. The Northerners are people from an area of origin where 
the 
influence of the Khatmiya religious order is strong and widespread, 
whereas the Dubasin have never 
had any marked interest or involve- 
ment in religious orders 
(taniga. 6 ). To the contrary, the Dubasin 
1"i :i; : 1Y r' 
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history during the early years of colonial rule reflects some 
active hostility to ta' qaz and to the Mahdist Anzan order in 
particular. 100 After the 1930s, however, with national events 
and colonial policies leading to the rehabilitation of Sayed 
Abdel Rahman, son of Al-Mahdi101, as a measure to check the deve- 
lopment of the anti-colonial nationalist movement, the Dubasin 
began to show guarded loyalty to the Ansar order and a continuous 
but increasing involvement in its organizations. And, during the 
same period, the Shammaliin began to revive and reorganize their 
Khatmiya loyalties which had seriously declined among them prev- 
iously. Thus competition between these two leading tribal groups 
acquired a new dimension of a religious significance. 
(iii) My observations of the present day would indicate that these 
differences have to some extent been transmitted to the new gen- 
erations though under new guises. Thus my attempt in 1980 to ass- 
ess the allegiances of the town's university and equivalent stud- 
ents who are members of the League of Hassaheisa Sons in Univers- 
ities and Higher Institutions, led me to conclude, after elimin- 
ating those with no active political loyalties, that 8 out of 35 
Shammatii n students were on the Right (mainly members of the Mus- 
lim Brotherhood) and 27 on the Left (mainly members of the Democ- 
ratic Front in the Universities), while only 3 of 22 Dubasin stud- 
ents were "Leftists" and the remaining 19 were "Rightists". 
(iv) Although national political parties have receded from the 
political arena since 1969, the basic orientation of the town's 
electorate has changed very little, if at all. The various elect- 
ions held during the last decade suggest that the primacy and 
depth of "tribal" ideologies as reflected in political allegian- 
ces have persisted. The analysis of the most recent election- 
without political parties- confirms the above statements. In 
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Table 7: 18 I present the detailed results of the May 1981 elect- 
ion for the representative of Hassaheisa Town, the areas covered 
by Hassaheisa Rural Council, Wad Habouba Rural Council, and Abu 
Ushar Town, to the newly established Regional Assembly of the 
Central Region at Wad Medani. 
102 
At the beginning of what promised 
to be a bitter campaign, the contending groups in Hassaheisa came 
together at a meeting of what they called "national reconciliat- 
ion"103 and agreed that the town's electorate should be given the 
opportunity to vote for one candidate, chosen by a select commit- 
tee of the leaders of various "tribal" groups and recommended by 
this committee to members of all groups. He was to be, according 
to the agreement, the town's only candidate in competition with 
candidates from other areas. The committee was also to choose two 
other candidates for the two Hassaheisa Town constituencies (Hass- 
aheisa East and Hassaheisa West) for the lower council of the reg- 
ional government (i. e. the Northern Gezira District Council). Acc- 
ording to the agreement, these two seats would not be contested. 
Thus E1-Tahir Hassan Osman, a Dubasin businessman, became the 
agreed candidate for Hassaheisa East, and Ali Eisa Bishara, a 
Shamma. L Suk merchant, the candidate for the Western Constituency. 
Both seats being uncontested, these candidates were returned. 
104 
After much arguement the select committee chose Hassan 
Abdel Rahim Al-Jamal, a policeman of Northern origin, as the sole 
candidate from Hassaheisa to face candidates from other places, 
and he was deemed by the agreement to have the whole hearted 
support of the entire electorate of the town. But the choice of 
this candidate caused considerable resentment and dissatisfaction 
among the Dubasin. This is reflected in several ways 
in the vot- 
ing figures given in Table 7: 18. 
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(a) Although the electoral turn-out was generally low (29.7%) 
-a fact attributable in part to the absence of competing cand- 
idates in the town, and in part to the general disillusionment 
about the elections and other "representative" institutions under 
the present regime in the Sudan- the Dubasin showed even greater 
indifference towards the election than average in spite of the 
candidate's need of their votes. In the Wassat- area (which is 
predominantly Dubasin), for example, only 17.4% of the electorate 
turned out to vote. 
(b) Of the Dubasin who did vote, a larger proportion than in the 
town as a whole supported candidates other than Hassan Abdel Rahim 
Al-Jamal, the Shammaiiin candidate, who was supposed to receive 
support from the town as a whole. He received only 56.7%, 48. Q70 
and 58.6% of the votes from areas dominated by the Dubasin: Wassat, 
Dhagalla and Shargi respectively-In contrast to this the Shammaliin 
areas he received much higher support (e. g. Karima, 91.3%; Mazad 
and Imtidad, 76.9%0; Police Quarter, 92.57; Mobile Police, 92.9%; 
Ghorrashi Irrigation Station, 87.70; Mygouma, 87.87 and Jadida, 
90.3% -cf. Table 7: 4 showing the residential 
distribution of the 
different "tribal" groups in the town). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis clearly reveals that tribalism in the urban 
situation as defined in this chapter, is a well established and 
deep-rooted phenomenon in Hassaheisa. It is my contention that the 
nature and the requirements of the colonial capitalist economy 
may be held to account for the emergence and growth of 
such trib- 
alism, and that its persistence and solidification 
are a conseq- 
uence of a continuing 
"distortion" of the economy and society in 
the post-colonial period. I contend that the growth and expansion 
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of the particular form of capitalistic commercial accumulation 
in post-colonial Hassaheisa have simply allowed the ideology of 
tribalism, institutionalized in the colonial period, to develop 
and to be consolidated. The economic system of the town- and of 
the Sudan as a whole- are too weak and dependent to allow any 
genuinely progressive socio-economic transformations. In my anal- 
ysis, I have attempted to illustrate the sense in which the dom- 
inant ideology of major groupings in the town is tribal. I regard 
this ideology as one of the "modern" tribalism, and I contrast it 
to the earlier "traditional" tribalism of pre-colonial days. In 
its specific context, the modern tribalism encountered in Hassah- 
eisa has the following salient features: 
(i) It bears little or no resemblance to the pre-colonial systems 
of social relations between "tribes" or between members of one 
"tribe ". 105 Prior to colonial rule there was no enmity between 
tribal groups now represented in Hassaheisa; indeed, there scarc- 
ely were any relations (whether hostile or friendly) between, say, 
the Dubasin of Gezira, the Shaikia of Northern Province, and the 
Fur of Western Darfur. What brought these various groups, or more 
precisely, peoples drawn from these "tribal" groups into direct 
contact and meaningful relations with each other, probably for 
the first time in their histories, was exactly their shared part- 
icipation in the colonial capitalist economy which was imposed on 
them from outside and in a way over which they had no control and 
little opportunity to resist. Thus the foundations of "modern" 
tribalism in Hassaheisa were laid when the various tribal indigen- 
ous socio-economic formations were partly displaced and partly 
distorted by colonial capitalism to the extent that migration to 
town was set in motion. This migration and the relative poverty 
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and inequality of opportunities in town gave rise to forms of 
insecurity and to competition for, and conflict over the limited 
resources and opportunities in the fields of work, residential 
land and other services and amenities necessary for any attempt 
to accommodate to the new urban life which arose out of colonial 
policies. 
106 
(ii) As a set of relations operating between different tribal 
groups, and based primarily on the perceptions held by peoples of 
various groups in relation to each other, tribalism figures as 
essentially an ideological phenomenon. 
107 
It arises out of one 
group of deprived people seeing other groups who are similarly 
deprived as the source of their insecurity, frustrations, and dep- 
rivation, and is developed and maintained' out of the "failure" of 
all local groups to see the full nature of their common exploit- 
ation through forces and policies stemming from outside their 
immediate interests. 108 
(iii) In Hassaheisa this situation did not develop "spontaneously" 
by which I mean without the direction or articulation of State 
policies. The colonial administration played a crucial role in 
fostering tribalism and in using it, once established, as a means 
of socio-political control as well as economic exploitation. Thus 
it is well documented that various specific policies were consis- 
tently developed to make the "tribal authorities"- in the meas- 
ure that they existed, and as they were progressively established- 
responsible for political and economic dealings between the State 
109 
and ordinary members of various groups, and also to assign to 
them the judicial and administrative roles which bore directly on 
individuals. The competition between contending leading families 
was developed about the opportunity to occupy these roles, and the 
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support of ordinary members was mobilized to serve this end. In 
addition, we know from various sources- and I have documented 
some specific examples from Hassaheisa, that the administration 
commonly discriminate in favour of one "tribal" group against an- 
other in different situations and at different points of history. 
(iv) In the post-colonial period, this kind of tribalism, if any- 
thing, has been intensified. Thus the leading families (i. e. trib- 
al authorities) of Hassaheisa still habitually present themselves 
to "their" peoples as patrons capable of bringing maximum benefits 
to them at the expense of other people, calling for tribal unity 
"behind them" and thus emphasizing "tribal" identities, and cond- 
emning any attempt to examine or explain the real causes of depri- 
vation and insecurity in all their forms as divisive. 
In the following Chapter on the Hassaheisa Town Council and 
its politics, I set out to explain how wealthy leading families of 
various tribal groups seek the support of ordinary, and mainly 
poor, people in the constant competition between the wealthy for 
licences, contracts, commodities, land, and in fact over the total 
political power structure of the town. As part of the same system 
of political organization, the poor became 'clients' seeking the 
help and assistance of the wealthy 'patrons' in finding jobs, land, 
and other public services. The form of consciousness which embra- 
ces both these sets of interests, and which conceals the real con- 
flict between them, expresses itself in tribal loyalties and iden- 
tities which lead members of any one group to figure as having 
grievance against all others110. And, since the leading families 
are well aware that many of their own privileges depend on their 
continued domination and control of the politico-administrative 
apparatus of the Council, appeals to tribal unity serve the 
dual 
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purpose of enhancing their existing leadership positions and neg- 
ating challenges based on other principles such as class antagon- 
isms within a "tribal" group and class loyalties across tribal 
boundaries. The existing system of social and political control 
thus rests on ordinary people continuing to "believe" that tribal 
identities and loyalties are significant. Real conflicts and ant- 
agonisms between the poor masses and the relatively small number 
of merchants, businessmen, and landlords are thus largely obscured 
by tribal forms of consciousness. And the more acute the contrad- 
ictions between the interests of poor and wealthy become, the more 
marked is tribal sentiments likely to be become, 
lll 
According to this analytical approach, "tribalism" can be 
explained as an ideology through which the contradictory interests 
of the poor and the rich in the town are partly expressed ( as 
between the poor and rich in different "tribal" groups), and part- 
ly concealed (within the same tribal group). This is a factor of 
prime importance in understanding why efforts to achieve " nation- 
al reconciliation and unity" in the town have had so little succ- 
ess. The very socio-economic forces mobilized in efforts of this 
kind ensure the consolidation of an economic system in which "tri- 
bal" identity and kinship increasingly provide the ordinary ind- 
ividual with his only "hope" of economic opportunity, or even 
of survival, in the town. 
r, 
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VII 
1. For example, Epstein, 1958; Mayer, 1961; Gluckman, 1960; Mitchell, 1956; Cohen, 1969; and Barth, 1966. 
2. My rejection of such approaches is mainly based on the ideo- logical assumptions underlying the anthropological use of the notion 'tribe', and the conceptual and theoretical implicat- ions of our acceptance for such a notion. The theoretical 
adequacy of the concept of 'tribe' received a lot of critical appraisal; see Mafeje, 1971; and Asad, 1972. 
3. This is the kind of abstract definition of 'tribe' put by Mafeje. See Mafeje, A., 1971, p. 258. 
4. Ibid, p. 258. 
5. See Chapter 1 for a statement on the way in which the census- 
type survey was conducted and Appendix (Z) for details of 
the questionnaire used. 
6. Colin Leys, 1975, views the development of 'tribalism' among 
the Kikuyu and Luo in Kenya as "initially develops out of, and feeds on, the real development of antagonistic classes". He 
also shows how "appeals to tribal solidarity" repelled chall- 
enges based on class antagonisms against the dominance of 
the bourgeoisie with the Kikuyu tribe. See, pp. 204-5. 
7. See El-Mustafa, M. Y. A., 1981, pp. 20-4. 
8. See Department of Statistics, 1960, Table 9: 13. 
9. Bashir, M. O., 1978, p. 214. 
10. For some general observations on regional variations on this 
general statement, see Modawi, A. A., 1982, p. 25. 
11. For details, see Democratic Republic of the Sudan, 1977, Table 
1-29 pp. 3-8. 
12. These percentages are compiled from figures given in Galal- 
el-Din, M. E., n. d. (1978? ), p. 125. 
13. This partly illustrates the point I have made in Chapter 3 
on the prostitutes. 
14. Incomes are shown according to the wages and salaries preval- 
ent in the Sudan before the upwards changes of 1978 took place, 
according to which the minimum wage for unskilled worker was 
increased from ES 180.0 to ES 336.0 per annum (Presidential 
Ordinance No. 338; and Ministry of Public Service and Adminis- 
trative Reform Circular No. 4,15 October 1978). As for the 
other categories of income earners in the town such as traders 
and self-employed workers, the figures represent their own est- 
imates which could be more or less than their real incomes. 
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15. The earliest known attempt to link the South to the Sudan- 
ese State was made by Khedieve Ismail in 1871. He employed 
two Englishmen- Samuel Baker and Charles Gordon- to annex 
the sources of the Nile. This initiative was hardly success- 
ful (for details, see, Shibeika, M., 1971, pp. 142-55). Dur- 
ing the Mahdia, the South was not effectively a part of the 
central state (for more on this, see, Holt, P. M., 1961, pp. 
102-3). During the period of Condominium colonial rule, the 
South remained strictly isolated from the North in accordance 
with the Civil Secretary's Memorandum on Southern Policy, 
which was drawn up after the final annexation and pacificat- 
ion of the South in 1930. (The text is published in Abd Al- 
Rahim, M., 1969, pp. 244-49). 
16. The 1955/56 National Census classified t 
Sudan as follows: 39% Arabs, 20% Central 
and other Darfurian Tribes, 6% Beja, and 
eastern Nilo-Hamitics accounting for 5%. 
ture of Westerners; Fellata from Nigeria 
former French colonies. 
he population of the 
Nilotics, 9% Fur 
6% Nubians, with 
The rest was a mix- 
and others from 
17. See MacMichael, H. A., 1967, Vol. II, pp. 10-11. Also see 
Hassan, Y. F., 1967, pp. 90-134. 
18. The earliest recorded (and known to us) Ni baz (genealogical 
pedigrees) of Arabs in the Sudan are those written by Al- 
Samarkandi during the period of the Funj Sultanate, see 
MacMichael, ibid, pp. 6-7. 
19. Cf. Hassan, Y. F., 1967, pp. 135-176. 
20. Ibid, pp. 142-54 for details. 
21. These are mostly of Juhayna tribal 'origins' according to 
their beliefs. Also, see MacMichael, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 237- 
323. 
22. See Abdel Ghaffar, M. A., 1977, pp. 21-30. 
23. Ibid, p. 27. 
24. See O'Fahey and Spaulding, 1972, p. 318. 
25. Hassan, Y. F., 1967, pp. 132-3. 
26. Ibid, pp. 133-4. 
27. Holt, 1961, p. 19. 
28. MacMichael, 1967, vol. II, p. 7. 
29. Holt, 1961, pp. 49-61. 
30. During the early days of the Mahdist revolution against 
the 
Turks, the Mahdi sent letters asking the support of all 
lead- 
ing tribal personalities in North Sudan. See, 
Ibrahim, A. A., 
1968, (In Arabic). 
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31. See Holt, 1961, pp. 87-9. 
32. Ibid, pp. 90-106. 
33. Such processes developed simultaneously with attempts by the Mahdist State to weaken the power base of leading tribal fam- ilies, especially towards the last years of its existence, 
through increased measures of centralization and security. This partially explains the cooperation of those leading families with the invading colonial armies as correspondence between them (e. g. Ibrahim M. Al-Nitaifa, Sheikh Ebboud Arabs, 
and Abu-Sin Habouba, Sheikh of Khartoum Arabs) and the Comm- 
ander of these armies suggest (See documents in Box 101/21/5, 
Sudan Archives, Durham University). 
34. MacMichael, 1967, vol. I, p. 377. 
35. Tame, G. B., 1934, p. 208. 
36. Buckhardt, J. L., 1819, p. 278. 
37. I reluctantly use this proposition of "egalitarianism" due, 
firstly to the lack of concrete historical material to subs- 
tantiate its functioning and, secondly, in the light of the 
theoretical critique Asad makes as to the theoretical viab- 
ility of concepts of nomadic society (or mode of production) 
in which the mechanism of equality functions. See Asad, T., 
1978. 
38. Throughout the periods of Funj, Turkish, and Mahdist rule, 
the state limited its demands to revenues from tributes and 
taxes to meet its direct expenditure on its personnel and 
rulers; it did not establish direct relations of exploitation 
resting on the mechanisms of the production process. 
39. Abdel Ghaffar, 1977, p. 27. 
40. For example the Hamar tribe in Kordofan as one administrative 
and political unit was only created after the introduction of 
the colonial rule, see, MacMichael, H. A., 1967, pp. 319-23. 
41. See O'Brien (with Shazali), 1979, pp. 166-8. 
42. The above paragraph depends heavily on, ibid, pp. 189-93. 
43. Abu-Lughod, J. L., 1969, pp. 198-212, and also by the same 
author, 1961, pp. 22-32. 
44. Mayer, P. 1961. 
45. Marris, P., 1972. 
46. Lewis, 0., 1965, pp. 491-503. 
47. Pahl, R. E., 1978, p. 280. 
48. Longton, J., 1955. 
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49. Mitchell, J. C., 1956. 
50. Cohen, A., 1969. 
51. Cf. E1-Mustafa, M. Y. A., 1981, p. 22, where it is recorded 
that the percentage of the Dubasin in Hassaheisa was 16.47, 
according to the figures of the First National Census of 1955/56. 
52. Tape-recorded interview with Mr. Yousif Al-Amin Iheimir, 5th 
November 1980, Rates Office, Hassaheisa, where he responded 
to my question about the observed declining role of the Duba- 
sin in the town's public affairs by an answer trying to em- 
phasize the temporary nature of other groups' dominance, I 
extract the following from his answer: 
Our one fathers were the people who established this 
town from nothing; they who built it and developed its 
once wast-lands. We inherited it from them with all its 
present amenities, and we are determined to preserve our 
town and serve it more. Simply, we must do so, because 
we have no other place where we can go. Others are not 
full citizens of this town; they came from elsewhere, 
they send their money to elsewhere, and they are defin- 
itely going back elsewhere. This is why we are the true 
sons of this town; it is ours. 
53.1 refer here to the Iheimir Family. 
54. These sub-sections of the Dubasin were supplied to me in 
my interview with Mr. Yousif Iheimir, but also see the acc- 
ount made by MacMichael, 1967, vol. I, p. 253. 
55. Reference is to the Gover-General's Report to the Consul- 
General in Cairo dated 27th March 1909 which is quoted in 
Chapter 4. In this report stress is laid on the "careful" 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POLITICS AND POWER IN THE TOWN 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political power relations in Hassaheisa constitute the 
focus of the present chapter, which includes a review of the 
origins of the present relations of dominance and representation 
in the community, their history of development, and their dynam- 
ics. My central interest is in the connection between local pol- 
itics and the economy of the town as revealed in different areas 
of activity in different conjunctures. The basic information 
relate mainly to the history and operation of the People's Coun- 
cil of Hassaheisa Town. I also attempt to use the case of Hassa- 
heisa to explain and criticise some essential feature of local 
government in the Sudan, with particular reference to urban 
areas. 
The need for a view as broad as that which I attempt, arises 
from the fact that urban political attitudes and behaviour in the 
Sudan, (and also in Third World cities generally), have received 
far less attention than many other aspects of the "urban problem". 
1 
As Cornelius argues, this has led many social scientist concerned 
with Third World problems to generalize rather too freely from 
the experience of advanced Western nations in their attempt to 
deal with "the same" type of processes in non-Western Countries: 
Many of the theses and propositions derived from Anglo- 
European experience have come to be accepted as the work- 
ing truth, forming a part of the conceptual framework of 
numerous government officials, politicians and academics. 
2 
The propositions often borrowed from the West concerning 
the political behaviour of urban dwellers tend to centre on two 
main questions: (a) Is the urban population radical or conserv- 
ative? and, (b) Is political participation widening or not? 
3 
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Some have suggested that the 'new' urban populations of the Third 
World hold essentially radical views and have wide opportunities 
for participation in political activities. It has been held that 
because the migrants entering the 'new' urban centres experience 
a high degree of material deprivation and frustration, combined 
with personal and social disorganization, they become alienated 
from the existing socio-political order, undergo political radic- 
alization, and consequently engage in various forms of disruptive 
activity and extremist behaviour. 
4 
At that time, however, it also 
sometimes argued that there is a positive association between 
degree of urbanization and degree of political participation, and 
that this due to an increase in political awareness resulting from 
large numbers of people coming into close contact with partisan 
political activities, wide ranges of educational and industrial 
employment opportunities, and various stimulating influences 
transmitted by communications and the mass media. 
5 
Basing itself on Hassaheisa the present Chapter posits a 
quite different set of propositions. The analysis of my observat- 
ions leads me to the conclusion that the dominant groups 
in the 
community have very successfully cultivated- and 
in some ways 
imposed- a conciliatory political ideology through their accept- 
ion, stimulation, and manipulation of the 
ideology of tribalism. 
Here an important point must be made quite clear: 
I do not assert 
that this kind of manipulation necessarily 
implies a full aware- 
ness on the part of the 
dominant groups of what they and their 
"representatives" are doing. But I do stress that, 
in spite of 
its appearing "spontaneousness", the process can 
only be under- 
stood and explained 
by dwelling on the correlation between cer- 
tain kinds of political 
behaviour and certain vested societal 
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interests. I do not attempt to interpret this as planned consp- 
iratoral behaviour; I simply argue that the patterns of political 
behaviour and overt attitudes of the dominant groups in pursuit 
of their interests exhibit a high degree of what might be called 
"instinctual awareness", and obviously their political actions 
are not accidental. 
The high level of acceptance of conciliatory political att- 
itudes, and the persistent strength of the ideology of tribali. sm- 
in the mentality of the vast majority of the population- together 
constitute a vital component in the normative political framework 
of the community, and this conduces neither to radicalism nor to 
active participation. On the contrary, most of the inhabitants, 
and not least the poor, hold conservative political attitudes, and 
are quite strikingly quiescent in the face of fast-developing 
socio-economic and political processes (e. g. capital accumulation), 
which have had, and promise to have, the most far-reaching conse- 
quences for them and their children. They are also "submissive" 
to the dominant group's efforts to establish and maintain their 
political ascendancy and to use it in its own interests. The evid- 
ence indicates that, contrary to common assertions of wider part- 
icpation, large sections of the urban population are being syst- 
ematically "marginalized" in and through the local political pro- 
cess. The dominant groups have successfully monopolized the act- 
ive and organized aspects of the political process, while the 
poor have been relegated to the side lines of the political arena. 
The poor have increasingly withdrawn and are probably more passive 
than at any stage in the history of the town. Their limited part- 
icipation in periodical elections has served only to legitimate 
the process, but little else. 
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The chapter begins with a brief account of the history and deve- 
lopment of the system and structure of the local government in 
the town. It then proceeds to the examination of the most general 
and salient features of this system at present and to deal in 
some detail with the relationship between the politics of the 
town's formal organ of local government (i .e. the Council) and 
the process of accumulation. Here the chapter attempts to detail 
the main ways in which the powers of the Council have been used 
and mainpulated to serve the interests of capital accumulation. 
This provides both an empirical exploration of the nature of the 
relationship between "politics" and the economy, and an analysis 
of how the "rich" dominant groups justify their efforts to secure 
and perpetuate their hold on local government through the Council. 
THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN HASSAHEISA: 
In order to understand and appreciate the nature of local 
government in the Sudan, we need to refer back to the earliest 
British administration's colonial policies designed to establish 
and develop a "cheap and efficient" system of administration that 
would be in keeping with its wider and more general aims for its 
vast newly-acquired colonial possession. 
6 
I stress this because 
the history of local government in the Sudan is partly a reflect- 
ion of the evolution and change over time of broad colonial aims 
and purposes, and partly a constituent element of the overall 
system of political and administrative control which was intent- 
ionally influenced both by general attitudes towards the local 
population, and by the need for pragmatic adaptation to 
local 
developments. In my attempt to review the dynamics of the relev- 
ant British policies, I have used, and elaborated upon, the works 
of Salih and Bakheit. 
7 Both draw important distinctions between 
the initial period of direct rule (1899-1921) when the paternal 
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role of the colonial administrators was emphasized, and the per- 
iod of indirect ruZe (1922-1936) when reliance was placed either 
on pre-existing forms of "native tribal" authorities or on ones 
recently constructed as administrative expedients. In this period 
the policy was "to enhance or strengthen the tribal chiefs author- 
ity so as to be strong administrative and executive heads of their 
tribe or district". 
8 The final policy of self-rule (1937-1955) was 
a direct response to developments in Sudanese national anti-col- 
onial politics. 
Since the formal declaration of Independence in January 
1956, the administrative structures of local government have un- 
dergone two general changes. First, there were the modifications 
that followed the Provincial Administration Act of 19609 which 
introduced a system based, by and large, on the decentraZization 
of powers and the devolution of administrative authorities down 
to the provincial level, thus superseding the system based on 
The Local Government Ordinance of 1951.10 The second major change 
was introduced with the enactment of the People's Local Govern- 
ment Act of 197111, through which further powers and authority 
were "decentralized" at all levels of local government system. I 
shall now follow these developments occuring at the national 
level, with special reference to their impact on Hassaheisa and 
its local government institutions. 
In the previous chapter I explained how in the early days 
of British rule the local administration in Hassaheisa sought_co- 
I 
operation with, and fostered the collaboration of, the 
leading 
family (that of the Iheimirs) in their dealings with the Dubasin. 
In 1913 Al-Amin Iheimir was formally recognized by the administr- 
ation as Sheikh of the Dubasin people in the town. 
12 As such he 
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was assigned a limited, yet important and decisive role in the 
development of the political process and held a range of respon- 
sibilities and powers. These powers were primarily consultative 
and were designed partly to construct and partly to remould 
Iheimir's traditional influence for the immediate purpose of 
administering the settlement. With the gradual growth of the 
settlement's population, his status was elevated to that of Omda13 
in 1918. With this provision, his sphere of influence was enlar- 
ged, but his role remained consultative as it had been during the 
period of his SheLtah4h. Lp. He functioned simultaneously as the 
settlement representative to the colonial administration, and as 
the authoritative agent of the governemt among the people. He was 
at once the mouth-piece and tax-collector of the community. By 
virtue of the seemingly integrated, but not necessarily harmon- 
ized, interests of both people and the administration, Iheimir 
and his family could monopolize the "linking position" between 
these two sections. 
Iheimir's powers were enhanced and further formalized 
through the Village Courts Ordinance of 1925.14 This extended 
the "judicial" powers, which had earlier been given only to 
Sheikhs of nomads by the Nomads Sheikhs Ordinance of 1922, to 
the Sheikhs of sedentary rural areas as well. (Hassaheisa was 
then considered as a village according to the Administration). 
'5 
Iheimir then received further "administrative" powers through 
the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance of 192716, which was an amend- 
ment of the similarly named ordinance of 1922- but with signif- 
icant omission of the word "Nomads". In April 1930 the govern- 
ment established a court in Hassaheisa17 with the powers of an 
urban court as defined in the Rules of Civil Justice Ordinance 
of 1930. In August of the same year Al-Amin Iheimir was appointed 
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"magistrate of the third class under the Code of Criminal Pro- 
cedure for the purpose of sitting on major and minor courts". 
18 
This was later formalized, regulated, and consolidated by the 
considerable judicial-administrative powers conferred on Iheimir 
through the Chiefs' Courts Ordinance and the Native Courts Ordin- 
ance of 1931 and 1932 respectively. By this time, the system of 
Native Administration was firmly grounded and had become an imp- 
ortant integral part of the administrative and political struct- 
ure developed in accordance with the policy of Indirect Rule. 
Iheimir thus now enjoyed considerable authority over his Dubasin 
people in Hassaheisa as well as over any others who happened to 
settle there. 
By the end of the 1930s, however, the system of Native Adm- 
inistration had, in the country at large, begun to prove too 
rigid and "conservative" for the kind of developments which the 
colonial government wished to accomplish. Hence the government 
launched on a policy of adapting the then existing Native Admin- 
istration structures for local government which was to be " an 
administration no longer according to the TRIBE a man belonged 
to, but according to the PLACE he lived in"19 or, according to 
the Governor-General, there should be: 
Local government, geared to keep public security and order, 
to provide social services, to train Sudanese in the art of 
government, to absorb nationalist sentiment and to divert 
enthusiastic patriotism into the service of concrete const- 
ructive ends. 
Z 
Thus a series of Local Government Ordinances of 1937 for Rural 
Areas, ' Townships, and Municipalities and the attendant 1938 Reg- 
ulations, were designed to produce a more "representative" and 
"democratic" set of institutions of local government with greater 
powers and authority21 towards the establishment of 
Self-Rule. 
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As explained elsewhere, there were significant socio-econ- 
omic and demographic changes in Hassaheisa during the 1930s. The 
town thus "qualified" for many of the changes in administrative 
arrangements provided for by the national legislation, and a maj- 
or specific development in Hassaheisa was the establishment of 
the Local Town Council in 1938.22 With some members elected by 
the citizens (defined as rate-payers only) and others appointed, 
the Council's composition reflected the emergence of new socio- 
economic groups in the town and their increasing political weight 
(e. g. the Northern merchants). Thus the Chairman of the first 
council was a prominent Northern merchant (Mr. Wida'a Osman), as 
were a majority of the members. This marked the beginning of the 
collapse of the "absolute domination" of the traditional Omda of 
the town on the town's administration. Though he kept his judic- 
ial powers, most of the Omda's administrative and financial auth- 
ority was now transferred to the Town Council. 
The following twenty years or so (the 1940s and the 1950s) 
saw the slow but continuous errosion of the political powers of 
the Iheimir Family in favour of the powerful emerging group of 
Northern merchants. Two historical conjuctures were of particular 
significance: 
(1) The establishment of the Merchant's Committee during 
the World War II (to which I referred in Chapters 4 
and 7). This was exclusively composed of merchants, 
as the name might indicate. The distribution and rat- 
ioning of goods and commodities was a matter of major 
concern to the administration during the War years. 
Regular contact, consultation, and cooperation with 
merchants was therefore essential and this took place 
through the Merchants Committee. The merchants, esp- 
ecially those on the Committee, took advantage of 
the situation to increase their general share in the 
administration of daily life in the town and to inc- 
rease the amount of contact between themselves, as 
the new representatives of the town population, and 
the administration. They, thus, moved as close to 
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the centre of 
under colonial 
the political process as was possible 
conditions. 
(2) In 1951 the Local Government Ordinance was passed. 
The principle of "democratic" election of all rep- 
resentatives was a basic addition in this ordinace 
which repealed and superseded earlier ordinances, 
though the principle that only resident rate-payers 
were entitled to vote remained. This limited franch- 
ise ensured a comfortable majority for the Northern 
merchants who manipulated their links with all Sham- 
maichn (Northerners) to ensure adequate support. The 
newly elected council, then, functioned in conjunction 
with Hassaheisa Rural Council which included, in add- 
ition to the town's representatives, a number of rural 
village representatives. Most of the latter were vill- 
age headmen and "alliance" naturally arose between 
them and the town merchants; the two groups had mut- 
ual commercial interests, as is explained in Chapter 
4- i. e. trading networks. The consolidation of the 
merchant councillors' hold over the town's affairs 
was thus ensured. One main consequence was that the 
traditional Omda was virtually stripped of his powers 
except for those attaching to judicial position in 
the Local Native Court. Even these were, however, re- 
duced in range by the "modern" Civil and Criminal 
Courts which was made permanent as from 1954. 
With the introduction of military rule in November 1958, 
and the consequent relegation of all democratic political act- 
ivities and institutions in the country, the new government once 
more relied mainly on the existing, but less popular, relics of 
of the traditional institutions of Native Administration. 
23 Co- 
operation and close contact between the District Inspector and 
the Executive Officer of the town -on the one hand, and Omda Ihei- 
mer on the other, was thus revived to the benefit of the latter; 
politically as well as financially. But it was short lived. In 
October 1964 the national political system of the military regime 
collapsed as a result of an act of mass civil disobedience (a 
general political strike from 24th to 30th October), and of the 
most prominent and popular slogans of the time the one demanded 
the abolition of all the powers exercised by the institutions 
of the At-Idana At-AhLiya (the Native Administration). 
24 The 
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then current balance of powers led to a compromise, according 
to which the tribal chiefs of the Native Administration were to 
concede their administrative powers-(especially in the urban 
areas) to bodies of democratically elected local representati- 
ves. 
25 
The tribal chiefs were also to share their judicial pow- 
ers in the Native Courts with persons appointed for this purp- 
ose from amongst the prominent and notable citizens of each 
settlement. 
These developments were reflected in Hassaheisa in the est- 
ablishment of a new elected Council which was again effectively 
dominated by merchants- mostly of Northern origins as Table 8: 1 
shows. Elections for this new Council were held by secret ballot 
system in April 1965 and were contested by candidates at the 
neighbourhood Level resulting in the success of the names in 
Table 8: 1 : 
Table 8: 1 Membership of the Town Council Elected 
in April, 1965 
Name Occuptation Tribal Group 
1. Al-Ais Al-Tuhami Merchant Dubasi 
2. Awadalla A1-Sheikh Merchant Shammali 
3. Hassan Ahmed Merchant Shaiki** 
4. Al -Ha j Ali Jal li Property Owner Ruf a' i 
5. Yousif Waziri Merchant Egyptian 
6. Mohd. Ahmed Mustafa Merchant Dubasi 
7. Ali Mohamed Ali Worker (T. U. )^ýý Shammali 
8. Ahmed Abdel-Majid Merchant Shammali 
9. Mirghani Mohd. Osman Merchant Shammali 
10. Awäd Bashir Worker (T. U. ) Shammali 
11. Ahmed Ibrahim Merchant Shammali 
12. A1i Eisa Bishara Merchant Shammali 
13. Yousif Hassan Babiker Merchant Shammali 
14. A1-Amin Hagi Merchant Hallawi 
15. A1-Tahir Hassan Merchant Dubasi 
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Source: Hassaheisa Town Coucil Office, File Dated 8/4/1965 for 
the names; the occupations and origins were acquired mainly 
through interviews. - 
* though as Shaiki he was a 'natural ally' of the Shammaliin, 
his political allegiances were with Umma Party which put him in 
opposition to other Shammaliin. 
^^ T. U. is an abbreviation for trade union leader in Hassaheisa. 
At the same time, the Native Court was replaced by a Coun- 
ciZ of Judges with a newly appointed membership. The Council 
consisted of ten persons acting on rotation basis as Presidents, 
and with seven additional permanent ordinary members. The occ- 
upations and "tribal groups" of the appointees are shown in 
Table 8: 2, from which the extent of the influence of merchants 
and Northerners is clearly evident. 
Table 8: 2 Membership of the Council of Judges, Hassaheisa 1966 
(Name Occupation Tribal Groupl 
1. Tajel-Din Iheimir Omda 
2. Abdel-Kadir Iheimir Deputy Omda 
3. Abdel-Kadir Waziri Merchant 
4. Abdel-Salam Aid Merchant 
5. Hassabel-Rasoul A/Rahman Merchant 
6. E1-Faki Ahmed Bashir Merchant 
7. Mustafa Haddad Merchant 
8. Al-Wad Rahama Property Owner 
9. Babiker M. Taha Merchant 
10. Babiker Haj Yousif Merchant 
11. Adam Kuku Butcher 
12. Hassan Alnour Lorry Owner 
13. Abdel Kadir All Musa* Merchant 
14. Mohamoud Sid Ahmed Merchant 
15. Osman Fadlel-Sid Merchant 
16. Möhd. El-Said Suleiman Merchant 
17. Mohd. Ahmed Al-Hassan Merchant 
Dubasi 
Dubasi 
Egyptian 
Shammali 
Shammal i 
Shammal i 
Shammal i 
Hal l awin 
Shammali 
Manasir 
Dubasi 
Araki 
Turco-Egyptia 
Shammal i 
Shammali 
Hadari 
Shammal i 
n 
Source: Resident Judge's Office, Hassaheisa Merkez, for the 
list of names. Other information was acquired through interviews. 
(N. B. From 1 to 10 are the names of the rotating presidents of 
the court, and from 11 to 17 are the names of the permanent mem- 
bers). 
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After May 1969, the government and politics again under- 
went far-reaching changes, and one of the most important devel- 
opments in this period was the imposition of the People's Local 
Government Act of 1971. Recognizing the previous local govern- 
ment system as being corrupt, undemocratic, and inefficient, the 
new system based on the 1971 Act was supposedly designed to 
achieve the following: 
(1) To abolish or remove the strong established influence 
of traditionally powerful local families and sectarian political 
parties by bringing "the people" closer to the administration and 
by undermining traditional loyalties. 
(2) To reform and recognize the institutions of local gov- 
ernment so as to allow for local popular participation and en- 
courage the emerging grass-roots political aspirations for pol- 
itcal democracy and socio-economic development. 
In the case of Hassaheisa, the Act facilitated the capture 
of seats on the local council by members of the group of Northern 
merchants and it enhanced the opportunities for this group to 
reduce the influence of its former competitors, namely the "Dub- 
asin". The way in which the "Northerners" achieved ascendancy 
under the Act calls for comment. In fact, the Act aimed not only 
to undermine the old elements of Native Administration but also, 
specifically, neutralize the influence of all elements of the 
society "identified with the less reputable aspects of previous 
party politics". 
26 The Northern merchants in Hassaheisa- or at 
least the leading elements among them- clearly fell into this 
latter category. But in the application of the Act, it proved 
extremely difficult to identify the extent of involvement of 
members of a group such as the Northerners in "the less reput- 
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able aspects of previous party politics", whereas it was relat- 
ively easy to "locate" the holders of traditional influence (i. e. 
the Omda and his deputies). As it turned out in practice, the 
Northern merchants and their supporters proved almost immune to 
any measure of "political seclusion", and, thus, they easily won 
a majority on the first People's Council of Hassaheisa Town formed 
in December, 1971. 
This Council was intended to run for three years, but it 
was dissolved before it had completed its full term following, 
firstly, the establishment of the Basic Units of the Sudanese 
SociaZist Union as the sole and governing political party in the 
country and, secondly, the issue by the central government (in 
effect by the S. S. U. ) of various guide lines for the organization 
and regulation of the new system. 
27 
These guide lines (or inst- 
ructions, as they were) stipulated the formation of various new 
tiers of local government to be formed in a particular specified 
manner. Viewed formally, the system was to constitute a pyramid 
28 
of the People's Executive Province Council, The People's District 
Councils and the People's Rural or Town Councils. Below the Peo- 
ple's Rural Councils, and at the very bottom of the system, there 
were to be Village People's Councils in rural areas. In the urban 
areas, there were to be below the Town's People's Council- as 
appropriate- Neighbourhoods People's Councils, Market Areas Peo- 
ple's Councils, and Industrial Areas People's Councils. 
29 Diag- 
ram 8: 1 shows the whole series of tiers for the Gezira Province, 
with additional information on Hassaheisa town. 
As shown in the Diagram, Hassaheisa was under the new sys- 
tem divided into nine residential Neighbourhoods 
30 
, 
later incr- 
eased to 12, (from 1 to 12 in the Diagram), and about twenty 
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members were elected (in a mass meeting by open vote) from each 
neighbourhood to make up the People's Council of the Neighbour- 
hood31, with a few local government officials32 added to bring 
the total number of council members up to 24. A ratio of 25% of 
the total membership was reserved on government instructions for 
female33 residents of the neighbourhood who were, however, elect- 
ed by all residents of the area (men and women). A separate coun- 
cil was established for the market area of Hassaheisa Suh. This 
consisted of elected representatives for each business group 
(e. g. merchants, tailors, butchers, etc. ). In addition, two 
councils were established for the two industrial areas of Hassa- 
heisa. 34 These were composed of representatives elected by the 
3 industrial business owners5- of each area (the SoutiZ n and the 
Northern). 
The representatives of all these People's Councils of 
neighbourhoods (13) were to constitute an electoral college for 
the election of 10 persons from among themselves as members of 
the People's Council of Hassaheisa Town. 
36 
At the same time, all 
the women elected from different Neighbourhood Councils formed 
a second electoral college to elect 6 representatives from among 
themselves to the Town's Council (i. e. 25.0%). 
37 
This in addition 
to three representatives; one for each industrial area and one 
for the Sui... The remaining five seats were reserved for local 
government officials representing various departments, e. g. edu- 
cation, health, works, etc. 
38 With the exception of these "offic- 
ials", all other elected members (19) participated in the elect- 
ion of the Chairman of the Council and its representatives in 
the yet higher tier in the system (i. e. The People's Council of 
Northern Gezira District). 
39 
On the face of it, this system of political representation 
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Table 8: 3 Membership of the Hassaheisa Town People's 
Council in the Sessions 1973/77 and 1977/81 
Name Area Occupation Tribal Group 
(a) 1973/74 Session 
1. FadlalIa M. Hammad* 
2. Ibrahim Sid Ahmed 
3. Omer Ahmed Yousif 
4. Mustafa Sal ih 
5. Al -Taiyb Attal Mul a 
6. Al-Sir Hassan 
7. Ahmed Yousif Mohd. * 
8. Abdel Hafiz Abbasd, e%''ý 
9. Ali Ahmed Karrar 
10. Ismail M. Abdal la 
11. Merghani Al-Taiyb 
12 . E1-Fatih HamadeNeil 13. Mohamed Ali Osman 
14. Zakia Hamza 
15. Nour el-Taiyb 
16. Mahal a Ali Diab 
17. Su'ad Bashir 
18. Ihsan Fadul 
19. Zainab Bashir 
Suk 
Omda 
Jamalounat 
Awssat 
Shargi 
Mygouma 
Jadida 
Imtidad & 
Mazad 
Kambo 
Fur 
Karima 
S. Ind. Area 
Suk 
Women 
Women 
Women 
Women 
Women 
Women 
Merchant 
Teacher 
Civil Servant 
Merchant 
Property Owner 
Policeman 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Worker 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Civil Servant 
Civil Servant 
mid-wife 
Civil Servant 
Civil Servamt 
Teacher 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Kawahl a 
Shammaliin 
Dubasin 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Darfurian 
Shammaliin 
Manasir 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Dubasin 
Dub asin 
Shammaliin 
Dubasin 
(b) 1977/81 Session 
1. Jabir Ahmed Al l oub Ghorashi 
2. Daf a' all ah A Al -A j ab Wad Kamil 
3. Yasin Ahmed Yasin Jamalounat 
4. Banaga Haj Siddik# Awssat 
5. Omer Hussein Shargi 
6. Yousif Abbas Mygouma 
7. Hassan Al-Jamal Jadida 
8. Mubarak Abbas Imtidad & 
Mazad 
9. Husein E1-Khidir Kambo 
10. Ismail M. Abdal la Fur 
11. Isam Mustafa N. Ind. Area 
12. E1-Fatih HamadeNeil* S. Ind. Area 
13. Al-Tijani Hassan Suk 
14. Eitimad Sheikh Idris Women 
15. Nour el-Taiyb Women 
16. Badria Mubarak Women 
17. Su'ad Bashir Women 
18. Samira Iheimir Women 
19. Khadija Ahmed Omer Women 
Worker 
Pol iceman 
Civil Servant 
Teacher 
Teacher 
Med. Asst. 
Policeman 
Shammaliin 
Dubasin 
Nubian Nort 
Dubasin 
Dubasin 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Butcher 
Worker 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Merchant 
Teacher 
Civil Servant 
Teacher 
Civil Servant 
Teacher 
No Occupation 
* Presidents of the Council during their respective 
Shammaliin 
Nubian Nort 
Darfurian 
Dub asin 
Manasir 
Shammaliin 
Dub asin 
Shammaliin 
Shammaliin 
Dubasin 
Dubasin 
Darfurian 
Sessions. 
*Ahmed Yousif was changed as representative for Jadida in ly/D, 
and was replaced by Osman Bashari, a Merchant 
from Shammaliin. 
Abdel Hafiz resigned his seat in August 1975, and was 
later 
replaced by another Shammali. 
# Banaga was force out of Council by his neighbourhood electorate, 
and was replaced by Yousif Waziri, a merchant of 
Egyptian Origin 
(See File No. M. M. H. /16/D. /2 dated 1/7/1979). 
Source: File M. M. H. S. /16/D, Hassaheisa Council for names, tribal 
origin and occupation were established through informants. 
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achieved considerable success in breaking the old mould of pol- 
itcs in the Sudan, particularly in urban areas as is shown for 
Hassaheisa in Table 8: 3. Two significant changes may be particul- 
arly noted: 
1. Firstly, there is a decline in the merchants' firm 
"mechanical" majority on the Town's Council. Thus the Table shows 
that in the 1973-77 session the number of councillors with no 
direct commercial business concerns (i. e. teachers, policemen, 
civil servants, etc. ) was as high as 10 (25.6%). And in the 1977- 
81 session they had an even greater share- i. e. 14 (73.7%). This 
clearly yields an appearance of increasing involvement in local 
political power of persons other than those with direct interests 
in commercial accumulation. But as I shall explain below, in ess- 
ence this "participation" involved a multidimensional process of 
socio-economic "mobility" for the councillors and an accentuation 
of polarization within the community. 
2. Secondly, the Table reveals a sharp reduction in the 
dominance of Shammat<in who had only 12 members (63.2%) on the 
council for the session 1973-77. This was a clear decrease in 
comparison with earlier councils, including that of 1972-73 sess- 
ion on which they had 17 out of 19 members. In the 1977-81 sess- 
ion the number of councillors. of Shammatiin group declined even 
further to only 7 members (i. e. 36.8%). Again, however, it would 
be misleading to read too much into these figures; they are cert- 
ainly not an indication of the "errosion of tribal 
ideology" res- 
ulting from "the campaign for political revolutionary enlightment" 
or of the campaign's success in "combating the 
defunct political 
parties, sectarianism, radicalism and tribalism 
40 On the contra- 
ry, as I shall explain, a fuller analysis of the situation 
in 
391 
Hassaheisa leads us to conclude that there is an intensificat- 
ion of "tribalism" (and a diversification of its forms) rather 
than the reverse. 
Apart from the question of how non-merchant coucillors have 
promoted and save-guarded the interests of capital accumulation, 
which I discuss later, a number of specific observations may now 
be made in relation to my earlier statement that the "apparent" 
decline in the number of merchant councillors has not essentially un- 
dermined their general accumulation interests. As the Table shows, 
all non-merchants council l ors in both sessions were drawn from the 
ranks of the State bureaucracy (civil servants), or were skilled 
workers. Both groups were anxious, due to their position in the social 
structure of the community, to establish themselves in secure/better 
positions within that structure through having better access to 
capital accumulation41 and they did not hesitate to use their 
council membership to this end. This was appreciably facilitated 
by their "right" to be relieved from their normal work duties dur- 
ing the life time of the council's session. The following case 
illustrates this: 
El-Khidir, a 40 years old member of Dongullawi (Nub- 
ian North) origin, works at the Gezira Scheme's Ginn- 
eries in Hassaheisa as an electrician. He lives, with 
this family, in the Kambo area. He was elected to serve 
as Chairman and representative of the People's Council 
of Kambo Neighbourhood in 1977-81 session. Early in 
1978, he was officially released of all duties in the 
ginneries with full wage-payment to allow him to dev- 
ote his time to "the service of the people" on the 
Council. In September 1978, he persuaded his collea- 
gues in the Council to issue him a licence for a small 
Kushuf2 (kiosk) in the Satz for the sale, maintenance, 
and repair of electrical alternators and their spare 
parts. The use of this type of electrical appliance 
increased during recent years due to the conversion of 
many of the old diesel-powered water-pumping machines 
to electricity in nearby villages. In the autumn of 
1980 he was employing three assistant electricians 
and a brand-new Mazda pick-up van to enable him to 
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travel between water-pump sites in the district. 
He was nevertheless one of the most active partic- ipants in the Council's routine work (meetings, 
committees, etc. ). In an informal exchange with him in October 1980, I learnt that he was doing very well in business, yet, he ruled out any suggestion of res- igning from his formal job in the ginneries, and he 
gave the following reasons: firstly, his position as 
a councillor was linked to his status as a resident 
of Kambo area which was in turn conditioned by his 
employment in the ginneries by the Gezira Board. Had 
he resigned from his job, he would automatically have 
lost his right to residence in Kambo and this would 
have disqualified him from being a member of the Peo- 
ple's Council of Kambo Neighbourhood, and also from 
being Kambo's representative on the Town Council. 
Secondly, a serious consequence for him of resigning 
from his job would have been the immediate loss of a 
relatively nice and free Gezira Board house. Thirdly, 
it would naturally have costed him his work wage. Four- 
thZy, it would have prevented him from using- freely- 
the quite expensive Board's equipment for his private 
business. 
An additional point in relation to the decline in merchant 
councillors concerns the organizational basis of the whole repre- 
sentational system. As explained earlier, there was provision for 
representation on the basis of residential neighbourhoods only 
(with the exception of "functional" councils for the Suk and 
the industrial areas). But the residential distribution of the 
town's merchants, and indeed of other socio-economic categories, 
is uneven. Thus there are virtually no merchants in areas such 
as Kambo, Jamalounat, and Ghorashi and very few in others such 
as Mygouma, Mazad, Imtidad, and Fur, while there is a concentrat- 
ion of them in areas such as Omda (cf. Table 8: 4). In fact (three 
of the most involved and politically controversial personalities 
of the town- Yousif Hassan, Ali Eisa, and Sid Ahmed- all are 
I., 
merchants and Shammaliin, live in Omda). Hence, merchant repres- 
entation from places with no merchants was obviously not possible 
and it was equally impracticable to have more than one represent- 
ative from each of the neighbourhoods dominated by merchants (e. g. 
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Omda- Mr Ali Eisa). These practical consideration were to a large 
extent responsible for the minority of merchants on the Council. 
Yet the merchants quickly realized that there was no real threat 
posed to their essential interests by the new councillors, partly 
because the representatives who "replaced" them were equally anx- 
ious to promote the same interests directly or indirectly, and 
partly because, in the general pursuit of the policies they fav- 
oured, the merchant "minority" found itself in the privileged 
position of having all the necessary experience to manoeuvre as 
they wished in both commerce and politics. And it is not surp- 
rising that, despite their small representation, as a group, they 
continued to hold the most important post of "Chairman" on the 
Council, a post which carried "full authority for total super- 
vision of council work and... the responsibility of accomplish- 
ing good functioning of the Council". 
42 
The foregoing account has centred on the question of What 
were, and are, the socio-economic groups most involved in the 
political/administrative system and of what were, and are, the 
positions held by members of these groups. The following conclu- 
sions may now be restated with comments relevant to the role and 
interests of the State in local developments. 
1. An advantageous position of dominance -in the administration 
of a local community clearly depends on the incumbents' abilities 
to assume and maintain channels of contact and communication bet- 
ween the local community and the local officials of the central 
state. In the case of Hassaheisa, the differential attitudes and 
behaviour of State officials- according to the interests dominant 
in the state- towards particular individuals and groups played, 
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and still plays, a crucial role in determining the relative 
roles of those concerned in, and with, the structure of local 
power relations. Through its local officials, the State ensured 
and perpetuated its own role in local politics, and more cruc- 
ially, its paramount influence over the formation, over time, of 
the main socio-economic features of the structure of the commun- 
ity. 
II. The subsequent emergence and continuing growth of new socio- 
economic categories in the community has affected the State's 
periodical "changes of heart" towards different groups, with 
the consequence of shifts in the "centre of power" between var- 
ious sections of the dominant group of the community (i. e. bet- 
ween the traditional tribal family of Iheimir, Shammaliin mer- 
chants, and "others"). 
43 
III In accordance with its policies, defined in relation to the 
implicit and explicit interests of "ruling" groups at different 
periods, the State consistently acted to ensure the local domin- 
ance of those groups whose interests and attitudes were most in 
line with the State's own ultimate interests. Thus the contin- 
uing dominance of certain, albeit different, groups with a com- 
mon interest (viz. participation in the process of capital accum- 
ulation as beneficiaries) was ensured. When we bear in mind the 
over-riding importance of commercial accumulation throughout the 
history of the town, which is of crucial importance for any ana- 
lysis, descriptive or theoretical, of how the town's power str- 
ucture operates, it becomes rapidly explicable that the merchants 
continued to hold such an influence. 
IV. With the recent political participation of members of "new" 
socio-economic groups, the policies of the State have not altered 
in any significant way. There has in effect been no "need" for 
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any essential change 
economic groups have 
interests of the peo 
ing any antagonistic 
atives have begun to 
by becoming involved 
quick profits can be 
as the representatives of the "new" socio- 
not established or defended the essential 
ple they supposedly represent. Far from adopt- 
"rejectionist" stance, the "new" represent- 
follow "conformist" patterns of behaviour 
in a way or another in activities where 
made. Hence the State's traditional reliance 
on accumulating groups has to all interests and purposes been 
undisturbed; partly because the counter-interests of the "poor" 
masses of workers have never been effectively expressed in and 
through local political institutions, and partly because the un- 
derlying interests of the State and the dominant local groups has 
not undergone any real change. The net result is that local groups 
with vested interests in the reproduction of the general condit- 
ions for the working of the process of accumulation have maint- 
ained their hold on the apparatus of local government. 
Once the above analysis is accepted, central questions which 
inevitably arise are How and why the less privileged masses of 
the town have not- as it appears- only refrained from vigorous 
resistance, but have in fact participated actively in the creat- 
ion of institutions such as the Council, which enhance the proc- 
ess of accumulation and work to perpetuate the conditions under 
which local capital operates. To answer such questions, we have 
to consider two aspects of the dominant local ideology as a mat- 
erial force in the society: the strength and dynamics of "tribal" 
loyalties, and the markedly conciliatory political attitudes held 
by the ordinary residents of the town. 
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THE POLITICS AND MANIPULATION OF TRIBALISM: 
In the previous chapter I attempted to analyse the nature 
and development of urban 'tribalism'. I now turn to a discussion 
of the way in which "tribalism" as an ideology is used and mani- 
pulated in the local political arena. My general contention is 
that 'tribalism' conforms with and indeed is activated to 
serve. the ulit imate .: purpose of the dominant- groups and, more 
specifically, that it is used by them in the circumstances of 
deeper socio-economic struggles for the acquisition and mainten- 
ance of political power as an important condition for the proc- 
ess of accumulation. This is illustrated by the use and manipul- 
ation of tribal ideology in the Council's politics at two conjun- 
ctures in particular. 
I. First in campaigns for seats on the Council. Here 'tribalism' 
is activated for two important purposes, both of which virtually 
guarantee the election of members of the dominant group or of 
others who support this group and their hold on the centre of 
local power. 
(a) Tribalistic fever among the "voters" usually leaves little 
chance for more "objective" and "rational" criteria to 
operate in political conflict. Among the poorer sections 
of the town's population tribal ideology ascends at the 
direct expense of all other forms of consciousness (i. e 
at the expense of both instinctual class interest and more 
reflective and articulated class affiliations). Tribalism 
r, 
thus tends to silence any voice which might draw attention 
to a real (or, at least, less distorted) conception of the 
social, economic, and political issues of election camp- 
aigns. Though it is difficult to substantiate this argue- 
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ment empirically in any fully representative way, I use 
one man's election campaign to illustrate my assertion. 
In December 1977, my own personal political concerns, 
coupled with some academic interest, led me to follow 
and analyse various stages of the election campaign for 
that last session of the Town Council, with particular 
reference to the candidate Farah Hassan. 44 Farah was 
a member of a Shammaliin family, a teacher by profess- 
ion. He stood as a candidate for the People's Council 
of Omda on a relatively radical leftist political plat- 
form. The balance of 'tribal forces' in this neighbour- 
hood was finely poised. No single major tribal group 
predominate in the neighbourhood (See Table 7: 4 in 
Chapter 7), and the voting behaviour of minor tribal 
groups in this area was difficult to predict. Since the 
staunchest leaders of the Shammaliin merchant group live 
in this area (e. g. Yousif Hassan and Ali Eisa) Farah's 
candidancy posed a real threat to them. In effect, 
Farah's most bitter critics turned out to be Shammaliin 
who accused him of being divisive and discordant and, 
more specifically of being a Communist with the part- 
icularly damaging innuendo that he was also an atheist. 
Not surprisingly, he was heavily defeated, and Ali Eisa 
was elected as the Chairman of that Council. The kind 
of rea-s: ons given by "ordinary voters" f or not supporting 
Farah are significant, and I illustrate them with a ver- 
bation statement by a fellow primary school teacher, 
also of Shammaliin origin, explaining why he did not 
vote for his colleague. "Farah stood a very remote 
chance of winning a seat on the Council. So I thought 
it wise to vote for some one with a chance of winning. 
Hence I voted for Ali whom I know and related to, rath- 
er than for 'the others' whom I don't know. I am sure 
Ali is going to serve 'me' better than others; after 
all he is a relative of mine". 
(b) In the run to the elections tribal ideology played a dec- 
isive part in "uniting" the members of each group against 
others and, especially behind those claimed to be the 
"fittest" and most qualified to contest, win, and rule. 
Thus bearing in mind the history of local political power 
and the varying degrees of involvement and political com- 
mitment of different socio-economic groups, it is clear 
that the most affluent ones with active experience in rS 
local politics are the most likely to succeed as candid- 
ates. With no organized and resourceful political part- 
ies, fitness and qualification were generally assessed 
in terms of the candidate's ability (a) to finance his 
campaign, and (b) to argue skillfully and effectively as 
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this is considered as essential for dealing with Govern- 
ment officials. In addition, candidates were favoured if 
they were considered to have the relatively scarce, but 
crucial, resource of "free time" to allow them to canvass 
and mobilize support. The use of the ideology of tribal- 
ism in conjuction with the concept of fitness had far- 
reaching consequences. Besides the immediate effect of 
mobilizing votes and winning seats, it served to estab- 
lish a degree of acceptance and justification among supp- 
orters of ordinary masses for the "legitimacy" of the 
efforts which a councillor made to imporve his "qualif- 
ications" and enhance his "fitness" so that he should be 
better able to do "battle" with contenders from other 
tribal groups. When we examine the data on the occupat- 
ions of the councillors of different neighbourhoods and 
those of the town compared with the occupations of work- 
ing inhabitants falling in my survey sample (as given in 
Table 8: 4), one can see that certain groups (e. g. mer- 
chants and civil servants) are over-represented and oth- 
ers (workers and farmers) are under-represented relative 
to their respective proportions. 
The following analysis of the way in which the competition 
for dominance on the Town's Council was carried out by different 
fragments of the dominant group reveals further aspects of the 
activation and manipulation of tribalism. 
After the elections of December, 1977, for the neigh- 
bourhood Councils (and also to the Councils of the Suk 
and the Industrial Areas) and the follow up election 
to the Town Council, the composition of the represent- 
atives of the neighbourhoods to the Town Council was 
a direct reflection of the tribal composition of the 
town's population. The Shammaliin won 6 neighbourhoods 
(Ghorashi, Karima, Omda, Mygouma, Jadida, and Imtidad- 
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Mazad); the Dubasin won 4 (Wad Kamil, Shargi, Wassat, 
and Dhagalla); the Nubians of the North- not Shammal- 
iin- won two (Kambo and Jamalounat); and the Darfur- 
ians won one (Fur), making the total of neighbourhood 
representatives 13. According to the Regulations these 
13 were to elect only 10 members from among themselves 
for the Town Council, in addition to the 3 members 
directly elected by the Councils for the Suk and the 
two industrial areas, 6 members elected by women of 
the town, and 5 members appointed by the Province 
Commissioner, ( but the latter with no vote for the 
crucial election of the Council Chairman). 
The events in the election of the 10 members from 
among the 13 representatives illustrate the manner 
and the extent to which "tribalism" can be manipulated 
to secure election or simply to prevent a member of 
a competing group from being elected. With six repres- 
entatives, the Shammaliin constituted the largest 
single 'tribal' group and thus appeared to have a 
good chance of achieving their will. In anticipation 
of this, the Dubasin with only four, allied themselves 
with other minority groups (i. e. Nubians North, 2 and 
Darfurians, 1), and offered key positions to the "re- 
presentatives" from the minority groups in return for 
their cooperation in preventing the dominance of the 
Shammaliin. The detailed agreement45 finally reached 
was as follows: 
1. The three to be eliminated should include two of the 
most prominent Shammaliin local politicians, (i. e. Ali 
Eisa of Omda and Merghani El-Taiyb of Karima; both 
merchants). None of the 3 minority group's represent- 
atives was asked to step down for, had one done so, 
the representative would in effect have cooperated 
with the Shammaliin and changed the balance aimed at 
by the Dubasin. It was thus imperative for one Dubasin 
to be eliminated to allow all three minority groups' 
representatives to elected. Thus the Dubasin represen- 
tative of Dhagalla Council stepped down. 
2. When the Council was convened, the "allied" groups were 
to elect members from minority groups to the posts of 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman (Al-Fatih Hamadel Nil of 
the Southern Industrial Area Council and Ismaeil Mohd. 
Fur of the Fur Neighbourhood r-espectively). 
3. The headships and membership of the more important 
Council Committees (e. g. housing and planning, finance, 
rationing, and urban renewal) were to be "given" to 
members of the "allied" groups, irrespective of their 
experience or abilities. 
This agreement was implemented in full to the satisfact- 
ion of the Dubasin and their allies and in the face of 
"noisy" protestations by the Shammaliin. 
46 And this cal- 
culated relegation of the Shammaliin had, as I shall 
shortly explain, some serious reprecussions for certain 
aspects of the Council's work. 
II. Secondly, tribalism was also manipulated, and thus perpetuated 
as an ideology, in the actual functioning of the Council. Many of 
the Council's routine decisions were either effected by "tribal" 
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considerations or oriented to strengthen "tribal" ideology and 
loyalty. I illustrate these claims with a few examples: 
1. As the Council is constantly faced with ever-increasing 
problems but has progressively limited resources, it has 
perforce to resort to selective tactics in the allocation 
of these resources. This commonly means that the limited 
resources are devoted disproportionately to areas of 
those 'tribal ' groups which support the dominant Councillors. 
Thus, for example, the Shammaliin-dominated Council of 
1972-73 distributed 572 plots of residential land in Imti- 
dad and Mazad mainly to the benefit of people of Shammal- 
iin origins, in addition to providing those areas with 
basic public services such as water and electricity. Or, 
again, the Council of 1977-81 which was dominated by the 
Dubasin and their allies granted the people of the over- 
crowded Dubasin neighbourhood of Shargi. 59 plots of land 
in the higher valued and central area to the North of 
Wassat, and pledged to provide them with water and elect- 
ricity. 
47 
2. Since the resources available to meet ever-expanding mass 
demand and to ease public grievances are scarce and in- 
sufficient, their differential allocation has increasingly 
favoured fewer and fewer people. And decisions are usually 
made to the advantage of key personalities within 'tribal' 
group "in power" (i. e. the grass-root brokers) and to the 
disadvantage of key personalities "in opposition". Files on 
the Council's proceedings during various sessions are re- 
plete with examples of this; the following are a few sel- 
ected from the Papers of the two last sessions: 
1973-1977 Session (when Shammaliin were "in power") 
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(a)Atal Mannan Ismail (Dubasin) was denied a reduction in his commercial licence fees on 8/10/75.48 
(b)Abdel Kadir Al-Sidik (Shammaliin) granted a licence 
and a plot of land to establish a butchery in Imtidad 
area on 29/1/1976.49 
(c)Faddllala Mohammed Hammed (Shammaliin) granted a free 
table in the newly established area for meat trade 
on 10/2/1976.50 
(d)Sid Ahmed Ibrahim and Al-Amin Al-Attaya (both allied 
to Dubasin) ordered to move their established unit of hide and skin treating from the Suk area to another 
more distant site on 14/6/1975.51 
1977-1981 Session (when the Dubasin and their allies were "in 
power"): 
(a) On 8/3/1978 the Finance Committee of the Council iss- 
ued 48 licences free of charge, mainly for persons 
of the "allied groups"; 18 licences at half the pre- 
scribed fees, also mainly for persons of these groups; 
and 5 licences with 
2full 
fees for 4 Shammaliin and one 
of Shukria origin. 
(b) At another meeting on 16/2/1979, the same Committee 
reduced the rates on the propert of the hiers of 
Khalil Iheimir (Dubasin) by 40%. 
D3 
(c) On 17/12/1979, the full Council decided to exempt the 
hiers of Abdel Kadir Al-Amin Iheimir (Dubasin) of all 
outstanding rates for the year 1977/78.54 
(d) On 20/12/1979, the Council exempted Abdel Kadir Taj- 
el-Din (Dubasin) from all dues and arrears relating 
to a contract for butcheries in the Suk. 55 
THE FOSTERING OF THE CONCILIATION MENTALITY 
In the previous section I have tried to show how the domin- 
ant "affluent" groups of various "tribal" origins used and mani- 
pulated the ideology of tribalism to distort the real nature of 
affairs in the town, to prevent the potential "militancy" of the 
poor from developing, and ultimately to use the "unconscious" 
support of the poor to maintain their own positions of power. I 
now focus on another aspect of the process of mystification which 
has the same effect. 
We have seen that up to 1970 the exercise of local politi- 
cal power, and participation in local government with administ- 
rators of the central government were generally only engaged in - 
by members of certain socio-economic categories. The main active 
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participants were prominent members of the community such as 
tirbal chiefs, merchants and senior civil servants. The ordinary 
poor members of the community were systematically and consisten- 
tly excluded. Since the underlying interests of both the group of 
prominent persons and the State through its administration were 
for the most part not contradictory, the involvement of the for- 
mer in the local administrative structure had no antagonistic con- 
sequences. 
Since Independence, the socio-economic conditions under 
which the poor live have deteriorated markedly as the process of 
capitalistic accumulation has intensified, and in the urban cen- 
tres the situation has become significantly worse as the pace of 
urban growth has accelerated so that growing poverty has manifes- 
ted itself on an aspect of the so-called "urban problem". Short- 
ages in basic commodities, inadequate education, defunct health 
services, and poor and insufficient housing (including, of course, 
the growth of shanty towns), are the main symptoms commonly listed 
in describing the plight of the urban poor. 
56 These 'problems' 
are not new, but they have developed in scale and severity in 
recent decades. At the same time, the old-established institutions 
of local government have shown an- increasing inability to face 
up to and to deal adequately with, or even ease, the overall sit- 
uation to the extent that it has begun to pose a real challenge 
to the ruling group's ability to impose and maintain "public or- 
der" and "tranquility" . 
57 Signs of political and social upheaval 
were repeatedly observed in various urban areas of the Sudan, 
particularly during the 1960s. 
The allegedly radical reforms of local government instit- 
utions of 1971, were an attempt to contain and repress the poten- 
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tial damaging consequences of the erruption of this situation, 
rather than to recognize and accept the legitimate aspirations 
of the urban masses and to create institutions correspondingly. 
Hence the main ideological document of this 'reform' (i. e. The 
People's Local Government Act of 1971) placed emphasis on the 
need for wider "popular participation and local initiative" in 
planning and in attempts to implement programmes of economic and 
social development at the local level. It was thought that this 
could be accomplished through the "decentralization" of power and 
authority from the central government to local institutions. Thus 
local institutions were formally empowered to initiate economic 
and social development with the aim of ensuring "that the services 
rendered by them are directed towards the benefit of the citizens 
of the area at the highest standard". 
58 
To attain these goals the 
Act and its supplementary regulating Guides provided for the max- 
imum possible participation of low-income groups in these instit- 
utions through mass organizations. 
59 
But all empirical studies to date on the fruits of this 
whole experiment (including the present one) point to serious 
and glaring discrepancies between the seemingly "high-minded 
aims" of the Act and the "realities" of the situation to which 
it gave rise. 
60 
It is not essentially only "the set of contradictions in- 
herent in the system"61, nor "the fact that the Act has become 
more of an administrative-political framework and that this has 
therefore undermined its economic functions and objectives"62, nor 
the presence of a "strong tradition of reliance on the bureaucracy'63 
in the Sudan which account for the apparent failure of the system to 
bring people at the grass-roots level into closer contact with 
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the State administration. My contention is that; the causes of 
the failure of the system must be sought in the following quite 
different directions: 
(a) The 'radical reforms' were drawn up with, in essence, the 
aim of eZiminating the symptoms of underdevelopment and 
poverty rather than the eradication of their fundamental 
causes. As such, the reforms aimed at a "progress in the 
quality of life" of the poor masses without even consider- 
ing any of the necessary radical changes in the socio- 
economic and political system. 
64 
(b) The 'right' of participation- particularly for the poor- 
was imposed from above, and those who were supposedly 
enabled to participate for the first time could only ex- 
ercise minimum power. They did not through the Act acquire 
any basic independence of action, and their scope for 
innovation and change remained extremely limited. 
The reforms were entirely conservative, rather than truely 
radical or "revolutionary". Their net effect in Hassaheisa (and 
65 
I believe more generally) has been to maintain the status quo in 
several critical respects: 
I. They tended -to 
blur and obscure the antagonisms between the 
dominant affluent groups and the poor by emphasizing the 
community of interest of the two different sections of the 
population within the territorial boundaries of the town. 
II. They thus encouraged compromise and conciliation in various 
ways, and in doing so limited the range of aspirations and 
demands of the poor to minimal general concessions. This is 
illustrated in Hassaheisa by the case of Wad KamiZ Lands 
described in detail below. I shall show how the low-income 
population of Wad Kamil "accepted" the demolition of their 
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neighbourhood as a part of a Council's plan of urban renewal 
in return for the establishment of a new and relatively be- 
tter 3rd Class residential area which was, however, to acc- 
ommodate only a small proportion of the population removed 
from their homes. 
III. The 'reforms' also creamed off the principal "leaders" of 
the poor by involving them in the routine work of the Coun- 
oils. As potential "trouble-makers", they were taken "off 
the streets" and assigned to positions in which they posed 
virtually no threat to the status quo. In this way, any 
potential opposition to the dominant ruling administrative 
group has been deprived of some of its erstwhile most vig- 
orous leaders. 
IV. The net effect of such participation by the poor, as was 
allowed for, has been to firmly secure the dominant infl- 
uence of the "affluent" groups by removing any serious thr- 
eat of a radical take-over. This participation in this sense 
is highly controlled; its main consequences have been, by 
and large, highly cosmetic. The strength of the calculated 
efforts to ensure the continuing dominance of the affluent 
cannot be better illustrated than by pointing to the fact 
that virtually all businessmen have more than one vote in 
local government, e. g. in the case of Hassaheisa a business- 
man votes in his neighbourhood, in the Suk, and, often, also 
in the industrial area. And this is in addition to the inh- 
erent bias of the local administrators in favour of business- 
men and the more affluent generally. The administrators 
favour these groups because, they say, these are the poeple 
who "are able to do something for the town"! 
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Thus the seemingly innovatory principle of participation 
in power by the "masses", but without any real change in the 
socio-economic structure of the society, can only be construed 
as part of a wider ideological attempt to dominate and pacify the 
poor. It extended and stimulated the aims of the dominant affl- 
uent groups in seeing change in poverty and backwardness as be- 
ing possible only through changes in the attitudes and motivations 
of the poor and through the wiZZingness of the poor to make act- 
ive efforts (i. e. through self-help) without any effective ext- 
ension of the necessary material resources for real change. In a 
sense, it was a way of encouraging the perception of the poor as 
being responsible for their own plight. As such it was an iZZus- 
ion, but it was a "necessary" one to keep the poor contented, 
subdued, and politically quiescent. As Coit puts it in her anal- 
ysis of a similar process of the poor participation in Community 
Action Programmes in contemporary American cities: 
By permitting some of those at the bottom of the 
social and economic ladder to participate or even 
to air their hostility toward some of the most obvious 
injustices to urban life and urban space, but at the 
same time keeping a lever on these groups, a partici- 
pation that is reinforcing rather than undermining 
the present system of domination is being legitim- 
ized in the eyse-of the poor and working-class 
groups. The lowest-echelons of society are given 
false hopes that there will be justice and equality 
for their class if they just learn to participate. 
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Having attempted to answer, theoretically as well as empir- 
ically, two questions concerning the local institutions of polit- 
ical power in the town- the question of WHAT are the 
basic feat- 
ures of the local political systems, and the question of HOW 
certain socio-economic groups came to dominate 
local political 
power and to exclude or at least neutralize the 
impact of the 
'partial' involvement of others- I now attempt to answer the far 
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more crucial question of HOW dominant groups made such elaborate 
and strenuous efforts to strengthen and maintain their local pol- 
itical dominance. What, in brief, is the "logic" of the dominant 
groups' endeavours at the local level of the town of Hassaheisa 
to consolidate and perpetuate the existing pattern of political 
dominance relations? The next section review the empirical data 
I gathered on Hassaheisa on the relationship between certain kinds 
of economic interests and particular patterns of political behav- 
iour; between political dominance on the Council and the interests 
of capital accumulation. 
THE COUNCIL AS A VEHICLE FOR CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: 
To fully understand the nature and role of the Town Council 
it is essential to keep in mind its fuction as a form of govern- 
ment and as an essential component of the neo-colonial capitalist 
6 
state in the Sudan. 
7 As such it has increasingly been delegated 
general authority and various administrative powers. These have 
included the responsibility for facilitating capital accumulation 
and for administering or coping with the the resultant social, 
economic and political contradictions in ways which either posit- 
ively favour or do not inhibit the further development of capital 
accumulation. Thus, for example, the maintenance of public order 
has always been paramount. 
The Sudanese State has, as is widely recognized, always 
assumed a centraZ and influential role in the social, economic, 
and political processes of the society, and the Town Council 
plays a similar role at the local level and commands considerable 
powers. The People's Local Government Act of 1971, gives the 
local councils the following powers: 
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(a) To make resolutions for the imposition of local 
taxes, rates, and fees for licences, in accord- 
ance with the provisions of any law relating 
thereto or in accordance with local legislation 
to be made by the council. 
(b) To make resolutions relating to public order in 
the area and to make local orders to that effect. (c) To make resolutions for the imposition of tempor- 
ary local taxes on public entertainments or on 
commodities or services in order to establish or 
complete any public project in the area. (d) To prepare the annual budget proposals for the area 
and to approve expenditure of money appropriated to 
th People's Local Councils in the area to be incur- 
red by them after the budget has been approved. 68 
The Council is also responsible for preparing and submitt- 
ing proposals for social and economic development schemes in its 
area, and it has the right to: 
establish or administer or participate with any 
other body to administer any commercial projects 
or p6ojects of commercial and developmental nat- 
ure. 
9 
PUBLIC SPENDING AND PRIVATE ACCUMULATION: 
In all the above respects, the Council is a powerful local 
institution with virtual command over many aspects of investments 
necessary to the functioning of the process of capital accumulat- 
ion. A first direct illustration of this is its crucial role in 
administering the production and distribution of public services 
and resources. Its expenditure on "public services" can only be 
properly understood and explained as a form of social capital 
expenditure, (i. e. public money spending). But under the prevail- 
ing socio-economic conditions in the Sudan, characterised by the 
dominance of private accumulation, public expenditure means exp- 
enditure by the State for private accumulation in a direct sense, 
and, indirectly, expenditure which produces private profit. 
Generally, the social capital expenditure, to which I re- 
fer, may be seen as falling into two main categories70: 
T sociaZ Investments; These consist of the following: 
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(a) The allocation of resources for the establishment of proj- 
ects and services which are, to some extent, intended to eff- 
ect an increase in Zabour productivity and therefore in the 
rate of profit for business owners who use such labour (e. g. 
the building and financing of institutions, mainly schools, 
for education and training). 
(b) The financing of various forms of "public consumption" such 
as projects and services which in some degree decrease the 
costs of the reproduction of the Labour force, and which 
therefore also have the effect- other things being equal- 
of lowering the costs of production and thus increasing the 
rate of profit (e. g. the development of public health serv- 
ices, the provision of housing, and the subsidization of 
transport). 
II. PubZic Spendings; These include the financing of projects 
and services (such as police stations and security night-guards 
in the Suk) required primarily to establish and maintain sociaZ 
order. Public spendings of this kind serve the interests of cap- 
ital accumulators by: ensuring the security of private business 
and industrial premises and by allowing them to develop and fun- 
ction in the confident knowledge that they are protected. 
The above statements should, however, be qualified. I do 
not mean that social investments and public spendings are direct- 
ly and immediately related to the interests of the local accumul- 
ators. But they are relevant to the local situation if we consid- 
r4 
ered the following: 
(1) Since the dominant pattern of accumulation in Hassaheisa is 
"commercial", it does not directly intervene in the product- 
ion process; its relation to public expenditure is more com- 
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plex, e. g. it benefits considerably, but indirectly, from the 
mere engagement of "workers" in the production process thus 
adds purchasing power to the local community. 
(2) Secondly, the process of accumulation in its various forms 
is by no means purely local. On the contrary, it has always 
had national and international dimensions. The manner in 
which "private accumulation" stands to benefit from "public 
investments and expenditure" must therefore be se. en as much 
wider process which cannot be fully appreciated by studying 
one particular locality. Equally, however, the connection 
cannot be overlooked if we wish to understand a local comm- 
unity. 
The way in which the Council emerges as an instrument in 
the local process of accumulation may also be assessed from an- 
other angle. A major part of the projects and services referred 
to above are produced by the private sector through contracts 
with the Council, (e. g. private enterprises are normally contr- 
acted with erection of shools, hospitals, public buildings, and 
with the provision of supplies for schools and hospitals). As 
such, the Council is naturally of prime importance to all who 
are interested in opportunities for private accumulation. Thus 
control of the Council, and of the way it functions are of para- 
mount importance in the local economy. And by the same token, 
the Council affects the interests of those who "suffer" or "lose" 
through the way in which it operates. It is thus not at all sur- 
rising that the groups who benefit from the Council's mode of P 
operation strive to obscure and distort the content and form of 
the politics in and of the Council. Their central concerns are 
thus to maintain their hegemony over the Council and to prevent 
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representatives of the "masses" from occupying effective posit- 
ions in it. These representatives might conceivably decide to 
change the rules of the "game" altogether in the event of their 
dominance on the Council. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: 
The second major aspect of Council politics, which is clo- 
sely related to the above, revolves around the distribution and 
aZZocation of public services and projects among various socio- 
economic groups in the community. As we began to see in Chapter 
3, and as Hill has noted that generally: 
the residential location of a socio-economic group 
relative to the distribution of the town's public 
services, carries with it more or fewer town serv- 
ices, better or worse schools, more or less access 
to commercial activities, entertainment, health, 
religious and so on. 71 
The distribution of public services in Hassaheisa is no 
exception to Hill's generalization; it shows a marked relation- 
ship between the "wealth" of the inhabitants and the availabil- 
ity of better services on the one hand, and between personal 
"poverty" and the scarcity- if not the total absence- of serv- 
ices on the other. To further substantiate this, I analyse the 
available data at two levels. 
The first; as there is increasing residential segregation 
between various socio-economic groups in the community, the un- 
even distribution of public services and resources among different 
neighbourhoods is taken as an important indicator to the relative 
power and authority commanded by each group on the Council which 
decides on the distribution and allocation. Thus, at this level, 
the analysis bears on social groups in relation to the areas in 
which they reside and service. 
The second; some public services and resources are, however, 
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used or appropriated by certain individuals and families rather 
than whole social groups. We therefore need to examine the relat- 
ive power and authority commanded by these individuals or famil- 
ies and to dwell on how they manipulate public resources for 
their private interests. 
At both levels, I wish to stress how those who seek to en- 
hance their opportunities for capital accumulation do so through 
the systematic appropriation of public social surplus. They 
socialize more and more of their own private domestic costs at 
the expense of the public. In the most flagrant instances, ind- 
ividuals simply use public resources in their private business 
firms and thus directly transfer parts of the costs of product- 
ion to the public budget. 
Table 8: 5 gives the monthly income distribution for earn- 
ers in various neighbourhoods according to my survey of 1978/79. 
It can be seen that the highest levels are found in Karima and 
Omda where most of the affluent merchants of Hassaheisa live, 
while the lowest levels are in the Wad Kamil, Mygouma, Kambo and 
Fur areas. Most of the residents of the four poorest neighbour- 
hoods have manual jobs in different sectors of the town's econ- 
omy. Using this classification of neighbourhoods and their peo- 
ples, I now examine the distribution and allocation of certain 
public services and resources among them. 
One of the most important public resources is residential 
land. Its availability for various uses by certain individuals 
It 
or groups tends to reflect their relative power and influence on 
the Council. Table 8: 6 gives basic data on the residential use 
of land in the town. In the residential areas inhabited by high- 
income earners, (especially Omda, Karima, and Jamalounat), the 
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Table 8: 6 Total Area, Number of Plots, Average Area of 
Plots, Total Population, and Average Area per 
Person in Various Neighbourhoods in Hassaheisa, 
1981. 
Neighbourhood Total Area 
(sq. M. ) 
No. of 
Plots*' 
Average 
Area of 
Plot 
(s q. M. ) 
Population 
Total No' ý* 
Average 
Area/ 
Person 
(s . m. ) 
Omda 85000 124 686 1558 55 
Karima 86963 136 639 949 92 
Mygouma 42000 140 300 1462 29 
Shargi 32369 66 490 1382 23 
assat 120731 260 464 4674 26 
Jadida 99600 308 323 4940 20 
Fur 85000 214 397 2095 41 
Imtidad & 
Mazad 203812 572 356 4974 41 
Wad Kamil 13125 N. A. N. A 737 18 
Jamalounat 161650 N. A. N. A. 973 167 
Sources: 
Table 5: 1 in Chapter Five. 
^^ Survey Office, Hassaheisa Town Council 
A census carried out in September 1981 
by the Census 
Office, Hassaheisa. I found the-data in a letter from 
the Census Officer to Hassaheisa Town People's 
Council 
dated 21/5/1981. 
p. 
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average area per person is very much higher than in the residen- 
tial areas of low-income earners, (especially Wad Kamil, Jadida, 
Shargi, and Mygouma). These disparities have their origins 
in early colonial times when various laws were passed governing 
the allocation of urban land. Prominent among these was the Town 
Building Regulations of 190972, which specified the various Class- 
es of urban land, the minimum size of area in each of them, the 
approved building materials to be used in each class, and the 
dimensions of walls in each class. According to these regulations, 
the better residential classes went to wealthy people while the 
poor were excluded and confined to residence in areas with virt- 
ually no facilities. The policy according to which land is now 
allocated by the Town Council is still based on the classificat- 
ion of the different types of areas for different categories of 
the population. Various enactments since 1909 have been codified 
into an overall set of regulations which maintains gross dispar- 
ities. 
Other examples of the appropriation of public facilities 
by the affluent group, (which in effect lowers the general costs 
of their domestic lives and thus increases their opportunities 
for profit-making and accumulation), are the uneven 
distribution 
of water-facilities, electricity, telephones, street 
lightening, 
public health services (i. e. rubbish collection and sewage), and 
so on, while the geographical location of many educational, 
health, 
administrative, religious, recreational, and shopping 
facilities 
also favour the affluent group in convenience and 
in reducing the 
transportation costs as discussed in Chapter 
3. 
To illustrate the direct use of the council's powers to 
serve the private accumulation 
interests of certain individuals 
and particular categories 
in the affluent group, I discuss two 
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cases - those of Hassan X Automatic Bakery, and the Wad Kamil 
I ands. 
(1) Hassan X Automatic Bakery73: 
Since 1975 there has been an increasing difficult 
situation in regard of supplies of bread in the Sudan 
as a whole, and in urban areas in particular. This 
originated mainly through the scarcity of wheat flour, 
whether imported or locally grown and milled, because 
of foreign exchange difficulties and the drop in local 
wheat production. As a result, there developed a flour- 
ishing trade in both flour and bread on the black mar- 
ket. The temptation to exploit these circumstances 
proved irresistible to all groups interested in accum- 
ulation. As difficulties gained momentum, the Govern- 
ment finally accorded all concessions available under 
the Industrial Investments Act (1976), to any one est- 
ablishing a new bakery, and especially for any that 
was automated. 
In Hassaheisa there were 14 traditional bakeries 
owned and operated mainly by Shammaliin businessmen. 
But in 1978 (i. e. during the 1977-81 session of Council 
when the Shammaliin were "out of power"), the Council 
decided to facilitate the establishment of automatic 
bakeries by promising local concessions in land and 
sites in addition to the central government concess- 
ions. In July 1978 Hassan X (who was then the Chairman 
of the Board of Directors of the Tenants' Cooperative 
Corporation for Grain Milling and Marketing which 
owned a milling plant 5 miles west of Hassaheisa) app- 
lied to the Council for a licence to establish an auto- 
matic bakery. This was carried through by the Chairman 
of the Council who put considerable pressure on the 
members to approve the application. (The two men orig- 
inally came from neighbouring villages in Hassaheisa 
Rural Council). The main argument-_ in opposition to 
the application (mainly from Shammaliin) was based on 
the fact that Hassan X was not a resident of the town 
and that the Council should only encourage investments 
by "sons of the town". But, however, the Chairman of 
the Council got his way, and the application was even- 
tually approved in October 1979. Hassan X immediately 
began to erect his bakery on 1000 sq. metres of 
land 
situated adjacent to the Suk and to Karima neighbour 
hood. 
Here it is relevant to add that the Chairman of the 
Council had by then- in partnership with some of his 
relatives- applied for a licence to establish another 
automatic bakery in the town and that 
he had already 
entered into an agreement with Hassan X 
for the prov- 
ision of an assured regular quota of flour in return 
for the licence. 
However, these developments did not go as smoothly 
as planned. The residents of Karima 
(which populated 
mainly by Shammaliin merchants) presented the 
Council 
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with a petition signed by a majority of the inhabit- 
ants of Karima complaining about the erection of Hassan X's bakery close to their houses (only 20 
metres away). They claimed that this would cause 
pollution, noise, and an intensification of shopping 
activities (queues for bread) in an area supposed to be for residence only. They also organized a protest demonstration and for this purpose mobilized large 
numbers of Shammaliin from other neighbourhoods. The 
protest and the petition emphasized their view that 
opportunities for investment should be afforded for 
residents of the town who were working in the same field. 
To calm the tense atmosphere, the Council decided 
on 20/12/1979 "after long discussion and exhaustive 
deliberations to order a halt for the building works 
which were going on at the site near Karima area, and 
to reallocate the bakery a site in the Suk area". Acc- 
ordingly, the Planning and Housing Committee of the 
Council decided on 12/1/1980 to constitute a technical 
team to conduct a field enquiry in order to implement 
the Council's decision. The team was composed of: 
(1) The Local Government Ispector 
(2) The Chairman of the Planning & Housing Committee 
(3) The Municipal Engineer 
(4) The Health Inspector 
(5) The Survey Officer 
Hassan X immediately appealed against the decision 
and threatened to sue the Council for the financial 
losses which he would incur if compelled to abandon the 
building which he had already begun (the foundations 
were then complete). The Planning and Housing Committee 
was again convened on 17/1/1980 to consider both the 
appeal and the report of the technical team. It then 
decided that "after careful and comprehensive consider- 
ation of Hassan X'S appeal, the complaints of the res- 
idents of Karima neighbourhood, and the report of the 
technical team the Committee recommends for the Council 
the following: 
(a) No change in the site of the bakery should be 
made because it is not (technically) in the area of 
Karima neighbourhood, but in the Suk area. 
(b) Becuase of its urgent nature this recommendation 
should be presented to the Council at its next sched- 
uled meeting for further discussion and approval. 
After hearing a detailed history of the case delivered 
by the Local Government Inspector, the Council on 
27/1/1980 confirmed and recorded the following points: 
(1) The bakery's site is located in the Suk area 
and not in Karima neighbourhood. 
(2) The possibility of the bakery posing any health 
hazard to the neighbouring residents was minimal. 
(3) The Council would not be able to pay compensat- 
ion in the event of a court decision in favour of 
Hassan X. 
(4) The unanimous recommendation of the Planning & 
Housing Committee based on the report of the tech- 
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nical team, that the original decision to approve 
the erection of the bakery on its present site be 
implemented. 
After the settlement of this case, the Chairman of the 
Council got his bakery approved at the same valuable 
site. Also a third bakery was licensed for a Dubasin 
businessman at the same area with similar concessions. 
By 1981 the three bakeries were complete and working 
in supplying the market (oftenly the black one). 
What this case reveals, in addition to being a general ill- 
ustration of how the council uses its powers in manipulative 
way to serve the interests of certain individuals and groups, is 
the kind of resistance, albeit unsuccessful, which certain mem- 
bers of the community were able to mount. But such resistance was 
waged primarily by groups seeking to pursue their own similar 
interests (as opposed to a different disinterested course). In 
fact, both sides used and manipulated every possible source of 
power and pressure in essentially the same way and for the same 
target. The conflict between them could by no means be construed 
as an example of class struggle; it could only be conceptualized 
as competition between different fragments or factions of the 
same incomplete social class. 
(2) Wad Kamil Lands74: 
Wad Kamil is situated in the north-eastern corner of the 
town between the Blue Nile and the Khartoum-Wad Medani 
highway. The site was originally inhabited by a small 
section of Dubasin who were primarily engaged 
in small- 
scale river side agricultural (JiAu6). Until recently, 
the area lay outside the administrative 
boundaries of 
the town and had no urban services such as piped water, 
electricity, planning controls, or school. 
Its "indepen- 
dent" status as a village encouraged increasing numbers 
of West African immigrants (FeUUQta) to settle there 
while pursuing various occupations 
in the townSut. (e. g. 
porters, tailors, and barbers). 
Such areas on the out- 
skirts of towns are common 
in the Sudan and increas= 
ingly so since Independence as the legal requirements 
for entry into the country 
have been tightened and West 
Africans without proper travel documents often prefer 
the anonymity of rural villages 
like Wad Kamil where 
they are less exposed than in the town. 
75 But even in 
Wad Kamil, the predominantly 
F ctta area remained cle- 
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any separated from the rest of the village; and it 
was overcrowded and of "very poor appearance". Follow- 
ing on The People's Local Government Act of 1971, the boundaries of the town were redrawn to accomodate Wad 
Kamil Village, and the whole population- including 
Fellata- became under the administrative authority of the adjacent Imtidad and Mazad People's Council. They 
remained so up to June 1976 when the Wad Kamil Neigh- 
bourhood People's Council was established as a separate 
entity. At first this was construed as formal recognit- ion of the 'rights' of the residents of Wad Kamil, and 
particularly the Fellata. Later, however, it turned out 
to be only the first step in a process of stripping them 
of the limited range of rights which they thought they 
had achieved. Prominent among these rights, was that of 
residence in this particular neighbourhood. 
With the intensification of commercial accumulation 
and the recent increase in the size of the town's pop- 
ulation and the subsequent escalation of the housing 
problem, the accumulating groups in the town began to 
cast their acquisitive eyes on the land of Wad Kamil. 
Its potential for commercial and other investments is 
easy to appreciate; it is located in the vicinity of the 
booming Northern Industrial Area and adjacent to the 
Through-Highway. Thus, when the Council drew up a plan 
for "the renewal and beautification of the town" in 1978, 
one of the concerns of those dominant on the Council was 
to plan for the removaZ of the poor residents of Wad 
Kamil (Fellata and Dubasin) to other areas with far less 
potentialities and to reclassify the area as First CZass 
land for sale by oPen auction or to buyers who can pay 
in hard currency. 7 In either case, developers would 
build on this area in accordance with the First Class 
specifications contained in The Town Building Regulat- 
ions. The whole plan was justified on the grounds that 
Wad Kamil was in the front of the town and that its 
appearance should be such as to impress by-passers 
along the Kartoum-Wad Medani road and the financial 
needs of the Council for new sources of revenue. But, 
indeed, the plan can only be properly understood as 
part of the wider class-based struggle over the nature 
of the town development and its beautification. 
The Council, dominated by groups interested in accumulation, 
in fact took the lands away from one group of users, who were 
said to be using it "inefficiently", and turned it over to an- 
other group for what was described as "higher and better use" in 
accordance with the ultimate interests of the town. In this 
struggle between a low-income and legally vulnerable group on 
one side, and the vested interests of capitalist speculators on 
the other, the Council openly sided with the latter to deprive 
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the former of their locality of residence and to open the way 
for the building of luxury apartments. Moreover, the Council 
then provided the area with more than averagely adequate serv- 
ices. But the struggle involved a number of confrontations and 
did not develop smoothly. These were further complicated by the 
complex character of the different interests involved. To exp- 
lain this, we need to look closely at the decisions taken by the 
Council Central Committee at its meeting on 8th November 1979 
on this issue: 
(1) To remove all Fellata from Wad Kamil to Kambo Haj 
Ali (a residential area inhabited by West Africans 
who are working in the Ginneries and situated beyond 
the boundaries of the town to the West of the Main 
Canal). The Fellata were to be allowed to take their 
building materials with them, but the Council would 
not pay any compensation after demolishing their hou- 
ses. The Fellata were thus the group to lose the most 
from this plan "to develop and beautify the town" and 
this was simply because they were the weakest group 
in all respects. 
(2) The poor Dubasin residents of Wad Kamil were also 
to be moved from the area and to have their houses 
demolished, but the Council was to compensate them 
with plots of land equal to theirs in the adjacent 
third class area to the North of Imtidad near the 
Northern Industrial Area. 
(3) The few better off residents of Wad Kamil and the 
leaders of the Neighbourhood Council were to be given 
plots of land in the replanned area of Wad Kamil, be- 
hind the first class area, and they were to benefit 
from the new planning and the new services. The plots 
they were to occupy were to be reclassified as second 
class. - 
(4) Members of the town's affluent group were, of course, 
to be given the first class section of Wad Kamil where 
they could build luxury residences and the Council 
would provide this section with all services, the 
reasons being that if they did not do so"investors 
needed for the development of the town would go 
away". 77 
This case, once more, illustrates some of the ways in which 
members of the dominant affluent group (accumulators) use legal 
and administrative powers not only to appropriate a potentially 
useful public resource, but, at the same time, to 
deprive poor 
people of its use. It also shows very clearly that the particip- 
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ation on the Council of some leading figures from among the poor 
of Wad Kamil did not lead to any "positive achievements" for the 
poor; on the contrary, their presence on the Council may be con- 
strued as having facilitated compromise with the affluent and 
"betrayal" of the poor, for the few better off residents of Wad 
Kamil represented on Neighbourhood Council contributed to gearing 
public opinion in the area to the acceptance of minimal concess- 
ions of which they- the representatives- themselves received the 
lion's share. 
REVENUES APPROPRIATION AND THE FINANCE OF PUBLIC SERVICES: 
The third set of Council powers which directly affect cap- 
ital accumulation concerns the financing of the "production" of 
public services and investments. The Council obviously has to 
"accumulate" sufficient revenue in order to be able to produce 
or to finance the production of public services and social inv- 
estments. 
78 
But since it is by definition, an integral part of 
the capitalist State, its methods of generating and appropriat- 
ing revenue are directly governed by the wider rules determining 
the relationship between the State and the process of private 
accumulation. These 'rules' may be summarised as follows. 
Capital accumulation takes place mainly in private enter- 
prises. Thus the State generally appropriates a surplus only to 
pass it on to the private enterprises, local or foreign. Gener- 
ally, the State in a capitalist society does not reinvest in its 
own enterprises to produce further surpluses; instead, it invests 
in the building and maintenance of the infrastructure (dams, 
roads, the generation of electricity, railways, etc. ) on which 
the process of private accumulation depends. 
79 At the local 
level, the state through the Council seeks means of revenue acc- 
umulation other than "surplus-producing" schemes. 
(This is why, 
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as pointed earlier, all public services and projects are being 
"produced" by private contractors and not the public departments 
of the Council). 
A close examination of the alternative means adopted to 
accumulate revenue show that the interests of private accumulat- 
ion dominate and that there is an intrinsic tendency in the dis- 
tribution of the burden to relieve the accumulating groups. The 
financing of Council expenditure is borne disproportionately by 
the groups who are least able to pay (i. e. the low-income earn- 
ers who receive the lowest benefits from this expenditure in the 
first place). To substantiate these assertions, I now consider 
the ways in which the burden of financing public expenditure is 
shared by different socio-economic groups in the town. I shall 
attempt to answer the question: Who pays for what is produced? 
Sources of local government revenue in the Sudan can be 
grouped into the three categories of: (1) Financial gr, najts from 
the central government; (2) Locally imposed taxes , including 
"rates"; and (3) Miscellaneous receipts such as licence dues and 
court fines. I therefore broadly discuss each in turn. 
(1) Government Grants 
80. 
These may be conditional (i. e. they must be spent on stip- 
ulated services such as education, health or electrification), or 
unconditional (i. e. given without any specific directions as to 
what they should be spent on). In both cases, however, the poor 
and the lower-income sections of the population in the country 
at large are the main contributors. This is simply because, acc- 
ording to various studies and reports on the Sudan economy, the 
central government relies heavily on indirect taxes 
for revenue 
accumulation; 
81 in this respect the situation in the Sudan is 
similar to that in most underdeveloped countries. 
And since in- 
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direct taxes have a highly regressive impact on different incomes 
(i. e. the rate of tax increases as income falls and vice versa), 
it is obvious which income groups bears the major burden. And, 
of course, in absolute terms the lower-income tax payers heavily 
outnumber the high-income tax payers. Thus the former consume 
much more of basic goods (which are taxed) than. the latter who, 
of course, consume much more of luxuries which are subsidized in 
various ways. 
(2) Direct LocaZ Taxes and Rates: 
Sources of Direct Tax in the urban areas of the Sudan have 
been drastically reduced since the abolition of Head Tax. At pre- 
sent, local governments in urban areas collect only what is 
known as the property tax (i. e. rates). This is imposed mainly 
on buildings (e. g. houses, stores, shops, factories, etc. ), and 
the rate of the tax is related to the assessed value of the pro- 
perty. In general, the contribution of this tax is modest in rel- 
ation to total local government revenue, because82: (a) First 
and foremost, the rates are held at a very low level (12%); (b) 
the rating system is inflexible so that revenue does not grow 
appreciably from year to year, and certainly does not match in- 
flation; and (c) Rateable values of property do not reflect their 
market values, especially as revaluations are usually delayed 
and under-assessed. 
83 
The modest share of total revenues contributed by the pro- 
perty tax is, however, largely drawn from the poorer sections 
of the urban population rather than from the more affluent acc- 
umulating groups. There are two main reasons 
for this: 
(I) Although the rates are paid directly by property owners, 
in 
the final analysis the propertyless poor are the real payers; 
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being propertyless, they have to rent houses and in doing so 
they, in fact, pay for the rates. This may explain why the "rat- 
es are held at a very low level", to match the paying ability 
of the poor. 
(II) In accordance with Article 25, Chapter 5 of the People's 
Local Government Act of 1971, local authorities may exempt any 
person unable to pay without the consent of the Minister if the 
amount is. less than a thousand Sudanese Pounds. And this prov- 
ision is commonly used by members of the Council to exempt them- 
selves, their 'tribal' supporters, and other members of their 
"class", while finding- and if necessary inventing- all "reason- 
able justification" to reject applications for exemption submit- 
ted by the "powerless". 
(3) MisceZZaneous Receipts: 
These include licence dues, court fines, some public ser- 
vices charges and fees, etc. The contribution of such receipts 
to the total revenue of the Council is low and stagnant. This is 
because the charges and fees on services are usually nominal. If 
that was not so, most of "the people" could not use these serv- 
ices (e. g. public health charges). And the licence dues are del- 
iberately kept low to avoid discouraging "investors" for devel- 
oping the locality. 
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The way in which "class" interests that surround the Coun- 
cil politics can be illustrated is by the study of the range of 
policies adopted to meet the Council's growing inability to fin- 
rk 
ance the "production" of services from its revenues. 
(1)The Council's first source of finance is, of course, the 
central government grants and it can accordingly put press- 
ure on the government for further help in 
financing some of 
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its (the Council) projects and services. But this possib- 
ility is, by and large, extremely limited, partly because 
of the Council's subordinate position in relation to the 
central administration, and partly because of the government 
growing inability to cope with its own severe economic and 
financial problems. 
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Furthermore, the government has argued 
that: 
continuous growth in aid from the central government 
may have precipitated a sense of irresponsibility 
regarding the exploitation of local authorities' own 
sources, and that some local authorities have either 
imposed a lower rate or underestimated the value of 
their revenue in order to get the maximum possible help 
from the centre. 
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There is thus increasing pressure on local authorities to 
cease looking to the central government for help and to find 
ways of helping themselves from their own resources. 
(2) The establishment of a surplus-generating projects is an 
obvious alternative, and is possible, but tends to run coun- 
ter to the interests of private accumulation and contradicts 
the basic principles and 'rules' of the relationship between 
the State and private enterprise in a capitalist society. 
Thus, in spite of recent legislation attempting to 
induce 
local authorities to enter the field of commercial and 
ind- 
ustrial investment (1971 Act), the achievements to 
date are 
scarcely significant in any part of the 
Sudan. And this is 
not because of difficulties in raising capital, since 
the 
extensive financial concessions and 
loans for such invest- 
% 
ments are available87, but primarily because of 
the reluct- 
ance of those who dominate the 
local authorities to compete 
against private enterprise in which 
they are often themselves 
involved, directly or indirectly. The attitude of councill- 
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ors is often " such investment is going to be profitable, 
why not establish it ourselves" 
(3) Another possible way of increasing revenue would be to raise 
the tax-base on the present principles, but this scarcely 
practicable owing to the nature of the taxes allowed for 
under the Local Government Appropriation of Taxes Ordinance 
of 1954; being based primarily on flat-rate principle, the 
taxes have a regressive impact and the ability of the maj- 
ority of the population (the poor) to pay more than a cert- 
ain proportion of their disposable incomes is limited. I 
would maintain that this is the essential, and not so much, 
as Howell argues, that the collection system is inefficient 
and corrupt. 
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(4) A final alternative open to the Council would be to imple- 
ment radical tax reforms and to impose progressive taxation 
(i. e. to increase the rate as income rises). Local councils 
have the power to do this under the 1971 Act (Article 4, C; 
Chapter Two), but the Council in Hassaheisa has never exer- 
cised this power. On one occasion in 1974, a local bus owner 
(Ahmed Al-Hassan) proposed the imposition of atax of only 
one Sudanese pound per month on all bus owners to allow 
for 
the improvement of the "streets", but this was rejected at 
the same time as the Council agreed to increase the rate 
on sanitary buckets (which affects different 
households eq- 
ually) from two to five Sudanese pounds annually. 
89 
More 
recently, the Council imposed a piastre on 
the consumption 
of a rottle of sugar to finance the town renewal. 
These are 
clear examples of the Council's preference 
for spreading 
the costs of services over the entire-population 
without 
a corresponding spread of the services themselves. 
Also 
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Table 8: 7 Hassaheisa Town People's Council Revenue 
for Selected Years(In Sudanese Pounds) 
jSource 1975/75 1976/77 1978/79 1979/80 1981/8 
Direct Taxes 
Buildings 1000 5000 14150 14200 15000 
Land 520 530 -- - 
Ushur - - -- - 
Animal 12040 10000 -- - 
Entertainment 6000 7700 13500 14000 10000 
General Rates 20700 28700 58000 60000 49450 
Licence s 
Commercial 14000 14000 13000 11000 16500 
Health 1750 1800 3000 3000 5500 
Local Beer 12745 9175 8000 5000 - 
Others 27000 20890 -- - 
Rents 
Council's Biuldi ngs 3655 3655 9000 9100 10000 
Fees & Dues 
Building Fees - - 2000 2050 3000 
Parks - 150 150 150 450 
Suk Contracts 9300 5300 7500 8000 6500 
Animals' - - 150 150 
100 
Central Market 2500 2500 8000 8000 8000 
Miscellaneous 775 745 4000 4000 6000 
Total % 111,985 110,145 
140,450 138,650 130,500 
Source: Various files in the Office of the Administrative Officer, 
Hassaheisa Town Council. 
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they illustrate the tendency of the dominant groups to 
share these costs with all "the people" rather than bearing 
them as internal costs in their businesses. 
The main results of the Council's failure over the years 
to meet the problems outlined have been (a) a chronic financial 
crisis (See Table 8: 7) and, (b) the rapid deterioration of the 
services and the Council's progressive inability to meet the 
ever-increasing demand for "necessary" social investments. With 
this general failure to "ensure that the services rendered by 
it (the Council) are directed towards the benefit of the citiz- 
ens of the area at the highest standard", there is now a develop- 
ing tendency to rely on "private" finance for essential services, 
and this is actually becoming the norm. With the relentless en- 
couragement of the State and the active blessing of the dominant 
group of councillors, the general ideology of self-help and local 
initiative is finding some acceptance even among the poor for 
whom it is yet another form of subjugation and exploitation. It 
is now up to each individual, if he "really desires" to better 
his life, to put more efforts and initiative in order to win 
and acquire services. This is a typical middle-class attitude 
according to which the poor are being asked to embrace without 
being given the material resources to practise it. In effect we 
presently find the following in the town: 
(a) The lower-income groups have extremely poor facilities 
which are increasingly inadequate and many of which are 
I. 
actually collapsing. Health services 
in the town- including 
clinical examinations, and prescribed medicines- are 
being 
provided by revenue from the "Funds of 
Self-Help for 
Health Revolution". The erection, maintenance, and renewal 
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of water pipes are paid for public self-help subscriptions 
in each of the neighbourhoods. In education, an increasing 
number of items such as school notebooks, ink, and books 
are becoming the private responsibility of parents. And as 
the financial ability of the low-income groups is so limited, 
it follows that the actual services which they now enjoy are 
minimal. 
(b) On the other hand, the affluent group of accumulators enjoy 
relatively good services provided mainly through private 
arrangements. They attend private clinics and hospitals 
where the fees and charges are invariably high enough to 
deter the poor from even contemplating their use. In Hassa- 
heisa there are 9 private clinics operated by "government" 
doctors in private premises and during private time, usually 
between 6 a. m. to 10 a. m. daily (2 consultants, 2 dentists, 
and 5 general practitioners). The fee for a private clinical 
examination is however quite high. 
With the poor teaching facilities in the government sch- 
ools, the rich of Hassaheisa commonly hire teachers privately 
to help their children. Thus there are what is referred to 
as the consolidating classes during the evenings 
for which 
the charges are, again, far beyond the means of 
low-income 
f amilies.. The rich also continue to enjoy other collective 
services, such as street lightening, refuse collection, 
and 
public parks by paying 
for them through private finance and 
subscriptions in heir areas, while 
the poor are almost 
completely deprived in all these respects. 
But the ability 
of the rich to finance these services 
privately results from 
surpluses which they originally acquired 
from the wider 
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population of the town, and the original subsidy provided 
by the government (central or local) for these services. 
This partly explains their complacency and indifference 
towards the inability of the Council to finance such ser- 
vices. 
CONCLUSION: 
I have in this Chapter tried to link various issues in 
the study of political behaviour and attitudes in urban areas to 
a central problematic in this thesis: the relationship between 
the patterns of local politics and the economic interests of 
various groups of people in the town. In conclusion, I re-emph- 
asize the following points: 
(1) Institutions of local political dominance have for long been 
controlled and, in a sense, monopolized by members of the socio- 
economic groups directly interested in promoting and facilitating 
private accumulation, especially in commerce. 
(2) This has throughout the town's history been possible because 
any potential threat of power being assumed by members of socio- 
economic groups disinterested in, or antagonistic to, the proc- 
ess of private accumulation has consistently been obstructed by 
a combination of government policies and local political action. 
(3) The promotion and manipulation of the ideology of tribalism, 
combined with recent attempts to cultivate sophisticated norms 
of participation and conciliation, are the main ways through 
which the dominance of the "accumulating" group is maintained. 
The ideology of 'tribalism' has been used to confuse and distort 
"politics" in the eyes of the low-income masses, so that the 
dominant groups have succeeded in presenting the local situat- 
ion as one of partnership and 'tribal competition' rather than 
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of class struggle "over resources". Potentially revolutionary 
and militant radical politics have thus turned into submissive 
political conservatism. 
(4) This has allowed the dominant groups to manipulate the inst- 
itutions of local government (principally the Town Council) to 
the direct benefit of private accumulation. Also, this process 
provides a good istance of the way in which the State behaves as 
an "executive organ" of the socially, economically, and ideolog- 
ically dominant groups in the society. The main strains and ten- 
sions in the political arena thus appear as ever-present 'compet- 
ition' between various individuals and factions of the same stock 
seeking to control the same process. From being a manifestation 
or reflection of class-struggle, such competition is, in the 
terms which I conceive it, an aspect of conflicts to be expected 
between various fragments of an incomplete class, each fragment 
striving to establish and consolidate its position in the class 
under formation. Though not clear and apprehensible to most mem- 
bers of the community- and to low-income members in particular- 
the process of class struggle is present in the various processes 
of domination- economic, political, and ideological. Objectively, 
the contending parties to this struggle are neither the fragments 
of the dominant groups seen as two great collectivities, the 
first with common interest in the process of accumulation in 
opposition to the second 'disinterested' in capital accumulation, 
are the contending parties both as real entities and as positions. 
`Finally, there seems to be a general intrinsic contradict- 
ion between the processes of private accumulation and of urban- 
ization, which should be noted. While private accumulation ben- 
efits from acceleration in the rate of urbanization- partly 
bec- 
ause accumulation at the rural 
level creates townward migration, 
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and partly because this migration provides cheap labour for 
urban production of services, customers for commercial commod- 
ities, tenants for urban houses, and so on - urbanization requ- 
ires increasing investments in urban public services for a pop- 
ulation progressively less able to pay for them or to contribute 
to the finance of their production. The Hassaheisa Council domin- 
ated by members of the affluent group, has thus far been quite 
unable to resolve this contradiction, or even to "defend itself 
against it". 
E 
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This study set out to investigate the creation, (production 
and reproduction) of Hassaheisa and the nature of life there to- 
day as aspects of the history and present structure of the soc- 
iety and economy of the region in which the town is set, and 
even of the Sudan as a whole. Since Hassaheisa was brought into 
being by and through early British colonial rule, the time span 
of the study extends from the early years of this century to the 
present. In one sense, the thesis is simply a case study in urb- 
anization and urban life. But such a statement fails to draw att- 
ention to the essential nature of the study, which is that I have 
attempted to view the creation of Hassaheisa, and of urban growth 
in the Sudan in general, as 'symptoms' of underdeveZopment rather 
than of 'development'. In attempting to assess the growth of 
Hassaheisa as a process unfolding within the specific conditions 
of colonial and neo-colonial capitalism, I have regarded the town 
as much more than an indicator, and also much more than a mere 
consequences of the profound changes taking place in the country. 
In the view taken, Hassaheisa is an integral part and expression 
of these changes, and not merely an indicator or a consequence 
of them. 
The thesis is, first and foremost, an empirical study, but 
the 'facts' which it presents are treated in a historical and 
theoretical framework which demands that many of the notions pre- 
valent in 'conventional' urban sociology, 
both in Africa and the 
West, be discarded and replaced with concepts derived from a 
Marxiän view of development and underdevelopment. 
Apart from general descriptive 
data on the composition of 
the population, the main empirical 
materials contained in this 
thesis refer to specific conjunctures 
which illustrate and reveal 
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the dynamic role of urbanization as a factor in, and an express- 
ion of, the processes of underdevelopment. 
My first task, essential for the broad aim I had set my- 
self, was to review the historical period during which Hassaheisa 
came into being (i. e. the period of colonialism) with special 
reference to the establishment of a new socio-economic formation 
which had a series of specific characteristics. The main feature 
and by far the most dynamic aspect of this epoch (and of the 
period of neo-colonialism as well) has been the development of 
the process of capital accumulation, a process which was, we know, 
closely related to the dynamics and mechanisms of the global 
imperialist economic system. 
The particular way in which the Sudan was involved in this 
colonial economic system was basically conditioned by the pre- 
existing social and economic system or systems of the country, 
but the 'needs' and policies adopted by colonialism to achieve 
capitalistic penetration in turn conditioned all subsequent deve- 
lopments in the society and economy of the country. One crucial 
and fundamental aspect of the specific manner in which the Sudan 
was 'linked' to the wider colonial capitalist system arose from 
the promotion of an economy in which peasants were compelled by 
various means to produce crops for cash. The need for a contin- 
uous flow of these crops to the centres of colonial capitalism 
at reasonable (cheap) prices led to policies which effectively 
established two quite basic characteristics of the 
'new' colonial 
economy: 
(1) The systematic stabilization of peasants 
in their communit- 
ies as producers of crops required as raw materials 
for cap- 
italist industry (e. g. cotton). The relation of 
'correspond- 
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ence' between the production of the crops and the needs of 
capitalist industry was established within the parameters of 
world trade through the basic mechanism of 'unequal exchange' 
of values favouring the latter. During the colonial period, 
the most 'efficient' functioning of the peasant production 
called for the concentration of the production of crops in 
those regions of the Sudan where the comparative advantages 
of production of these crops were thought to be highest. This 
concentration then called for the mobilization of the labour 
needed at various stages of the production process. The init- 
ial attempts to import labour from beyond the boundaries of 
the Sudan rapidly proved too expensive and impractical. The 
colonial administration therefore soon resorted to the mobil- 
ization of a labour force of an indigenous source. But this 
policy, in addition to the contradiction it reveals in the 
colonial approach (i. e. stabilization versus mobilization), 
faced the fact that the transformation of 'peasants' into a 
mobile and 'free' labour force was a formidable task and 
soon called for more elaborate measures to reduce and part- 
ially disintegrate the viability of 'peasant economies', or 
even, in certain areas of the Sudan, to bring about their 
disintegration. The resultant dislocation of population from 
some regions and its movement to those where crop production 
was intensified- or where labour was required for other rel- 
ated purposes- revealed a process of proletarianization. 
Whether the colonial capitalist process of accumulation cal- 
led for the settlement of this 
'mobilized' population in 
rural or urban areas, 
did not alter the fundamental nature 
of the process as one 
involving a deep and far-reaching 
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transformation of socio-economic relations within and bet- 
ween various sections of Sudanese society. The rate and 
the maginitude of these movements did, of course, show 
significant variations over time according to the needs, cri- 
ses, and the degree of intensity of development of the col- 
onial and neo-colonial economy, and we have seen that these 
variations were clearly reflected in the changing rate and 
changing pattern of urbanization in Hassaheisa. 
(2) The second essential feature of the colonial and neo-colonial 
economy which ultimately affected urbanization arose from 
imperial capital's intrinsic need not only for a regular 
supply of raw materials but for supplies at low prices. Since 
the 'price' of any commodity, is ultimately determined by 
the 'value' of labour which produces it, and since the 'val- 
ue' of labour is largely determined by the specific histor- 
ical conditions within which production occurs, it follows 
that the following are engendered and maintained as condit- 
ions for the mechanism of low pricing: (a) Low level of dev- 
elopment in all the relevant forces of production (i. e. land, 
labour, and implements) and (b) a low standard of living as 
the pre-existing societies had a very limited range of nec- 
essities. For, both of these had a profound determining imp- 
act on the measure of the level of prices or values of the 
peasants labour. This simply to say that; low levels of 
development in the forces of production and in the standard 
of living were intimately related to 
lower crop prices. And *s 
this meant that higher than average profits were recovered 
as the starting point 
for the whole process of colonial acc- 
umulation. Thus the maintenance 
and perpetuation of 'under- 
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developed' forces of production and a low standard of liv- 
ing were not only a logical and sensible course of action 
from the point of view of colonial capitalist accumulation, 
but were necessary for the continuation and reproduction of 
the whole system of extraction of profits at higher than 
average level to 'compensate' for the declining average rate 
of profit in Western Europe. 
The general argument is thus that the system operated, and 
continues to operate, mainly through the mechanism of unequal 
exchange of values in the world trade. In the internal situation 
of the Sudan it was, therefore, necessary for the colonial system 
to establish a trading structure which provided an effective link 
between crop producers and the world capitalist market. And, bec- 
ause of the specific geographical conditions of the country, this 
trading structure was geared to the interests of accumulation out- 
side the country. As a 
. 
result of various policies established 
with this framework of interests, local traders were 'located' at 
certain strategic "stations" in the crop-producing regions and 
were allowed minimal shares in the profit created out of the 
over-arching system of unequal exchange. The process of commer- 
cial capital accumulation which emerged in these "stations" and 
carried out by local indigenous merchants, was thus weak and un- 
certain and this became a major factor in the dynamics and manner 
of motion of the forces shaping and structuring the communities 
which grew up around these "stations". 
We have seen how, in the case of Hassaheisa, the weak and 
dependent process of local commercial capital accumulation virt- 
ually influenced the behaviour of the 
indigenous merchants in 
various ways. We have also seen 
how the local commercial pursuits 
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were, and are, 'underdeveloped' and just how precarious the 
foundations of accumulation on the local level are. Indeed, the 
nature of the 'investments' out of commercially accumulated cap- 
ital indicate the inherent weakness and insecurity of the proc- 
ess, and do not in any way point to the development of new and 
higher stages of economic activity. 
Such local accumulation as there has been could not lead 
to or effect any profound restructuring of internal social relat- 
ions in the community. This is partly because commercial accumul- 
ation did not need a direct intervention into the social realat- 
ions of production, and partly because the level of accumulation 
was too slow to manifest itself in a markedly different pattern 
of internal social relations. Thus the 'underdeveloped' and 'tra- 
ditional' internal social relations of the community have simply 
tended to persist and to recurr, and we have seen that their 
persistence has been encouraged and given impetus by the way in 
which the small dominant groups in the community recoursed to the 
manipulation of these relations in the 'management' of the comm- 
unity's daily life. Prominent among the 'traditional' 'backward' 
social relations thus maintained and manipulated are those which 
identify different peoples with their respective regional and 
'tribal' origins. Such identifications provide a basis for inter- 
personal and inter-group relations within and between various 
sections of the population. 
This set of relations is what I call 
'tribalism', and the 
consciousness which articulated them and gave 
them meanings is 
what I call "tribal ideology". 
This initially developed out of 
the direct needs of migrants to the 
town to assist each other 
(and not necessarily against each other) , 
but over time it has 
changed very appreciably. 
It now has no more than a marginal 
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effect as an instrument of assisstance to new comers or to the 
poor, while its consolidation into afirm 'ideology' has become 
an instrument through which antagonisms within the community are 
generated, controlled, and managed in the interests of the domin- 
ant groups. I have attempted to reveal and analyse the tendency 
for this 'ideology' to intensify with the persistence and incr- 
ease of the dependent status of commercial accumulation and with 
the intensification of the process through which the neo-colonial 
extraction of profits has increasingly drained surpluses out of 
the country. 
I am well aware that the formulations elaborated in this 
study, especially as they affect the process of urbanization, 
call for a great deal of further empirical work. Until this has 
been done, it will be difficult to give many of the above prop- 
ositions more secure foundations. There is an urgent need for 
more empirical work on the way in which some sections of the 
urban community are overcoming the "illusions" of the 'tribal 
ideology'. I believe that there is some progressive disillusion- 
ment in some sections of the community, but that the salient 
features of daily life, in the case of Hassaheisa at least, 
clearly reveal the dominance of 'tribalism' and, also, the ext- 
ensive way in which it is manipulated to obscure and distort the 
nature of the processes of differentiation in the urban-commun- 
ity. The main aim of all sections in manipulating 'tribalism' is 
to achieve more secure positions in a situation which is inheren- 
tly and manifestly insecure. For various reasons which I 
have 
tried to explain, dominant positions in the structure of local 
political power are seen as crucial 
for the enhancement and def- 
ence of security in an essentially 
insecure setting. This acc- 
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ounts for the fierce competition which exists between various 
factions of the "accumulating" group (where insecurity is most 
illustrated) for dominance and ascendancy in the Town Council. 
In their attempts to secure mass support for themselves, leading 
members of different factions do not hesitate to use 'tribalism' 
and, on the whole this is clearly effective despite a growing 
divergence of interests between the "leaders" and the supporting 
masses. The continuation of this process depends largely on the 
fundamental conditions which gave rise to "urban tribalism" in 
the first place, namely the conditions of insecurity imposed by 
the operation of the colonial capitalist economy. And, indeed, 
it seems clear that these insecurities are "necessary" for the 
operation of the economic system as it stands. In other words, 
it is necessary to maintain and reproduce the conditions of 
"underdevelopment" in order to maintain the operation of colonial 
and neo-colonial accumulation and thus to perpetuate the 'under- 
development' of urbanization and urban life which is an essent- 
ial part of the prevailing socio-economic formation of the coun- 
try. 
I 
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APPENDIX (1) 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A SAMPLE OF 220 SUK MERCHANTS, HASSAHEISA 
1. Name: 
2. Sex: 
(0) No. Answer (1) Male (2) Female 
3. Age: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) 10 - 14 Years 
(6) 25 - 29 Years 
(9) 40 - 49 Years 
(12)70 Years & Over 
(1) 0-4 Years 
(4) 15 - 19 Years 
(7) 30 - 34 Years 
(10) 50 - 59 Years 
(2) 5-9 Years 
(5) 20 - 24 Years 
(8) 35 -39 Years 
(11) 60 -69 Years 
4. Birth Place: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Rural in Hassaheisa 
(6) Town in North 
(9) Other Sudan Rural 
(1) Hassaheisa Town 
(4) Hallawin Rural 
(7) Rural in North 
(10)Other Places 
(2) Other Gezira Town 
(5) Other Gezira Rural 
(8) Other Sudan Town 
5. Area of Residence 
(0) No Answer (1) Omda 
(3) Mygouma (4) Shargi 
(6) Mazad (7) Imtidad 
(9) Fur (10) Kambo 
(12) Other Town in Gezira(13) Nearby Village 
6. Level of Education: 
(0) No Answer (1) Illiterate 
(3) Primary (4) Intermediate 
(6) University or College(7) Post-University 
7. Type of Firm or Business: 
(0) No Answer (1) Retail Trade 
(3) Retail & Wholesale (4) Workshop 
(6) Busjness Admin. Office 
(2) Karima 
(5) Wassat 
(8) Jadida 
(11) Other in Town 
(2) Khalwa 
(5) Secondary 
(2) Wholesale Trade 
(5) Rakouba or Kushuk 
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8. Main Items of Trade 
(0) No Answer (1) Meat (2) Building Material 
(3) Wood-work 
(6) Tailoring 
(4) Contracts 
(7) Electronics 
(5) Pharmacy 
(8) Books and Press 
(9) Refreshments (10) Food (11) Household Utensils 
(12) Machine Spare Parts (13)Hair Dressing (14) Ready-made Clothes 
(15) Cloths (16) Mech. Rep. Service(17) Photo 
(18) Shoes (19) Fruits & Vegetable(20) Wine 
(21) Miscellaneous or General (22) Other 
9. Period Business Established 
(0) No Answer 
(3) 4-8 Years 
(6) 23- 29 Years 
(1) Less Than 1 Year (2) 1-3 Years 
(4) 9- 15 Years (5) 16 - 22 Years 
(7) 30 Years & Over 
10. Type of Previous Occupation 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Farmer 
(6) Other Occupation 
(1) Government Salar. (2) Worker 
(4) Petty Trader (5) Craftsman 
(7) No Occupation 
11. Type of Secondary Occupation 
(0) No Answer (1) Govt. Salariat 
(3) Farmer (4) Petty Trader 
(6) Other Occupation (7) No Occupation 
12. Source of Initial Business Capital 
(2) Worker 
(5) Craftsman 
(0) No Answer (1) Own Savings (2) Private Loan 
(3) Public Loan (4) Inherited (5) Gift 
(6) Mor'Than 1 from Above (7) Other Sources 
13. Size of Present Capital 
(0) No Answer (1) Less than fS 1000 (2) ES 1000-1999 
(3) ES 2000- 2999 (4) ES 3000 -3999 (5) ES 4000-5999 
(6) ES 6000- 9999 (7) ES 10000-19999 (8) ES 20000-29999 
(9) Es 30000-49999 (10)ES 50000 
&+ 
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14. Type of Premise Occupancy 
(0) No Answer (1) Owned 
(3) Other 
15. The Manager of Business 
(0) No Answer (1) Owner Himself 
(3) Sibling (4) Parent 
(6) No Relation 
(2) Rented 
(2) His Son 
(5) Other Relative 
16. Number of People Employed in Firm 
(0) No Answer (1) One Worker Only (2) Two 
(3) Three (4) Four 
(6) Six (7) Seven 
(9) Nine and Over 
} 
(5) Five 
(8) Eight 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR. HEADS OF HOUSEHODS IN THE SAMPLE (410) 
1. Name: 
7 Via C, 4A 'm rý ti1A Vº eo 
APPENDIX (2) 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Mygouma 
(6) Mazad 
(9) Fur 
(1) Omda 
(4) Shargi 
(7) Imtidad 
(10) Kambo 
(2) Karima 
(5) Awssat 
(8) Jadida 
(11) Wad Kamil 
(12) Other Area in Town 
3. Number of Family Members: 
(0) No Answer (1) 1-2 members 
(3) 5-6 members (4) 7-8 members 
(6) 11-12 members (7) 13 + members 
4. Sex: 
(0) No Answer 
5. A e: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) 7-9 years 
(6) 20-24 years 
(9) 35-39 years 
(12) 50-54 years 
(15) 65-69 years 
6. Marital Status: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Married 
(6) Other 
(1) Male 
(1) 0-4 years 
(4) 10-14 years 
(7) 25-29 years 
(10) 40-44 years 
(13) 55-59 years - 
(16) 70 years & over 
(1) Below age 
(4) Divorced 
(2) 3 -4 members 
(5) 9 -10 members 
(2) Female 
(2) 5- 6 years 
(5) 15- 19 years 
(8) 30- 34 years 
(11) 45- 49 years 
(14) 60- 64 years 
(2) Never Married 
(5) Widowed 
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7. Tribal Group: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Shukria 
(6) Arab (Centre) 
(9) Dubasin 
(12) Darfurians 
(15) Southerners 
(1) Ja'aliin 
(4? Hallawin 
(7) Nubians (North) 
(10) Baggara 
(2) Shaikia 
(5) Arab(North) 
(8) Nuba (West) 
(11) Kordofanians 
(13)Westerners (Foreign) (14) Other Foreign. 
(16) Gawama'a & Gimi' 
8. Present Main Occupation: 
(0) No Answer (1) Senior Adm. & Prof. (2) Jun. Adm. & Prof. 
(3) Big Merchant & Busin. 
(6) Unskilled Worker 
(9) Farm Worker 
(12) Regular Forces 
(15) Unemployed 
DTý. výl e% -F Ti t4 »n of-4 e-% r% 9 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Primary 
(4) Small Trader & Seller(5)Skilled Worker 
(7) Craftsman ($) Farmer 
(10) Unprod. Occupation (11) Below Age 
(13) Fisherman 
(1) Unschooled 
(14) Other 
(2) Khalwa 
(4) Intermediate (5) Secondary 
(6) University or College (7) Other 
10. Birth Place: 
(0) No Answer (1) Urban Large (2) Urban Small 
(3) Rural Sedentary (4) Rural Nomadic (5) Abroad 
(6) Hassaheisa Town (7) Other Place 
11. Movement to Elsewhere since Arrival in Town 
(0) No Answer (1) Yes 
(2) No 
'S 
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12. (If Yes), Reason for Movement: 
(0) No Answer (1) Transference (2) Search for Work 
(3) Religious 
(6) Trade 
13. Destination of Movement: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Gezira Rural Sedentary (4) Gezira R. Nomadic (5) Other U. Large 
(6) Other Urban Small (7) Other Rural Sedent. (8) Other R. Nomadic 
(9) Outside Sudan 
14. Place of Last Residence before Arrival in Town: 
(0) No Answer 
(4) Education 
(7) Personal 
(1) Gezira Urban Large (2) Gezira U. Small 
(1) Urban Settlement (2) Rural Settlement 
(5) Familial 
(8) Other 
15. Province of Last Residence: 
(0) No Answer (1) Khartoum (2) Blue Nile 
(3) White Nile 
(6) Northern 
(9) North Kordofan 
(12) S. Darfur 
(15) Jonglei 
(18) Upper Nile 
(4) Gezira 
(7) Kassala 
(10) South Kordofan 
(13) Bahr el-Ghazal 
(16) West Equatoria 
(5) El-Neil 
(8) Red Sea 
(11) N. Darfur 
(14) E1-Buhayrat 
(17) E. Equatoria 
(19) Outside Sudan 
16. Period since Arrival in Town: 
(0) No Answer (1) 0-5 years (2) 6- 
10 years 
(4) 16 - 20 years (5) 21- 25 years (3) 11 - 15 years 
(6) 26 - 30 years 
(7) 31 years & Over 
17. Reasons for Coming into the Town: 
(1) Familial (0) No Answer 
(3) Political (4) Transference 
(6) Other (7) Unknown 
(2) Economic (Work) 
(5) Educational 
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18. Membership in Voluntary Associations: 
(0) No Answer (1) Yes (2) No 
19. (If Yes), Nature of Voluntary Association: 
(0) No Answer (1) Political (2) Religious 
(3) Sport 
(6) Economic 
(4) Socio-cultural 
(7) Other 
(5) Occupational 
20. Previous Residential Area in the Town: 
(0) No Answer (1) Omda (2) Karima 
(3) Mygouma 
(6) Mazad 
(9) Fur 
(12) Other 
(4) Shargi 
(7) Imtidad 
(10) Kambo 
(13) None 
(5) Wassat 
(8) Jadida 
(11) Wad Kamil 
21. Length of Residence in Present Area: 
(0) No Answer (1) 0-5 Years (2) 6- 11 years 
(3) 12 - 19 years (4) 20 - 24 years (5) 25 + years 
22. Reasons for Change of Residential Area: 
(0) No Answer (1) Family Property (2) Personal 
(3) Government Policy 
(6) Economic (Rent) 
(4) Government House 
(7) Near Services 
(5) Near Work Place 
(8) Other 
23. Type of House Occupancy: 
(0) No Answer (1) Owned Freehold (2) Owned Leasehold 
(3) Rented 
24. (If Rented) Amount of Monthly Rent* 
(0) No Answer (1) ES 1-5 
(3) ES 12 - 19 
(4) ES 20 - 
(6) ES 30 - 34 
(7) ES 35 + 
(4) Other 
(2) ES 6- 11 
24 (5) ES 25- 29 
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25. Number of Rooms in House: 
(0) No Answer (1) One Room 
(3) Three Rooms (4) Four Rooms 
(2) Two Rooms 
(5) Five or More 
26. Availability and Pattern of Water Installation: 
(0) No Answer (1) Inside (2) Outside 
(3) Communal 
27. Electricity Provision for the House: 
(0) No Answer (1) Yes (2) No 
28. Type of Bathroom: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Bowel 
29. Type of Lavatory: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Pit Latrine 
(1) Traditional Shower (2) Modern Bath. 
(1) Syphon 
(4) Communal 
(2) Bucket 
(5) Other 
I 
456 
APPENDIX (3) 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAMPLE (2850) 
1. Name: 
2. Residential Area in Town: 
(0) No Answer (1) Omda 
(3) Mygouma (4) Shargi 
(6) Mazad (7) Imtidad 
(9) Fur (10) Kambo 
(12 ) Other Area in Town 
3. Sex: 
(0) No Answer (1) Male 
4. Relation to Head of Household: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Son 
(6) Mother 
(9) Brother 
(12) No Relation 
5. Age: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) 10 - 14 years 
(6) 25 - 29 years 
(9) 40 - 44 years 
(1) Head Himself 
(4) Daughter 
(7) Grandfather 
(10) Sister 
(1) 0-4 years 
(4) 15 - 19 years 
(7) 30 - 34 years 
(10) 45 - 49 years 
(12) 55- 59 years 
(15) 70 + years 
(13) 60 - 64 years 
(2) Karima 
(5) Wassat 
(8) Jadida 
(11) Wad Kamil 
(2) Female 
(2) Spouse 
(5) Father 
(8) Grandmother 
(11) Other Relative 
(2) 5-9 years 
(5) 20-24 years 
(8) 35-39 years 
(11) 50-54 years 
(14) 65-69 years 
L 1t-- .: a-.. 
1 C4-. +-ii " 
(1) Below Age 
(4) Divorced 
(2) Never Married 
(5) Widowed 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Married 
(6) Other 
3 i 
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7. Tribal Group: 
(0) No Answer (1) Ja'aliin (2) Shaikia 
(3) Shukria 
(6) Arab (Centre) 
(9) Dubasin 
(12) Dar f ur i an 
(15)Southerners 
(4) Hallawin 
(7) Nubians (North) 
(10) Baggara 
(13) Westerner (For. )(14) Other Foreigners 
(16) Gwama'a & Gimi' (17) Others 
(5) Arab (North) 
(8) Nuba (West) 
(11) Other Kordofanian 
8. Religious Affiliation: 
(0) No Answer (1) Muslim (2) Christian 
(3) Pagan (4) Other 
9. Birth Place: 
(0) No Answer (1) Hassaheisa (2) Other Town 
(3) Rural Sedentary (4) Rural Nomadic (5) Outside Sudan 
10. Province of Birth: 
(0) No Answer (1) Khartoum (2) Blue Nile 
(3) White Nile 
(6) Northern 
(9) North Kordofan 
(12) North Darfur 
(15) Jongolei 
(18) Upper Nile 
11. Level of Education: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) Intermediate 
It 
(6) Other 
(4) Gezira 
(7) Kassala 
(10) North Kordofan 
(13) South Darfur 
(16) West Equatoria 
(19) Outside Sudan 
(5) Neil 
(8) Red Sea 
(11) S. Kordofan 
(14) Bahr el Ghazal 
(17) E. Equatoria 
(1)Pre-Primary Khalwa(2) Primary 
(4) Secondary (5) University & College 
12. Continuous Employment during the Last Twelve Months: 
(0) No Answer (1) Yes (2) No 
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13. Are You Currently Employed? 
(0) No Answer (1) Yes (2) No 
14. (If Yes), Employer: 
(0) No Answer (1) Public Sector (2) Private Sector 
(3) Self 
15. Main Occupation: 
(4) Not Applicable (5) Other 
(0) No Answer (1) Senior Adm. & Prof (3) Jun. Adm. & Prof. 
(3) Big Merchant & Bus. -man (4) Small Trader (5) Skilled Worker 
(6) Unskilled Worker (7) Craftsman (8) Farmer 
(9) Farm Worker 
(12) Regular Forces 
16. Previous Occupation: 
t0) No Answer 
(3) Big Merchant 
(6) Unskilled Worker 
(9) Farm Worker 
(12) Regular Forces 
(10) Unprod. Occupation(11) Below Age 
(13) Fisherman (14) Other 
(1) Sen. Admin. & Prof . (2) Jun. Adm. & Prof . 
(4) Small Trader (5) Skilled Worker 
(7) Craftsman (S) Farmer 
(10) Unprod. Occupation(11) Below Age 
(13) Fisherman (14) Other 
17. Reasons for Change of Occupation: 
(0) No Answer (1) Better Income (2) Interest 
(3) Have Some Knowledge 
(6) End of Previous Job 
(4) Easy Job 
(7) Other 
(5) Improve Soc. Status 
(8) Not Applicable 
18. Do You Have Secondary Occupation? 
(0) No Answer (1) Yes (2) No 
19. Tvne of Secondary Occupation: 
(0) No Anýwer (1) Sen. Adm. & Prof . (2) Jun. 
Adm. & Prof . 
(3) Big Merchant (4) Small Trader (5) Skilled Worker 
(6) Unskilled Worker (7) Craftsman (8) Farmer 
(9) Farm Worker (10) Unprod. Occupation(11) Below 
Age 
(12) Regular Forces (13) Fisherman 
(14) Other 
Appendix (3) cont. 
20. Total Monthly Income: 
(0) No Answer 
(3) ES 50- 74 
(6) ES 150 - 199 
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(1) Less than ES 25 
(4) ES 77 - 99 
(7) ES 200 and More 
(2) ES 25 - 49 
(5) IS 100 - 149 
rS 
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APPENDIX (4) LAND CERTIFICATE 
Blue Nile Province 
Town Of Hassaheisa 
Section 12 Plot 7 
Title No. 74/1915 
This is to certify that in consideration of the proof 
produced to the satisfaction of the Settlement Officer that EZ-Dawi Hamid formerly possessed land within the Hassaheisa 
Town Boundaries the Governor of the Blue Nile Province (herein- 
after called "the Governor") on behalf of the Sudan Government hereby grants unto the Said EZ-Daus Hamid his heirs and ass- igners the piece of land hereinafter described subject to the 
conditions hereinafter mentioned which the Said EZ-Daus Hamid 
his heirs and assigners (all hereinafter included in the words "the Grantee") hereby convenants to perform. 
DESCRIPTION 
A piece of land situated within the Town of Hassaheisa 
known as Plot No. 7 in section No. 12 containing by ad- 
measurement 428 square metres or thereabouts and more par- 
ticularly delineated on the map of Hassaheisa Town deposited 
in the office of the Inspector at Hassaheisa & thereon numbered 
as aforesaid. 
CONDITIONS 
1. The Grantee is bound to build on the said piece of 
land within two years from the First day of October 
1915 suitable residential buildings with surrounding wall in 
accordance with plans and specifications approved by the Insp- 
ector. 
In the even of non compliance with this condition, the 
Government may re-enter upon the said land without payment of 
compensation and all buildings then standing thereon shall be- 
come the property of the Government. 
2. The land is subject to all general rates and taxes, 
building and sanitary and local regulations which now exist or 
may hereafter be in force in the Town of Hassaheisa. 
In witness whereof the parties hereto have hereunto affixed 
their signitures or seals thisFirst Day of October 1915 
Signed by the Governor 
In the presence of: - 
Sealed (or signed) by 
in the presence of: 
the Grantee: EZ-Daw Hamid 
This is registered in 
Deed No 74 /1915 1 
E 
the Hassaheisa Town Land Register under 
Dated this15 October 1915. 
Inspector, Blue Nile Province 
There appeared before me on the day of 
19 , and 
being identified by acknowledged the 
above to be his and that he 
freely and volutarily 
this document and understands its contents. 
Land Registry Form No. 12 
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APPENDIX (5) EXTRACTS FROM GOVERNOR-GENERAL REPORT ON 
WAD HABOUBA REBELLION, 1908 
Blue Nile. - At the end of April telegraphic news was received that Mr. C. C. Scott Moncrieff, Deputy Inspector of the Blue Nile Province, and Yuzbashi Mohammed Effendi Sherif, the Mamur of the Mesellamia District, had been treacherously murdered at a village called Tugr situated in the strip of land between the Blue and White Niles known as the Gezira, by a certain Abdel Kader Mohammed Wad Habuba of the Halowin tribe and some of his followers, who, after-the crime, took up arms against the Government and entrench- ed themselves near the scene of the outrage. The antecedents of the rebel leader are interesting as giving an indication of the motives which gave rise to the murder and subsequent rebellion. 
Abdel Kader belonged to a well known family associated with the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed, to whose cause and that of his successor (the Khalif a) he was always a firm adherent. When the general amnesty was proclaimed after the battle of Omdurman he returned to his property in the district of Mesellamia, where certain land transactions to which he was addicted led him into disputes with his relatives whose property he was trying to acquire. He was known to be on bad terms with his uncle Abdulla Musaid, Omda of Katfia, and his brother Imam Mohammed, both men of influ- 
ence in the tribe, who had never beei-i supporters of the Mahdist 
rebellion and had been the first of the inhabitants to come for- 
ward and welcome Sir Archibald Hunter when he occupied the Gezira 
after the overthrow of the Khalifa. 
It will be easily understood therefore how this family antagon- 
ism tended to keep alive the latent Mahdist predilections of Abdel 
Kader, and there is little doubt that for years past he had been 
working upon the fanatical instincts of his co-religionists and 
secretly sowing the seeds of rebellion in the Gezira Province. 
The actual events which led up to the murder were as follows: - Mr. Scott Monerief, having received a report that Abdel Kader 
had collected some forty followers near Wad Sheneina, two or three 
miles North East of Tugr, and had refused to come in and explain 
his conduct to the Mamur, went himself accompanied by the Mamur 
to enquire into the matter. It is clear that neither he nor Yuz- 
bashi Mohammed Effendi Sherif had realized the murderous intent- 
ions of Abdel Kader , for it seems that on arriving in the Wad Sheneina District some communications passed between them and the 
latter, who finally sent a message saying--that if they would come 
and interview him unattended and unarmed, he would lay his griev- 
ance before them. In this invitation-he included his uncle Abdul- 
la Musaid and three of his own brothers, all of whom it is clear 
he intended to murder as soon as he got them into his hands. The 
latter, however, declined, and tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
Mr. Scott Moncrief and the Mamur to do so also. 
On reaching Tugr, it seems, from the evidence given by prison- 
ers that Mr. Scott Moncrieff and Yuzbashi Mohammed Effendi Sherif, 
who had left their escort of two policemen over a mile away, dis- 
mounted from their camels and entered the enclosure surrounding 
one of the houses, where they were met by Abdel Kader and some of 
his followers. 
Mr. Moncrieff asked Abdel Kader if he had any grievance against 
the Government, and if so to state it. 
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The reply is significant as showing the premeditated intention 
of the rebel, as also the lack of any just motive for his action: "I have no grievance against the Government" he said "that which 
I am doing for Allah and I will die for him". Thereupon Abdel 
Kader struck down of the officials, whilst someone standing by 
struck down the other. This formed the signal for the crowd to 
rush in and hack both of them to death. 
Prompt measures were now necessary. On the 30th April, an hour 
after receipt of the news, Major Dickinson, Governor and Command- 
ant of the Blue Nile Province, left Wad Medani with one Company 
of Sudanese under Captain Logan, a Maxim, and a few camel police, 
and reached Katfia, a village a few miles from the scene of the 
murder on the evening of the following day. Thr force, too small 
to form a square, bivuacked that night, which was cloudy and pitch 
dark, 150 yards from the village in the form of a semi-circle with 
its ends thrown back, intending to attack the rebel position at 
dawn next morning. 
A spy, however, who had been in Katfia when the troops arrived, 
reported their presence at Tugr, whereupon Abdel Kader made up his 
mind to deliver a night attack. The rebels, led by the spy, were 
brought silently close to the bivouac, which they charged without 
uttering a sound, in three parties, about 2-30 a. m. One party, 
slightly in advance of others, having rushed through the police 
lines, pierced the perimer and made straight for the offers' bi- 
vouac, when they could keep silent no longer. The noise thus made 
gave the Sudanese Troops a momentary warning of what to expect 
when the other two parties were on them. 
The men stood their ground with admirable steadiness, fighting 
at first in little knots with the bayonet, but gradually their 
Captain, Yuzbashi Hassan Effendi Taufik, who had succeeded to the 
Command on Captain Logan falling severely wounded in the first on- 
slaught, managed to form them into a rough oblong round some of 
the wounded, and in this formation they resisted all further att- 
empts on the part of their assailants, who finally drew off as 
dawn approached. 
The casualties amongst the Government Troops, including camp 
followers, amounted to two Officers (Saghkolaghasi Abdel Aziz 
Effendi Magdi and Yuzbashi Mohammed Effendi Fahmi Yakut) and 
15 
men and camp followers killed; and four Officers 
(Captain Logan, 
Yuzbashi Mohammed Effendi Hussein Safwat, Major Dickinson and 
Captain MacEwen) and 35 men and camp followers wounded. 
Of the wounded, Captain Logan, Yuzbashi Mohammed Hussein 
Saf- 
wat and one man died subsequently. 
The. rebels left 35 dead on the field but 
had managed to get 
away any wounded they may have had who were unable to walk. 
Other precautions had in the meantime been taken on receipt 
of the news, and were as follows: - Half a 
Company of Mounted 
Infantry under Captain Ryan D. S. O., was 
despatched from Khartoum 
on the` night of the 30th April and reached 
Katfia, a distance of 
90 miles, at 6-0 a. m. on the 2nd May. 
Two Companies and two Maxims left Khartoum on the 
1st May for 
Kamlin and additional reinforcements were 
held in readiness. 
A Company of Sudanese Troops was sent to garrison 
Geteeinaeandt 
Dueim on the White Nile, a half Company at each place, 
p 
crossing being effected at those places. 
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A gunboat patrolled the river North and South of Dueim and Camel Police were kept constantly on the move on both banks. 
On the afternoon of the 2nd May, a reconnoitring patrol under Captain Ryan found Tugr deserted and, lying outside the Dervish 
entrenchments, the bodies of Mr. Scott Moncrief and Yuzbashi 
Mohammed Effendi Sherif, which they buried. 
On-the 3rd, Major Dickinson issued a Proclamation declaring 
Abdel Kader an outlaw for having rebelled against the Government 
and murdered its Officers, at the same time warning all people to 
abstain from giving him assistance, with the result that on the 4th Abdel Kader was captured and brought into Katfia by the vill- 
agers of Debeiba El. Dubassin. 
He was tried on the 8th May at Kamlin before a Civil Court in 
accordance with the Sudan Penal Code and was found guilty of mur- 
der and rebellion. 
His execution by hanging took place on 17th May at Hillet 
Mustafa, the chief market place of the Halowin tribe. 
With a few exceptions all the other leaders of note implicated 
in the rebellion have now been captured or handed over by the peo- 
ple. They have been duly tried by Civil Courts and sentenced to 
varying terms of imprisonment. 
On his return from the While Nile, shortly after the action at 
Katfia, the Inspector General, Sir R. von Slatin, proceeded immed- 
iately to Kamlin to investigate the causes of the rising. Finding 
that the trouble was of a local and not of a general nature, he 
pointed out to the people the evil effects both to the country and 
themselves of coming into conflict with Government authority and, 
as a result, a reconciliation was effected between two sections of 
the Halowin tribe who had been for many years at enmity. 
Pardon was then accorded by Government to the tribesmen and it 
is satisfactory therefore to note that, despite the leniency dis- 
played, the district is fast recovering from the ferment into 
which it was naturally thrown by this fanatical attempt to upset 
law and order. 
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